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The proliferation of the doppelgänger theme in so many films of Wilhemine and Weimar 
Germany raises the question of its historical significance, in particular during Germany’s 
“crisis of classical modernity”. While previous studies have addressed the double from a 
narrative perspective, focusing on its psychological significations as divided self, this thesis 
instead  considers  the  theme  from  a  structural  and  historical  perspective:  how,  as  a 
technical reproduction of the human body that is ontologically double,  at once real and 
unreal, it serves as a site for reflection on the visual experience of modernity and on the 
medium of cinema. The thesis begins by considering the relationship between the theme of 
the double, born circa 1800, and the burgeoning visual regimes of modernity. Important 
aspects of this relationship are the abstraction of representation from stable referents in the 
aftermath  of  Kantian  thought,  the  empirical  study  of  the  observing  subject,  and  the 
development  of  new  technologies  of  recording  and  projection.  Nineteenth-century 
technologies of optical illusion, such as the phantasmagoria and lifelike automata, as well 
as the itinerant showmen who displayed them, gave rise to doubles of the human body with 
uncanny effects  of  ontological  uncertainty.  These not  only  influenced the doppelgänger 
stories of German Romanticism and after, but also were ancestors of cinema’s doubles and 
their showmen. This study considers the “cinematic” themes of a set of stories and films of 
the double, including repeatedly performed scenarios of exhibition and voyeurism, visual 
pleasure and anxiety, foregroundings of the narration, and allusions to the history of cinema 
and media technologies. The central chapters of the thesis offer readings of five classics of 
German film: The Student of Prague (1913), The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari (1920), The 
Golem: How He Came into the World (1920), Waxworks (1924), and Metropolis (1926). 
Addressing the double as a reflexive theme of optical uncertainty, these readings focus on 
how moments of optical distress are depicted and how film language is used to construct a 
cinematic uncanny: an ontological problem arising from the ambivalent character of visual 
experience that affects the narrative and film form, characters and spectator alike. This 
perspective sheds light on the historical significance of the double theme, revealing its close 
relationship with the problematic status of vision and the observing subject in modernity, 
and with a special case of modern visual experience, the technological medium of cinema.
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CHAPTER I
“THE SWAY OF THE DOPPELGÄNGER”
Since  the  early  work  of  Georg  Lukács  (1913)  and  Siegfried  Kracauer  (1920s), 
writing  on  German  silent  cinema  has  focused  considerable  attention  on  the 
relationship between the films and the social and ideological context in which they 
were  produced  and  received.1 In  the  decades  after  World  War  II,  sociological 
analyses of the film classics of the 1910s and 1920s have been undertaken above all 
with an eye seeking forewarnings of the reactionary revolution to come, retroactively 
searching for clues in the 1920s  Zeitgeist to the kind of mass insanity that could 
allow Hitler’s accession to power. These readings have particularly sought to relate 
films of the fantastic genre for which Weimar cinema is renowned to currents in 
Wilhelmine and Weimar thought that, in hindsight, appear to have foreshadowed the 
rise of National Socialism. “Expressionist” cinema in particular has been mined for 
its  reactionary  significations.2 Expressionism itself,  Lukács  alleged  in  1934,  was 
“undoubtedly one of the diverse bourgeois ideological currents that would later result 
in fascism”, insofar as its “tendency towards subjectivism and romanticism linked it 
ideologically to the irrational mysticism of Wilhelminian philosophy, and therefore 
to one of the central sources of Nazi beliefs”.3 The best-known and most influential 
1 Including Kracauer’s study of white-collar culture (Die Angestellten), collected essays published as 
The Mass Ornament, and later, From Caligari to Hitler.
2 In fact, the usual categorization of fantastic films of Weimar cinema as “Expressionist” based on 
certain graphic motifs obscures their significance and individual distinctness, making it easier to make 
broad socio-historical arguments while blurring the problems inherent in such arguments. Taking into 
account plot, mise en scène, and so forth, the films usually classed together as Expressionist are quite 
distinct from each other and not easily constitutive of a genre (unlike Expressionist theatre). Also, as 
Barry Salt has pointed out, “All the features of film style that lazy critics call ‘expressionist’ predate 
any possible influence from any part of German Expressionism.” (Barry Salt, “From German Stage to 
German  Screen”,  in  Before  Caligari:  German  Cinema,  1895–1920,  ed.  Paolo  Cherchi  Usai  and 
Lorenzo Codelli,  Edizioni Biblioteca dell’Immagine,  1990, p.  418.) The common feature of these 
films is rather self-consciousness toward the medium and its possibilities. 
3 See Patrice Petro, “From Lukács to Kracauer and Beyond: Social Film Histories and the German 
Cinema”, Cinema Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring 1983), p. 47. Georg Lukács, “Grosse und Verfall 
des Expressionismus”,  Essays über Realismus, Neuwied, 1971, p. 120, trans. Patrice Petro. In this 
early essay, Petro compares Kracauer’s work with two other sociological studies of German film, Paul 
Monaco’s Cinema and Society: France and Germany during the Twenties (New York: Elsevier 1976) 
and Julian Petley’s  Capital and Culture: German Cinema 1933–1945 (London: BFI 1979), arguing 
that Kracauer’s influential approach remains the most viable. 
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sociological study of German silent film, Kracauer’s From Caligari to Hitler, found 
in the plots of a vast array of films intimations of the dark struggles taking place in 
the “German soul” between its  contradictory longings  for  anarchy and tyrannical 
authority, a conflict soon to be resolved. 
One major stumbling block for these interpretations has been the difficulty of 
relating  historical  and  empirical  arguments  –  let  alone  abstractions  such  as  a 
collective unconscious or a national or class psychological profile4 – not only to the 
artistic specificity of individual films, especially of self-avowed “art films”, but also 
to  the complex spectatorial  experience of  cinema.  Kracauer,  for  instance,  largely 
disregards the artistic and structural particularities of the films he discusses, forcibly 
narrativizing them to present plot-driven readings that support his larger sociological 
and psychological argument. Thus, while self-conscious formal effects may well be 
the  hallmark  of  many  of  the  well-known  films  of  German  silent  cinema,  their 
prevalence and significance have remained largely ignored in sociological studies. 
Similarly, the complex relationship between the fantastic themes of the films and the 
medium of cinema and its history has been glossed over. 
For these same reasons, German silent cinema’s major recurring theme, the 
double,  has  failed  to  receive  adequate  critical  attention.  Doubles  appear  in  an 
astonishing  parade  of  works  of  different  styles  and  genres,  from  Wilhelmine 
successes such as  The Other (Der Andere) and  The Student of Prague  (1913), to 
Weimar masterpieces such as The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (1920), Nosferatu (1922), 
and  Metropolis (1926).  These  stories  haphazardly  recall  well-known  fictional 
archetypes from German Romanticism and after. At the same time, they rely on the 
visual language of cinema to construct  often uncanny, and sometimes humorous, 
narratives  of  subjectivity  in  crisis.  Some  better-known  representative  films  with 
themes of the double are listed below, although many of these could fit in different 
categories and/or have been remade multiple times:5
♦ The  archetypal  doppelgänger  of  German  Romanticism,  an  uncanny  shadow, 
mirror reflection, or portrait of a character that acquires an independent life of its 
own, is perceptible to the senses, whether to the character in question or to others 
as well, and generally haunts, pursues, or sabotages its “host”: Der Student von 
4 Or  for  that  matter,  single/unitary  psychological  profiles  of  social  classes,  such  as  the  petite 
bourgeoisie.
5 E.g., several versions of Hoffmanns Erzählungen were made, in 1911, 1916, and 1923.
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Prag (Stellan Rye, 1913; Henrik Galeen, 1926); Der Andere (Max Mack, 1913); 
Der  Mann  im  Spiegel  (Robert  Wiene,  1916/1917);  Der  verlorene  Schatten 
(Rochus Gliese, 1921). 
♦ The  artificial  life-form created  by  a  scientist-magician,  which  functions  as  a 
double of its creator, over which he generally loses control, as in the Frankenstein 
theme, and/or a replica of a real person: Der Golem (Paul Wegener, 1915); Der 
Golem, wie er in die Welt kam (Paul Wegener, 1920);  Metropolis (Fritz Lang, 
1926); Alraune (Henrik Galeen, 1928; Richard Oswald, 1930).
♦ The individual with multiple identities or a split personality (cf.  Dr Jekyll/Mr 
Hyde or Dracula): the  Homunculus serial (Otto Rippert, 1916);  The Cabinet of  
Dr Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1920); Der Januskopf: Eine Tragödie am Rand der  
Wirklichkeit  (F. W. Murnau, 1920); Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens (F. 
W. Murnau,  1922);  Dr Mabuse,  der  Spieler –  Ein Bild  der Zeit  (Fritz  Lang, 
1922);  Orlacs Hände (Robert Wiene, 1924/5);  Geheimnisse einer Seele (G. W. 
Pabst, 1925–26); Faust (F. W. Murnau, 1926). 
♦ Two people who uncannily resemble each other and function as doubles.  Die 
Schwarze Kugel (or  Die Geheimniswollen Schwestern, Franz Hofer, 1913);  Die 
Bruder Schellenberg (Karl Grune, 1926).
♦ The  “unreal”  double  that  is  explicitly  technologically  induced,  imagined,  or 
hallucinated  (Schiller’s  The  Ghost-Seer):  Der  Golem und  die  Tänzerin (Paul 
Wegener, 1917);  Unheimliche Geschichten (Richard Oswald, 1919);  Schatten: 
Eine  Nachtliche  Halluzination (Arthur  Robison,  1923);  Das 
Wachsfigurenkabinett (Paul Leni, 1924). 
The proliferation of such themes in so many of the major works of Wilhelmine and 
Weimar cinema raises the question of what historical and cultural factors might have 
made the double particularly relevant, not only to this socio-historical context but 
also to the medium of cinema – especially at a time when the status of film as art was 
subject  to  debate.  With  regard  to  cinema,  one  is  driven  to  consider  how  the 
transplantation of familiar literary motifs to a medium of moving images affects their 
meanings and effects, all the more in light of how themes of the double concern a 
narrative crisis of subjectivity that appears as a crisis of vision.6 
Interpretations of the double theme, in the seminal histories of German silent 
film like others to follow, have relied on methods derived from literary criticism, 
focusing on the thematic signification of the divided self (Kracauer) or as a neutral 
6 See, e.g., Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger: Double Visions in German Literature. 
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quotation  from  German  Romanticism  that  cinema  spectacularly  and  magically 
“brings to life” for the first time (Eisner). More recently, psychoanalytic theory has 
been  the  predominant  tool  in  approaches  to  the  doppelgänger,  and  the  theme of 
identity crisis the focal point. In other words, the double has been considered within 
the context of narrative, as signifying the problematic and problematized identities of 
protagonist-subjects,  for  example  as  the  return  of  the  repressed.  As a  result,  the 
specifically cinematic significance of the double has been considered only in passing, 
with the acknowledgment of a vague resemblance between the double theme and the 
mimetic activity of film.
While noting the strikingly many recurrences of doubles in films of the 1910s 
and 1920s, Kracauer’s  From Caligari to Hitler and Eisner’s  The Haunted Screen 
approach the theme as an unqualified re-emergence of a German Romantic obsession 
and as a phenomenon of Weimar culture, not only ignoring the significance of earlier 
films of the double but also obscuring the theme’s longer-term relationship with the 
medium  of  cinema.  Kracauer  dismisses  Wilhelmine  films  as  “archaic”  and 
exclusively considers the double’s diegetic role: i.e., the literary, narrative theme of 
identity crisis. In his account the double indicates “split personality” and represents a 
“retreat into the depths of the soul”;7 its proliferation in Weimar film reflects how 
“cases  of  duality  occurred  in  real  life  on  a  rather  larger  scale”,  hinting  at  the 
“widespread discrepancy between theory and practice, thinking and living”.8 Reading 
the history of German cinema as a mirror of the German soul in conflict, the double 
becomes a metaphor for the paradoxical longings of the “German soul” for chaos and 
authority, while Kracauer’s book itself tells a doppelgänger story about the German 
people and their repressed and contrary drives. 
Lotte  Eisner’s  discussion of the double also highlights  its importance,  but 
does little more than tabulate graphic resemblances between the examples and their 
sources,  moving  seamlessly  from  literary  works  to  film.9 Voicing  a  common 
assumption,  she  ultimately  defers  the  question  of  the  double’s  proliferation  in 
German film with the conclusion that “It  is  reasonable to argue that the German 
7 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 81.
8 Ibid., p. 123.
9 Eisner, The Haunted Screen, London, Secker & Warburg, 1969, pp. 109–113.
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cinema is a development of German Romanticism, and that modern technique (i.e. 
cinematography) merely lends a visible form to Romantic fancies”.10 
 More recently, Thomas Elsaesser has addressed the crucial questions of why 
Romantic motifs should emerge so forcefully in such a different context and how 
“modern  technique”  affects  their  meaning.11 Categorizing  the  doppelgänger  as  a 
German  Romantic  motif  and  focusing  on  the  films’  theme  of  social  mobility, 
Elsaesser considers historical parallels between 1830s/40s and 1910s/20s Germany 
that might illuminate the popularity of such uncanny figures. In fact, however, the 
double has enjoyed popularity since the late 18th century in a spectrum of works of 
“popular”  and “high” culture,  and across Europe and in  the United States.  Even 
during a hiatus in the use of the motif in “serious” literature in the mid-19 th century 
when  naturalism  was  in  vogue,  its  popularity  continued  unabated  in 
pulp/sensationalist  fiction.  The  forced  choice  of  examples  and  search  for  strict 
historical parallels between time periods in which these motifs become popular is 
thus not very credible. From another perspective, the way in which the double has 
been a rhetorical staple of critiques of modernity and accounts of modern subjectivity 
also indicates that the problem is  more far-reaching than such hypotheses would 
suggest. 
For Elsaesser, the double theme in  A Student of Prague (1913) provides a 
suggestive case study; with recourse to classical psychoanalytic theory (following 
Freud’s thesis in The Uncanny), Elsaesser finds the double to signify disavowal and 
the return of the repressed, where
What is being repressed is the initial situation, in its social and historical dimension. 
The fact that it is repressed, rather than simply elided or passed over, characterizes 
the film as belonging to the genre of the Fantastic, what one might call “the Double 
as disavowal”… The repressed dimension of social or ethnic otherness returns to the 
hero in a horribly altered form, as the nightmare of  the split  self,  as a  crisis  of 
identity  and  a  compulsion  toward  self-destruction  and  death…the  structure  of 
disavowal is made visible across the shock which the uncanny return is capable of 
causing to the hero’s body, be it because of what he lacks…or of what there is too 
much...:  both times, the missing part or excessive supplement are the element of 
terror and total self-estrangement.12
10 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen, p. 113.
11 Thomas Elsaesser,  “Weimar Cinema,  Mobile Selves,  and Anxious Males:  Kracauer  and Eisner 
Revisited”, in  Expressionist Film: New Perspectives, ed. Dietrich Scheunemann, p. 43. See also the 
classic  essay “Social  Mobility  and  the  Fantastic”,  in  Film and the  Fantastic,  ed.  James  Donald 
(London: British Film Institute, 1989), pp. 25–32.
12 Thomas Elsaesser, p. 56–57.
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Elsaesser’s  reading,  an  insightful  analysis  of  the  narrative significance  of  the 
doppelgänger  in  the  film,  nonetheless  remains  within  the  diegetic  space  of  the 
protagonist’s identity crisis, even while relating the latter to issues of social class and 
historical context. Despite his “looking for moments in the films where narration and 
genre do  the  ideological  work  on the  story  material… by way of  foregrounding 
repetition or excess”,13 the double’s significance is considered only in its narrative 
effect. 
These examples point to how interpretations of the doppelgänger theme have, 
in  different  ways,  focused  on  its  diegetic  psychological  significations,  as  “case 
studies”  of  identity  crisis  and  the  divided  self.  As  a  consequence,  they  have 
characteristically  neglected  the  figure’s  structural  significance  –  whether  as 
representing a mimetic excess or as a theme of visual crisis in a visual medium – in 
other  words,  its  relationship  to  film  form,  film  history,  and  questions  of  visual 
pleasure and spectatorship.14 There has thus been no adequate account of  what the 
reflexive themes and devices centering on the figure of the double have to do with 
the historical  context  in  which  they  were produced and the  significance of  their 
resurgence.
Many of  these  films are  usually  ascribed  to  the  fantastic  genre,  which is 
founded on  an  ambiguous perception  of  uncanny events  on  the  part  of  a  reader 
identified with a principal character.15 The fantastic, as Todorov has shown, requires 
a precarious, sustained hesitation between an uncanny experience being ultimately 
accounted for with the established laws of reality (“l’étrange”) or its being based on 
new laws altogether (the marvelous). Involving an inconclusive attempt to pin down 
the indeterminate ontological status of what is being perceived, these uncanny effects 
are based on a perceptual hesitation, a hovering between fantasy and reality that puts 
the credibility of the text itself into play. 
13 Ibid., p. 51.
14 The problem with this reading is its consideration of castration anxiety in exclusively thematic 
rather  than  “structural”  terms.  Castration  in  the  context  of  the  uncanny,  as  Samuel  Weber 
convincingly  shows,  is  best  understood  as  a  crisis  of  phenomenality:  as  a  structural  rather  than 
thematic phenomenon, that has to do with the status of reality itself, rather than a particular situation 
or scene: “For what is designated by the term ‘castration’ is  precisely the impossibility of seeing 
directly, right on or straight ahead. Castration can never be looked at, en face, for it is always off to 
the side, off-side, like the uncanny itself.” Samuel Weber, “The Sideshow, Or: Remarks on a Canny 
Moment”, MLN, Vol. 88, No. 6, Comparative Literature (Dec. 1973), p. 1122.
15 See Tzvetan Todorov,  The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Richard 
Howard, Cleveland, Ohio, Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973.
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To put the problem differently, what previous studies have neglected, often as 
a  consequence  of  adhering  to  psychoanalytic  theory  and  thematic  analyses  of 
subjective crises, is that the appearance of the double has a structural significance 
because of its uncanny effect. As Samuel Weber noted in his classic discussion of 
Freud’s  The Uncanny,  “Such a position misconstrues the peculiar structure of the 
uncanny,  or,  more  precisely,  ignores  the  fact  that  the  uncanny  has  a  particular 
structure, which, however intimately bound up with subjective feelings—above all 
with anxiety—is nonetheless determined by a series of ‘objective’ factors that in turn 
stand in a certain relation to literary discourse”.16
Constitutive  for  the  uncanny  is  not  the  alternative:  reality-imaginary,  for  this 
alternative presupposes the identity and the meaning of whatever it thus questions, 
and seeks only to fix its ontological status. Uncanny is a certain indecidability which 
affects and infects representations, motifs, themes and situations, which … always 
mean something other than what they are and in a manner which draws their own 
being and substance into the vortex of signification.
But the uncanny is  not  merely identical  with this  indecidability:  it  involves  and 
implies a second moment or movement, namely the defense against this crisis of 
perception and phenomenality, a defense which is ambivalent and which expresses 
itself in the compulsive curiosity, the Wissgier, the craving to penetrate the flimsy 
appearances to the essence beneath—and below!—the desire to uncover the façade 
and to discover what lurks behind, “the  thing on the doorstep” or “the haunter of 
the  dark”…  This  desire  to  penetrate,  discover  and  ultimately  to  conserve  the 
integrity  of  perception:  perceiver  and perceived,  the  wholeness  of  the  body,  the 
power of vision—all this implies a denial (Verneinung is the Freudian term) of that 
almost-nothing which can hardly be seen, a denial that in turn involves a certain 
structure of narration, in which this denial repeats and articulates itself. The problem 
of  the  narrative  context  of  the  uncanny  thus  emerges  as  crucial  for  further 
investigation.17
With the uncanny, real and imaginary are no longer contradictory ontological states 
of what is perceived by a character, but the unresolvable double condition of this 
perception. The uncertainty as depicted has a reflexive moment that also affects the 
text that depicts it and the reader who follows the narration. Interrogating how the 
uncanny, which is first and foremost a specular problem, relates to the structure of 
narration becomes all the more significant in a visual medium. With the construction 
16 Samuel Weber, p. 1103.
17 Ibid.,  p.  1132–33.  The  narrator  in  Charles  Brockden  Brown’s  novel  Wieland,  or,  The 
Transformation (1798), faced with the ghastly sight of her sister-in-law’s murdered body, illustrates 
this point: “I bore a light in my hand, and brought it nearer my eyes, in order to dispel any illusive 
mists that might have hovered before them. Once more I fixed my eyes upon the bed, in hope that this 
more steadfast scrutiny would annihilate the object which before seemed to be there…” (Wieland or,  
The Transformation, New York, NY, Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1973, pp. 172–73).
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of perceptual indecidability in film, it is clearly the case that “If … das Unheimliche 
has  a  privileged  relation  to  …  ‘fiction,’  it  is  surely  not  to  the  mere  contents 
represented ‘in’ or ‘by’ texts,  but to their ‘formal,’ textual structure itself”.18 The 
relationship between the double  and the  structure of  the cinematic  text,  where it 
appears  as  a  spectacular  film  trick  and  as  the  onscreen  redoubling  of  cinema’s 
double-images of the real, is thus vital. In this sense, the figure explicitly concerns 
the question of duplication and reproduction, the  modus operandi of the cinematic 
text itself in which the psychological “case study” finds expression. 
More recently, a number of scholars have discussed these films’ structural 
and self-referential effects, although the tendency to read the double thematically in 
discussions  of  individual  films  has  persisted.  Thomas  Elsaesser  in  particular  has 
considered the foregrounding of vision in Weimar cinema, justly noting how “the 
gaze is codified explicitly and implicitly as something that can substitute itself for 
other forms of power relations… But it also signifies more directly the power-nexus 
of  the  cinematic  spectacle  itself—modes  of  surveillance,  manipulation, 
suggestibility,  instrumentalization  and  ‘objecthood.’”19 Going  further,  Elsaesser 
points toward the historical significance of such constructions of vision:
There is, however, a reason that one might want to go beyond specific cases and 
individual film texts. These textual effects relate to another ‘crisis of perception,’ 
outside the cinema, described this time not within psychoanalysis and film theory, 
but in Georg Lukács’ account of ‘reification’ as well as Walter Benjamin’s remarks 
about  shock-effects,  visual  stimuli,  urbanization  and  the  formation  of  the 
unconscious, perception, memory and experience… It is not possible here to explore 
the  full  implications  of  Benjamin’s  or  Lukács’  observations  about  the  historical 
nature of human perception, visual decoding, attention span and memory. But it is 
important to note that they suggest a connection between specific forms of industrial 
organization,  technological  modes  of  production,  demographic  changes  and 
urbanization on the one hand, and the emphasis that our society places on vision and 
the eye for mastery and control of the everyday environment on the other… This 
cultural  shift  is  taken  in  charge  by  the  cinema  through  its  systematic 
overdevelopment of voyeurism and scopophilia.20
Precisely how such textual effects of visual crisis relate to the shift in the status of 
perception  in  bourgeois  modernity  remains  to  be  explored.  Such  a  study  would 
concern the intersection of two different ways of thinking about themes of vision in 
individual films: it would seek to connect what these themes say about the cinematic 
18 Ibid., p. 1115.
19 Thomas Elsaesser,  “Film History and Visual  Pleasure:  Weimar Cinema”, in  Cinema Histories,  
Cinema Practices, ed. Patricia Mellenkamp and Philip Rosen, American Film Institute, 1984, p. 74.
20 Thomas Elsaesser, “Film History and Visual Pleasure: Weimar cinema”, p. 74–75.
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spectacle itself (interpreted for example from the perspectives of psychoanalysis and 
film theory) to what they signify concerning the historical determination of visual 
experience (Lukács and Benjamin). Approaching the double both in relation to the 
medium  of  cinema  and  to  the  status  of  perception  in  modernity  offers  a  new 
perspective on the possible historical motivations for its recurring appearances from 
circa 1800 onward, and particularly in Wilhelmine and Weimar cinema.
In this vein it is also especially suggestive, as commentators have pointed out, 
how in German cinema the structures of narration are repeatedly foregrounded to an 
unexampled degree. It is interesting to take a closer look at how the doppelgänger is 
associated with the ways in which narrativity is brought to the viewer’s attention. 
Even in the earliest German doppelgänger films, the visual doubling of a character 
onscreen and its symmetries can function as a structuring principle for the film as a 
whole.  Leon  Hunt,  for  example,  has  discussed  the  double  and  the  structural 
significance of symmetry in The Student of Prague (1913).21 Similarly, Yuri Tsivian 
has observed with regard to Franz Hofer’s Die schwarze Kugel (Die geheimnisvollen 
Schwestern; 1913) that
The very story is thus grounded in symmetry, and part of the reason why the film is 
visually compelling is that Hofer converts the story symmetry into the symmetry of 
space. Each time the two sisters are seen together in the shot, they are symmetrically 
positioned with respect to the centre of the frame; this symmetry is strictly lateral 
(rather than staged in depth); Hofer reinforces it by way of making the two sisters 
mirror  each  other’s  gestures  and  wear  (always!)  identical  costumes  which  both 
actresses change from scene to scene as if to refresh this sense of symmetry.22
While the double signifies various forms of identity crisis within its narratives, its 
appearance – whether as a visual shock or sublime feat of technology – always also 
foregrounds  the  uncanny  magic  of  the  cinematic  apparatus.  As  the  chilling 
multiplication of selves is often explicitly a consequence of technology, depicted as 
dangerous or dehumanizing, it is interesting to consider what the double signifies 
with regard to the status of film as a modern technology.
Such  a  structural  approach  raises  the  question  of  how  the  uncanny  is 
constructed in film, and what specific effects are used to create the necessary visceral 
21 Leon Hunt, "The Student of Prague: Division and Codification of Space”, in Early Cinema: Space,  
Frame, Narrative, ed. T. Elsaesser, London, BFI, 1990, pp. 56–62.
22 Yuri Tsivian, “Two Stylists of the Teens: Franz Hofer and Yevgenii Bauer”, in  A Second Life:  




effect  on  the  spectator.  Further,  with  such  spectator-effects,  how  does  the 
uncanniness of the medium itself come into play? For onscreen too,
The world becomes uncanny when it is perceived as no longer simple substance, but 
also as  a  shadow, a  sign of  the  existence of  a  world beyond itself,  which it  is 
nevertheless unable fully to disclose. The uncanny sign is not allegorical, for it only 
suggests  the  presence  of  another  world… It  lacks  both  the  transparency  of  the 
allegory and the positivity of the symbol. It is frustrated allegory, negative symbol.23
Within  its  narratives,  the  double  is  both  life  and  its  shadow,  embodying  the 
analogous  duality  of  the  cinematic  image.  Maxim Gorky,  who saw the  Lumière 
cinematograph’s “Kingdom of Shadows” in action in 1896, was perhaps the first of 
many  sensitive  viewers  to  describe  this  inherently  uncanny  quality  of  cinema’s 
images:
It  is  not  life  but  its  shadow,  it  is  not  motion  but  its  soundless  spectre… It  is 
terrifying to see, but is the movement of shadows, only of shadows… This mute, 
grey life finally begins to disturb and depress you. It seems as though it carries a 
warning,  fraught with a  vague but sinister  meaning that  makes your heart  grow 
faint. You are forgetting where you are. Strange imaginings invade your mind and 
your consciousness begins to wane and grow dim.24 
This relationship between the double as uncanny theme and cinema’s mimetic effects 
will  be the focus of the following chapters,  in  tandem with the diverse thematic 
issues  presented  by  the  individual  films.  These  narratives  of  the  double  have  in 
common the production, by a diegetic agent or by the technological medium itself, of 
an identical, and for that very reason uncanny, image or copy of a diegetically real 
person. Here it is vital to point out an often neglected fact: that on film the “original” 
in question is always already an image and an “imaginary signifier”,  present  but 
absent, a shadow or captured image, the portable ghost of an actor now long dead. 
The issue, therefore, is not the classic problem of mimetic representation involving 
the production of an (identical) image of the real, but that of reproduction (i.e., Bild 
versus Abbild), and by extension, of the mise en abyme of the represented body. Here 
23 Paul  Coates,  The Gorgon's  Gaze:  German Cinema,  Expressionism,  and  the  Image  of  Horror, 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 1.
24 Maxim Gorky, a review of the Lumière programme at the Nizhni-Novgorod Fair, as printed in the 
Nizhegorodski listok newspaper, July 4, 1896, and signed ‘I. M. Pacatus’. Translated by Leda Swan. 
Reprinted in Jay Leyda,  Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1983, pp. 407–8.
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too, where cinema’s absent selves are re-doubled, the very structure of narration – 
the cinematic apparatus – is implicated. 
From  this  perspective,  the  double  theme  evokes  the  question  Walter 
Benjamin considered in “The Artwork in the Age of Its Technical Reproducibility”: 
the significance of a shift from the image – whether it be what is seen by the eye 
gazing  upon the  world  or  the  auratic,  mimetic  work  of  art  –  to  the  products  of 
mechanical reproduction, such as film and other modern technologies of serial image 
production.  As reproduction, the film doppelgänger shares a structural resemblance 
with the  latter  modern  techniques  of  technical  reproduction. Looking at  the  film 
double  in  this  guise  offers  a  promising  way to  relate  the  figure  to its  historical 
context,  ultimately  that  of  Germany’s  “crisis  of  classical  modernity”.25 More 
generally though, the context is bourgeois modernity, in which 
Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range by 
way  of  its  likeness,  its  reproduction.  Unmistakably,  reproduction  as  offered  by 
picture magazines and newsreels differs from the image seen by the unarmed eye. 
Uniqueness and permanence are as closely linked in the latter as are transitoriness 
and reproducibility in the former. To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its aura, 
is the mark of a perception whose "sense of the universal equality of things" has 
increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of 
reproduction. Thus is manifested in the field of perception what in the theoretical 
sphere is noticeable in the increasing importance of statistics.26
In this light, the double’s effects of similarity and equivalence, which are the basis of 
perceptual crisis, speak to the perceptual consequences of modernity, its proliferation 
of simulacra through industrialized image-making, the empirical study of the human 
body, and the constitution of a new kind of observer who is both a consumer of 
images and a “human resource”. The double is an ironic simulacrum, recalling the 
production, after the Industrial Revolution, of series of identical objects, the relation 
between  which  “is  no  longer  one  of  an  original  and  its  counterfeit,  analogy  or 
reflection, but is instead one of equivalence and indifference. In the series, objects 
become indistinct simulacra of one another and, along with objects, of the men that 
produce them. The extinction of the original reference alone facilitates the general 
law of equivalences, that is to say, the very possibility of production”.27 
25 See Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, New York, Hill and 
Wang, 1992.
26 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, Illuminations, New 
York, Schocken Books, 1986, p. 223.
27 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death (L’Échange symbolique et la mort), London, Sage 
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Critical for film is how the visually ambivalent doublings of the real by the 
unreal that these stories enact parallel cinema’s realistic yet unreal duplications of the 
phenomenal world. Approaching the doppelgänger as a formal involution or self-
reference allows one to relate questions of film form to spectator effects, offering a 
promising  perspective  on  the  significance  of  uncanny  themes  in  the  social  and 
historical  context of their spectators. As a focal point of ambivalent narratives of 
modernity, it overcomes the characteristic difficulty in film interpretation of relating 
the specificities of a  film’s construction and its  spectator effects  to the historical 
milieu of its production and reception. As Thomas Elsaesser succinctly pointed out,
Film theory has attained the degree of  self-reflexivity appropriate to a cognitive 
endeavour  by  constantly  rearticulating  a  seemingly  ineluctable  dualism:  that 
between realist tendencies of the cinema and formalist ones… Crucial in each set of 
terms is the importance given to the basic discontinuity of the filmic process when 
set against the perceptual continuity of the viewing process, i.e., whether priority is 
accorded to a specific form of production (aesthetic, technological, semiological) or 
a specific form of experience (perceptual, psychic, cognitive). 
These antinomical tendencies name polarities that are intertwined and inseparable, 
and  their  common  ground  over  the  past  two  decades  have  [sic]  been 
psychoanalytical theories of spectatorship and ideological theories about spectatorial 
effects. On the other hand, specific historical or sociological considerations have 
rarely informed the argument to any significant degree.28
With the doppelgänger, a perceptual problem within the diegesis is constructed in 
terms of a problem of form – the contradiction between illusionist-realist effects and 
formalist trickery – which is in turn explicitly related to spectatorial effects of visual 
pleasure  and  visceral  unease.  These  narratives  highlight  significant  issues  of 
cinematic  representation:  mechanisms  of  identification,  the  double  nature  of  the 
image as real and unreal, the technical basis of film. But they also relate these issues 
to  the  historical  context  of  technological  modernity,  the  source  of  the  narrative 
imbalance of the doppelgänger.
Fictional Prototypes and Literary Studies
German  silent  cinema  abounds  in  references  to  the  doppelgänger  stories  of 
Romanticism  and  after.  An  important  motivation  for  the  return  to  such  themes, 
beginning with the first German “author films”, Der Andere (Max Mack; 1913) and 
Publications, 1993,p. 55.
28 Thomas Elsaesser,  “Cinema – The Irresponsible Signifier  or ‘The Gamble with History’:  Film 
Theory or Cinema Theory”, New German Critique, Number 40, Winter 1987, p. 65. 
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Der Student von Prag (Stellan Rye; 1913), is doubtless the validation of cinema, the 
former fairground amusement, as a medium and art form suitable for consumption by 
bourgeois audiences and critics.29 Justifying film as art  at  the time of the “Kino-
Debatte” coincided with the use of recognizable “classic” themes and plot structures 
borrowed from literature as well as the involvement of respected and well-known 
authors in the film industry. Furthermore, cinema offered the possibility of depicting 
narratives of fantastic phenomena realistically for the first time. But the extensive use 
in film of such a figure raises further questions with regard to its literary sources. Do 
the  effects  and  themes  already present  in  fictional  tales  of  the  double  somehow 
predispose it for cinema or make it especially meaningful in the new medium? How 
does  the  cinematic  version  differ  from its  literary  progenitors  in  its  effects  and 
significations? What sociological  factors  influence the proliferation of the double 
theme, in different media or historical periods? While the double’s significance as a 
metaphor concerning the mimetic project has been glossed over, the question of the 
distinction between the double on film and the literary version, or how the metaphor 
is modified for and by its new medium, also has yet to receive adequate treatment.
As  mentioned  previously,  interpretations  of  the  cinematic  double  have 
generally reproduced the approaches used in literary studies of the figure. Although 
an in-depth account of the considerable critical literature on the literary doppelgänger 
theme is outside the scope of the present work, certain common tendencies in these 
studies deserve mention, where they help clarify the ways in which the present study 
serves as a departure. Most important is that, despite differences in methodologies, 
their focus has been the narrative function of the figure as a crisis of the self, while 
the reflexive signification of doubling in relation to textual production has received 
scant attention. Following the philosophical study, Emil Lucka’s “Verdoppelungen 
des  Ich”  (1904),  the  groundbreaking  work  on  the  subject  was  Otto  Rank’s  Der 
Doppelgänger (1914),  inspired  by  his  seeing  The  Student  of  Prague in  1913, 
followed by Freud’s influential essay, The Uncanny (1919), which set the course for 
psychoanalytic interpretations of the double as divided self. Both Rank and Freud 
29 See  Anton  Kaes,  Kino-Debatte:  Texte  Zum  Verhaltnis  Von  Literatur  Und  Film,  1909–1929, 
Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978; the compilation Hätte Ich das Kino! Die Schriftsteller  
und der Stummfilm, ed. Margot Pehle, Ludwig Greve, & Heidi Westhoff, Stuttgart, Klett, 1976; and 
Sabine  Hake,  The Cinema’s  Third  Machine:  Writing  on  Film in  Germany,  1907–1933, Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1993.
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analyzed the double’s fictional appearances as case studies on which they founded 
their  discussions  of  classic  psychoanalytic  concepts  such  as  primary  narcissism 
(Rank) and the return of the repressed and castration anxiety (Freud). 
There  have  been  a  number  of  studies  devoted  to  the  double,  almost 
exclusively  focusing  on  its  literary  appearances.30  With  the  exception  of  Karl 
Miller’s Doubles, the common feature of these studies has been their approaching the 
double from the perspective of its  thematic  signification.  They consider,  in other 
words, the signification of the divided self within the narrative, analyzing the causes, 
consequences, and significations of crises of subjectivity.31 Most interpretations are 
furthermore informed by psychology/psychoanalysis, although John Herdman’s The 
Double in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (1990) is distinct in its interpretation of the 
double  in  theological  terms,  reading  divisions  of  the  self  as  arising  from moral 
conflict and the issue of free will. Focusing on a select set of stories chosen for their 
theological themes, Herdman identifies these themes with the “true” doppelgänger. 
He attributes the disappearance of theological double themes in the later nineteenth 
century to literary scientism, arguing that it marks the decline of the doppelgänger. 
Especially  noteworthy  among  these  studies  is  Andrew  Webber’s,  which 
offers a “case-history of subjectivity in German writing in and around the nineteenth 
century”.  While  retaining  the  thematic  perspective,  Webber  analyzes  the 
“dismantling  of  the  idea  of  the  transcendental  subject  by  assembling  a  series  of 
individual literary case-studies into a case-book of subjectivity in crisis”.32 Based on 
suggestive readings of case studies of the double against the theoretical texts they 
engaged and reciprocally influenced, he defines a set of recurrent characteristics of 
the doppelgänger  story in  a  framework indebted to  psychoanalytic  theory.  While 
30 In  particular,  Ralph  Tymms’s  Doubles  in  Literary  Psychology  (1949);  Masao  Miyashi’s  The 
Divided Self (1969); Karl Miller’s Doubles (1985); Aglaia Hildenbrock’s Das andere Ich (1986); John 
Herdman’s The Double in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (1990); Andrew Webber’s The Doppelgänger:  
Double Visions in German Literature (1996); Christof Forderer’s Ich-Eklipsen: Doppelgänger in der  
Literatur seit 1800 (1999); and Gerald Bär’s Das Motiv des Doppelgängers als Spaltungsphantasie in 
der Literatur und im Stummfilm (2005).
31 These include Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study (Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina 
Press, 1971); Ralph Tymms, in  Doubles in Literary Psychology  (1949), presents the double as an 
allegorical projection of the unconscious; Aglaia Hildenbrock,  Das andere Ich: künstlicher Mensch 
und Doppelgänger in der deutsch- und englischsprachigen Literatur (Tübingen: Stauffenburg 1986); 
Andrew  Webber,  The  Doppelgänger:  Double  Visions  in  German  Literature (1996);  Christof 
Forderer’s Ich-Eklipsen. Doppelgänger in der Literatur seit 1800 (1999); Gerald Bär, Das Motiv des  
Doppelgängers als Spaltungsphantasie in der Literatur und im Stummfilm (Rodopi, 2005).  
32 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger: Double Visions in German Literature, p. 1.
 14
The Divided Screen
Webber  specifically  considers  the  reciprocal  influences  of  fiction  and  theory, 
questions  of  the  double’s  specific  significance  for  cinema  and  its  historical 
motivations and context remain outside the scope of his study. This is acknowledged 
in some measure by a disclaimer: “Though my own focus is always primarily on the 
personal,  this  would  suggest  a  false  dichotomy.  The  case-studies  also  have 
significant implications for the politics of class, the family, gender, and sexuality”.33 
Webber’s  readings  of  the  film double,  like the literary version,  follow the  same 
“personal” approach and focus on the depiction of subjectivity in crisis. 
Similarly, the most recent work devoted to the subject, Gerald Bär’s study, 
offers  a  compilation  of  representative  films,  literary  sources,  and  typology  of 
doppelgänger themes and the range of approaches to the theme of the divided self. 
Bär  provides  a  useful  compendium of  the  double’s  appearances  in  literature  and 
silent film, a bibliography of relevant theoretical work on the subject, and a helpful 
description of the reception of a number of important films. But his discussion also 
specifically concerns the double as divided self and the theme of identity crisis, and 
focuses only on film narratives influenced by psychoanalytic theory.
With  the  overarching  influence  of  psychoanalytic  theory,  the  structural 
significance of the film double has been neglected because “the psychoanalysis of 
the uncanny does not touch upon modern technologies of trace detection with as 
much as a single word. Freud and Rank, in their hunt for the remainders of an archaic 
reaction,  return  mobile  mirrors  to  stationary  ones  once  again,  turn  cinema  and 
railroad into the romantic world of books”.34 This study differs from previous work 
in  its  focus  on  how  the  double  concerns  mimetic  reproduction  and  vision  in 
conjunction  with  the  narrative  significations  of  the  divided  self.  It  will  thus 
incorporate the spectator and spectator effects in the discussion of what the double 
“means”, while relying on a concept of the uncanny that opens up the study of the 
double, usually mired in the “personal” sphere of mises en abyme of subjectivity, to a 
consideration  of  its  relevance  to  film  and  modernity.  But  looking  into  the 
significance of the double in these films requires a concomitant reappraisal of the 
“cinematic”  themes  of  the  works  from which  they  derive.  A  related  aim of  the 
33 Ibid., p. 10f.
34 Friedrich  Kittler,  Gramophone,  Film,  Typewriter,  trans.  Geoffrey  Winthrop-Young  & Michael 
Wutz, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 152.
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following chapters is to return to the relevant literary sources of the double in order 
to reconsider the critically neglected but nevertheless pivotal narrative role played by 
their representations of mimetic technologies, such as fairground automata and the 
magic lantern. While the medium of film may be ideally suited for the depiction of 
the doppelgänger because of its technical capacities, this approach will allow us to 
consider what further formal or thematic issues are involved in its depiction. It is of 
consequence,  for example,  that  in these stories uncanny, proto-cinematic mimetic 
technologies  are  implicated  in  unleashing  shadow-doubles,  “beings  of  a  mixed 
nature”,  while  a  structural  resemblance  between  their  optical  illusions  and  the 
doppelgänger is foregrounded. 
It is also illuminating to compare the stylistic requirements of the fictional 
doppelgänger to those of the film version. As Freud noted, for effect the uncanny 
requires  a  realistic,  illusionist  narrative  that  is  sundered  by  the  appearance  of  a 
strange phenomenon. From this perspective the formal construction of the films, their 
engagement  with  illusionist  effects  and  shocking  film tricks,  are  at  stake  in  the 
narrative. Furthermore,  the  ways  in  which  literary  scenarios  highlight  visual 
mediation in the doppelgänger encounter, compulsively using metaphors on vision 
and  visual  phenomena,  become  especially  significant  for  cinema.  The  narrative 
conflict of the double is represented by visual incommensurability. The appearance 
of the double itself is an optical crisis: characters who come across their uncanny 
alter egos “cannot believe their eyes”. Indeed, a kind of ambivalence toward vision is 
operative in the canonical scenes of doubling that foreshadows what P. Adams Sitney 
has  described  as  the  antinomy  of  vision  in  Modernism:  Doppelgänger  stories, 
prefiguring the obsessions of Modernist art, “stress vision as a privileged mode of 
perception,  even  of  revelation,  while  at  the  same  time  cultivating  opacity  and 
questioning  the  primacy  of  the  visible  world”.35 The  stories’  concern  with  the 
questionability of vision and the visible, bound up with the indeterminacy of reality 
and fantasy, point toward what will become crucial issues for cinema. The following 
chapters will consider how the films in question replicate an essentially ambivalent 
construction of vision, a questioning of the credibility of what is seen and of vision 
as a source of knowledge about the phenomenal world. Significantly, the fictional 
35 P. Adams Sitney,  Modernist Montage: The Obscurity of Vision in Cinema and Literature, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 2.
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doppelgänger was born circa 1800, coincident with the burgeoning visual regimes of 
modernity  and  in  response  to  the  aftermath  of  Kantian  thought  and  the  Radical 
Enlightenment. Insofar as the uncanny effects of these stories are founded on the 
ambivalent  status  of  vision,  it  is  interesting  to  consider  how the  incipient  visual 
anxiety that they appear to chart relates to social and cultural changes brought about 
with modernity and modern science. 
The Double and Cinema
Studies  on the  double in  German silent  film have  characteristically  neglected  its 
complex relationship with the history of the development of cinema. This question 
encompasses several interwoven subjects: (1) the proto-filmic themes of the double 
in literature; (2) the relationship between the double theme and the history of media 
technologies; and (3) and the relationship between the double and the broader (i.e., 
not  specifically  German) context  of  modernity.  Perhaps  owing to  the importance 
accorded to obvious literary allusions, the crucial, parallel line of descent of the film 
doppelgänger has been ignored: the optical mimetic technologies of the 19th century 
that created true-to-life doubles of man, culminating in the cinematic medium itself. 
From this perspective, the double hearkens back to visual forms of entertainment and 
developments in optics in the nineteenth century.  A stereoscopic photograph with its 
doubled image, one might argue, foreshadows the cinematic double no less than the 
literary  versions  of  Jean  Paul  or  Adelbert  von  Chamisso.  To  consider  the 
distinctiveness of the double on film, it is important to view it not just as a literary 
derivative, but as referring to and descending from technologies of optical illusions, 
whose  disturbing  effects  in  turn  figured  prominently  in  the  classic  doppelgänger 
fictions. The rapport between the prehistory of cinema and the doppelgänger theme 
warrants a closer look at how vision and mimetic technologies figure prominently in 
the  literary  world  of  the  doppelgänger  as  well  as  cinema’s  ancestral  mimetic 
technologies and developments in optics.36 
One important aspect of this connection is how the real-life inventors and 
stage magicians involved in the production and use of these technologies appear not 
36 Even if inventions such as the kaleidoscope or stereoscope may be based on antithetical forms of 
spectatorship, they are nevertheless part of a broader narrative of visual discovery and invention on 
which the invention of cinema relied.
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only in the doppelgänger literature but also in film history and film, as participants in 
the development of the medium and as the characters who produce doubles in early 
cinema and after.  The innovators of early cinema, Thomas Edison, the Lumières, 
Georges Méliès, and Oskar Messter, belong in these ranks as inventors, showmen, 
and magicians. Much like their predecessors, they too have entered the doppelgänger 
cannon. The case of Méliès is especially interesting, not least because the film trick 
of  the  divided  screen,  used  to  double  a  character  onscreen,  is  one  of  his  many 
innovations in the medium.37 Méliès the filmmaker – who invented the film double – 
repeatedly appeared in his own films as both double-maker and double, as magician 
and showman, and as scientist and devil. In a prototype of the double narratives to 
come,  The Double Magician and the Magical Head  (1902),  Méliès appears as  a 
conjurer,  divides  into  two of  himself,  and  brings  to  life  the  head  of  a  beautiful 
woman. As the head turns into a complete woman, the two conjurers attempt to kiss 
her, but Mephistopheles appears, and they flee. Mephistopheles then takes off his 
disguise to reveal the original magician. In L’Homme à la tête en caoutchouc (1901–
02), a chemist (Méliès) in his laboratory places his own head on a table, attaches a 
gigantic pair of bellows to it, and puffs air into it. It grows bigger and bigger until it 
explodes.38 The  radical  multiplications  of  the  protagonist  in  these  short  films 
prefigure the issues later raised by the film doppelgänger with regard to vision and 
cinema as an unleasher of doubles. Méliès also provides a noteworthy instance of the 
fact  that  doppelgänger-makers  of  fiction  and  film  function  at  the  same  time  as 
surrogate  directors,  recalling  how “When professorial  media  technologists  of  the 
founding age conduct their experiments, they simultaneously play project director 
and subject, murderer and victim, psychiatrist and madman, but storage technologies 
do not want to, and cannot, record this difference”.39 
The  early  history  of  the  film double  has  been  generally  glossed  over  by 
writers on German film, who tend to credit Paul Wegener and Hanns Heinz Ewers 
(Stellan  Rye’s  The  Student  of  Prague;  1913)  with  its  representation  on  the  film 
screen. In fact, dozens of films that involved onscreen doubling or complex related 
37 This technique involves masking part of the lens and filming a scene, then superposing a reversely 
masked filmed image on it to make a whole.
38 See Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, trans. into English and ed. by Ben Brewster, London, BFI, 
1990, p. 165.
39 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 147.
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themes were made before  The Student of Prague.  Not only early trick films with 
doubles, but a number of narrative films of the theme were made, including  The 
Double Life (Percy Stow/Gaumont; 1907), A Dual Life (Selig Polyscope Co.; 1908), 
The Accusing Double (Gaumont; 1909), and Dobbeltgaengeren (Nordisk; 1910). In 
The Haunted Man (William Duskes; 1909), for example, a man sees a ghostly figure 
that imitates his actions everywhere he goes, which is visible to no one but himself. 
Frankenstein (J. Searle Dawley/Edison; 1910) takes up the theme of the double in a 
way that specifically relies on its reflexive connections to cinema for effect. In this 
film the monster dies by fading away, while his reflection remains in a mirror. Dr. 
Frankenstein enters: looking into the mirror, he sees the fading image of the monster 
reflected instead of his own face. Myriad versions of  Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde were 
also shot, at least seven by 1920 (e.g., Otis Turner/Selig, 1908; Lucius Henderson, 
1912). Indeed, it is not far-fetched to claim that cinema has had a perpetual obsession 
with the double theme; far from its being an exclusively German phenomenon, the 
double’s omnipresence in film rather hints at its paradigmatic connection with the 
medium and modern forms of visual experience. 
Relating the double to  the history of  19th  century mimetic  technologies is 
especially useful for attempting to understand the theme in its historical context. The 
19th century’s barrage of invention and discovery in optics, acoustics, and visual and 
aural storage media (e.g., photography, the X-ray, the phonograph, and film) belongs 
to  the  gathering  impetus  of  the  modernity  of  1910s–1920s  Germany.  These 
innovations  extended  the  senses  of  man:  they  made  the  invisible  visible,  the 
inaudible  audible,  and  the  transitory  permanent  through  recording  and  replaying 
sounds and images. That such indicators of progress evoke the themes of the double 
is almost needless to say; they do so not only in their actual production of copies of 
man (e.g., photography), but also in what they reveal about the ideological context in 
which they flourished. Of particular interest is the 19th century’s obsession with the 
manufacture  of  perfect  replicas  of  the  living  world.  A  standard  thesis  of 
doppelgänger stories is the ultimately uncanny quality of the reproduction of life, 
which poses a threat  to perception and the living body. Fictional  human doubles 
critique  the  illusionist  impetus  of  mimetic  technologies  (e.g.,  Schiller’s  Der 
Geisterseher), enacting  ontological crises that originate precisely in the paradox of 
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the credible imitation of reality through an immersion in artifice. A closer look at this 
polemical relationship between the themes of doppelgänger fiction and the visual 
experience of modernity promises to be especially revealing for the German context 
of modernity in crisis.
A vital  point  of  this  connection is  how the double’s  uncanny quality  can 
mirror that of mimetic technologies: both are replicas of life originally intended as a 
defeat of death or a kind of immortality,40 which paradoxically become harbingers of 
doom and morbidity. Tom Gunning has described this unnerving aspect of recording 
technologies, appropriately with recourse to the doppelgänger theme:
As an objective  form of  memory,  these  recording  techniques  represented man’s 
triumph  over  death,  the  ultimate  astonishment  and  wonder  of  which  man  was 
capable. But the uncanny aspect of these technologies does not reside simply in their 
apparently  miraculous  overcoming  of  fatal  oblivion;  a  deep  ambivalence  marks 
these  means of  reproduction.  Each delivers  an uncanny foretaste  of  death,  as  a 
peculiarly  modern  memento  mori.  The  proclaimed technological  defense  against 
death became death’s image. The preservation of distinctive human traits divorced 
from a living individual produces less an experience of immortality than a phantom, 
a bodiless transparent, or even invisible, double, who haunts our imagination rather 
than reassuring us. As Charles Grivel has put it, “my self would live without me – 
horror of horrors!” 41
Noël Burch, similarly alluding to a canonical double, has argued that the ideological 
impetus  behind  these  technical  innovations  was  the  19th-century  bourgeois 
“Frankensteinian fantasy” of the “suppression of death”. This fantasy, both fulfilled 
and exposed as uncanny in fictional accounts of lifelike doubles, found expression in 
a particular cinematic mission, originally exemplified by Edison:
And of course, Edison’s wish to link to his phonograph an apparatus capable of 
recording and reproducing pictures, fulfilling a dream of ‘grand opera being given at 
the Metropolitan Opera House in New York … with artists and musicians long since 
dead’ (Edison 1895), is not just the ambition of an astute captain of industry; it is 
also the pursuit of the fantasy of a class become the fantasy of a culture: to extend 
the ‘conquest of nature’ by triumphing over death through an ersatz of Life itself.42
This particular understanding of film as an “ersatz of Life” culminates in a naturalist, 
illusionist cinema from which (ideally) the instrumentality of mechanical equipment 
40 See Otto Rank, The Double. Frankenstein’s monster is a perfect example.
41 Tom Gunning, "Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the Uncanny in 
Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the Century", in Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics of  
Transition,eds.  David  Thorburn,  Henry  Jenkins,  & Brad  Seawell,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  MIT Press, 
2003.
42 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, p. 7. 
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has  been  effaced.  The  formal  principles  of  classical  narrative  (the  “Institutional 
Mode  of  Representation”),  Burch  contends,  express  this  Edisonian  dream.  Its 
established rules of shot–reverse shot, spatial and temporal continuity in editing, and 
the actors’ avoidance of looking into the camera, and so forth, are intended to erase 
the  footprints  of  the  instruments  of  recording  and  projection  involved  in  film 
construction and to foster the illusion of a credible three-dimensional space that the 
spectator enters as voyeur. 
With such structural correspondences, it is fitting that the doppelgänger has 
haunted  film  theory,  in  particular  the  seminal  theorizations  of  spectatorship  and 
film’s double nature as “imaginary signifier”, from the late 1960s through the 1970s. 
From  the  perspective  of  spectatorship,  the  double  encounter,  understood  as  the 
condition  of  seeing  oneself  or  autoscopy,  parallels  the  medium’s  proffered 
identification with the human form onscreen. Jean Paul Richter’s original definition 
of the doppelgänger in 1796 as “People who see themselves” applies perfectly to the 
film spectator.43 The seminal texts of film theory, the psychoanalytic-semiological 
analyses  of  the  ideological  underpinnings  of  “classical”  spectatorship,  raise  the 
spectre of the double in their characterization of the experience of film viewing.44 
One  can  discern  echoes  of  the  double  in  the  description  of  classical  narrative 
cinema’s  placement  of  the  spectator  in  the  position  of  a  unified,  transcendental 
subject with classical narrative strategies of identification and continuity, while the 
real  film  spectator  is  double:  hovering  between  a  “real”  multiplicity  and  the 
pleasurable fictive unity imposed in the act of watching a film. 
From the  perspective  of  film form instead,  cinema reproduces  the  visual 
tension of the doppelgänger as being inextricably both real and reality’s phantom 
image. In Christian Metz’s words, “the cinema, ‘more perceptual’ than certain arts 
according to the list of its sensory registers, is also ‘less perceptual’ than others once 
the status of these perceptions is envisaged rather than their number or diversity; for 
its perceptions are all in a sense ‘false’. Or rather, the activity of perception which it 
involves is real (the cinema is not a phantasy), but the perceived is not really the 
43 Jean Paul, Werke, ed. N. Miller, Munich, 1970, p. 67.
44 E.g.,  Colin MacCabe, Stephen Heath,  Christian Metz,  Jean-Louis Baudry.  See,  e.g.,  Narrative,  
Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986.
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object, it is its shade, its phantom, its double, its replica in a new kind of mirror”.45 
With  its  extraordinary  iconic-indexical  resemblance  to  reality  coupled  with 
simultaneous  unreality,  the  double  nature  of  its  signifier  as  at  once  present  and 
absent, film precisely parallels the ontological character of the doppelgänger. As a 
textual device, in short, the double reproduces the duality of the cinematic image and 
that of its spectator, yet also the process of film production. In  Friedrich Kittler’s 
succinct phrase: “Film doppelgängers film filming itself.”46 Understanding precisely 
how they do so, though, requires a closer look at the formal construction of specific 
films and the relationship between their uncanny effects and cinematic signification. 
Because film is composed of moving images that are exceptionally rich in 
iconic resemblance to pro-filmic reality, the film double, not signified at the remove 
of  language,  is  more “realistic”  than its  literary counterpart.  And,  when German 
silent cinema’s parade of doppelgängers and artificial  creatures crosses the silver 
screen, its uncanny characters appear no less real to the viewer than do the already 
unreal, but purportedly real, canny characters they replicate and/or thwart. Moments 
of visual crisis, now related in a visual language, are especially significant in always 
also referring to  their  means of  depiction. Significantly,  many of  the novels  and 
screenplays on which these films were based underwent modifications that show a 
deliberate use of the medium’s specific possibilities to convey themes concerning 
cinema  as  a  mimetic  technology.47 For  example,  with  the  final  version  of  the 
prologue and epilogue of  Caligari,  which ascribe the narration to a madman in a 
lunatic asylum, the film becomes enigmatic and involuted, and the viewer’s diegetic 
pursuit inconclusive. As Kittler concludes, “It is precisely this indistinguishability 
between framed and framing story, between insanity and psychiatry, that does justice 
to film technology.”48 In considering how the double is suitable or effective on film, 
such self-referential tendencies become especially important, not least because they 
exploit  the relationship between the formal aspects  of  film construction (whether 
“realist”  or  “anti-realist”)  and  the  cinema  as  experience  from  the  spectator’s 
perspective.  With  these  effects,  the  established  norms  of  narrative  cinema  are 
45 Christian Metz,  The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1982, p. 45.
46 Friedrich Kittler, p. 149.
47 E.g., Thea von Harbou’s  Metropolis (1926), Hanns Heinz Ewers’  Der Student von Prag  (1913), 
Paul Lindau’s Der Andere (1893), and The Cabinet of Dr Caligari.
48 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, p. 147.
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subverted,  revealing  the  mechanisms  of  identification,  scopophilic  pleasure  or 
unpleasure, that characterise the medium’s spectator effects.
Looking at the thematic continuities in German doppelgänger films and their 
self-conscious  effects  casts  doubt  on  the  distinction  usually  been  made  between 
Wilhelmine cinema and the “Golden Age” of the classics of Weimar cinema. Recent 
studies  of  previously  neglected  Wilhelmine  films  have  drawn  attention  to  their 
prolific  use  of  self-referential  effects,  foreshadowing the  similar  avant-garde  and 
modernist  techniques of  Weimar cinema.  As  Thomas Elsaesser has asserted,  “So 
many films from the early period – and notably those of Max Mack and Franz Hofer 
–  display  such  a  sophisticated  grasp  of  filmic  processes  and  contain  so  many 
references to the cinematic situation as one of ‘doubleness’ that one is tempted to 
make ‘zweimal gelebt’ the motto of Wilhelmine cinema itself.”49 Relying on Tom 
Gunning’s concept of the early “cinema of attractions”,50 Sabine Hake has argued 
that the use of self-referential effects in Wilhelmine films functions as a form of 
advertisement by the new medium of its own spectacular products. With these effects 
“the breaking of the illusionist conventions draws attention to the constructed nature 
of  narrative  and  invites  the  spectator’s  active  collaboration;  this  process  has 
affirmative and critical functions.”51  
The re-presentations of cinema, for instance in the form of stories about filmmaking 
and through images of  images,  imitate  the aesthetics  of  the  store-front  window. 
Their primary purpose is to advertise the many goods this new mass medium has to 
offer. While the films create critical distance through the scenarios of duplication 
and  display,  they  skillfully  apply  the  rules  of  advertising,  namely  to  make  the 
product look appealing and to seduce prospective buyers into their realm of new 
sensations and new pleasures.52
Whether or not one agrees with the description of these constructions as primarily a 
form of advertising, it is certainly the case that the spectacular, exhibitionist self-
references of German silent cinema expose the agency of the cinematic apparatus 
and draw attention to its wondrous capabilities. In many cases, though, this exposure 
49 Thomas Elsaesser, “Early German Cinema: A Second Life?” in A Second Life: German Cinema’s  
First Decades, ed. Thomas Elsaesser, p. 11.
50 See Tom Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde, in 
Early  Cinema:  Space,  Frame,  Narrative,  ed.  T.  Elsaesser,  London,  BFI,  1990,  pp.  56–62;  “An 
Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous Spectator”, in Art and Text, 34, Spring 
1989, pp. 31–45.
51 Sabine Hake, “Self-Referentiality in Early German Cinema”, in A Second Life: German Cinema’s  
First Decades, ed. Thomas Elsaesser, p. 245.
52 Sabine Hake, p. 237.
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has  an  uncanny  effect  –  and  therefore  has  ambivalent  value  as  any  form  of 
advertisement  of  the  medium.  Nevertheless,  it  is  fruitful  to  relate  the  double’s 
appearance onscreen,  especially as a shocking film trick,  to the exhibition of the 
power  of  cinematic  technology  and  as  an  interruptive  gesture  of  a  “cinema  of 
attractions.”
As the double theme’s uncanny effect has a reflexive content while requiring 
(problematised) narrative continuity, it proves an interesting subject as a means by 
which German cinema’s  art  films respond to the stylistic  legacy of Hollywood’s 
“Institutional  Mode  of  Representation”,  which,  after  D.  W.  Griffith,  aimed  at 
obscuring the role of an apparatus in the creation and transmission of the film image 
to the audience (e.g., continuity editing, three-dimensional space, shot-countershot). 
The  question  remains  of  precisely  what  doppelgänger  films  say  about  the 
possibilities of cinematic representation, the double nature of the visible film image 
as artificial  life,  and the role of technology in  its  transmission. In  particular, the 
thematic relationship in these films between science/technology and the production 
of doubles is of special interest in relation to how “The age of media … renders 
indistinguishable what is human and what is machine, who is mad and who is faking 
it.”53
But the double also speaks to a greater American invasion, perceived at the 
time as  a  major  threat  to  the  German way of  life:  industrial  capitalism,  and the 
consequences of instrumental reason, rationalization, the occultation of production 
processes, and the tacit acceptance of technology as an extension of man’s dominion 
over  nature with no dénouement (or  “essence”)  of  its  own.  Despite  the  political 
importance of the question of technology and the tendency to read the films of the 
time for ideological content, the crucial relationship between the doppelgänger and 
modernity, its visual regimes and radical repercussions for human subjectivity, has 
received little critical attention. For it is the case that the contemporary sense of the 
uncanny
...is not simply a survival of a romantic commonplace, or a feeling confined to the 
artistic genres of horror and ghost stories. Its theoretical exposition by Freud, and 
later by Heidegger, places it centrally among the categories that might be adduced to 
interpret  modernity  and  especially  its  conditions  of  spatiality,  architectural  and 
urban.54
53 Friedrich Kittler, p. 146.
54 Anthony Vidler,  The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely, Cambridge, MA, 
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The survival of the uncanny in the context of critiques of modernity is all the 
less random if we recall the original irrationalist aspect of such themes and 
their  appearance  in  response  to  the  Radical  Enlightenment.  On  film,  as 
Thomas Elsaesser has pointed out:
These  motifs,  borrowed  from  Romanticism  and  the  Gothic  tradition,  were 
transformed into the specific mythology of the cinema to become the very mark of a 
self-reflexive  dialectic.  This  dialectic  was  based  on  the  anti-technological 
conservative ideology of late-Romanticism … which collided with and at the same 
time articulated the film ‘creator’s’ own participation in this technology...55
The appearance of such anti-technological motifs in the hyper-technological medium 
of  film  is  not  devoid  of  a  certain  irony.  It  hints  at  an  ambivalence  toward  the 
experience  of  cinema  itself,  a  modern  technology  for  producing  doubles  that 
reproduces the diabolical dénouement of a doppelgänger story. 
While the following chapter (CHAPTER II) will further explore these suggestive 
connections between visual culture in bourgeois modernity, themes of the double, 
and the German “crisis”, CHAPTER III will return to doppelgänger fiction to consider 
themes  of  vision  in  a  couple  of  influential  stories,  E.  T.  A.  Hoffmann’s  “The 
Sandman” and Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s Tomorrow’s Eve.  CHAPTERS IV to VIII will 
present readings of six classics of German silent film: The Student of Prague (1913), 
The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari (1920), The Golem: How He Came into the World 
(1920),  Waxworks (1924), and  Metropolis  (1926). The films, rather than providing 
supporting evidence for a preconceived theory of the double, will be considered on 
their own terms, their internal logic and textual structures determining the course of 
the analysis. The focus, though, will be on the uncanny and the articulation of vision: 
how it is depicted within the diegesis, how the spectator is projected to interact with 
the film’s images, how crises of perception involved in the uncanny are constructed, 
and what these effects say about cinema. Such a perspective, which allows a closer 
look at the intersection of formal and spectatorial effects, of metaphors of vision and 
the  spectator’s  visual  experience,  also  allows  one  to  reconsider  how these  films 
respond to and reflect their historical context of bourgeois modernity.
MIT Press, 1992, p. 12.
55Thomas Elsaesser, “Film History and Visual Pleasure: Weimar Cinema”, p. 78.
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CHAPTER II 
THE DOPPELGÄNGER AND THE MODERN SPECTATOR
Ich denke mich mein Ich durch ein Vervielfältigungsglas.
[I see my ego as being viewed through a lens.]
E. T. A. Hoffmann, Tagebücher
The fantastic is not in opposition to living Life, it is a new aspect of it: a 
life without presence, fate reason, motives, a life with which the innermost 
recess of our soul will never – nor can be – identical. 
Georg Lukács “Gedanken zu einer Ästhetik des Kinos” (1913)
Our  favorite  haunt was an  amusement  park in  the  “Kantstrasse,”  where 
sideshow magic could be found, where the lust for life was abroad, and 
hunger  and  misery,  with  the  glamour  of  electric  lights  and  mechanical 
music, where cheap, dainty candies, made of chemical by-products, were 
offered, and where young boys and girls flirted with each other.
Hans Janowitz, “Caligari—The Story of a Famous Story”
Georg Grosz, “The City” (1917)
The Divided Screen
Sideshow Magic 
Mythologising the genesis  of  the  Caligari screenplay, Hans Janowitz  describes a 
carnivalesque scene whose surfeit of objects make for a confusing mental picture, so 
that one hardly knows where to look. The amalgam of technological concoctions – 
electric lights, mechanical music, and chemical candies – evokes a very modern kind 
of  sensory distress,  an  extreme-case  scenario  of  the  experience  of  the  bourgeois 
world of the everyday or “second nature”: the world of the shopping centre, the city 
street,  the  movies,  or  the  knick-knack  collection.  Suggestively  situated  on  the 
Kantstrasse in Berlin, the scene with its uncanny atmosphere and visual excesses 
could  be  seen  as  primal  not  only  for  the  milieu  of  Caligari  the  showman  and 
psychiatrist,  but for a host of variations on the doppelgänger theme – such as the 
carousel finale of Alfred Hitchcock’s Strangers on a Train or the replicant-designer’s 
workshop in Blade Runner. 
Characteristics  of  the  Luna  Park  and  sideshow  permeate  German 
doppelgänger films, both recalling the exhibition spaces of early cinema and variety 
theatre and providing the spaces in which the doppelgänger appears. Their carnival 
mise  en  scène offers  an  antithesis  to  the  bourgeois  world  of  the  everyday (the 
Heimisch): In the sideshow’s topsy-turvy suspension of order, especially visual order, 
people of different origins and classes mix freely as equals; the perceiver and the 
perceived  are  united  by  a  mutual  looking;  the  line  between  reality  and  fantasy 
becomes permeable; and bourgeois narrative rules are suspended.1 Kracauer describes 
the  milieu  as  Babel  and  Babylon,  “an  enclave  of  anarchy  in  the  sphere  of 
entertainment”.2 For the doppelgänger cinema, the space of the carnival is  not so 
much an orgiastic, anarchic utopia as a locus of ontological distress: the return of the 
spectator’s voyeuristic look by its object poses a threat – it can even result in murder. 
1 The carnival world has characteristically been discussed as signifying chaotic resistance to and an 
inversion  of  the  disciplinary hegemonic  order  (and  by extension  the  visual  regimes of  bourgeois 
illusionism) in the work of theorists notably beginning with Mikhail Bakhtin, and, e.g., Jacques Lacan, 
Jacques Derrida, and Guy Debord and the Situationists. Cf. Bakhtin’s  Rabelais and His World. As 
Derrida writes: “It is the place where the spectator, presenting himself as spectacle, will no longer be 
either seer (voyant) or voyeur, will efface within himself the difference between the actor and the 
spectator,  the represented  and the representer,  the object  seen and the seeing object…”.  (Jacques 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Spivak, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976, p. 306).
2 This  and  the  following  quotations  are  from  Siegfried  Kracauer,  From  Caligari  to  Hitler:  a 
Psychological History of the German Film, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 73.
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Such  a  haphazard,  Baroque  surfeit  of  visual  stimuli  can  confuse  and 
overwhelm the spectator’s eye, giving rise to a distress involving the inadequacies of 
the  sense  of  sight.  In  a  comparison  with  Janowitz’s  scene,  it  is  illuminating  to 
consider the similar associations made by Walter Benjamin, based on his perusal of 
the concatenations of objects in the Parisian arcades. An evocative parallel is found 
in the following fragment:
On a pale-colored wallpaper full of figures and busts shone a gas lamp. By its light, 
an old woman sat reading. They say she has been there alone for years, and collects 
sets of teeth “in gold,  in wax, and broken”. Since that day, moreover,  we know 
where Doctor Miracle got the wax out of which he fashioned Olympia.3
Like Janowitz’s  description,  Benjamin’s alludes to an archetypal double, E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s  automaton  Olympia,  while  fostering  a  similar  sense  of  the  uncanny 
through evocations of dismemberment, the “collection”, and its grotesque admixture 
of  “nature”  and  artifice,  primitive  and  ultramodern,  magic  and  technology. 
Significantly,  both  these  scenes  draw  attention  to  the  media  by  which  they  are 
illuminated,  electricity and gas  lamps,  beyond which is  an encroaching darkness, 
stressing the connection between the visibility of things and lighting technologies. 
These media are themselves in no wise without value or immaterial. In one 
sense, especially in the stark chiaroscuro of the description, objects are so enframed 
by the light as to acquire the aspect of an image or representation. This “imaginary” 
quality of objects illuminated by lighting technologies is a consequence of modernity, 
whose  light,  wrote  Kracauer,  “blinds  more than  it  illuminates  –  and  perhaps  the 
abundance of light pouring out lately over our large towns serves not least to increase 
the darkness”.4 But as a re-presentation of itself, the image thus enframed can also 
allegorize that modernity, in other words, make its effects visible. This possibility is 
incisively captured in a chance remark of Benjamin’s on the illumination by gaslight 
of the Paris arcades: “The cashier, by gaslight, a living image—as allegory of the 
cash register”.5 
3 “Parisian dolls - true fairies of the arcades”, in Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, Cambridge, 
Mass., Belknap Press, 1999, p. 874.
4 Siegfried Kracauer,  The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany, London and 
New York, Verso, 1998, p. 90.
5 Walter Benjamin,  The Arcades Project, p. 570. Interestingly, a recent book by Frances Guerin (A 
Culture of Light:  Cinema and Technology  in 1920’s  Germany,  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  University of 
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Bathed in these lights the object is both itself and a “living image”. It is at 
once alive and dead… something like the tableaux vivants of the late 18th century. Its 
spectator  feels  a  distrust  of  what  he  sees  that  is  related  to  the  medium  of  its 
illumination (although beyond it is the threat of the unknown) and that has to do with 
difficulty  in  distinguishing  the  real  from  the  virtual.  Visual  indecidability, 
paradoxically  accompanying  increased  visibility,  is  an  effect  of  various  optical 
products  of  the  19th century,  above  all  mimetic  technologies  of  illusionist 
entertainment whose “forms of visual experience usually uncritically categorized as 
‘realism’ are in  fact  bound up in  non-veridical theories  of  vision  that  effectively 
annihilate a real world”.6 It is shared by the cinema, whose “kingdom of shadows” 
causes a primal unease, and embodied in the uncanny figure of  the doppelgänger, 
which “confronts the subject with the fact that it will never … be able to believe its 
eyes, since what they have seen is neither simply visible nor wholly invisible”.7
For Ernst Jentsch, the early theorist of the uncanny, this sense had to do with 
facing the unfamiliar,  and ultimately led to the intellectual mastery of the new: it 
recaptured the “feeling of uncertainty” at the “origin of the drive to knowledge and 
research”.8 Jentsch associated the uncanny with perceptual indecision – an inability to 
distinguish, for example, between the natural and artificial, the transcendent and the 
mundane,  or  the  animate  and  inanimate.  To  borrow  Freud’s  terminology of  the 
uncanny as return of the repressed, the coming to view of something that ought to 
have  remained  hidden  (Schelling),  the  uncanny could  thus  be  understood  as  the 
unexpected surfacing of a primitive fear (of death and nature) that positive science 
and habituation were intended to have repressed. Such a fear can arise in looking at 
the unknown and potentially unknowable, the irrational and unclassifiable, according 
Minnesota  Press,  2005)  addresses  a  similar  subject,  namely,  the  relationship  between modernity, 
electrical light, and the uses of lighting in the films of Weimar cinema. Guerin discusses how electric 
light’s representational possibilities were explored and thematised in the films of the time, how light 
itself was used as a structuring device of narrative, and the relationship between these effects and the 
anxieties and changes related to modernization in Weimar society.
6 Jonathan Crary,  Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1990, p. 14.
7 Samuel Weber specifically refers to castration here, the “return” of its repression in Freudian terms 
being a sense of the uncanny; see "The Sideshow, Or: Remarks on a Canny Moment",  MLN  88.6, 
1973, p. 1113.
8 Ernst Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny (1906)”,  reprinted in  Angelaki Vol. 2, No. 1, 
1996, p. 9. See also Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, New York, Penguin Books, 2003.
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to present knowledge. In both Janowitz’s and Benjamin’s descriptions, it has to do 
with  Hoffmannesque  perceptual  uncertainty,  “the  flowering  of  a  sense  of 
unfamiliarity in the midst of the apparently familiar”.9 
 
Circa 1800: Historical Background
Doubles have been common motifs all over the world, in “primitive” cultures, in folk 
tales and mythology, in antiquity, and in the Western canon. But, although studies of 
the double have often failed to  make such a  distinction  (e.g.,  Otto  Rank’s),  it  is 
necessary  to  acknowledge  the  ways  in  which  the  doppelgänger  of  German 
Romanticism and other  literary works  of  the late  eighteenth century onward is  a 
distinct and novel entity, as well as the product of a specific historical context. The 
modern concept of the doppelgänger, and the coinage of the word by Jeal Paul in 
Siebenkäs (1796) as “people who see themselves”, differs from the doubles that come 
before – e.g.,  in Shakespearean comedies – not  least  because the  “companionate, 
faithful, heavenly twins have become clashing antagonists”.10 
German Romanticism’s new doubles have an explicit association with a post-
Kantian subjective and textual  irony and with the concept of the uncanny, which 
likewise dates to the eighteenth century.11 In order to understand the historical and 
cinematic relevance of the theme, it  is necessary to keep in mind the connections 
between  the  birth  of  the  doppelgänger  and  the  concurrent  formation  of  modern 
culture, especially visual culture, around the end of the eighteenth century. In part, it 
is  significant  that  the  first  fictional  doppelgänger  responded  to  the  problematic 
constitution  of  subjectivity  in  Idealist  thought  and  to  the  burgeoning  science  of 
psychology, with Mesmer’s discoveries and the work of G. H. Schubert giving rise to 
a  notion  of  the unconscious  as  a  kind  of  second self  for  the  first  time.  Andrew 
Webber,  considering  the  literary  case  studies  of  the  double  in  tandem  with  the 
theoretical  texts  that they engaged, has described the figure as enacting  a literary 
9See Tom Gunning, "Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the Uncanny in 
Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the Century", in Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics of  
Transition,  eds.  David Thorburn, Henry Jenkins,  & Brad  Seawell,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  MIT Press, 
2003.
10 Hillel  Schwartz,  The Culture  of  the  Copy:  Striking  Likenesses,  Unreasonable  Facsimiles,  New 
York, Zone Books, 1996, p. 83.
11 Cf. Terry Castle,  The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and the Invention of the  
Uncanny, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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“dismantling of the idea of the transcendental subject”,12 where “between the poles of 
Fichte  and  Schubert,  the  intense  reflections  upon  subjectivity  in  and  around  the 
philosophy of Idealism were projected more or less directly into the  Doppelgänger 
scenarios of Romanticism”.13 Kantian and post-Kantian thought thus influenced and 
fed into the doppelgänger fiction, while the latter has ever since lent the rhetoric of 
the doppelgänger encounter to theoretical figurations of subjectivity, echoes of which 
can be discerned in accounts of the heterogeneity of the self in psychoanalysis, or the 
crisis of the self in modernity and the alienated subjects of Marx. 
While  the  double  theme  reveals  that  reflections  on  subjectivity  may  be 
doomed to a mise en abyme, as Webber argues, it is important to note the fact that 
this  dénouement  is  explicitly  constituted  within  texts  in  terms  of  problematic 
perception and, in the encounter with the double, as a crisis of phenomenality. The 
fragmentation and heterogeneity of the self made manifest are indissociable from the 
fact of the visual basis of the self’s constitution: With the double, the sense of sight 
and  the  value  of  images  are  discredited  along  with  a  unified  conception  of 
subjectivity because of their uncertainty and failure to ground the self. And, where 
vision and images are put into question, the problem that afflicts the self also has a 
reflexive effect of putting into question the status of the text as representation. Thus, 
for  German  Romanticism,  “Ideas  of  subjectivity  and  of  aesthetic  production  are 
mediated by specular reproduction, by processes of reflection of and on the self and 
the world which are always liable to be propelled into the vertiginous wonderland of 
a gallery of mirrors”.14 
Charles  Brockden Brown’s  gothic  novel  Wieland  (published  in  1798),  for 
example, thematises  the untrustworthiness  of  the  senses  as  a  means of  access  to 
objective  reality,  while  the  recently  discovered  phenomenon  of  ventriloquism 
furnishes the mechanism by which identities are mistaken. The characters' belief in 
the  false  testimonies  of  their  perceptions,  arising  unbeknownst  to  them from an 
ambulant  charlatan and ventriloquist’s  interference,  drives  the dénouement’s  gory 
bloodbath.  The narrator,  whose “mind seemed to be split  into separate parts,  and 
12 Andrew  J.  Webber,  The  Doppelgänger:  Double  Visions  in  German  Literature,  Oxford,  UK, 
Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 1.
13 Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 23.
14 Ibid., p. 24.
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these parts to have entered into furious and implacable contention”, finds, ultimately, 
that “If I erred, it was not my judgment that deceived me, but my senses”. As for her 
lover,  “appearances  had  led  him  into  palpable  errors”.15 Here  too,  the  lack  of 
“objective” reliability of physical descriptions coincides with the unreliability of the 
narrator and her narrative, the account of events that the reader experiences. 
But the double has a considerable range of associations beyond the Romantic 
themes  of  subjectivity  in  crisis  that  are  discussed  in  the  critical  literature.  In 
particular,  focusing on the visual effects of the fictional  doppelgänger, it  becomes 
clear that both in its narrative themes and its reflexive effects, the double addresses 
developments in physiology, optics, psychology, and technical advances in recording 
and reproducing the human body. Usually ignored in its interpretations are the ways 
in which stories and films of the double consistently and problematically allude to 
modern empirical  science and technology, inseparably linking their  effects  to  the 
crises of the self that unfold. Understanding the double as an uncanny theme, that is, 
as a phenomenal crisis involving an inability to trust the eyes, allows us to attempt to 
situate  it  within  broader  historical  trends.  One  question  that  arises  is  how  the 
infection of what is being perceived (within the narrative) by indecidability may be 
related to modernity’s visual regimes and the experience of the modern observer. 
A crucial moment in the conceptualization of the modern observing subject is 
the work of Kant, and in particular, how the latter theorizes a radical dissociation of 
representation  from a  reality with  which  it  was  previously understood to  have  a 
relation of similitude and resemblance. Foucault’s discussion, which identifies the 
work of Kant as the founding gesture of the Modern episteme, points to the years 
circa 1800 as marking a change in the status of representation and of man as the 
viewing subject. The Kantian critique
[S]anctions for the first time that event in European culture which coincides with the 
end of the eighteenth century: the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the 
space of representation. That space is brought into question in its foundation, its 
origin, and its limits: and by this very fact,  the unlimited field of representation, 
which Classical thought had established, which Ideology had attempted to scan in 
accordance  with a  step-by-step,  discursive,  scientific  method,  now appears  as  a 
metaphysics.16
15 Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland or, the Transformation, New York, NY, Doubleday, 1973, p. 
162.
16 Michel  Foucault,  The Order of  Things:  An Archaeology  of  the Human Sciences,  London, UK, 
Tavistock Publications, 1970, pp. 242–43.
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Arguing how with the Modern episteme knowledge and thought came to be located 
in the body of a perceiving subject, Foucault dramatically posits the “birth of man” as 
both  the  locus  and  subject  of  knowledge,  an  empirical-transcendental  doublet  in 
whom representation  is  related to  its  object.  The consequence of  the shift  is  the 
appearance of the “unthought”, evocatively presented in  The Order of Things  as  a 
doppelgänger:
Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the episteme without 
thought at the same time discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders 
yet also within its very warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert 
density in which it  is  embedded,  an unthought which it  contains entirely,  yet in 
which it is also caught. The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in 
man like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history; it is, in relation to man, the 
Other: the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man, nor in man, 
but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in an unavoidable 
duality.  This  obscure  space so readily interpreted  as  an abyssal  region in man’s 
nature, or as a uniquely impregnable fortress in his history, is linked to him in an 
entirely different way; it is both exterior to him and indispensable to him: in one 
sense, the shadow cast by man as he emerged in the field of knowledge; in another, 
the blind stain by which it is possible to know him. In any case, the unthought has 
accompanied man, mutely and uninterruptedly, since the nineteenth century. Since it 
was really never  more  than an  insistent  double,  it  has  never  been  the  object  of 
reflection in an autonomous way…17 
This  twin Other,  the condition  of  doubleness  intruding with the invention  of  the 
modern subject, resonates in very evocative ways with the uncanny doppelgänger of 
fiction. Indeed, Foucault’s account could serve as an explanation of the birth of the 
fictional  doppelgänger,  strikingly  at  the  same  historical  moment.  Neither  is  it 
coincidental  that the double appeared in the context  of Romanticism’s sometimes 
irrationalist responses to Idealist philosophy and the development of the science of 
psychology. 
Here it is relevant how, in many doppelgänger stories, catastrophe unfolds as 
a  consequence  of  the  Augustinian  ocular  sin  of  curiositas and  the  exaltation  of 
instrumental reason. The Faustian/Promethean thematic of the double has never been 
adequately  discussed,  to  my knowledge.  In  Beckford’s  Vathek,  for  example,  the 
eternal doom of the proud and scientifically minded Caliph is
… the chastisement of that blind curiosity, which would transgress those bounds 
which the wisdom of the creator has prescribed to human knowledge; and such the 
17 Ibid., pp. 326–27.
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dreadful  disappointment  of  that  restless  ambition,  which,  aiming  at  discoveries 
reserved for  beings of  a  supernatural  order,  perceives  not,  through its  infatuated 
pride, that the condition of man upon earth is to be – humble and ignorant.18
The  doppelgänger’s  appearance  as  the  pursuit  of  science  that  trespasses  into  the 
metaphysical, is especially obvious in cases where the uncanny second self appears 
as the unwelcome consequence of physiological research taken too far, e.g., that of 
Doctors  Frankenstein  or  Jekyll,  or  by the  work  of  amoral  scientists  who  design 
distressing  human-machines,  as  in  E.  T.  A.  Hoffmann’s  “Automata”  or  Karel 
Čapek’s R. U. R. The subjective crises that unfold provide illustrations of Foucault’s 
analysis: The uncanny appears as a revelation of the unthought, something that ought 
to have remained hidden with the ascendancy of instrumental reason (the “homely” 
to which it nonetheless owes its existence). With the uncanny, as Paul Coates has 
written,  the  Other  has  not  yet  been  externalized,  in  contrast  to  the  genre  of  the 
monstrous, but is located in the “blind spot that is the self’s place vis-à-vis itself”.19 
The optical metaphor of the “blind spot”, like Foucault’s “shadow” and “blind stain”, 
defines  an  area  of  self-reflection  that  is  impervious  to  vision/rationality  and 
irreproducible in language. Outside the realm of the rational, it is both unseeable and 
unseeing. 
In these perceptual terms, the threat to the subject (and to knowledge) is that 
which lies outside the scope of mimetic representation, whether in image-making or 
in language. Here, the uncanny becomes especially appropriate as a critical device 
with regard to how in modernity, with instrumental reason and the organization of 
mimesis,  the  dominion  over  things  is  related  to  the  possession  of  their  images. 
Against the nineteenth-century drive toward the reproduction of perfect replicas of 
the world, the uncanny is “by definition that which defies representation; to represent 
it would be to draw its sting”.20 
Thematically, though, it evokes that which cannot be represented of the self, 
by the self to itself or to others, i.e., in self-reflection and self-representation, the 
“blind spot” that appears in the Romantic responses to Kant in doppelgänger fiction. 
18 William Beckford, Vathek, ed. and intro. by Roger Lonsdale, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 
1970, p. 254.
19 Paul  Coates,  The  Gorgon's  Gaze:  German  Cinema,  Expressionism,  and  the  Image  of  Horror, 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 6.
20 Ibid., p. 107.
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Following Heinrich von Kleist’s “Kant crisis”, writes Webber, “subjective identity 
will be as vulnerable to the logic of distorted perspectives as other phenomena”.21 In 
optical language, Kleist acknowledges how 
Even the only thing which we possess, language, is incapable of this, it cannot depict 
the soul,  and what it  gives us are only torn-up fragments.  This is why I  have a 
sensation akin to horror whenever I am to reveal my innermost being to somebody; 
not because it shies from exposure, but because I cannot show him  everything,  I 
cannot, and so must fear being misunderstood from these fragments.22
By extension, the theme of the divided self is interlinked with the problematization of 
the text’s ontological status as representation. As an indicator of phenomenal crisis 
and unrepresentability, it appears as a threat to representational order, to the mimetic 
project of the text in which it appears: “The division of the self is concomitant with 
the incoherence of the text as life-story, as evidence for the continuity and integrity of 
the self”.23 As an uncanny theme, the double portends such a failure of signification, 
conjuring not only the self’s but the text’s (and mimesis’s) “repressed” – that which 
remains  unsaid,  unrepresentable,  and  impervious  to  rational  thought.  While 
thematically  enacting  a  crisis  of  subjectivity,  it  reflexively  signifies  a  structural 
incommensurability intrinsic to the text that represents it. 
Historical Doubles
It is remarkable that with the birth of the doppelgänger, the end of the eighteenth 
century  also  saw  a  vogue  for  a  variety  of  cultural  products  and  modes  of 
entertainment that spectacularly evoke the same visual themes and spectator effects, 
and which are explored in Romantic and post-Romantic literature (CHAPTER III). In 
fact,  there seems to have been a marked fascination with and fashion of real-life 
doubles of an indeterminate nature, whether life-like simulacra of the living body, 
such  as  automata  and magic  lantern  projections,  or  the  living  body displayed as 
inanimate, as was the case with tableaux vivants and the fad of “striking attitudes”. 
These  spectacles  played  on  a  two-fold  uncanny  effect,  “the  arrested  motion  or 
21 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 28.
22 Heinrich von Kleist, letter of 5 February 1801 to Ulrike von Kleist,  Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, 
Vol. 2, p. 626, quoted and translated by Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 26.
23 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 181.
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freezing—hence death—of the human body on the one hand, and the embodiment or 
bringing to life of the inanimate image on the other”.24 
It  was  for  the  literature  of  the  doppelgänger  to  chronicle  the  strange 
experience involved, to draw attention to the curious duality of copies of man and the 
visual disquiet on the part of their spectators. As such, these tales reveal how human 
doubles  are  “archetypes  of  the  unreasonable  facsimile:  images  of  ourselves  that 
arouse consternation; omens of the peril of relentless copying”.25 Thus in E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s  “Automata”,  the  protagonist  bewails  the  optical  unease  produced by 
hyper-realistic automata, which have something “fearful”, “unnatural”, and “terrible” 
about them: 
When I see the staring, lifeless, glassy eyes of all the potentates, celebrated heroes, 
thieves, murderers, and so on, fixed upon me, I feel disposed to cry with Macbeth
Thou hast no speculation in those eyes
Which thou dost glare with.
And I feel certain that most people experience the same feeling, though perhaps not 
to  the  same extent.  For  you may notice  that  scarcely anyone talks,  except  in  a 
whisper, in waxwork museums.  But it is not reverence for the Crowned Heads and 
other great people that produces this universal pianissimo; it is the oppressive sense 
of being in the presence of something unnatural and gruesome; and what I detest 
most of all is the mechanical imitation of human motions.26
The disturbing effect of these automata is shared by other forms of entertainment that 
display lifelike copies of the human form, and ultimately, by cinema. What these 
different types of “performances” have in common is their presentation of the human 
body in a double state: as being at one and the same time alive and dead, the thing 
itself (the human body) and its counterfeit or copy. 
The fashion for such dubious replications at the end of the eighteenth century, 
not to mention the new “realistic” representations to follow in the nineteenth century 
(e.g.,  photography)  which  had  similar  effects,  begs  the  question  of  what  socio-
cultural  causes  and  effects  might  have  influenced  or  given  rise  to  their  curious 
prevalence.  An  in-depth  historical  consideration  of  the  subject  is  unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this work, and attributing causes and effects among synchronic 
24 Brigitte  Peucker,  Incorporating  Images:  Film  and  the  Rival  Arts,  Princeton,  N.J.,  Princeton 
University Press, 1995, p. 112.
25 Hillel Schwartz, The Culture of the Copy, p. 49.
26 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Automata”, The Best Tales of Hoffmann, New York, Dover, 1967, p. 81.
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developments that are interrelated in such complex ways is in any case an impossible 
task. However, there are certain observations to be made with regard to the forms of 
spectatorship  and  type  of  experience  involved  and  concurrent  changes  in  the 
conception  of  the  viewing  subject  that  are  relevant  to  understanding  the 
doppelgänger.  In  any  case,  the  following  is  only  intended  to  give  a  few 
impressionistic snapshots, to show some striking correlations, and hopefully to hint 
at the previously unacknowledged complexity of the relationship between the double 
and its historical context, including cinema. 
One aspect of this line of inquiry that deserves mention is how technological 
advances and optical inventions and discoveries have effected a radical change in the 
status of vision and the visible, in many cases engendering double themes in “real 
life”. One effect of modern optical instruments has been to dismantle the conception 
of the body as unitary or whole;  for example,  the microscope literally shows the 
human body to be composed of infinite fragments. Art historian Barbara Stafford has 
described the proliferation of optical instrumentation in the Enlightenment and after, 
specifically, of the microscope, as a major factor in the destruction of the conceptual 
unity accorded to the body.27 And in conjunction with the recording technologies of 
the  nineteenth  century,  optical  instruments  have  revealed  the  human  body to  be 
duplicable and transportable (cf. cinema). Also relevant to the double theme is the 
sense in which human sight has been compromised or devalued by the proliferation 
of  instrumentation  with  superior  sight,  capable  of  revealing,  making visible,  and 
recording what had always been inaccessible to “natural” vision; proving, in other 
words, its limitations and misperceptions.
Another  key  fact  to  consider,  especially  in  anticipation  of  the  film 
doppelgänger,  is  how  in  the  same  period  (c.  1800)  the  projection  of  credible 
simulacra became possible for the first time, owing to advances in the crafting of 
lenses:
The totally convincing simulation of a worldly or otherworldy presence … had to 
wait until the close of the eighteenth century. Prior to the romantic era, chromatic 
aberration –  due  to  bubbles  trapped  in  the  imperfectly ground glass  of  slides  – 
tended to deform figures and evocatively ring them with nebulous halos.28
27 See  Barbara  Maria  Stafford,  Body  Criticism:  Imaging  the  Unseen  in  Enlightenment  Art  and  
Medicine, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1991.
28 Barbara Maria Stafford, “Revealing Technologies/Magical Domains”, in Devices of Wonder: From 
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These credible projections are, as aforementioned, but an instance of a number of 
similar  contemporary scenarios  of  an in-between nature,  which offer the realistic 
representation of the human body with an indeterminate ontological  status. Other 
such productions, around the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth,  include  Felice  Fontana’s  anatomical  waxes,  automata,  the 
phantasmagoria  and  related  magic  lantern  entertainments,  and  Lady  Hamilton’s 
tableaux vivants. In Italy, to take a curious instance, it became fashionable to go to 
museums by night, so that the flickering candlelight would create the impression of 
motion in the artworks.29 
In the same period that saw the birth of the doppleganger, the magic lantern 
was transformed into a medium of public entertainment, playing an important role in 
the rise of modern visual culture:
At the end of the eighteenth century, the magic lantern moved from the home, the 
coffeehouse, and the laboratory into the theater,  where various showmen devised 
ways to project large-scale images of supernatural beings to scores of people while 
hiding the mechanism itself from view to increase the mystery… Although the magic 
lantern can be numbered among these older optical devices for puzzling audiences, 
its greatly expanded role at the end of the eighteenth century conditioned the modern 
world to a new kind of visual culture.30
The optical experience of the public magic lantern performance not only figures in a 
number of doppelgänger stories, such as Schiller’s  Der Geisterseher, but prefigures 
the experience of cinema, offering an early structural connection between film and 
the double. The most basic aspect of this resemblance is how both experiences offer a 
credible copy of the human body that retains an ambivalent double nature. 
Scenes from Der Geisterseher in fact recall the genre of the phantasmagoria, 
which  used  magic  lanterns  and  other  visual  and  sound  effects  to  create  ghostly 
moving  images  of  horror  and  became  tremendously  popular  around  1800.  A 
predecessor of cinema, especially of its fantastic themes, “the subliminal power of 
the  phantasmagoria  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  induced  in  the  spectator  a  kind  of 
the World in a Box to Images on a Screen, ed. by B. Stafford and F. Terpak, pp. 81–82.
29 See Brigitte Peucker, Incorporating Images, p. 110.




maddening, irrational perception: one might believe ghosts to be illusions, present ‘in 
the mind’s eye’ alone, but one experienced them here as real entities, existing outside 
the boundary of the psyche. The overall  effect  was unsettling—like seeing a real 
ghost”.31 This double character of the image – as objectively present yet thoroughly 
imaginary – and consequently of irrational perception, which is precisely the situation 
in film, is illuminating for understanding the cinematic construction of the uncanny.
Recent work on nineteenth-century visual culture and the constitution of the 
modern observer is especially helpful for our attempt to understand the doppelgänger 
within its historical context, with an eye to cinema. Concurrent with appearances of 
the uncanny literary double, in the aftermath of the work of Kant and Schopenhauer, 
were the beginnings of the visual culture of modernity and its shift in the conception 
of vision and the status of the observer. Following Foucault’s thesis in The Order of  
Things, Jonathan Crary has characterized the constitution of the modern observer as 
involving a move from an Albertian conception of spectatorship, in which vision was 
understood as perspectival and representations were thought to offer a window on the 
world,  to  a  physiological  grounding of  perception and its  theoretical  dissociation 
from “real”, accessible referents. German Romanticism’s ironic critical dialogue with 
Idealism, based on metaphors of visions and themes of the alter ego – for example 
“Jean Paul’s objection to the tendency of Fichte and his ‘sect’ to take ‘das Licht (oder 
das  Auge) für das  Objekt’”32 – can be read in the context of a broader evolution in 
visual culture and the conception of vision. An interesting example of these broader 
trends, and a focal point of Castle’s argument about the phantasmagoria, is the shift 
in the same period in the belief in ghosts as something external and supernatural to a 
new understanding of them as phenomena of hallucination and mental projection: 
At the end of the eighteenth century, however, thanks to the emergence of the new 
scientific  theory  of  mind,  the  projective  argument  took  on  a  conceptual 
sophistication and an ideological urgency unmatched in previous epochs. A host of 
31 Terry Castle,  “Phantasmagoria:  Spectral  Technology and the  Metaphorics  of  Modern Reverie”, 
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 1, Autumn 1988, p. 49. Castle describes the potential epistemological 
abyss represented by the uncanny metaphor of the phantasmagoria, arguing that the changing use of 
the metaphor exemplifies the process whereby “The rationalists did not so much negate the traditional 
spirit world as displace it into the realm of psychology. Ghosts were not exorcized—only internalized 
and reinterpreted as hallucinatory thoughts. Yet this internalization of apparitions introduced a latent 
irrationalism into the realm of mental experience..”. (p. 52). 
32 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 32.
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polemical  treatises  on  apparitions  appeared  in  England,  France,  and  Germany 
beginning around 1800.33
Castle also interestingly points out how the word “hallucination” was not in popular 
use until 1800.34 
The consequence of this shift, grounding the transcendental in the empirical, 
was, according to Crary, “an irreversible clouding over of the transparency of the 
subject-as-observer. Vision, rather than a privileged form of knowing, [became] itself 
an object of knowledge, of observation”.35 The theoretical relation of what was seen 
to the specific physical makeup of the individual observer and dissociation of sensory 
impressions from reference to exterior reality, argues Crary, were preconditions for 
the constitution of observers and modes of observation required by modern life, the 
perceptual activities involved in participation in the urban landscape, consumerism, 
mass culture, and the labour force. Indeed, the new conception of the observer was 
part  of  the  19th century’s  “pervasive  ‘separation  of  the  senses’  and  industrial 
remapping of the body”, where 
The loss of touch as a conceptual component of vision meant the unloosening of the 
eye  from the  network  of  referentiality  incarnated  in  tactility  and  its  subjective 
relation  to  perceived  space.  This  autonomization  of  sight,  occurring  in  many 
different domains, was a historical condition for the rebuilding of an observer fitted 
for the tasks of “spectacular” consumption. Not only did the empirical isolation of 
vision  allow its  quantification  and  homogenization  but  it  also  enabled  the  new 
objects of vision (whether commodities, photographs, or the act of perception itself) 
to  assume  a  mystified  and  abstract  identity,  sundered  from any relation  to  the 
observer’s position within a cognitively unified field.36
Characteristic aspects of modern life – the profusion of visual stimuli, surveillance 
and  spectacle,  commodity  fetishism (of  phantasmagoric  imaginary products),  the 
spatialization  of  time,  the  rise  of  new mass  media,  and,  generally,  the  growing 
indistinctness of the real and simulacra – require an abstracted conception of vision 
and the observer. Concomitantly, “The traumatic reorganization of perception that 
33 Terry Castle, “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie”, p. 
54.
34 Ibid., p. 55.
35 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, p. 70.
36 Ibid., p. 19.
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masquerades  as modernity manifests  itself  most  obviously in  spatial  terms,  as  an 
uprooting of the subject from a human range of perception”.37 
With  its  themes of  problematic  perceptions  of  the phenomenal  world,  the 
double becomes relevant to understanding the experiential effects of modernity as a 
“traumatic  reorganization  of  perception”  and  to  the  post-Kantian  dissociation  of 
perception  from  the  world  of  things-in-themselves.  Within  these  cinematic 
narratives, as the following chapters will discuss further, represented reality itself, 
along with realism, falls prey to distortions, a problem reflected in the early fictional 
works of the doppelgänger. Jean Paul, for instance, 
is compelled to repeat the Fichtean model,  but askew; to project  selfhood into a 
gallery  of  distorting  mirrors,  where  it  becomes  subject  to  a  sort  of  dialectical 
repetition compulsion… Indeed, the distinction between original and parody itself 
recurrently collapses, so that we cannot be sure of the identity of the characters or 
narrative positions as we read them.38
The ultimate narrative consequence is a mise-en-abyme effect in which it is no longer 
possible to distinguish the subjective misperceptions of characters from “objective” 
observations (cf. those of the omniscient narrator),39 and where the textual true-false 
dichotomy is put in suspension; in other words, with a threatened destruction of the 
text’s ontological hierarchy, explicitly put in terms of vision. 
But these textual themes of indistinguishability also chronicle a receding of 
the phenomenal world from human apprehension, significantly coinciding with this 
world’s progressive instrumentalization. With a compulsive use of visual metaphors 
and references to optical instrumentation, they question the ontological status of the 
world viewed,  including through the  mediation  of  instruments.  The  latter,  which 
purport  to offer realism or a sensory experience of the real –and we may include 
cinema  by  extension,  paradoxically  further  distance  their  users  from  sensory 
engagement with the phenomenal world. 
One  issue  these  themes  evoke  is  how  optical  devices  of  the  nineteenth 
century, some of which paved the way for cinema, offered “realism” while being 
37 Miriam Hansen, “Benjamin, Cinema, and Experience: The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology”, 
New German Critique, No. 40, Winter 1987, p. 189; p. 254; p. 123. 
38 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 32.
39 In classical narrative film, this omniscient narrator is the camera.
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implicated in a conceptual distancing of the observer from the phenomenal world and 
founded on the empirical study of vision. As Crary has claimed, “some of the most 
pervasive means of producing ‘realistic’ effects in mass visual culture, such as the 
stereoscope, were in fact based on a radical abstraction and reconstruction of optical 
experience,  thus  demanding  a  reconsideration  of  what  realism  means  in  the 
nineteenth century”:40 
Optical devices that became forms of mass entertainment, such as the stereoscope 
and the phenakistiscope, originally derived from new empirical knowledge of the 
physiological  status  of  the  observer  and  of  vision.  Thus  certain  forms of  visual 
experience usually uncritically categorized as “realism” are in fact bound up in non-
veridical theories of vision that effectively annihilate a real world.41
Precisely this  paradoxical  complicity  of  “realistic”  media  and  the  decline  of  the 
“real”  is  captured by Auguste  Villiers  de l’Isle-Adam, a  master  chronicler  of the 
nineteenth-century bourgeois  Zeitgeist, in his doppelgänger novel  Tomorrow’s Eve, 
which  ascribes  a  thoroughly  Kantian  skepticism  and  “sensationalism”  to  the 
fictionalized figure of Edison. The inventor justifies the equivalence (or superiority) 
of his  automaton to the real  woman on the grounds that,  since knowledge of the 
“real” is inaccessible to man, who is imprisoned by his faulty individual perceptions, 
man-made simulacra of things are in no wise inferior to the (subjective) images that 
are all we can know of objects:
Never forget that the only things we see in objects are those which our eyes suggest 
to us. We only form our ideas of them from the few glimpses of their real being that 
they let  us catch; we possess them only to the extent  we are able to  experience 
them… And Man, like a solemn squirrel, scurries forever around the spinning wheel 
of his own EGO without being able to escape from the illusion in which he is caged 
by his ridiculous senses. Thus Hadaly, when she deceives your sight, will do nothing 
else in reality than what Miss Alicia does.42
Significant in the fictional Edison’s view is the equation of the simulacrum to the 
“original”, which no longer has grounds for taking precedence. While the skeptical 
derogation of man’s senses is by no means novel, the difference here is the broad 
dissemination  of  new technologies  that  constantly  offer  palpable  proof  of  man’s 
40 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, p. 9.
41 Ibid., p. 14.
42 Auguste  Villiers  de  L’Isle-Adam,  Tomorrow’s  Eve,  trans.  Robert  Martin  Adams,  Urbana  and 
Chicago, Ill., University of Illinois Press, pp. 66–7.
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deficiencies  and  their  superior  capabilities.  In  the  novel,  modern  optical 
instrumentation  (including  cinema)  plays  a  crucial  role  in  creating  the  conflict 
between  the  already-artificial  modern  “real”  and  its  technological  image;  the 
doppelgänger is a product both of technological advances and of modern forms of 
entertainment.
The  following  chapters  will  consider  how  metaphors  of  the  double 
foreground this  ironic  relationship  between  “realistic”  media  (and  genres)  of  the 
nineteenth century and a burgeoning uncertainty of the visible. One focal point will 
be how the doppelgänger theme concerns a sense in which, from circa 1800 on, the 
ontological  status  of  the  visible  gains  in  indeterminacy  with  the  empirical 
colonization  of  vision  and  its  objects  and  with  the  parallel  proliferation  of 
mechanically reproduced simulacra and the optical  assault  of visual commodities. 
This modernity is “inseparable from on the one hand a remaking of the observer, and 
on the other a proliferation of circulating signs and objects whose effects coincide 
with  their  visuality,  or  what  Adorno  calls  Anschaulichkeit”.43 It  is  vital  to 
acknowledge  with  regard  to  the  doppelgänger  that  the  status  of  its  “images”  is 
radically  different  from  that  of  the  image  defined  in  contradistinction  to  an 
“original”, in other words, by recourse to the concept of mimesis dating to antiquity. 
Instead, the problem is of interchangeable, equivalent simulacra with no ontological 
hierarchy vis-à-vis an inaccessible “real”; the fact that in the nineteenth century “a 
new kind of sign emerges: These new signs, ‘potentially identical objects produced in 
indefinite series,’ herald the moment when the problem of mimesis disappears”.44 
For  this  understanding  of  modernity the  doppelgänger  becomes  especially 
relevant. For within what is already a mimetic product, the double appears not simply 
as a counterfeit reproduction of an original self, but as a mimetic excess, i.e., as too 
many visually equivalent versions of the same self, casting the notion of an “original” 
in doubt altogether. This is especially apparent in the cinematic version, with its re-
doubled images of what were already ghostly doubles of an “original” performance. 
The double represents an excessive multiplication of what vision presents, whether to 
the diegetic subject or to the reader or viewer.  The following chapters will  more 
43 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, p. 11.
44 Ibid., p. 12.
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closely  consider  how  the  doppelgänger  scenario coincides  with  ontological 
uncertainty affecting the images present to vision
From the standpoint of genre, the double concerns the status of illusionist 
versus  anti-illusionist  tendencies  in  art  and  the  ultimate  uncanniness  of  the  too-
faithful  replica  of  “reality”.  Webber  has  insightfully  described  the  double’s 
appearance as a subversion of the naturalist understanding of mimesis in art, as a 
“return” of a repressed fantastic:
The Doppelgänger… serves as a test case for the dialectically complicated conflict 
between realism and fantasy; in the case of the Doppelgänger the ‘real’ is duplicated 
as  phantasm in such a way as to defy distinction.  The duplication,  I  will argue, 
points up an essential lack which must be supplemented, a lack within the ‘real self’, 
and  by  extension  within  the  order  of  the  real.  The  Doppelgänger  can  be  said 
paradoxically to subvert the aesthetic principal of figuration precisely by a virtuoso 
act of imitation—duplicating the ‘real’ by the unreal. The subjective spook at once 
threatens  and underpins  the objective  claims of  realism; it  has  something of  the 
effect of a photographic negative. The realist project  can be said to rely upon a 
repressible fantastic,  a source of profound insecurity against which to gauge and 
assert its security; the two are dialectically interdependent.45 
Although Webber’s account conflates the “real” and “realism”, thus eliding a greater 
phenomenal  problem in  which  more  is  at  stake  than  a  generic  distinction  (even 
within  the  self),  it  points  to  the  figure’s  relevance  to  the  relationship  between 
bourgeois ideology and the illusionist drive of the nineteenth century culminating in 
cinema’s  “Institutional  Mode  of  Representation”.  In  his  early  discussion  of  the 
uncanny, Ernst Jentsch restates an ancient claim – that the task of Art should not be 
to  produce  perfect  mimetic  copies  of  reality –  but  adds  a  new reason:  that  such 
reproductions can give rise to distasteful uncanny effects,46 something like the eerie 
quality of photographs. “Natural” copies are just what the mimetic technologies of 
the nineteenth century offered for the first time, and their vaguely unsettling effects 
are recaptured and magnified by doppelgänger stories and films. 
In the German Context
Considering  the  double  in  conjunction  with  the  perceptual  consequences  of 
modernity for the human subject offers an interesting perspective on what it would 
45 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 9.
46 Ernst Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny (1906)”, p. 12.
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represent in the Wilhelmine era and in Weimar Germany, a period that, in historian 
Detlev Peukert’s expression, was the site of “crisis of classical modernity”.47  Not 
surprisingly,  the  critiques  of  modernity that  were  a  staple  of  the  time  evoke the 
doppelgänger canon in describing the experiential effects of modernity and its crises 
of  subjectivity. The resonance of  these  originally Romantic  themes is  also,  more 
generally, attested to by historians’ typical descriptions of Germany from the period 
of  its large-scale industrialization in the 1890s  through the Weimar Republic with 
recourse to the double.48 It is commonplace to speak of the German “identity crisis”, 
the conflict between Romantic, agrarian, and feudal traditions on the one hand, and 
industrialisation,  capitalism,  liberalism,  and  other  perceived  legacies  of  the 
Enlightenment on the other. While the onset of World War I delayed the breakdown 
of old social and economic structures, the war concluded in a crisis involving the 
German national character itself, and the need to forge an identity independent of the 
capitalism of the west and the communism of the east. Jeffrey Herf has described the 
situation succinctly:
Nowhere else in Europe  did  rapid  industrialization  confront  feudal  structures  so 
rapidly and harshly as in Germany. No other European society became capitalist and 
industrial to such an extent without a single successful bourgeois revolt or strong 
liberal  political  tradition...  Although aesthetic  modernity and the cult  of  technics 
existed elsewhere in Europe and in the United States, nowhere did modernity and 
tradition meet in such unmitigated confrontation as in Germany. Nowhere else did 
the  reconciliation  of  romanticism  and  modern  technology  become  a  matter  of 
national identity.49
The  commonplace  antitheses  of  the  time  –  man  and  machine,  Innerlichkeit and 
Technik, Kultur and Zivilisation, irrationalism and reason – placed a certain notion of 
the  German  soul  in  a  precarious  opposition  to  the  technophile  legacy  of 
Enlightenment thought. Where the Weimar Republic was seen as standard-bearer for 
modernization according to the rational Enlightenment model, its vehement and often 
violent critics bemoaned the consequences of “modernity” for the German “soul”, 
47 Peukert uses the term to describe the Republic. See The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical  
Modernity, New York, Hill & Wang, 1987.
48 E.g.,  Kracauer’s description of the “German psyche” in the period from World War I to Hitler’s 
accession to power as undergoing a psychological crisis of identity owing to its contradictory drives 
toward chaos and authority.
49 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third  
Reich, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 232–33.
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grappling  with  the  double  threats  (and  technological  identities)  of  American 
capitalism  and  Soviet  communism.  These  icons  of  technological  advance  were 
attacked  for  their  opposition  to  notions  of  the  German  “soul”  and  Innerlichkeit, 
hearkening to a Counter-Enlightenment Romantic tradition, where “The cry of the 
1890s—inside  and  outside  the  natural  sciences—for  more  life,  more  soul,  more 
Goethe, more  wholeness was, of course, raised in the face of the ‘other’ impulse 
spreading across German-speaking Europe: a fascination with the idea of efficiency 
and  Technik”.50 The  strident  debate  about  technology that  emerged  is  especially 
important for the contemporaneous vogue of the doppelgänger, keeping in mind the 
latter’s original appearance in response to the Radical Enlightenment.
As Herf has shown, while some right-wing intellectuals saw the inexorable 
march of western technology as dehumanizing and soul-destroying, those who paved 
the  way  ideologically  for  the  Third  Reich  paradoxically  managed  to  find  in 
technology – represented,  for example,  by the battlegrounds of World War I – a 
baptismal font for authentic German being (Ernst Jünger), a means for the expression 
of the German soul, or a Sonderweg compared to the capitalism of the West and the 
Communism of the East. The well-known dénouement of the debate was the bizarre 
reconciliation  of  technology  and  the  German  soul  offered  by  the  Nazis:  the 
apocalyptic  rejection  of  classical  modernity  in  favour  of  irrationalism  and 
“reactionary modernism”.
In this  context,  it  is  important  that  the  films  of  Wilhelmine  and Weimar 
cinema evoke national (and arguably nationalist) classics, such as Goethe’s Faust and 
the works of Wagner, at a time of social upheaval, rapid industrialization, the rise of 
white-collar  culture,  political  and  economic  instability,  and  fervent  debates  on 
modernity and the question of technology. Even the more generic appearances of 
sorcerer’s apprentices, amoral magician-scientists,  and of course the doppelgänger 
raise the spectre of the hallowed fictive icons of German culture. That they do so is 
important  in  several  interrelated  ways.  First,  many  of  these  works  themselves 
originally  offered  critiques  of  Enlightenment  constitutions  of  subjectivity  and 
instrumental reason. (This is readily apparent, for example, in the recurrent themes of 
50 Anne Harrington,  Reenchanted  Science:  Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II  to  Hitler, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 30.
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the pursuit of rationality and empiricism gone awry.) Second, from a conservative 
point of view, these figures recall the golden age of the German “soul”, before it was 
beset by the horrors of urbanization, mechanistic science, and industrialization. And 
third, these works participate in defining a distinctly German cinema, not least in 
opposition to American cinema’s invasion of the German market. 
But the Hollywood incursion is only an instance of the more general threat of 
soulless Americanism – the machine, mass media, Fordism, Taylorism, monotony, 
and uniformity. Stefan Zweig speaks for many critics of  Americanismus, writing in 
1925:
What is the source of this terrible wave threatening to wash all the color, everything 
particular  out  of  life?  Everyone who has  ever  been  there  knows:  America.  The 
historians of the future will one day mark the page following the great European war 
as the beginning of the conquest of Europe by America… In reality we are becoming 
colonies of its life, its way of life, slaves to an idea profoundly foreign to Europe: 
the mechanical idea…It is always inventing new artifices for itself, like cinema and 
radio, to feed its hungry senses with nourishment for the masses, and it transforms 
this common interest in enjoyment into concerns as massive as its banks and trusts.
America is the source of that terrible wave of uniformity that gives everyone the 
same: the  same overalls  on the skin,  the  same book in the  hand,  the  same pen 
between the fingers, the same conversation on the lips, the same automobile instead 
of feet.51
Uniformity, culminating in multiple versions of the same person, and automatism, 
the  replacement  of  obsolete  natural  man  by  uncanny  beings  of  a  mixed  nature 
(cyborgs): critiques of modernity ceaselessly return to these doppelgänger themes. 
Ever  present  in  such  accounts  is  a  looming  ontological  uncertainty  and  in 
conjunction,  a  perceptual  anxiety,  arising,  for  example,  with  an  inability  to 
distinguish the natural from the artificial. These indeterminacies of vision and of the 
self’s relationship to the phenomenal world, as mentioned previously, hearken to the 
problematic  reorganization  of  perception  in  modernity,  the  spatial  and  temporal 
restructuring of  experience occurring with what  Martin  Heidegger would call  the 
“enframing” of the world as “standing reserve”.52 
51 Stefan Zweig, “The Monotonization of the World”, in  The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. by 
Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, & Edward Dimendberg, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1994, 
p. 398-99.
52 See Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, in The Question Concerning  
Technology and Other Essays, New York, Harper & Row, 1977.
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Writing  in  the  turbulent  Weimar  years,  Kracauer  discusses  the  general 
contemporary malaise and its relation to the shifting status of perception (“Those 
Who  Wait”).  Considering  what  “gave  rise  to  the  emptying  out  of  people’s 
spiritual/intellectual space”,  he notes,  requires retracing the fate of the self  in the 
process  of  civilization,  culminating in  its  version  in  the “age of  materialism and 
capitalism” when “it both becomes ever more atomized and increasingly degenerates 
into  an  arbitrary chance  construct”.  The  phenomenal  world,  that  of  “reality”,  he 
argues,  has undergone an attendant  change, not least  in becoming construed as a 
product of human perception:
One would furthermore have to show that, corresponding to these transformations of 
the self, there are transformations of the outside object-world, of reality, which is 
gradually robbed  of  its  substance  and compressed  to  a  point  where its  structure 
depends on the self. One would also have to consider the social developments and a 
hundred other lines of development that ultimately lead to the present chaos; yet, in 
the  end,  one  still  wouldn’t  have  really  answered  the  question  (that  is,  in  its 
metaphysical  sense)  but  instead  would  have  given  a  historical  derivation 
encumbered with all the inadequacies peculiar to such derivations.53   
In the German-speaking world, what perhaps seems a heightened critical sensitivity 
to the consequences of modernity for the self and its perceptions may be related to a 
number of factors, along with rapid industrialization, which took especially dramatic 
form.  One  was  the  exceptionally sudden rise  of  a  “society of  the  spectacle”,  as 
described  by  Guy Debord.54 Germany’s  urban  centers,  above  all  Berlin,  saw  an 
unexampled explosion of the mass media, department stores,  and picture palaces. 
Kracauer’s study of the lifestyles and worldviews of the mushrooming population of 
white-collar workers, Die Angestellten, describes the discombobulating effects of the 
urban  phantasmagoria,  wherein  surface  glamour  has  become a  value  for  its  own 
sake.55 The sensory consequences of modernity were in any case most pronounced in 
the field of vision, with its surfeit of visual stimuli both titillating and harassing the 
human eye.56
53 Siegfried Kracauer,  “Those Who Wait”,  in  The Mass Ornament,  The Mass Ornament: Weimar 
Essays, ed., trans., and intro. by Thomas Y. Levin, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1995, 
p. 129-30.
54Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, New York, Zone Books, 
1995.
55 See Siegfried Kracauer, The Salaried Masses (Die Angestellten).
56 Georg Simmel ascribed the importance of sight to how “[The] sense of sight is the primary organ of 
the  big-city  dweller:  Interpersonal  relationships  in  big  cities  are  distinguished  by  a  marked 
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A  further  contemporary  factor  linking  modernity  to  uncanny themes  and 
ontological crisis was the Great War and its unprecedented technological bloodbath, 
as a result of which bodily injury and dismemberment became a mass phenomenon. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that Freud’s castration-minded essay on  The Uncanny 
dates to 1919, when the German-speaking urban landscape was littered with tens of 
thousands of dismembered veterans. Equipped with state-of-the-art mechanical parts 
that facilitated specialized factory labour, the war disabled were a new kind of double 
being, actual machine-men.57 Prolific robotic veterans and other cyborgs appear in 
artwork of the time (e.g., Berlin Dada, the paintings of Georg Grosz), provoking a 
host of visual anxieties, ranging from the empathetic fear of losing one’s eyes and 
dismemberment more generally, to the perceptual dilemma arising with a blurring of 
boundaries  between  the  natural  and  artificial.  Thomas  Elsaesser  has  related  the 
uncanny  effects  of  German  fantastic  cinema,  read  in  the  Freudian  paradigm  of 
castration anxiety, to a Weimar “crisis of masculinity”.58 One might rather allow the 
possibility  of  a  broad  anxiety  about  literal  dismemberment,  in  the  face  of 
omnipresent reminders. 
preponderance of the activity of the eye over the activity of the ear. The main reason for this is the 
public  means of  transportation.  Before  the  development  of  buses,  railroads  and trams in  the  19th 
century, people had never been in a position of having to look at one another for long minutes or even 
hours without speaking to one another”. (Quoted by Walter Benjamin,  Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric  
Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, London, New Left Books, 1973, p. 38).
57 Mia Fineman, “Ecce Homo Prostheticus”,  New German Critique, Special Issue on Weimar Visual 
Culture, No. 76, Winter 1999. Fineman suggestively compares the use of prosthetics with the camera 
as prosthesis for the eye.
58 Thomas Elsaesser,  "Weimar  Cinema,  Mobile  Selves,  and Anxious Males:  Kracauer  and Eisner 




The  sense of the uncanny, having to do with an “indecidability which affects and 
infects representations, motifs, themes and situations” (Samuel Weber), can in this 
context be considered historically, as a disorder affecting the perceiving subject in 
modernity –  a  kind  of  visual  neurasthenia  (also  an  American export)  or  nervous 
disease caused by modern life – inseparable from the effects of industrialization, the 
dream world of the commodity, modern transportation, and mechanical reproduction. 
The modern viewing subject is ideal prey for the uncanny, insofar as “Modernity, in 
this case, coincides with the collapse of classical models of vision and their stable 
space of representations. Instead, observation is increasingly a question of equivalent 
sensations and stimuli that have no reference to a spatial location”.59
Considering  the  double  in  relation  to  the  proliferation  of  simulacra  and 
perceptual indecision offers a productive approach for a historically contextualized 
understanding  of  German  film,  especially  in  relation  to  the  reorganization  of 
perception in modernity. It is no coincidence that these visual “indeterminacies” are 
also recurring features of descriptions of modern life in Germany, for example in 
Kracauer’s  account of an obsession with the “surface glamour” of things and the 
irrelevance of “substance” to the white-collar work-force, as evinced in the picture-
palaces with their sham visual splendours.60 Art critic Walter Petry’s diagnosis of the 
problem, published in 1929, brilliantly illustrates these perceptual concerns: 
We believe that urban man is nearly blinded by the optical wealth, by the increasing 
confusion of  his  impressions;  furthermore,  we believe that  this loss  of  peaceful, 
contemplative  vision  is  not  merely sensual,  as  in  a  weakening of  the  eyes,  but 
spiritual, as in a loss of his human capacities. Man is no longer capable of securing a 
fundamental connection to some sort of appearance in his surroundings; the world 
seems to distort itself in a process of continual mechanical metamorphosis…61
In this account, the uncanny disorder of the nerves that afflicts the victim of urban 
life  equally  well  describes  the  effects  of  a  special  case  of  the  modern  optical 
experience, namely the “continual mechanical metamorphosis” of cinema. It is here 
important that the films in question explicitly rely on metaphors of vision and cinema 
with highly self-conscious forms of narration.  Looking into the reflexive themes of 
59 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, p. 24.
60 See, e.g., The Salaried Masses and The Mass Ornament.
61 Walther  Petry,  “Bindung an  die  Dinge”,  Das  Kunstblatt,  May 1929,  p.  247.  Quoted  by  Mia 
Fineman, “Ecce Homo Prostheticus”, p. 99. 
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the double and the depictions of problematic vision in the films of the time, it is as 
well to remember that film is the medium par excellence among modernity’s arsenal 




CINEMATIC THEMES OF DOPPELGÄNGER FICTION
The recurrent allusions found in the films of Wilhelmine and Weimar cinema to 
German Romantic literature have held considerable fascination for film critics and 
historians,  in  particular with respect  to  reactionary elements in Romanticism that 
were  later  to  resurface  in  the  rhetoric  and  ideology  of  the  Nazis.  Romantic 
characterizations  and  plots  that  are  regarded  as  the  hallmarks  of  German  silent 
cinema have, in hindsight, been interpreted as indications of a cultural disposition 
toward the reactionary, counter-Enlightenment aspect of Romanticism, prefiguring 
the right-wing revolution to come with their “gloomy forebodings”.1 In particular, the 
tendencies of these stories toward irrationalism, mysticism, and “inwardness”; their 
identification, not only thematically but as “classics”, with German nationalism (e.g., 
Schiller);  and  their  themes  of  distrust  of  the  outsider  (e.g.,  “Jewish”  itinerant 
charlatans), support such an argument. According to Kracauer, in consequence, the 
obsession of the German cinema with figures such as the doppelgänger showed “a 
deep and fearful concern with the foundations of the self” that led to the reactionary 
depiction  of  “outer  duplicities  as  inner  dualities”.2 Even  the  “world”  that  these 
Hoffmannesque allusions – scientists and their creatures, divided selves, Romantic 
settings – are used to conjure foreshadows Fascism: “Like the Nazi world, that of 
Caligari overflows with sinister portents, acts of terror and outbursts of panic”.3 For 
1 Siegfried  Kracauer,  From  Caligari  to  Hitler:  A  Psychological  History  of  the  German  Film, 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 33.
2 Ibid. pp. 30–31.
3 Ibid., p. 74.
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Anton  Kaes,  the  admixture  of  ultramodern  and  Romantic  elements  exemplified 
above all by Metropolis gives rise to a 
…[F]usion  of  technology  and  vitalistic  Nietzschean  Lebensphilosophie [that] 
corresponds to what Joseph Goebbels would later call “stählerne Romantik.” It was 
an  intoxicating  mixture,  putting  modernity  (steel  technology)  at  the  service  of 
romanticism defined as irrationality.  Ernst Jünger and Goebbels—and one might 
add Fritz Lang—reinvested modernity with the mythical dimension that had been 
repressed since the 18th century.4
In his plot-driven analysis, historian Peter Gay finds Metropolis to be an “essentially 
reactionary tale” that “sees the class struggle as science fiction and draws the kind of 
conclusion that can only be called a studied lie”.5
The currency of such themes, however, had complex motivations that cannot 
easily  be  related  to  reactionary  undercurrents  and  psychological  dispositions  in 
Wilhemine and Weimar culture. One major influence, beginning in 1912–1913, is 
the  justification  of  cinema  as  an  art  form  and  the  Autorenfilm’s  reliance  on 
established literary classics and contemporary popular authors. The first “art films” 
in 1913,  The Other  and  The Student of Prague, were validated as the products of 
well-known authors (Paul Lindau and Hanns Heinz Ewers) with time-tested motifs. 
Otto Rank, for example, excuses his use of The Student of Prague as inspiration for 
his groundbreaking study of the doppelgänger in 1914 with the argument that “Those 
whose concern is with literature may be reassured by the fact that the scenarist of this 
film, The Student of Prague, is an author currently in vogue and that he has adhered 
to prominent patterns, the effectiveness of which has been tested by time”.6
The popularity of cinematic doubles could also be considered in relation to 
the obsession with the double in literary and graphic works of “high culture” from 
the late nineteenth century onward. Indeed, its still-unabated popularity again points 
to its associations with industrial modernity. One common feature of these works is 
that Romantic double themes appear in “modernist” works (e.g., decadent, symbolist, 
expressionist) that are conceived in opposition to positivism and bourgeois naturalist 
aesthetics, as exemplified in the graphic arts by photographic realism. In the case of 
4 Anton Kaes, “Cinema and Modernity: On Fritz Lang’s  Metropolis”, in  High and Low Cultures:  
German Attempts at Mediation, eds. Reinhold Grimm & Jost Hermand, Madison, WI, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1994, p. 23.
5  Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider, New York, Harper & Row, 1968, p. 141.
6 Otto Rank,  The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina 
Press, 1971, pp. 3–4.
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The Student of Prague, for example, both Hanns Heinz Ewers, who became involved 
with  film  in  1907,  and  Stellan  Rye,  the  director,  were  authors  of  decadent 
doppelgänger fiction. Gustav Meyrink’s novel  The Golem,7 which hearkened to a 
Romantic fascination with the Jewish legend and indirectly inspired several Golem 
films by Paul Wegener, was a bestselling novel. 
But it is also from the perspective of the technical capabilities of cinema that 
literary  works  with  the  double  theme  came  to  be  seen  as  especially  suited  for 
cinematic representation; i.e.,  because of film’s capacity for realistically depicting 
fantastic phenomena (with the iconic and indexical verisimilitude of its images and 
techniques  such  as  the  divided  screen).  Ewers  and  Paul  Wegener,  for  example, 
pointed  to  the  artistic  specificity  of  cinema  as  their  motivation  for  using  the 
doppelgänger  motif  in  The  Student  of  Prague.  Early  on  (1914),  Otto  Rank  in 
reference to The Student of Prague argued that modern technology has the capacity 
to depict internal states through images in ways inaccessible to language:
Any apprehensions about the real value of a photoplay which aims so largely at 
achieving external effects may be postponed until  we have seen in what sense a 
subject  based  upon  an  ancient  folk-tradition,  and  the  content  of  which  is  so 
eminently  psychological,  is  altered  by  the  demands  of  modern  techniques  of 
expression. It may perhaps turn out that cinematography, which in numerous ways 
reminds us  of  the  dream-work,  can also express  certain  psychological  facts  and 
relationships—which the writer often is unable to describe with verbal clarity—in 
such clear and conspicuous imagery that it facilitates our understanding of them.8
Pursuing this argument of cinema’s suitability for the fantastic, Lotte Eisner’s well-
known  study  traces  iconographic  associations  between  the  films  and  German 
Romantic literature,9 drawing attention to how doppelgänger stories prefigured (and 
indeed seemed to be made for) cinematic effects with their fantastic and uncanny 
transformations of images:
Such  transformations  carry  the  phenomenon  of  split  personality  to  its  extreme. 
Wrapped in a cloak ‘of a very particular shade of brown’ (!) which flaps around him 
forming innumerable folds and re-folds, the odd little man in  Die Abenteuer der  
Sylvester-Nacht, deprived of his reflection as the result of diabolical machinations, 
skips around the tavern; the image seems to multiply itself. ‘In the lamplight those 
7 Gustav Meyrink, The Golem, trans. Mike Mitchell, Sawtry, Cambs., Dedalus, 1995.
8 Ibid., p. 4.
9 See especially the section entitled “The Sway of the Doppelgänger” in Lotte Eisner,  The Haunted 
Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max Reinhardt, London, Thames 
& Hudson, 1969, pp. 109-113. 
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present had the impression of seeing several superimposed figures cavorting like 
those in the phantasmagorical scenes of Ensler.’
Romantic authors such as Novalis or Jean Paul, while anticipating the Expressionist 
notions  of  visual  delirium and  of  a  continual  state  of  effervescence,  also  seem 
almost to have foreseen the cinema’s consecutive sequences of images. In the eyes 
of Schlegel in Lucinde, the loved one’s features become indistinct: ‘very rapidly the 
outlines changed, returned to their original form, then metamorphosed anew until 
they  disappeared  entirely  from  my  exalted  eyes.’  And  the  Jean  Paul  of  the 
Flegeljahre says: ‘The invisible world wished, like chaos, to give birth to all things 
together; the flowers became trees, then changed into columns of cloud; and at the 
tops  of  the  columns  flowers  and  faces  grew.’  In  Novalis’s  novel  Heinrich  von 
Ofterdingen there are even superimpositions.10
While  Eisner  does  not  make  much  of  how  these  scenes  actually  evoke  the 
phantasmagoria, the contemporaneous proto-cinematic genre of optical illusions, her 
observations  lead  her  to  the  important  conclusion  that  “German  cinema  is  a 
development  of  German  Romanticism,  and  that  modern  technique  merely  lends 
visible form to Romantic fancies”.11 
Despite the visual resemblances to which Eisner alludes, the ways in which 
doppelgänger works of fiction are concerned with essentially “cinematic” issues has 
remained a neglected area in the study of the figure’s signification. It is therefore 
important to reconsider, with an eye to cinema, how stories of the doppelgänger are 
marked by obsessive metaphors of visual experience and optical instrumentation, an 
engagement  with  Idealist  philosophy  and  the  experiential  consequences  of 
modernity,  and moments of visual/ontological crisis caused by the appearance of 
simulacra of the human body. While the fictional doppelgänger has been discussed 
extensively,12 literature on the subject has primarily focused on narrative themes, i.e., 
on the double as a psychological case study of the divided subject. In what follows, 
we instead focus on the “structural” significance of the double’s figurations of vision 
and  their  related  crises  of  subjectivity:  not  only  how these  effects  relate  to  the 
ontological status of the text itself, but also how they refer to modernity and its forms 
of visual experience.
10 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
11 Ibid., p. 113.




Archetypal  themes  of  the  doppelgänger  involve  a  character’s  psychological 
disjunction – whether as a multiple personality, conflict of desires, or the pangs of 
conscience – appearing as a visible second self that is both same and uncannily other, 
and  therefore  inducing  optical  and  ontological  crisis.  As  the  previous  chapter 
discussed, the themes of the divided self or  alter ego resonate in far-reaching and 
complex ways with currents in the sciences, developments in mimetic technologies 
and forms of entertainment, and philosophical accounts of subjectivity in modernity 
(concomitant with the work of Kant and after). It is especially important that “in the 
case of the Doppelgänger, theory and creative writing are engaged in a complex and 
highly ambivalent exchange of reciprocal readings and representations”.13 
For the film double, one significant aspect of such stories is their thematic 
preoccupation  with  the  anxiety  engendered  by  modern  science  and  technology, 
including technical developments in optics and mimetic technologies. The creation of 
the double represents man’s attempted domination of nature, the urge to recreate life 
or  eliminate  death  (e.g.,  Frankenstein):  a  project  that  instead  results  in  the 
construction or appearance of uncanny creatures tinged with morbidity. Along these 
lines, Otto Rank found the primitive motivation behind the duplication of the self to 
be a defense against death, which becomes its uncanny harbinger. Faustian scientist-
magician figures play a key role in the process of unleashing doubles (sometimes 
themselves);  often  diabolical,  they  paradoxically  combine  positive  science  and 
magic.14 These stories present the mimetic project of the construction of the perfect 
replica as the ultimate human response to the threat posed by nature, revealing the 
primitive and mythical disposition of radical positive science.15 
But  scientists,  magicians,  and  showmen  likewise  hearken  to  the  real-life 
physiologists,  opticians,  and  inventors  of  recording  technologies  whose  uncanny 
work, from the late eighteenth century on, exposed what was previously invisible to 
the  human  eye,  supplemented  the  eye’s  natural  capacities  with  mechanical 
13 Andrew  Webber,  The Doppelgänger:  Double  Visions  in  German  Literature,  Oxford,  UK, 
Clarendon; Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 1.
14 E.g., Hoffmann’s Miracle  Doctorr Dapertutto in  Das Abenteuer der Sylvester-Nacht, Stevenson’s 
Doctor Jekyll, and Shelley’s Doctor Frankenstein.
15 They  are  historically  relevant,  in  other  words,  in  the  context  of  Adorno  and  Horkheimer’s 
consideration in  Dialectic of Enlightenment of the dialectic intertwining of myth and enlightenment 
and how the process of disenchantment of the world is founded on a primitive fear of nature.
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extensions,  and captured traces  of  the body.  In  particular,  many such characters, 
taking their cue from the real-life versions (e.g., Edison), have the naturalist mimetic 
goal  of  creating  duplicates  or  perfect  replicas  of  living  beings.  Thus,  their 
problematic  reproductions  relate  to  structures  and  effects  of  mimetic  recording 
technologies of the 19th century, as well as to the archaeology of cinema.
Through a preponderance of metaphors of vision and optical instrumentation, 
these works stress the role of (unreliable) vision in the construction and breakdown 
of identity. In this context, “The Doppelgänger”, as Andrew Webber finds, “is above 
all a figure of visual compulsion”.16  The crucial significance of optical instruments, 
spectatorship,  and the visual  mediation of  subjectivity,  which we will  explore in 
greater  detail  below,  foreshadows certain  archetypally  cinematic  issues.  It  is  also 
significant with regard to film that the uncanny often arises as a consequence of 
amoral  attempts  to  advance  the  sciences,  especially  physiology  (e.g.,  Doctor 
Jekyll/Mr  Hyde)  and  optics,  and  through  the  use  of  optical  instruments  (e.g., 
Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer). 
Themes of vision often coincide with a multiplicity of styles and narrative 
voices,  for  example  in  the  very  common  use  of  framed  narratives.  Stylistic 
heterogeneity or perspectivism is ironically intertwined with the doppelgänger plot 
and  its  uncanny  effects.  Taken  together,  these  elements  contribute  to  reflexive 
themes, whereby the ontological problem that the double poses as a replica refers 
back to the status of the text itself as a mimetic representation.  The visual crisis of 
seeing the double is intertwined with the issue of the credibility of the narrative, 
precisely  because  both  “Ideas  of  subjectivity  and  of  aesthetic  production  are 
mediated by specular reproduction, by processes of reflection of and on the self and 
the world which are always liable to be propelled into the vertiginous wonderland of 
a gallery of mirrors”.17 Discussing Jean Paul,  Andrew Webber has highlighted the 
ironic connection between the doppelgänger plot’s characteristic visuality and the 
mimetic success of the text, evoking at the same time the skewed optics of the film 
double’s fairground haunts: 
Jean  Paul’s  instrumentation  of  the  optical  field—where  every  lens  is  prismatic, 
every mirror metamorphic—and the opthalmic work he carries out on his characters, 
16 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 24. 
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are of the essence of his tragicomic artistic vision. The processes of simulation of 
the  self  reflect  not  only  the  complication  of  subjectivity  but  also  the  mimetic 
apparatus  of  art… As  the  Doppelgänger embodies  the  breakdown of  subjective 
integrity, so it represents the threat to aesthetic integrity; a threat which may strike 
at the very core of narrative life and life-likeness...18
The lifelikeness of the double as simulacrum thus closely concerns the question of 
lifelikeness  of  the  narrative,  or  more  generally,  of  the  ontological  validity  of 
naturalist representation. With the double’s uncanniness,19 the structures of narration 
–  in  particular  of  naturalistic  mimetic  representation  –  are  compromised  by 
perceptual uncertainty. Thus,
…above all, the role of the narrator and the narrative structure, totally neglected by 
Freud, must be interrogated, since this provides the context for that movement of 
repetition and splitting which is constitutive for the uncanny and for the crisis of 
perception and of corporal unity that are inseparable from it. This crisis involves the 
crisis  of  the  traditional,  representational  narrative  and  this  marks  perhaps  the 
specific frontier of the Unheimliche.20
In the visual medium of cinema, the ironic connection between the optics of the 
doppelgänger encounter and the medium of its narration becomes a critical point of 
inquiry.  It  is  interesting,  in  particular,  to  reconsider  how  the  foregrounding  of 
discursivity  in  German  silent  film,  which  accompanies  the  doppelgänger  theme, 
responds in a similar way to “naturalistic” narrative norms.
Where the double theme is used to question the value of simulacra of the 
living world (whether traditional, representational narrative or mimetic technologies 
such as photography), it becomes a figure of critique of the bourgeois ideological 
motivations  behind  nineteenth-century  realism.  In  part,  the  double  reveals  the 
association  between  realism  and  the  bourgeois  “Frankensteinian”  drive  (as  Noël 
Burch calls it) to overcome death. The appearance of the uncanny depicts the failure 
of  this  project:  the “repressed” of  realism returns in  these tales as the unhomely 
threat of death and dismemberment. 
Doppelgänger stories thus negatively thematize the bourgeois mimetic ideal 
of the naturalistic copy, at times explicitly depicting the  process of production of 
simulacra  intended  as  a  defense  against  mortality  that  instead  cause  death.  For 
18 Ibid., p. 60.
19 Samuel Weber, “The Sideshow, Or: Remarks on a Canny Moment”, MLN, 88.6, 1973, p. 1132–33
20 Ibid., p. 1123.
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example, they depict “representations” being brought to life, not least through the 
classic escaped shadow or mirror image, resulting in the production of uncanny, even 
murderous doubles, or the artistic production of “copies” of the living for which the 
“original” has to die (or is killed by the artist for the sake of the work’s completion). 
In Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Oval Portrait”, for example, the completion of the perfect 
realistic portrait coincides with the death of its subject. In Brigitte Peucker’s words, 
“The fear of death motivates the flight into the text – just as making representation 
‘come  to  life’  originates  in  this  fear”.21 Thus,  “Introducing  the  body  into 
representation  involves  the  urge  to  rescue  it  (metaphorically)  from  temporality; 
embalmed  within  the  ‘death’  of  representation,  the  body  is  secure  from  actual 
wounding or decay”.22 In a related vein, Paul Coates has pointed to the “identification 
of  Idealism with  the  petrification  of  life”,  whereby the  fleeting  mortal  image  is 
arrested and thus preserved from death (while dying in the process). In his reading of 
Büchner’s story “Lenz”, Coates concludes, “Lenz’s remarks reveal the dangerous, 
uncanny underside of photographic realism: the sense that humanity is engaged in 
recording  the  world  so  as  to  be  free  to  destroy  it”.23 This  association  between 
photographic realism and the primitive fear of nature/death is crucial  for cinema, 
itself a mimetic technology conceived as a way to overcome death.
If the appearance of the double implies a critique of bourgeois realism, it also 
responds to the ideological backdrop behind this mimetic ideal, driving the creation 
and accumulation of empty, equivalent simulacra of the real. Kracauer’s description 
of  the  style  of  die  neue  Sachlichkeit is  especially  insightful: “But  this  is  what 
characterizes die neue Sachlichkeit in general, that it is a façade concealing nothing; 
that it does not derive from profundity, but simulates it. Like denial of old age, it 
arises from dread of confronting death”.24  The “daemonic bourgeois” characters, 
lawyers and bureaucrat functionaries in frockcoats, who persistently appear in these 
stories and films testify to a complex relationship between the terrorizing double and 
a  middle-class  Weltanschauung.  It  is  fitting,  therefore,  that  the  Romantic  double 
21 Brigitte  Peucker,  Incorporating  Images:  Film  and  the  Rival  Arts,  Princeton,  N.J.,  Princeton 
University Press, 1995, p.4. Likewise Goethe’s Propyläen, Peucker contends, shows how “the passion 
for mimesis is at bottom a desire to bring the body into the space of representation” (p. 113).
22 Ibid., p. 166.
23 Paul  Coates,  The Gorgon’s  Gaze:  German Cinema,  Expressionism,  and  the  Image  of  Horror, 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 13.
24 Siegfried Kracauer, The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Culture, London & New 
York, Verso, 1998, p. 92.
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became a resonant metaphor in critiques of bourgeois culture and their descriptions 
of  divided,  alienated  subjects.  In  his  study of  white-collar  culture, Kracauer,  for 
example, is struck by how
There are a great many fantastical E. T. A. Hoffmann figures among employees of 
advanced years. They have got stuck somewhere, performing unremittingly banal 
functions  that  are  anything  but  uncanny.  Yet  it  is  as  though  these  men  were 
shrouded in an aura of horror. It emanates from the decayed powers that have found 
no outlet within the existing order.25
E. T. A. Hoffmann’s The Sandman (1817)
As the key text of the psychoanalysis of the uncanny and an important influence on 
German silent film,  The Sandman  provides an illustrative case study of the visual 
effects of doppelgänger fiction. In Hoffmann’s novella, not only the characters but 
also  the  text  itself  are  subject  to  a  precarious  mise-en-abyme  effect.  The  initial 
epistolary  narrative,  in  the  first-person  perspectives  of  various  characters, 
unexpectedly  breaks  into  the  omniscient  first-person  narration  of  Hoffmann  (as 
himself).  Within this grotesquely fragmentary narrative, the protagonist Nathanael 
suffers  from  repeated  crises  of  subjectivity  and  ricochets  between  sanity  and 
madness. Clara, the “real” yet unfeeling female (out of whose eyes death looks), is 
doubled  by  the  automaton  Olimpia  (whose  eyes  are  “sightless”):  Nathanael 
repeatedly conflates and vacillates between the two, perceiving Clara as a lifeless 
automaton and Olimpia as a real woman. The uncanny Sandman is both the advocate 
Coppelius and the barometer salesman and optician Guiseppe Coppola. A  mise en 
abyme of  the  human  form,  which  becomes  foregrounded  with  the  tale  of  the 
automaton, occurs not only within the story but is reflected in and reflects on the 
narrative structure.
Nathanael’s madness is revealed in terms of his (discredited) discernment of 
seemingly doubled people and things, the faulty perceptions or “phantoms of his own 
ego”  that  determine  and  undermine  his  sense  of  self  and  subjective  stability. 
Nathanael’s  subjectivity  (especially as artist)  is  explicitly made a function of the 
25 Ibid., p. 70.
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images and representations he both creates and witnesses, as well as of the optical 
and  mechanical  devices,  including  the  automaton  Olimpia,  which  mediate  his 
perception  of  reality.  This  “reality”  is  itself  split  for  the  reader  into  multiple 
incommensurable  perspectives.  His  perception  mediated  by  instrumentation, 
Nathanael is shown to project himself into what he sees and to see what he wishes or 
expects to see. 
In this context it is significant how Nathanael’s voyeuristic interaction with 
the automaton Olimpia, who he watches through binoculars and windows when her 
curtains  are  pulled back – a deliberate  “staging” – approximates a  magic-lantern 
scenario and, by extension, that of watching a film.26 The binoculars purchased from 
Coppola seem endowed with magical powers: Just as they bring the object closer and 
improve visibility, these strange binoculars project the viewer outward and into what 
he spies. This is a defining moment:  In voyeuristically looking at the automaton, 
Nathanael’s  own  sense  of  sight,  mediated  by  instrumentation,  is  projected  by 
extramission  into  the  unnatural  image,  which  becomes  not  only his  reflection  or 
double but also capable of vision and ocular self-expression. Nathanael’s viewing of 
Olimpia becomes a magical bringing to life:27
He took up a small, very beautifully cut pocket perspective, and by way of proving 
it he looked through the window.
Never before in his life had he had a glass in his hands that brought out things so 
clearly  and  sharply  and  distinctly.  Involuntarily  he  directed  the  glass  upon 
Spalanzani’s room; Olimpia sat at the little table as usual, her arms laid upon it and 
her hands folded. Now he saw for the first time the regular and exquisite beauty of 
her features. The eyes, however, seemed to him to have a singular look of fixity and 
lifelessness. But as he continued to look closer and more carefully through the glass 
he fancied a light  like humid moonbeams came into them. It  seemed as if  their 
power of vision was now being enkindled; their glances shone with ever-increasing 
life.
Nathanael remained standing at the window as if glued to the spot by a wizard’s 
spell, his gaze riveted unchangeably upon the divinely beautiful Olimpia.28
26 Andrew Webber has in fact made a broader claim, with regard to the magic lantern paradigm, that 
“Hoffmann's narratives can be said to proceed by analogy with this forerunner of the cinematographic 
apparatus, presenting a series of illuminations with a degree of overlay and continuity, but one equally 
prone to a sense of interruption and disjuncture.” (The Doppelgänger, p. 120).
27 Cf. Noël Burch’s quotation of Demenÿ: “We will do more than analyse, we will bring back to life!” 
Demenÿ 1892, quoted in Life to Those Shadows, trans. Ben Brewster, Berkeley, Calif., University of 
California Press, 1990, p. 26.
28 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “The Sand-Man”, in The Best tales of Hoffmann, ed. E. F. Bleiler, New York, 
Dover, 1967,  p. 203.
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Watching  the  automaton  is  like  a  film  experience,  down  to  the  humming  and 
scraping, a mirror for the protagonist-spectator in which he reads what he wishes, 
where, as Baudry describes narrative cinema, “the reality mimed … is first of all that 
of a ‘self’”: “Oh! what a profound soul you have! my whole being is mirrored in 
it!”29 “Upon me alone did her loving glances fall, and through my mind and thoughts 
alone did they radiate; and only in her love can I find my own self again”.30 Here too
Everything happens as if, the subject himself being unable – and for a reason – to 
account  for  his  own  situation,  it  was  necessary  to  substitute  secondary  organs, 
grafted on to replace his own defective ones, instruments or ideological formations 
capable of filling his function as a subject. 31
Nathanael falls prey to the kind of visual pleasure discussed by Baudry and others, a 
process of identification with a perceived image that reflects him ideally and wherein 
he experiences the fictive unity of a transcendental subject (here, insanity). 
These optical prostheses, Coppola’s lenses and binoculars, which purport to 
supplement  limited  human  vision,  ironically  turn  out  to  have  an  ambivalent 
epistemological value: they are incapable of deconcealing the true nature of things, 
seeming instead to magically corroborate what the viewer most wishes to see. While 
they  seem  to  respond  prosthetically  and  “objectively”  to  the  problem  of  the 
dissociation  of  human  perception  from  the  world  of  things  in  themselves,  the 
instruments  fail  to  provide  an  antidote  to  the  subjective  grounding  of  human 
perception and instead compound it.  The  extension  of  Nathanael’s  vision by the 
binoculars is uncanny, in posing a threat to his own vision: he loses his eyes in the 
process.  The grafting of a mechanical implement leads to a kind of blindness or 
misperception of reality, causing an uncertainty to infect what he sees, as well as 
what the reader, identified with him in his first-person missives, understands to be 
happening.  Using  the  demonic  binoculars  provides  him  with  seemingly  greater 
clarity  of  vision  by  supplementing  his  own  eyesight,  but  at  the  same  time 
paradoxically  deprives  him altogether  of  a  consensual  or  objective  vision  of  the 
phenomenal world. A resurgence of this “madness” occurs when he unthinkingly 
29 Ibid., p. 206.
30 Ibid., p. 208.
31 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus”, in Film Theory 




uses the binoculars at the end of the novella. Through them he sees a close-up of 
Clara, misperceives what she is, and tries to kill the “wooden doll”.
The  uncanny  threat  posed  to  Nathanael’s  perception,  arising  from  the 
indecidability of what he is seeing, is made apparent in his transaction with Coppola: 
his own eyes (and the fragmentation of his subjectivity) are the price he pays for the 
binoculars:
“Ah well!” thought he, “he’s laughing at me because I’ve paid him too much for this 
little perspective—because I’ve given him too much money—that’s it.”
As he softly murmured these words he fancied he detected a gasping sigh as of a 
dying man stealing awfully through the room; his heart stopped beating with fear. 
But to be sure he had heaved a deep sigh himself; it was quite plain. “Clara is quite 
right,” said he to himself, “in holding me to be an incurable ghost-seer; and yet it’s 
very ridiculous—more ridiculous, that the stupid thought of having paid Coppola 
too much for his glass should cause me this strange anxiety; I can’t see any reason 
for it.”32
Spalanzani later confirms his suspicions of what the high price was: 
“Coppelius—Coppelius—he’s stolen my best automaton—at which I’ve worked 
for twenty years—my life  work—the clockwork—speech—movement—mine—
your eyes—stolen your eyes—damn him—curse him—after him—fetch me back 
Olimpia—there are the eyes.” And now Nathanael saw a pair of bloody eyes lying 
on the floor staring at him; Spalanzani seized them with his uninjured hand and 
threw them at him, so that they hit his breast.33
The uncanniness of the double/image (Olimpia) and the ontological crisis it provokes 
are  inseparable  from  the  monstrous  character  of  the  technological  mimesis  it 
represents, brought about by the obscure complicities of science with metaphysics 
and myth. The characterisations of the demonic Coppelius/Coppola and the amoral 
“professor  of  physics”  Spalanzani  support  the  anti-science  and  counter-
Enlightenment tendencies of the story: the deception the two men of science practice 
reveals them to be charlatans, while painting the pursuit of instrumental reason as a 
morally  ambivalent  enterprise.34 In  part,  Coppelius  as  “purveyor  of  anti-science 
opens  up  perspectives  on  what  is  conventionally  discounted  or  repressed  in  the 
cultural  heritage  of  the  Enlightenment:  the  destructive  potential  of  desire,  the 
32 “The Sand-Man”, p. 204.
33 Ibid., p. 211.
34 Similar  themes  become  especially  significant  in  works  like  Mary  Shelley’s  Frankenstein and 
Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.
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prevalence of the unknowable, and the corruptible condition of subjective identity”.35 
But  more  generally,  the  story’s  chronic  ocularphobia  evinces  such  ambivalence 
toward Enlightenment rationality, the supreme symbol of which is the disembodied 
eye: precisely what the story makes uncanny, e.g., by highlighting its enucleation. 
This ambivalent  valuation of the eye is captured in the scene where Coppola,  to 
Nathanael’s absolute horror, covers his table with thousands of “eyes”, blinking and 
disturbingly animate spy-glasses and spectacles – the emblems of rational progress 
and learning.
While  optical  implements  and  the  automaton,  a  media-technological 
simulacrum of man, either supplement visual access to phenomena or replicate the 
real too perfectly – Olimpia dances and sings with perfect accuracy – they cause an 
uncanny indistinguishability to intrude, not least between human and machine. The 
automaton’s story may have concluded with the exposure of the ruse, “But several 
most honourable gentlemen did not rest satisfied with this explanation; the history of 
this automaton had sunk deeply into their souls, and an absurd mistrust of human 
figures began to prevail”.36 
This “absurd mistrust of human figures”, I would argue, is a paradigmatic 
effect  of  the  onset  of  modernity  and  its  technological  artifices  –  describing  an 
incipient understanding that with a proliferation of simulacra, such as automata, and 
a  loss  of  faith  in  the  human sensorium, a  certain  indecision comes to  affect  the 
observer. It is fitting, reading Hoffmann’s tale, that Jonathan Crary has traced the 
constitution of the modern observer to the same period:
What begins in the 1820s and 1830s is a repositioning of the observer, outside of the 
fixed relations of interior/exterior presupposed by the camera obscura and into an 
undemarcated  terrain  on  which  the  distinction  between  internal  sensation  and 
external signs is irrevocably blurred.37
Importantly, The Sandman, through various forms of self-reference, ironically links 
the uncanny problem of vision and representation within the diegesis to the problem 
of the text itself as a copy of the world or its mimetic representation.  Its self-directed 
35 See Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 148.
36 “The Sand-Man”, p. 212.
37 Jonathan Crary,  Techniques of the Observer, On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1990, p. 24.
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irony  is  representative  of  much  of  the  literature  of  the  doppelgänger.38 Here,  a 
narrative  concern  with  the  credibility  and  value  of  “images”  –  the  automaton, 
Nathanael’s own stories and poems, and even what the lenses of science bring into 
focus  –  is  materially  implicated  in  the  textual  irony and reflexive  effects  of  the 
novella itself. Nathanael as a writer, for example, acts as a surrogate for Hoffmann 
himself in constructing a poem within the story – in which the Sandman destroys his 
chances at a happy life with Clara – that foretells the novella’s dénouement.  Clara, 
distrustful of the images offered by art or the imagination, represents the voice of 
“reason” and is thus found soulless and mechanical by Nathanael: 
Dreamers and visionaries had a bad time of it with her; for without saying very 
much—she was not by nature of a talkative disposition—she plainly asked, by her 
calm steady look and her rare ironical smile, “How can you imagine,  my dear 
friends, that I can take these fleeting shadowy images for true living and breathing 
forms?”39
Such  reflexive  gestures  and  stylistic  heterogeneity  are  characteristic  of  the 
doppelgänger  story,  corroborating  how  “Doppelgänger and  their  host  texts  are 
typically  literary double-agents,  in  the  duplicitous  service  of  conflicting aesthetic 
systems”.40 In  this  case  The  Sandman’s  initial  epistolary  structure  is  rudely 
interrupted by the first-person voice of the author himself (Hoffmann), who digresses 
into a discussion of his own difficulties in constructing a sensational, fantastic, and 
yet credible account of a sequence of events that he presents as a reproduction of life: 
Perhaps, like a good portrait painter, I may succeed in depicting Nathanael in such 
a way that you will recognize it as a good likeness without being acquainted with 
the original, and will feel as if you had very often seen him with your own bodily 
eyes. Perhaps, too, you will then believe that nothing is more wonderful, nothing 
more fantastic than real life, and that all that a writer can do is to present it as “in a 
glass, darkly.”41
38 Adelbert von Chamisso's The Wonderful History of Peter Schlemihl (trans. Theodore Bolton, New 
York, B.W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923), for instance,   is narrated by the eponymous hero in the form of a 
letter to his friend, the actual author, Chamisso. He complains at one point: “I must now pass quickly 
over one period of my story—how gladly I would dwell on it had I your lively genius for conjuring up 
remembrances! But the colors which vivified the scene and alone can reanimate it have been blotted 
out...” (p.51).
39 “The Sand-Man”, p. 197.
40 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 10.
41 Ibid., p. 196.
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The  reference  to  Saint  Paul’s  speculum  obscurum  –  warning  against  the 
untrustworthy representations offered by earthly vision – is especially appropriate in 
this context, describing not only the problem the author faces, but also the central 
preoccupation of the narrative, which continues in Hoffmann’s voice of omniscient 
narrator.  In  any  case,  such  involutions  draw  attention  to  the  novella’s 
constructedness,  counteracting its illusionist  moment and disallowing the reader’s 
passive stance toward the text as narrative. They serve, in other words, as distancing 
gestures that are analogous to the uncanny and interruptive effect of the double itself 
as  something  unreal  intruding  in  the  construct  of  a  naturalistic,  bourgeois,  i.e., 
homely sphere. Concluding  the  episode  of  the  automaton,  a  diegetic  critic 
significantly sums up the “meaning” of Olimpia as doppelgänger:
The Professor of Poetry and Eloquence took a pinch of snuff, and, slapping the lid 
to  and  clearing  his  throat,  said  solemnly,  “My  most  honourable  ladies  and 
gentlemen, don’t you see then where the rub is? The whole thing is an allegory, a 
continuous metaphor. Sapienti sat.”42
An allegory for what? Where the theme of the double solicits a comparison between 
naturalistic reproductions of the “real” by technology and the illusionist tendencies of 
narrative, both are implicated in an uncanny, vertiginous indecidability, a loss of the 
power to see.
Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s Tomorrow’s Eve (1886)
Proto-cinematic themes of the double become crucial in  Tomorrow’s Eve, a novel 
well known among film historians for its detailed description of the medium of film 
before its invention (in the Lumière or Edison forms). The novel, offering the rare 
case of a female doppelgänger, revolves around an exaggerated – and clairvoyant – 
characterization of Thomas Edison, the Wizard of Menlo Park, as a (film) pioneer 
who peddles in life and death through his masterful inventions in media technology. 
Edison’s ambivalent portrayal dialectically intertwines the vocations of mechanistic 
scientist and magician. Villiers ironically stresses the inventor’s paradoxical double 
nature  as  wizard  and  electrician,  for  example  in  describing  his  laboratory  as 
42 Ibid., p. 212.
 66
The Divided Screen
“positively, a place of magic”43 and even explicitly comparing him to the Sandman.44 
Here, Edison is showman and director of the technological mimetic representations 
that he displays to his  astonished guest and reader, among which is  the uncanny 
android double Hadaly.
Like other stories about artificial  doubles,  Tomorrow’s Eve  incorporates a 
summary description of past real-life attempts at building men, along with a credible 
scientific explanation of the new work and how it supercedes previous efforts (cf. 
Frankenstein).  The  story  is  therefore  presented  as  taking  part  in  a  narrative  of 
scientific  progress,  which  lends  both  credibility  and  irony  to  the  uncanny 
dénouement.  Artificial  life-forms  made  before  are  derided  as  the  unrealistic 
(therefore unsuccessful) and obsolete work of mediocre quacks. The fictional Edison, 
by  the  late  19th century,  sees  his  automaton  not  only  as  a  new  and  improved 
technology, but also purely in illusionist terms: a mechanical reproduction that must 
ideally be indistinguishable from the original. Making an android for a spectator who 
must be unable to detect the presence of the “instrument” in what he views (Lord 
Ewald) – an aim that resonates with the illusionist tendency in film – he is able to say 
of the legendary builders of automata,
Poor  fellows,  for  lack of  the  proper  technical  skills,  they produced nothing  but 
ridiculous monsters… Their automata deserve to be exhibited in the most hideous of 
wax museums; they are disgusting objects from which proceeds a rank smell of 
wood, rancid oil, and gutta-percha. Degraded works of that sort give man no sense 
of power; instead, they force him to bow his head before the great god, Chaos…The 
absurdity of their shapes and colors!…That noise of the key in the mechanism! The 
sensation of vacancy!45
For Villiers’ Edison – who is not so far removed from the real one – precisely those 
elements in the old androids that signal the fact of their mechanical nature, all of 
which are perceived by senses other than vision and are not “realistic”, are what 
deprive man of a "sense of power". This power has to do with the ultimate triumph 
over nature of which man may be capable, the fashioning of its perfect replica. This 
is the ideology of the Gesamtkunstwerk, the organization of mimesis understood as 
43 See  the  “White  Magic”  chapter  in  Tomorrow’s  Eve,  trans.  Robert  Martin  Adams,  Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1982, p. 53 (italics mine).
44 Ibid., p. 8.
45 Ibid., p. 61.
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naturalism.  Noël  Burch’s  description  of  the  real  Edison  is  especially  apt  for  the 
fictional version:
This association of naturalism and a certain petty-bourgeois metaphysics is a perfect 
evocation  of  Edison’s  character.  In  him  we  can  locate  the  point  at  which  the 
bourgeois fantasy par excellence, so well expressed in Demenÿ’s living portraits, of 
the this-worldly non-finitude of the subject, of the materialist victory over death is, 
as it were, sublimated in that of total representation, in which spectators overstep the 
narrow limits of their lives in a communion with ‘artists and musicians long since 
dead’, projecting themselves into the latter’s survival.46
Edison’s clandestine inventions in the novel, which chillingly foreshadow the 
later work of his real-life model, are explicitly intended by their inventor as a means 
of  overcoming  death  through  creating  the  credible  illusion  of  reality.  These 
technologies,  predicated  on  recording  the  minutiae  of  life,  preserve  the 
characteristics of the dead in a kind of immortality and, according to him, replace 
what is already an illusion by a superior illusion. They therefore belong to a history 
of  19th century  developments  in  recording  technologies  that,  as  Noël  Burch  has 
shown, were from the beginning conceived as a means of overcoming death – of 
loved ones or of great singers – by means of exhaustively recording visual and aural 
data. The recorded song of Edison’s favorite nightingale, for example, compensates 
for  its  death,  while  revealing  the  complicity  of  technology  with  “primitive” 
mysticism:
Well, the fact is, I’m a lover of nature, so I am. I really was fond of the song of that 
bird,  and  his  death  a  couple  of  months  ago  caused  me,  I  assure  you,  genuine 
sadness… Dead, you say? Not altogether, since I’ve recorded here his song and his 
spirit. I evoke it by means of electricity; that’s spiritualism put in really practical 
terms, right?47
More than immortality, though, Edison claims to re-accord to the object its aura, to 
borrow Benjamin’s term, which was lost with bourgeois modernity, paradoxically 
through its technical reproduction. With the reproduction of the bourgeoise, artificial 
herself owing to makeup and modern manners, Edison argues, “Miss Alicia Clary 
will appear before you, not simply transfigured, not just made the most enchanting of 
46 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, p. 28.
47 Villiers de L’Isle-Adam, Tomorrow’s Eve, p. 95.
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companions, nor merely lifted to the most sublime level of spirituality, but actually 
endowed with a sort of immortality”.48 
Motivated by this  ideology,  the fictional  Edison has invented a  cinematic 
medium that captures its subject in a perpetually replayable moment of youth;49 he 
consequently finds death to have become inconsequential:
–After all, you understand, her death mattered very little; I can make her come into 
our presence as if nothing had ever happened to her… 
A long strip of plastic encrusted with bits of tinted glass moved laterally along two 
steel tracks before the luminous cone of the astral lamp. Drawn by a clockwork 
mechanism at one of its ends, this tip began to glide swiftly between the lens and the 
disk of a powerful reflector. Suddenly on the wide white screen within its frame of 
ebony flashed the life-size figure of a very pretty and quite youthful blonde girl.
The transparent vision, miraculously caught in colour photography, wore a spangled 
costume as she danced a popular Mexican dance. Her movements were as lively as 
those of life itself, thanks to the procedures of successive photography, which can 
record on its microscopic glasses ten minutes of action to be projected on the screen 
by a powerful lampascope, using no more than a few feet of film.50
It is no great surprise that André Bazin uses part of the above quotation to justify the 
idea of “total cinema” as a myth that preceded the inventions that came to constitute 
it, and the thoroughgoing recreation of reality as the natural culmination of film.51
Edison relies on this medium of recording and projection to construct the 
perfect simulacrum, the android double. This process incorporates an amalgam of 
recording and playback devices that capture and “replay” the minute particularities of 
the real woman, such as aural, olfactory, and visual data (e.g., skin pigmentation). 
Edison’s aim, both with his “cinema” and with the android, is a recreation of reality 
whose true, mechanical nature is hidden and forgotten by the viewer. His success is 
complete when Ewald mistakes the artificial woman for the real. 
The  re-creation  of  life,  however,  turns  out  to  be  deeply  unnerving  and 
uncanny,  capable  of  inducing  ontological  crisis  precisely  because  of  its 
indistinguishability from the “real”. Edison warns Lord Ewald that the sight of the 
android may induce perceptual distress, caused by astonishment before the machine’s 
liminal state between reality and illusion, between the phenomenal realm and the 
48 Ibid., pp. 53–54.
49 See chapter entitled “Danse Macabre”, p. 117.
50 Ibid., pp. 116–17.
51 André Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema”, republished in Film Theory and Criticism, ed. Gerald 
Mast, Marshall Cohen, & Leo Braudy, 4th ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1992.
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spiritual: “The being whose sight you are about to experience is of an indefinable 
mental condition. Its appearance, even when one is accustomed to it, always causes a 
certain shock”.52 This shock is the sense of the uncanny, “a certain indecidability 
which affects  and infects  representations,  motifs,  themes and situations,  which… 
always mean something other than what they are and in a manner which draws their 
own  being  and  substance  into  the  vortex  of  signification”.53 Significantly,  both 
Edison and the android justify this unholy reproduction with recourse to a Kantian 
account of the subjective perception of phenomena as arbitrary and independent of 
the things themselves, which remain inaccessible. Dismissing the original as herself 
already an image,  they can claim the reproduction to be not merely perceptually 
equivalent but morally an improvement over the original.
As a media technology, the android resembles the cinematic medium that 
Edison  has  invented:  both  are  renditions  of  the  phenomenal  world  that  are 
indistinguishable from and even superior to it. As Edison is shown to understand, the 
similarity of the android double to his other invention of cinema inheres in their 
shared double nature as both real and unreal, as life and its shadow double, and as 
signifying a kind of immortality. At the same time, he underscores not only the vital 
role that new, magical technologies play in these reproductions of life, but also their 
fundamentally  uncanny  and  morbid  quality  as  phantom  doubles  with  a  “mixed 
nature”:
This is the arm of an Android of my making, animated for the first time by this vital, 
surprising agent that we call Electricity, which gives it, as you see, all the soft and 
melting qualities, all the illusion of life! …
The techniques of reproduction, of  identification have been rendered more precise 
and perfect, so that the resources available to man for new ventures of this sort are 
now different—oh, completely different—than they used to be. Henceforth we shall 
be  able  to  realize—that  is,  to  MAKE  REAL—potent  phantoms,  mysterious 
presences  of  a  mixed  nature,  such  as  pioneers  in  the  field  could  never  have 
conceived, and at the thought of which they would have smiled sadly and cried, 
“Impossible!”—Think now, didn’t  you, just now, find it  difficult to smile at the 
appearance of Hadaly?54
The italics and capitalisation in the above quotation are original to the text, pointing 
out Villiers’s prophetic concern with issues that later became so significant in the 
52 Tomorrow’s Eve, p. 55–56.
53 Samuel Weber, "The Sideshow, Or: Remarks on a Canny Moment”, p. 1132–33.
54 Villiers de L’Isle-Adam, Tomorrow’s Eve, p. 61.
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discussion of film, for example in the work of André Bazin, Christian Metz, and 
Jean-Louis  Baudry,  Noël  Burch’s  archaeology  of  the  “Institutional  Mode  of 
Representation”, and recently in Tom Gunning’s discussions of amazement and the 
uncanny in the face of new technologies.55 More generally, the novel foregrounds the 
structural analogy between the doppelgänger and mimetic technologies of the 19th 
century, the mythic moment at the heart of positive science, and the questionable 
ideological motivations of an archetypal nineteenth-century inventor. 
55 See, e.g., Tom Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the 
Uncanny in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the Century”, in Rethinking Media Change: The  





THE STUDENT OF PRAGUE (1913)
Three years ago I turned for the first time to film, because I thought I had 
an idea which could not be realized in any other medium. I remembered 
seeing trick photographs in which a man plays cards with himself or a 
fraternity  student  duels  against  himself.  I  knew that  could  be  done  by 
splitting the image, and I said to myself that it must also be possible to film 
E. T. A. Hoffmann’s fantasies of a  doppelgänger  or mirror image, as if 
they were reality, and thus achieve effects which were not possible in any 
other art form. Thus, I hit upon the idea for The Student of Prague which 
Hanns Heinz Ewers gave filmic form.
Paul Wegener1
We penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize it  in the 
everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday 
as impenetrable, and the impenetrable as everyday.
Walter Benjamin2
1 Paul Wegener, “Die künstlerischen Möglichkeiten des Films” (1916), in  Paul Wegener und Seine 
Rollen: Ein Buch von ihm und über ihn, ed. Kai Möller, Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1954, p.110, quoted by 
Heide Schlüpmann, in “The First German Art Film: Rye’s The Student of Prague (1913)”, in German 
Film and Literature: Adaptations and Transformations, ed. Eric Rentschler, New York and London, 
Methuen, 1986, p. 13.
2 Benjamin, “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia”, in One-Way Street and 
Other Writings, London, New Left Books, 1979, p. 237.
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The 1913 The Student of Prague, the first film to receive broad critical consideration 
in the German press, was lauded at the time for its originality and resonance. It has 
since often been considered the “first German art film”. Film critics and historians 
have, however, tended to uncomfortably situate the film somewhere between early 
and “classical” cinema, or as a “primitive” German film that foreshadows what was 
to come in the “Golden Age”.3 Thus, Janus-like, the film is found to look back to 
early or "primitive" cinema and forward, both to classical narrative and to avant-
garde or modernist film practices.4 In addition, the film’s central narrative theme of 
the doppelgänger has been discussed both by Lotte Eisner and Siegfried Kracauer in 
terms exclusively  derived  from literature.  Their  canonical  readings  conclude  that 
German cinema’s Romantic quotations reflect the (stable) German Geist (Eisner) or 
a mass psychological, socio-political crisis of the divided self (Kracauer). Both, in 
short,  ignore the importance  of  the specific  relationship of  the motif  to  the new 
medium, which, sublimely able to represent the “hybrid, half-real world”5 of German 
Romanticism,  is  itself  fraught  with the motif’s  reflexive tensions concerning real 
selves and their indistinguishable copies, realism and fantasy.
While Ewers and Wegener are generally credited for the idea and execution 
of the film, Casper Tybjerg6 has shown in a recent article that the choice of Stellan 
Rye  as  director  was  especially  appropriate  for  the  “artistic”  depiction  of  the 
cinematic  doppelgänger.  Rye,  a  decadent  and  dandy,  had  himself  earlier  (1905) 
published a doppelgänger story that reveals his fascination with the uncanny effects 
of simulacra and prefigures the scene of several of the films we will discuss. The 
story’s narrator visits a travelling waxworks show, where at a tent labelled “Teatrum 
Mundi”, he has a chilling encounter with his own wax double: 
3 See, e.g., Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film, 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1947.
4For a discussion of the ambivalent reception of the film, see Leon Hunt’s “The Student of Prague”, in 
Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. T. Elsaesser, London, BFI, 1990. Hunt compares the film 
in this respect to Noël Burch’s account of the films of Edwin S. Porter, describing Lotte Eisner and 
Siegfried Kracauer’s appraisals of the film as primitive but portentous.
5 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max  
Reinhardt, London, Thames & Hudson, 1969, p. 109.
6 Casper Tybjerg, “The Faces of Stellan Rye” in A Second Life: German Cinema’s First Decades, ed. 
T. Elsaesser, pp. 151–59.
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Then I look at the doll’s face, and my breathing suddenly stops, as though it had hit 
a  wall  inside me.  It  is  myself  who stands there!  The doll,  the wax figure,  it  is 
myself. It is my features, my eyes, my frame, my haircut. And as it stands there, with 
the thumb and first finger of the left hand in the waistcoat pocket, with the coat 
collar turned up and a mocking smile around the slightly crooked left side of the 
mouth, it is me, completely, so lifelike in the dead wax. Only the eyes are somehow 
smaller than mine.7
That the double is a perfect replica but for a form of ocular inequality is a recurring 
effect in these stories and films that is especially suggestive. While in this case the 
actual eyes are different (we will see a similar inconsistency in Metropolis), in others 
the difference can be in the double’s form of spectatorship. Tybjerg continues, “The 
doll  comes  to  life  and  starts  speaking,  the  very  words  with  which  the  dandy 
commenced the tale we are reading. Unable to stop the doll, and enraged by its self-
satisfied manner, he smashes it to pieces. The old man appears, smiles sagely and 
says, ‘Now there is one doll less in the world.’”8 It is fitting that, with the reflexive 
effects of the uncanny, the text itself begins to be repeated as a result of the structural 
agency of the doppelgänger.
As  Paul  Wegener’s  remarks  on  the  genesis  of  The  Student  of  Prague 
underline, many of German cinema’s film artists sought to establish an autonomous, 
non-derivative formalism for  the new medium, independent  of  fiction,  drama,  or 
painting. What is involved in the choice of the double theme, then, is Wegener’s 
insightful  understanding  of  the  specific  possibilities  of  film.  The  pivotal  fact  is 
cinema’s  tremendous  iconic  resemblance  to  reality,  coupled  with  simultaneous 
unreality – i.e., a structural resemblance to the double’s ontological duality. To return 
to Christian Metz’s classic account of cinema, 
[The] activity of perception which it involves is real (the cinema is not a phantasy), 
but the perceived is not really the object, it is its shade, its phantom, its double, its 
replica in a new kind of mirror. It will be said that literature, after all, is only itself 
made of replicas (written words, presenting absent objects). But at least it does not 
present them to us with all the really perceived detail that the screen does (giving 
more and taking as much, i.e. taking more). The unique position of the cinema lies 
in this dual character of its signifier: unaccustomed perceptual wealth, but at the 
same time stamped with unreality to an unusual degree, and from the very outset. 
More than the other arts, or in a more unique way, the cinema involves us in the 
7 Stellan Rye, “Teatrum Mundi”,  Verdenspejlet  3, No. 35, p. 550. Quoted and translated by Caspar 
Tybjerg, p. 157.
8 Ibid., p. 157.
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imaginary: it drums up all perception, but to switch it over immediately into its own 
absence, which is nonetheless the only signifier present.9
It is in these terms that Wegener deems the cinema to be appropriate ground for the 
double, and the double suitable for the medium: “The Student of Prague, with its 
strange mixture of the natural and the artificial, in theme as in setting, interested me 
enormously”.10 As Heide Schlüpmann has pointed out, 
If  photography  offers  a  world  devoid  of  subjective  and  projected  meaning,  as 
Kracauer once suggested, if it demythicizes, then the cinema can achieve an uncanny 
effect par excellence by inserting subjective images of an animistic worldview into 
photographic reproductions of reality, e.g. by making a mirror image become the 
image of a soul.11 
To  go  still  further,  while  the  cinema  provides  the  ideal  context  for  the  visual 
indecidability  that  is  the uncanny,  it  especially  does so for  the old theme of the 
doppelgänger,  precisely  owing  to  the  reflexive  resemblance  of  the  motif  to  the 
medium  as  double  of  reality.  Fittingly,  then,  The  Student  of  Prague  screenplay 
borrows its material haphazardly from various literary renditions of the doppelgänger 
motif; the film is a pastiche of these stories, and not a literary adaptation. Indeed, it is 
a film about the motif of the double itself and is successful on the basis of the motif’s 
special  relationship  to  cinema.  In  other  words:  “The  penchant  for  mirrors  and 
shadows  in  German  expressionist  cinema  …  thus  stands  as  a  metafilmic 
consideration. The recourse to the romantic motif was not simply provoked by film 
technique, but above and beyond that by film aesthetics”.12 
A close reading of the film’s spatial constructions is found in Leon Hunt’s 
article on the film’s “constant use of space to articulate narrative concerns”.13 This 
analysis addresses the relationship between the film’s articulations of space and the 
two narrative themes of the double and social mobility. Remaining within a rigid 
9 Christian Metz, “Identification, Mirror”, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema,  
trans. Ben Brewster et al., Bloomington, Indiana Univeristy Press, 1982, p. 44–45.
10 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen, p. 40.
11 Heide Schlüpmann, “The First German Art Film: Rye's The Student of Prague (1913)”, p. 21.
12 Ibid., p. 14. However, The Student of Prague (1913) is hardly an Expressionist film, as it predates 
the advent of so-called Expressionism in German cinema and has neither the graphic and decorative 
effects of Expressionist art nor the plot elements of Expressionist theatre or fiction.
13 Leon Hunt, “The Student of Prague: Division and Codification of Space”, p. 395.
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formalist reading of binary spatial oppositions, however, Hunt glosses over the ways 
in  which  these  structures  are  disrupted.  For  in  the  cinematic  construction  of  the 
uncanny,  precisely  those  moments  in  which  expected  visual  cues  are  violated 
become the most significant.
As the previous chapter indicated, literary doppelgänger scenarios explicitly 
relate the uncanny crisis of seeing the double through metaphors of vision and optics. 
With the uncanny, vision and representation alike are infected by an indecidability or 
“crisis  of  phenomenality”.  In  the  visual  medium of  film,  this  problematic  has  a 
pronounced  metafilmic  effect.  Thus,  of  particular  interest  in  looking  at  the 
doppelgänger in film is where, with uncanny spectator effects and visual metaphors, 
the diegetic conflict relates to film form and “exposes the instrument”.
An especially suggestive discussion of the film’s doppelgänger theme is that 
of Thomas Elsaesser’s well-known essay on “Social Mobility and the Fantastic”.14 
Taking his cue from Eisner’s assertion about German cinema as a development of 
German Romanticism, Elsaesser considers the historical grounds for the return of the 
motif in the 1910s and 1920s, i.e., the “historical reality” to which its use responds. 
Elsaesser’s  reading,  however,  does  not  consider  the  motif’s  metafilmic 
significance,15 and  thus  neglects  the  question  of  whether  or  how the  “historical 
reality” to which such motifs speak could also concern cinema, and in tandem, the 
historical determination of vision and of spectatorship. It is important, for example, 
that  when  the  double  appears  onscreen,  each  time  there  is  a  split  second  of 
uncertainty in which the spectator is not yet sure which Baldwin is which. The theme 
of social mobility emerges as a consequence of this hesitation, and the reading of 
visual cues of wealth and poverty it compels in the double vision of two identical 
men. 
More recently, Brigitte Peucker has discussed the film in the context of how 
the depiction of the human body on film relates to film’s consciousness of itself as a 
14 Thomas Elsaesser,  “Social  Mobility and the Fantastic”,  in  Fantasy and the Cinema,  ed.  James 
Donald, London, BFI, 1989, pp. 25–32.




hybrid and fragmented text, and in its relation to the other arts.16 Peucker’s insightful 
conclusion is that the film contains “a figure of its own hybrid status as text,  its 
discomfiting suspicion that its own body is not all of a piece”.17
[The] function that the Double takes on in  The Student of Prague  has at least as 
much to do with the anxiety created by the production of the moving image itself as 
with the technology of this production, and must be seen within the experimental—
and potentially problematic—context of movement both attached to and divorced 
from the human body.18
Clearly, the theme of the Double as it is figured in The Student of Prague expresses 
cinema’s  fascination  with  the  ontology  of  the  image,  and  it  poses  questions 
concerning  the  nature  of  cinematic  representation,  especially  with  regard  to  the 
manner in which narrative and visual coherence in films are anchored in the human 
body.19
Peucker, however, does not consider just how this reflexive figuration of the status of 
cinema in the figure of the double is established in the film. 
The Divided Spectator
 
The  Student  of  Prague’s  main  narrative  opens  in  a  beer  garden  peopled  with 
frolicking students. This scene, a continuous shot20 in which the camera is discreetly 
moved to refocus the spectator’s attention, begins with the clutter and chaos of a kind 
of  non-centrifugal  “realism”  in  the  tradition  of  the  Lumières.  The  spectator  is 
initially faced with a moment of confusion, hardly knowing where to look. As in 
16 Brigitte Peucker,  Incorporating Images: Film and the Rival Arts, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1995.
17 Ibid., p. 20.
18 Ibid., p. 17.
19 Ibid., p. 19.
20 It is, however, interrupted by intertitles.
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several sequences to follow, the fact that the film was shot on location adds a certain 
debris of the “real”, with a profusion of non-narrative visual detail that both confuses 
and engages the eye. Similarly, relatively long segments of the film showing forest 
scenes or the streets of Prague, unnecessary as regards narrative development, draw 
attention to the qualities of the image as such. Of the extended hunt sequence, for 
example,  Heide Schlüpmann observes that “The scene manages to create interest 
solely through its images of reality, instead of through plot-motivated suspense”.21 
These shots resist being mastered at a first viewing.
This  scene  reveals  Baldwin,  Prague’s  wildest  student,  as  world-weary, 
joyless, and unwilling to join in youthful festivities. As the camera pans to refocus 
the center of attention, the viewer is presented with the spectacle of the gypsy girl 
Lyduschka dancing  for  a  crowd of  young men,  effectively  placed  on  Baldwin’s 
shoulder.  Although  Lyduschka’s  display  is  ultimately  targeted  at  him,  Baldwin 
refuses to be its  voyeur,  turning his  back to the assembled company and instead 
facing the spectator. Significantly, then, Baldwin’s problem, the basis of the plot’s 
conflict, is introduced as this lack of desire to look, so much so, indeed, that not even 
the “unbelievably slender, beautiful, frisky legs of Lyda Salmonova”,22 in the words 
of a contemporary reviewer, succeed in offering him distraction. Baldwin’s “crisis”– 
and we as yet do not know of his financial woes – is therefore of a visual nature: he 
lacks Schaulust and curiosity. Toward the end of the film this problem is reiterated: 
Baldwin seeks to forget his love in dance and gaming: similarly seated, he faces the 
camera as the dancers and Lyduschka fail to capture his gaze.
21 Heide Schlüpmann, “The First German Art Film: Rye's The Student of Prague (1913)”, p. 21.
22 Alfred Richard Meyer, quoted in Ludwig Greve, Margot Pehle, and Heidi Westhoff, eds., Hätte ich 
das Kino! Die  Schriftsteller und der Stummfilm  (Stuttgart:  Klett,  1976), p.  106. Quoted by Heide 
Schlüpmann, in “The First German Art Film: Rye’s The Student of Prague (1913)”, p. 10.
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This first scene is significant in laying out the film’s central concern with 
visual uncertainty and conflict. While initially there are multiple points in the image 
on  which  one  could  focus  and  no  hierarchy  of  narrative  importance,  with 
Lyduschka’s  dance  the  image  is  divided  into  two  related  narratives,  which  are 
literally  separated by Scapinelli’s  coach.  A foreground scene,  Baldwin’s meeting 
Scapinelli,  follows  an  independent  course  from  what  is  taking  place  in  the 
background, Lyduschka’s display and voyeurism. 
Already,  the  film is  split  in  two  in  a  number  of  ways,  not  only  divided 
between foreground and background, but also between a kind of hyper-realism and 
the fantastic. The camera both makes the viewer see and confuses vision, changing 
its focus to the center of attention yet showing a deep-staged scene with multiple 
narratives. As spectators, we are already doubled in the pursuit of two narratives, 
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split  between following Baldwin’s  actions and looking at  Lyduschka. This  scene 
announces a bifurcation in the spectator’s visual interaction with the film:
[Baldwin] looks straight into the camera, so that he is doubly separated from what 
goes on: spatially, and in terms of his field of vision. By contrast, we, the spectators 
are made to identify with two distinct points of view: we participate as spectator-
voyeurs in the girl’s self-display (and are thus part of the ‘student scene’) but we 
also identify with Baldwin’s refusal to participate: as spectators we are already split 
well before Baldwin’s double appears.23
To complicate matters further, Lyduschka herself is a stand-in voyeur, watching the 
scene in the foreground. When Baldwin shakes hands with Scapinelli, she regretfully 
holds her forehead, acting out a commentary on the foreground scene. When they 
leave, she, like the viewer, follows: unobserved except by the latter. 
Importantly,  the  two  narratives  are  explicitly  related  to  contrary  diegetic 
positions with regard to spectatorship: one concerns a man who refuses to look, and 
the other a woman who acts as both exhibitionist and voyeur – espying not only 
Baldwin but the spectator, who receives her exhibitionist look at the camera. They 
also represent two possibilities of cinema, with an omniscient, voyeuristic spectator 
or with one whose look is acknowledged by the viewed object. In addition, the single 
shot, in its representation of multiple narratives, constructs a form of parallel action 
without the use of continuity editing.  In the binary oppositions the image erects, 
however,  one  side  of  the  image,  the  voyeur  who  shares  her  activity  with  the 
spectator, offers a commentary on the other. The multiplicity of perspectives and 
points of entering the narrative solicit a comparison with baroque art  or with the 
cinema of the Lumières in the lack of centrifugality. The shot, like others in the film, 
could be viewed multiple times from different perspectives: it is not meant to be 
viewed  once  and  “consumed”  as  a  product.  Here  is  one  source  of  the  film’s 
resemblance to the mode of early cinema, its “primitive” quality.




This complex scene introduces us to several forms of visual conflict at issue, 
which are developed in the course of the film and are related to its central story of 
the doppelgänger. These include the visual uncertainties of “baroque” mise en scène; 
the bifurcations of the visual field into near and far, left and right; and the double 
modes of voyeurism and exhibition. In this context, Baldwin’s problem, the film’s 
central conflict, is introduced in the reflexive terms of a problem of vision, regarding 
his interaction with a spectacle, a disorder in which the spectator also participates 
with a doubled vision. Baldwin in a sense hates “cinema”: the  modern arsenal of 
spectacle is powerless to attract his look and, as we find out, he also dislikes being 
looked at, antagonistically fencing with his mirror image – a voyeur.
Bifurcated Vision
As Leon Hunt has shown, the film’s spaces are constructed through a set of polarities 
that become crucial in the viewer’s reading of the narrative, as spatial articulations of 
the self/mirror-image and the rich/poor dichotomies. Specifically, 
The division of the frame and the distinction between foreground and background of 
an image composed in depth becomes the basis of a textual system of repeated and 
alternated spatial articulations…The film’s ‘meaning’ is determined by this complex 
organisation of space. As a result, the film is ‘about’ Baldwin and his mirror-image 
occupying the left or the right hand of the frame; it is ‘about’ movements from the 
background (far-space) to the foreground (near-space) and back; and finally, it is 
‘about’ Baldwin’s room being framed either frontally or diagonally.24
24 Leon Hunt, “The Student of Prague: Division and Codification of Space”, p. 390.
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The bifurcation of the visual field is established through a number of strategies. Deep 
staging, for example, allows a distinction to be made between front and back, or near 
and far. In the scene of departure for the hunt, for example, we see the movement of 
the people going to the hunt in the far distance, among the birch trees. Here again, 
parallel action is set up within a single shot and not through continuity editing. In the 
foreground,  the  servants  are  attending  to  their  duties,  while  in  the  distance  their 
masters  are  going  to  the  hunt:  thus  the  split  visual  field  corresponds  to  a  class 
difference. As before, the spectator’s look is doubled by the two (really multiple) 
areas that require attention. These multiple divisions, with repetitions and variations, 
are featured in most scenes. Scapinelli’s unseen entrance into Baldwin’s room from 
the background, for example, is an inverted repetition of how Baldwin is framed in 
the first scene, his position as voyeur recalling that of Lyduschka. Baldwin’s room is 
divided  into  a  left  and  right  side,  his  space  and  the  mirror’s.  His  image  is  not 
reflected, hinting at what is to come.
The screen is often split down the middle, with two simultaneous narrative 
developments  on  each  side  whose  interaction  provides  the  film’s  narrative 
“meaning”. Spatial divisions serve as signposts to the intentions and psychology of 
characters, acting as a cinematic language in the absence of words. When Baldwin 
first visits the Countess, for example, he speaks to the Count on the right side of the 
screen, while the Countess is wooed by her cousin (whose flowers are much larger 
than Baldwin’s) on the left. The screen is divided down the middle between the two 
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parties by a doorframe, and, less noticeably, between foreground and background 
(the forest), which people may emerge from or recede into.
Not least, these bifurcations solicit a way of looking at the cinematic image 
on  the  part  of  the  viewer  that  paves  the  way  for,  and  even  foreshadows,  the 
introduction of the doppelgänger and the possibility of its uncanny effects. In a way, 
they train the spectator to look at detail, repetition, and change. Thus, when for the 
first time in the film, Baldwin crosses his room and his mirror image is reflected in 
the mirror in the  other half  of the room, walking in an opposite direction, we are 
already cued in  to the significance of the two motions,  and in a mode of  visual 
engagement whose uncertainties contain the threat of the uncanny. 
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It  is  on the basis  of  this  visual  preparation that  the later  appearance of the 
doppelgänger  on  the  divided  screen  is  effectively  uncanny:  The  uncanny  arises 
precisely  with  the  violation  of  the  film’s  codes  and  binary  oppositions.  In  the 
established field of “double” visions,  moments of shock occur when – through a 
form of shock-cut sometimes – the two sides of the screen acknowledge each other, 
specifically, when the voyeur’s look is acknowledged, in the in-between area of two 
fields of vision. Part of the image that at first is unseen by the protagonist(s), i.e., that 
is repressed (and this is where the voyeur resides) comes to be seen in all its horror. 
Baldwin’s double appears as a transgression of the visual regime of the film and its 
split fields of vision. The construction has a decidedly reflexive significance,  not 
least  recalling  how bifurcation is  itself  required by  the  film trick  of  the divided 
screen used to represent the double. The technical necessity that allows the collision 
of the two shots, filmed at different moments, in a single space and time is made 
uncanny.
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Visual Hesitation and “Unaccustomed Perceptual Wealth”
The hunting lodge interior,  the milieu of the film’s aristocrats,  confirms the first 
scene’s visual chaos and its surfeit of visual clues to be deciphered. Here again, the 
eye is momentarily puzzled by the profusion of visual stimuli. The ornamentation of 
its décor signifies the wealth of owners – to be contrasted with the sparse furnishings 
of Baldwin’s humble lodgings. The scene shows a profusion of kitsch knick-knacks 
and furniture against the background of a detailed mural of a forest scene. This mural 
opens onto a deep forest of bespeckled birches, whose equally complex, flat, framed 
image replicates and blends in with the forest mural around it. The doorframe that 
marks  off  the  forest  from  the  mural  is  itself  like  a  picture  frame,  marking  the 
boundary of a picture within the picture. The door is flanked on either side by riders 
facing it, as if moving toward the framed forest.
 
 These painterly effects and profusion of detail make it particularly difficult 
both to gauge the depths involved in the image and to analyze the image surface 
itself  horizontally.  The  scene’s  visual  excess  and  flat,  planar  qualities,  in  other 
words, create a “derangement of the conventional functioning of optical cues”, like 
in characteristic nineteenth-century stereoscopic images of interiors:
[T]he most intense experience of the stereoscopic image coincides with an object-
filled space, with a material plenitude that bespeaks a nineteenth-century bourgeois 
horror of the void; and there are endless quantities of stereo cards showing interiors 
crammed with bric-à-brac, densely filled museum sculpture galleries, and congested 
city views… But the experience of space between these objects (planes) is not one 
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of gradual and predictable recession; rather, there is a vertiginous uncertainty about 
the distance separating forms.25 
The hunting lodge interior provokes just this kind of “vertiginous uncertainty”, both 
in terms of depths and horizontally. This uncertainty is partly resolved by the motion 
of the actors, who reveal the forest, the deep-staged background that the flatness of 
the image obfuscated, to be real. Their motion into the deep background, however, 
comes as a surprise. In the confused mise en scène they seem to recede into an unreal 
forest or to enter a painting. If the viewer at first categorises the scene as theatrical, 
its  opening  onto  a  “real”  forest  is  unexpected.  In  short,  the  image  –  the  very 
theatrical appearance of the scene, its planar, flat quality – fosters visual uncertainty: 
it is unclear to the eye what is real and what fake, what is a trick and what “true”. 
These ornamentalised scenes recall Christine Buci-Glucksmann's discussion of the 
Baroque as a “madness of vision”, subverting “the dominant visual order of scientific 
reason”. As Martin Jay notes, the Baroque represents
[T]he overloading of the visual apparatus with a surplus of images in a plurality of 
spatial planes. As a result, it dazzles and distorts rather than presents a clear and 
tranquil  perspective on the truth of  the external  world.  Seeking to represent  the 
unrepresentable,  and of  necessity  failing in  this  quest,  baroque vision sublimely 
expresses the melancholy so characteristic of the period—that intertwining of death 
and desire trenchantly explored by Walter Benjamin.26
The visual structure of the scene is especially significant as a subversive quotation of 
the  mise  en  scène  of  the  popular  contemporaneous  genre  of  “aristocratic” 
melodramas.  In  his  1916  speech,  Wegener  specifically  dismissed  as  kitsch  the 
standard  high-society  dramas  so  common  in  German  (and  other  countries’) 
filmmaking of the first half of the 1910s, with “the film apartments with upholstered 
furniture  and expensive  bouquets,  these lordly  rooms with  thick tapestries,  these 
doormen, which pass for elegance”.27 All these elements appear in the lordly scenes 
25 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992, p. 125.
26 Martin  Jay,  Downcast  Eyes:  The Denigration of  Vision in  Twentieth-Century  French  Thought, 
Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1993, p. 48. 
27 Kristin Thompson, “Im Anfang war: Some Links between German Fantasy Films of the Teens and 
the  Twenties”,  in  Before  Caligari:  German  Cinema  1895–1920,  p.  138.  Paul  Wegener,  “Die 
künstlerischen Möglichkeiten des Films” (1916), in  Paul Wegener und Seine Rollen: Ein Buch von  
ihm und über ihn, ed. Kai Möller, Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1954, p. 109–110.
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of The Student of Prague. But what is specifically cinematic in the quotation is the 
means whereby their standard codes – geared to a ready “visibility”, linearity, and 
the effacement of the apparatus – are manipulated in order to pose a visual challenge 
to the spectator.
Ultimately, in this supremely artificial setting, a painting of a forest becomes 
the doorway to a “real” forest.  But although in the diegetic context this forest is 
revealed  to  be  real  and  walkable,  it  nevertheless  represents  –  at  the  spectator’s 
remove – only the moving picture of a forest and the image of walking. The multiple 
layers  of  represented  representation,  of  hunting  images  within  hunting  images, 
conspire to form “a strange mixture of the natural and artificial”: the effect is one of 
an  ontological  mise-en-abyme  that  foreshadows the  uncanny  visual  effect  of  the 
doppelgänger.
It is therefore only fitting that in the climactic sequence of the film, Baldwin 
runs through these same “real” woods, woods of unaccustomed perceptual wealth yet 
marked with an oneiric unreality. He flees his double: Complicit in the impossibility 
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of this escape is the fact that he is trapped in a representational mise en abyme, a hall 
of mirrors reflecting the natural world. The doppelgänger too is a figment of this 
medium of reproduction in which all images are equal, all as “real” as the diegesis. 
Where these layers of reality and fantasy have become permeable and trust in vision 
disrupted, a sense of the uncanny assaults the spectator.
Voyeurism and Exhibition
The film’s  consistent  depictions  of voyeurism and exhibition,  which are  a major 
factor  in  the  spectator’s  interaction  with  the  narrative,  also  foreground  the 
metacinematic  significance of  its  visual  constructions.  Forms of  voyeurism are  a 
central motivating force in the film’s dénouement itself. The duel, for example, is a 
consequence of Lyduschka giving the Baron information that  she gleans through 
spying. Peeping Tom figures – especially Lyduschka and the double – are a constant 
presence in the film in almost every scene, from the beginning to the chase sequence, 
where Baldwin’s vain flight is powerless to deliver him from the torment of seeing 
and being seen by his double.
Baldwin, as previously mentioned, is defined at the film’s beginning by his 
unwillingness  to  look,  with the exception of  the scene where he sneaks  into the 
Countess’s room. His antagonism toward his double, foreshadowed when he fences 
with  his  mirror  image,  is  an  indication  of  this  problem,  showing  his  reluctance 
ultimately to see or be seen by himself. While refusing voyeurism, he is however 
constantly  under  surveillance.  The  release  of  his  double  from  the  mirror  only 
replicates the surveillance of Lyduschka, both of whom are only stand-ins for the 
spectator’s look. The ultimate voyeur is his doppelgänger, from whose gaze he is 
unable to escape except in death.
These scenarios of voyeurism are based on the bifurcation of the visual field. 
In almost every shot that offers two (or more) distinct arenas to the spectator’s look, 
whether front and back or left and right, these arenas belong to different viewing 
parties. Often, one party may be unaware of being under the observation of another, 




Lyduschka,  whose  incessant  voyeurism  is  neither  seen  nor  punished,  is 
Baldwin’s other shadow or doppelgänger, as well as that of the Countess. Incessantly 
watching and following him, in a couple of cases she is framed as literally hovering 
over his shoulder, like a whispering devil or angel, his past or his conscience. Her 
function as Baldwin’s double is echoed by their repetitions of each other’s actions: 
While Lyduschka scales a sheer wall to continue her observation of him, Baldwin 
scales a wall (using a ladder) to get to the countess, then enters her room exactly as 
the gypsy had done before. When the double appears to watch him in her place, she 
disappears from the scene (e.g., the sequence by the columns). At times, Lyduschka 




key difference between the two, however, is that Lyduschka is a purportedly “real” 
voyeur, while the double is fantastic and uncanny.
 
The  double’s  voyeurism  contrasts  markedly  with  the  original  Baldwin’s 
refusal to look. The double thus does not simply appear as the return of his repressed 
poorer self or the “past”, haunting him in his social climb, but also as marking the 
division between himself as one who scorns to look and a repressed voyeur second 
self. If the double compensates for or embodies a lack in his host, that also involves 
this difference in position as spectator. Not just the uncanny visual crisis of seeing 
his double (both I and not-I), Baldwin’s identity crisis is grounded in two antithetical 
ways of seeing (not-looking and looking). 
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Expressed in terms of vision, Baldwin’s doubling has a metacinematic aspect, 
relating to the viewing experience of the spectator, who is likewise doubled through 
identification with both Baldwin and the film’s voyeurs. Importantly, the film does 
not rely on any point-of-view shots that would invisibly foster viewer identification 
with the characters’ perspectives. [A “classical” spatial construction would cross-cut 
the viewer-camera point of view and that of the diegetic voyeurs.] Instead, when 
Lyduschka is  spying  on  Baldwin,  both  in  the  beginning  of  the  film and  by  the 
columns, she faces and looks toward the spectator, reflecting his/her look as in a 
mirror, and as if to acknowledge a collusion in voyeurism. In the scene of the card 
game the double also turns to look at the viewer, while Baldwin, facing him, remains 
limited to the visual space of the narrative. While the voyeur’s point of view is never 
literally  represented,  the  viewer’s  nevertheless  colludes  with  and  doubles  it, 
sometimes as its mirror image. In the few scenes where the voyeur’s look is absent, 
the viewer’s takes its place. 
Like other aspects of the film that seem to recall the modes and material of 
early  cinema,  such  as  its  frontality  or  Lumière-like  realism,  these  depictions  of 
voyeurism hearken back to early cinema’s archetypal genre of voyeurism films of 
“The Bride Retires” or “through-the-keyhole” variety. As Noël Burch has noted, “the 
film of voyeurism in the strongest sense” was among the first archetypal forms of 
narrative in cinema, where “a woman undresses under the gaze of a man (normally 
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concealed from the woman, if only by a convention of the ‘Bride Retires’ kind)”.28 
Contrasting the voyeuristic scenarios of The Student of Prague with the spectator’s 
voyeurism  in  classical  narrative  cinema  is  revealing.  In  the  latter,  what  is 
indispensable  is  “the  spectator’s  invulnerability:  the  actors  spied  on  must  never 
return the spectator’s look, must never seem aware of the spectator’s presence in this  
auditorium, their looks must never pin the spectator down to that particular seat”.29 In 
The Student of Prague, like in the early cinema “bride retires” genre, the spectator is 
explicitly acknowledged in his activity of looking by the diegetic voyeur’s complicit 
return of his look. This returned look, the frontality of the staging, and lack of point-
of-view  shots  –  and  even  the  redundantly  ceaseless  vigilance  depicted  in  the 
narrative – recall  Tom Gunning’s description of early cinema as an exhibitionist 
“cinema of attractions”. However, the self-avowed stagings of voyeurism confront 
the spectator within an illusionist narrative structure. Precisely because of this dual 
mode, the film’s quotations of familiar scenarios come to have an uncanny effect. 
Similarly, Thomas Elsaesser has observed that the comedy-musical genre is a 
subtext of The Student of Prague. These films, “set in the carefree milieu of wining 
and dining, wenching and duelling students”, were popular in German commercial 
cinema from its beginnings: “A film like The Student of Prague sets up expectations 
of  this  kind,  but  does  not  fulfil  them”.30 Specifically,  it  does  not  fulfil  them by 
introducing the uncanny (and self-referential) into the familiar scene, bisected for 
example  by  the  arrival  of  Scapinelli’s  coach.  With  such  deliberate  generic 
concatenations as the film presents, if only to subvert them in the construction of the 
uncanny, it is easy to see how it has offered a challenge to attempts at situating it 
within a  rigid timeline of  film history,  not  least  in  the split  between “primitive” 
cinema and after.
Finally, in its ultimate quotation from a familiar genre, the climactic sequence 
of the film fittingly returns to the first narrative form: the chase. Taking up its rules, 
the film transforms them into metacinematic parody: the impossible sight of a man 
28 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, trans. Ben Brewster, Berkeley, Calif., University of California 
Press,  1990,  p.  213.  The  through-the-keyhole  genre,  for  Burch,  is  a  further  step  toward  the 
identification of spectator and camera.
29 Ibid., p. 216.
30 Thomas Elsaesser, “Social Mobility and the Fantastic”, p. 26.
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fleeing from himself. Baldwin, exhibiting an unwarranted faith in the “realistic” rules 
of space and time, and of classical narrative, keeps fleeing from and trying to lose his 
double,  who  is  always  ahead  of  him.  The  rules,  it  turns  out,  are  a  matter  of 
indifference to the uncanny double and to cinema itself. 
The examples detailed above show how The Student of Prague consistently 
takes up familiar  “bourgeois” visual cues – from theatre,  painting,  literature,  and 
cinema alike – to subvert their norms and viewer expectations with the introduction 
of a moment of uncertainty about what is being seen. This uncertainty engenders a 
visceral  sense  of  the  uncanny  for  the  viewer,  corresponding  to  the  narrative’s 
depiction of Baldwin’s visual crisis of seeing the double. Thus the film, rather than 
straddling  some  divide  between  primitive  cinema  and  classical  narrative,  makes 
sophisticated use of a variety of cinematic codes and the expectations they create for 
a successful representation of its uncanny subject. But significantly, this cinematic 
construction of visual uncertainty doubles as metacinematic commentary on the new 
language of cinema.
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Uncanny Cinema
As a closer look at  The Student of Prague’s obfuscatory realism, violated spatial 
bifurcations,  and  obsessive  depictions  of  spectatorship  has  shown,  the  film’s 
doppelgänger narrative is also a narrative concerning the cinematic medium and its 
spectator. Where the cinematic codes on which  The Student of Prague  relies, and 
masterfully  makes  use of,  become themselves  the basis  of  narrative conflict,  the 
question is not merely one of how cinematic signifiers articulate the themes of the 
double and social  mobility,  but of  how the latter  are  used to articulate a  certain 
conception  of  cinema and  spectatorship.  “Realist”  elements  that  derive  from the 
film’s being shot on location, which recall the Lumières’ films, as well as scenarios 
of voyeurism, subverted generic archetypes, and the geometrical arrangements of the 
film’s spaces become elements of a kind of doppelgänger story about film. 
This metafilmic “theme” concerns vision, specifically, an optical-ontological 
uncertainty  that  corresponds  to  that  of  the  doppelgänger  encounter.  From  the 
perspective of the spectator, the doppelgänger motif is the diegetic representation of 
an optical problem that the film (ideally) seeks to enact for the viewer’s sight with 
uncanny spectatorial effects. The spectator thus participates in Baldwin’s perceptual 
crisis,  explicitly  represented  in  several  shots  when,  after  the  appearance  of  his 
doppelgänger, he rubs his eyes in disbelief.
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That the doppelgänger is a perfect instrument of this formal involution has to 
do  with  a  structural  resemblance:  how the  indistinguishability  of  the  two  selves 
mimics the foundational tensions of cinema. Not least it  concerns the question of 
mechanical  reproduction:  the  problem  not  of  original  and  image,  as  is  usually 
assumed  in  studies  of  the  double,  but  of  the  equivalence  of  the  image  and  its 
reproductions. If the film actor is both present and absent, his image mechanically 
reproduced and transported,  then his  double  presence on screen  as  doppelgänger 
recalls this very fact. It is also a gesture to the real/magical “nature” of cinema when, 
at the story’s conclusion, Scapinelli – foreshadowing the final scene of Antonioni’s 
Blow-Up – disappears from the scene.
To return  once  more  to  Thomas  Elsaesser’s  question  about  the  historical 
reality to which fantastic motifs answer and the connection between the omnipresent 
doubles in German Romanticism and cinema, it would be illuminating at this point to 
consider  a  number  of  features  The  Student  of  Prague  shares  with  E.  T.  A. 
Hoffmann’s  A  New  Year’s  Eve  Adventure,  arguably  its  major  influence.  In 
Hoffmann’s tale, the narrator and a man who has lost his mirror reflection are both 
suffering in the aftermath of their relations with two women (themselves doubles), 
Julia and Guiletta. These women’s vague familiarity and erotic power over the men 
is tied to their being doubles of ideal images of women in paintings: i.e., they exactly 
resemble women in paintings of Rembrandt, Mieris, or Brueghel. Simulacra of man-
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made images (paintings that paradoxically play the part  of Platonic Forms), their 
effect  resides  in  their  unreality  and,  one  might  say,  re-representational  nature. 
Fittingly, while looking into mirrors, the protagonists see them approaching from a 
distance.31 
When  the  protagonist  of  the  first-level  nested  narrative,  the  Travelling 
Enthusiast,  meets  Erasmus  Spikher,  who  has  lost  his  reflection  to  the  diabolical 
Guiletta and (Scapinelli-like) Miracle Doctor Dapertutto, he describes him as
… engulfed  in  a  cloak  of  peculiar  brownish  color,  which  bubbled  and  flapped 
around him as he bounced across the room toward us, so that in the dim light it 
looked as if a series of forms were dissolving and emerging from one another, as in 
Ensler’s magic lantern show.32
For Hoffmann too,  the dim light and the transformations of forms, the sideshow 
space of the double’s appearance, already solicit a comparison with the effects of the 
magic lantern. These media of optical illusion, whether mirrors or magic lanterns (or 
cinema), are the opaque intermediaries between the spectator and the visible world, 
the object of vision. They give rise to uncanny perceptual uncertainties that continue 
to act when the cause has been removed, as if they were involved in a structural 
change taking place in the consciousness and experience of their viewing subject – 
like the binoculars sold by Coppola to Nathanael in The Sandman.
Forms vaguely glimpsed in mirrors, multiply nested reproductions of selves 
and images, and even the uncertainty of the distinction between paintings and the 
real are elements of the uncanny optic shared by Hoffmann’s story and The Student  
of Prague. These striking thematic resemblances point toward a set of particularly 
modern  conditions:  the  proliferation  of  optical  instruments  and  simulacra,  the 
debased status of “natural” vision, the lack of reference of representation, and the 
inaccessibility of the “real”. Once more,  they evoke the turning point marked by 
Kantian thought:
31 Among  the  reflexive  narrative  effects  of  the  story  is  that  Hoffmann  borrows  Adalbert  von 
Chamisso’s famous doppelgänger character, Peter Schlemihl, the man who has lost his shadow. Thus 
his text too is a mirror of yet another representation.
32 E.T.A. Hoffmann, “A New Year’s Eve Adventure”, in The Best Tales of Hoffmann, ed. and intro. by 
E. F. Bleiler, New York, NY, Dover Publications, 1967, p.110.
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Kant’s “Copernican revolution”… is a definitive sign of a new organization and 
positioning of the subject. For Kant, continuing the use of optical figures, it is “a 
change in point of view,” such that “our representations of things, as they are given, 
does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects as 
appearances, conform to our mode of representation.”33
The fact  that  emerges as significant  is  that  1820s–1840s saw the “abstraction of 
optical experience from a stable referent”, as a result of which “by 1840 the process 
of perception itself had become, in various ways, a primary object of vision”.34 The 
thematic  intersection  of  The Student  of  Prague  and Hoffmann’s  stories  concerns 
precisely such a dissociation of representations, images formed in the mind or shown 
on a screen, from stable referents in “reality”. The doppelgänger theme evokes this 
lack of referentiality, which instruments like cinema both compound and signify: a 
sense in which the phenomenal world becomes infinitely distant while its perception 
is  stranded  in  a  hall  of  mirrors  of  an  individual  subjectivity  and  prosthetic 
instruments. 
With  regard  to  the  visual  regimes  of  modernity  and  their  supreme 
manifestation,  cinema, it  is important that  “the  Doppelgänger is more properly a 
figure of the displacement which inheres in the environments it disrupts”.35 On film, 
it  points  to  what  has  been  displaced  from  an  environment  that  is  composed  of 
“realistic”  images of  the world and the human form: namely,  referentiality.  This 
absence,  crucially,  was  “the  ground  on  which  new  instrumental  techniques 
[constructed] for an observer a new ‘real’ world”.36 In evoking the instabilities of 
realism, the double highlights the paradoxical fact that the realistic effects offered by 
modern instruments were founded on the abstraction of perception. What it exposes, 
in  this  case,  is  how realism  coincides  with  the  “real”  world  becoming  (at  least 
theoretically) inaccessible to human perception. The uncanny effects of the double 
coincide  with forms of  self-reference,  and are  inseparable  from the paradigmatic 
ontological vertigo of cinema itself, precisely the kind of visceral discomfort that a 
naturalistic cinema would seek to elide or instrumentalise.
33 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, pp. 69–70.
34 Ibid., p. 113, 138.
35 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger: Double Visions in German Literature, Oxford and New York, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 8–9.
36 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, p. 91.
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CHAPTER IX
THE DOPPELGÄNGER ALLEGORY OF CINEMA
The preceding discussions drew attention to a set of characteristics shared by the 
films of  the  double.  One recurring feature is  effects  that  create  visual  obscurity, 
ranging from unclear lighting and smoke in the mise-en-scène, to film tricks such as 
superposed  images,  to  the  structural  uncertainties  of  multiply  framed  narratives. 
These effects contribute to ontological uncertainties of perception both within the 
narrative and for the spectator, and to distraction from a “natural” diegetic spacetime, 
e.g.,  with  the  intrusion  of  an  alien  temporality  (as  in  the  montage  of  eyes  in 
Metropolis). They can even issue a direct threat to the viewer’s eye, as exemplified 
by the figure of Death wielding a scythe (Metropolis), or Jack the Ripper brandishing 
a  knife  as  he  moves  toward  the  viewer  (Waxworks).1 Altogether,  these  elements 
1 Similarly, as Lotte Eisner noted of Nosferatu, “Murnau created an atmosphere of horror by a forward 
movement of the actors toward the camera”. (Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the  
German  Cinema  and  the  Influence  of  Max  Reinhardt,  trans.  Roger  Greaves,  Berkeley,  Calif., 
University of California Press, 1994, p. 102). In Fritz Lang’s Dr Mabuse, der Spieler, “the doctor’s 
head appears, at first small and remote on a black background, only to be suddenly projected forward, 
as if by some supernatural agency, filling the whole screen” (p. 104).
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participate in the effective cinematic depiction of the uncanny. The close readings of 
films in the preceding chapters furthermore illuminated the ways in which the visual 
effects that accompany the double support metacinematic themes, while the figure of 
the double plays a key role in their allegories of cinema. 
These films share a variety of visual and generic excesses, such as mixed 
quotations from different arts (e.g., theatre and painting) and from different genres or 
film styles (e.g., detective film and melodrama, early cinema and classical narrative). 
They  quote  with  equal  ease  from early  cinema  and  variety  theatre,  as  from the 
nascent norms of classical narrative. They both foreshadow (in the case of the earlier 
films, such as  Der Student von Prag or Franz Hofer's  Die schwarze Kugel  [1913]) 
and quote avant-garde and modernist film practices. From another perspective, while 
appropriating structures familiar  from literature and classical  narrative norms that 
seek to ground the viewer in a basic narrative continuity, they also characteristically 
use a variety of methods to defer, delay, or halt the progression of narrative. 
Observing  these  films,  it  certainly  holds  true  that  in  the  cinema  too, 
“Doppelgänger and their host texts are … double-agents, in the duplicitous service of 
conflicting aesthetic systems”.2 But for the film double, this is a more complicated 
phenomenon than for the literary version. On film the conflicting aesthetic systems 
involved  encompass  not  only  various  generic  conventions,  such  as  realism  and 
fantasy, but also the conventions of different art forms and media, such as theatre, 
painting, architecture, music, and so on. Drawing on heterogeneous cinematic effects 
and genres to create a  bric-à-brac of visual effects, their directors display a keen 
awareness  of  the  possibilities  of  cinema,  while  using  the  reflexive  theme of  the 
double as part of the project to define the specificity and position of the medium of 
cinema vis-à-vis the other arts.3 
2 Andrew  Webber,  The  Doppelgänger:  Double  Visions  in  German  Literature,  Oxford,  Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 10.
3 See  Brigitte  Peucker,  Incorporating  Images:  Film and the  Rival  Arts, Princeton,  NJ,  Princeton 
University Press, 1995. A promising approach for further study is reconsidering the double in the 
context  of  film’s  anxiety  about  its  position  vis-à-vis  the  other  arts,  taking  a  cue  from  Brigitte 
Peucker’s study. Peucker’s analysis, which focuses on the figuration of the body (and the film’s body 
as  a  monstrous hybrid)  concerns  how the  introduction  of  movement  into the  visual  arts  by  film 
introduces the spectre of death/castration. 
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In a related vein, many of these films also contain scenes depicting a surfeit 
of visual stimuli or forms of ornamental excess, for which Metropolis  may well be 
the extreme-case scenario. Thus for example, “excessive” Expressionist and early-
cinematic imagery is combined with “primitive” camera techniques, such as the use 
of circular mattes, to illustrate what is essentially a detective story in  Caligari. A 
basic effect of such seemingly gratuitously ornamental imagery and mise en scène, 
especially where these effects have limited narrative motivation, is a self-conscious 
aesthetic defamiliarization that stresses or draws attention to the visual characteristics 
of the film image as such. As a consequence too, the excessively detailed images in 
these films are not easily “consumed” or exhausted at a first viewing. 
The recurring milieus of the carnival or Luna Park are a feature related to 
these  excesses  of  visibility.  Located  or  appearing  on  the  margins  of  the 
naturalistic/bourgeois world of the everyday, these settings are often the backdrop of 
uncanny and/or fantastic phenomena. The carnival world appears in a large number 
of films of the double; in Caligari and Waxworks it is the primary site of the action. 
As mentioned previously, the fair has a set of characteristics that lend themselves to 
visual confusion and a suspension of perceptual (and by extension hegemonic) order. 
These include the ways in which movement from booth to booth has a random and 
episodic character,  without beginning or end,  and occurs in an irrational acentric 
space. But a number of other settings in these films resemble the fairground in their 
suspension of bourgeois visual order. For example, Prague’s Jewish Ghetto in  The 
Golem,  the  Jewish  Cemetery  in  The  Student  of  Prague,  and  the  catacombs  in 
Metropolis  play the same role, representing sites of suspended rationality in which 
the uncanny arises. The city of Prague in particular offers a recurrent haunt for the 
doppelgänger, signifying the “other” of German order on the margins of the German-
speaking world. The theatre setting too, with its artificial lights and circulations of 
identity offers similar possibilities.4 
The Baroque details of these settings and other elements of visual disorder in 
the films have the effect of compounding visual and ontological uncertainty, so that 
at times the viewer’s eye scarcely knows where to look, while the credibility of the 
4A suggestive example is the use of the variety theatre setting in Die Schwarze Kugel (1913).
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image is put in question and its mechanical nature foregrounded as an interruption of 
narrative.  The  ornamental,  far  from  offering  the  meaningless  beauty  of  empty 
aesthetic spectacle (in the midst of suffering, as Kracauer especially claims is the 
case in Metropolis), has instead a decidedly ambivalent effect: that of giving rise to 
an uncertain visual gratification with paradoxically dark and threatening undertones. 
Peucker, discussing Fritz Lang’s  Destiny, has pointed to such a tendency, which, I 
would  argue,  is  not  only  a  Langian  gesture  but  a  recurring  feature  of  the 
doppelgänger theme: 
Whether it is a patterned curtain, a wrought-iron gate, or a series of pillars behind 
which danger lurks,  the visual  surface at  its  most  ornamental—where it  is  most 
obviously  a  lure  for  the  eye—is  particularly  suspect  and  most  vulnerable.  This 
surface is less likely than any other to be able to contain the agent of death; indeed, 
it seems to be its special function to reveal this agent.5
The doppelgänger and its uncanny spectator effects require that what characters see 
become and remain questionable.  The visible  qualities  of objects  are  revealed as 
“superficial”,  as  having the potential  to deceive and hiding their  monstrous “true 
nature” of untold terror. But what is shown onscreen partakes of this denigration of 
the diegetic visible and contains a threat to the spectator; the uncanny is not just a 
narrative  but  a  structural  effect.  In  other  words,  the  world  of  “surfaces”  that  is 
revealed to vision by the camera eye is also exposed as a pleasurable phantasmagoria 
that obscures the true nature of things. [Cf. classical narrative cinema, where what 
the camera shows, above all in its role of omniscient narrator, is the incontrovertible, 
foundational true version of events, one exception being subjectivized point-of-view 
shots, such as a blurry shot of what a drunkard is  seeing.]  Taken together,  these 
effects of Baroque generic and stylistic excess, forms of diegetic visual obscurity, 
and so forth, engender a visual regime that fosters an ontological uncertainty and an 
ambivalent  characterization  of  vision  and  the  visual,  accompanying  the  affective 
presentation of the double theme and its metacinematic signification.
Beyond the  scope  of  such  sometimes  egregious  stylistic  effects  (e.g.,  the 
graphic  Expressionism  of  Caligari),  which  contravene  the  unifying  effects  of 
5 Brigitte Peucker, Incorporating Images, pp. 40–41.
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narrative development, are other kinds of visual disorder that are no longer even 
decorative  and  instead  distract  the  viewer  from  the  narrative  with  an  “obtuse 
meaning”. Examples include the multiplication of Jack the Ripper in  Waxworks or 
the  illegibility  of  particular  detail  elements,  for  example  the  strange  hexagonal 
eyeglasses of the club doorman in Metropolis (see image below). These elements too 
contribute to perceptual confusion and/or distraction (from the diegesis) on the part 
of  the  spectator  and  reproduce  the  diegetic  problematic  based  in  vision. Such 
cinematic excess is not only intimately linked with the crises of perception in the 
diegetic world, but also to their possibilities for uncanny effects. Likewise, it is a 
necessary  aspect  of  the  themes  of  the  double,  insofar  as  the  difficulty  or 
bewilderment they pose for the spectator’s perception echoes the narrative optical 
crisis of the double. 
Within the bounds of the naturalist tendencies of these narratives – in the 
sense that they could have been credible, classically cohesive stories, but for the fact 
that something is structurally not right – the double could be classed in the ranks of 
these visual excesses. Its uncanniness is as an excessive figure: it enters the narrative 
as a redundancy, as too much of the same realistic thing. It acts as a repetition of a 
figure  beyond  narrative  requirements  for  its  deployment,  and  thereby  puts  the 
naturalist-illusionist potential of the film in question. In this way it could be read as 
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an anthropomorphic representation of cinematic excess, as a reflexive symbol of this 
excess within the narrative. Its uncanny significations have a kind of a “third” or 
“obtuse meaning”, 6 like other elements in film that cannot be accounted for in terms 
of narrative necessity and therefore have a potential counternarrative effect, where 
“Excess implies a gap or lag in motivation”.7 
The Curious Spacetime of the Uncanny
Gustav Meyrink’s short story “Waxworks”, the film rights for which were bought by 
Paul Leni, begins with an interesting discussion of the uncanny that is unusual in 
describing the concept in spatial and temporal terms:8
“I suppose it’s probably the waxworks that have upset me,” Sebaldus went on, “I’m 
unspeakably nervous today. When I saw Melchior just  now in the distance,  and 
watched his figure getting bigger and bigger as he approached, I could feel some 
kind of perturbation, I don’t know how to say it, but it was something uncanny, as if 
the distance could swallow up everything, no matter what: bodies, sounds, thoughts, 
fancies, events. Or conversely, as if we could see them tiny at first,  then slowly 
getting bigger,  everything,  even  non-material  things,  which don’t  have  to  move 
through space in the same way. – I don’t think I’m using the right words here, but 
you know what I mean? Everything seems to obey the same law!”
His friend nodded thoughtfully.
“Yes, and there are some thoughts and happenings that come creeping up, as if there 
were an ‘over there’, like a hill or something that they can hide behind; and then 
they jump out right in front of you when they’ve grown to giant size.”9
6 See Roland Barthes, “The Third Meaning”, Image – Music – Text, ed. by Stephen Heath, New York, 
Hill & Wang, 1981, pp. 52–68. “In other words,  the third meaning structures the film  differently  
without – at least in SME – subverting the story and for this reason, perhaps, it is at the level of the 
third meaning, and at that level alone, that the ‘filmic’ finally emerges. The filmic is that in the film 
which cannot be described, the representation which cannot be represented. The filmic begins only 
where language and metalanguage end” (p. 64).
7 Kristin  Thompson,  “The Concept  of  Cinematic  Excess”,  in  Narrative,  Apparatus,  Ideology, ed. 
Philip Rosen, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 134. Thompson argues that cinematic 
excess can arise in several ways: through the randomness of the specific form that an element takes, 
the length of time something is onscreen, a redundancy of narrative motivation, and the repetition of 
an element beyond the narrative’s requirements. These elements tend to alienate the viewer from the 
diegesis and baffle the critic who attempts to pinpoint their signification within a cohesive thematic  
reading of what the film “means”. Thompson relies on definitions of the concept by Stephen Heath 
and Roland Barthes.
8 The chapter on The Golem briefly considered how the visual effects and imagery of Meyrink’s novel 
replicated effects that cinema had made possible, such as fade-outs, close-ups, and so on. It is perhaps 
no coincidence that Meyrink’s conceptualization of the uncanny also has a “cinematic” quality.
9 Gustav Meyrink,  “Waxworks”,  in  The Opal and Other  Stories,  Trans.  Maurice Raraty.  Sawtry, 
Cambs.: Dedalus/Ariadne, 1994, p. 135. 
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This  somewhat  murky  description  foreshadows  Freud’s  attempt  to  define  the 
uncanny a few years later (1919) as a “return of the repressed”, the coming to light of 
something  that  should  have  remained  hidden,  signifying  a  threat  to  vision  and 
castration anxiety. But it also expresses in evocative terms certain possibilities of the 
cinema: its capacity to overcome space and time through editing and montage; the 
ghostly,  unreal  approach  of  the  flickering  specter  onscreen,  getting  bigger  and 
bigger; the passive, immobile spectator’s powerlessness before the approach; even 
the possibility of a sudden, threatening intersubjectivity.10 It especially captures the 
effect of Jack the Ripper’s pursuit in Waxworks’ irrational spaces: his floating toward 
the spectator caught in his path and his multiplication in the air. 
What makes this an unusual and evocative description of the uncanny is its 
attribution  of  spatial  and  temporal  dimensions  to  the  concept,  relating  its  vague 
unease to the violation of the “ordinary” and “natural” motions or positions of things, 
ideas,  and  so  on  –  the  cinematic  counterpart  of  the  latter  being  “naturalism”  in 
classical  narrative.11 Interestingly  too,  it  posits  an  immobile  observer  who  feels 
threatened  by  the  unusual  approach  and/or  possible  sudden  deconcealment  of 
something  hidden.  Instead  of  the  observer’s  senses  or  agency,  the  unpredictable 
vagaries of space (distance) – of which time seems to be a function – determine his 
experience:  the  distance  can  “swallow up  everything”.  With  the  immobility  and 
passivity of the observer as a precondition, the unexpected agency of the things or 
objects  themselves  becomes  the  source  of  a  sense  of  the  uncanny.  The  viewing 
subject can be directly confronted by something that should not have been seen  in 
such  a  way.  Immobile,  he  is  prey  to  an  unexpected  intersubjective  experience, 
becoming the object of the gaze/approach of the things themselves.
Sebaldus’s description of this uncanny experience also evokes a peculiarly 
cinematic spectatorial situation and the quite similar effects made possible by the 
10 Perhaps this is even more the case after the “unchained camera” was invented by Karl Freund while 
shooting  Murnau’s  The  Last  Laugh  (1924).  At  this  point  it  was  still  the  screen  spectre  who 
approached, and not the camera.
11 In  Meyrink’s  Golem,  some people  who have  seen  the  Golem describe  it  as  simply  vanishing 
afterwards, while “On the other hand, you come across agitated people who maintain they saw it 
coming round a corner towards them. Although it was quite clearly walking towards them, it gradually 
grew smaller and smaller, like the figure of someone disappearing into the distance, until it finally 
disappeared” (trans. Mike Mitchell, Dedalus Books, 1995, p. 58).
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movie camera and film editing, such as close-ups or slow-motion. While such effects 
are stock components of widely varied cinematic practices, from classical Hollywood 
films to avant-garde cinema, they specifically have the potential to create a sense of 
the  uncanny  when  they  appear  as  a  violation  of  “natural”  narrative  spacetime. 
Signifying the “arrival of the instrument”, in such moments they expose the hidden 
conditions of illusionist cinematic practice (the cinematic counterpart of bourgeois 
naturalism):  the  production  process  and  the  mediation  of  the  transmitted  image. 
Uncanny temporal disjunctions, for example, have the potential to self-consciously 
draw attention to the structural constitution of a film.12 
In  the  films  we  have  discussed,  a  key  feature  of  the  construction  of  the 
uncanny is the treatment of narrative spacetime. Uncanny gestures often appear to 
interrupt or disturb the flow of natural narrative time, at times prolonging it so that 
the image seems to freeze within the moment. These effects illustrate the claim that, 
according  to  Paul  Coates,  “the  modernist  theme  of  temporality  is  linked  to  a 
perception of  the  uncanny,  which  establishes  itself  as  time is  abolished and one 
becomes trapped in the moment”.13 Within the confines of a progressing narrative, 
the unnatural(ist) appearance of space and time is itself uncanny. An example of such 
a  sequence  is  Freder’s  visual  crisis  in  Metropolis,  brought  on  by  seeing  the 
doppelgänger Maria in his father’s arms. In this scene and during his subsequent 
12 Instances of such effects can be found in a variety of genres of films with a doppelgänger theme. 
There  are  some  especially  evocative  examples  in  Hitchcock’s  films  of  the  use  of  “cinematic 
possibilities” (in the midst of stock effects to which the viewer is habituated) to create a sense of the 
uncanny,  often in  conjunction with the doppelgänger.  In  Strangers  on a Train,  the woman (Mrs. 
Haines) about to be murdered at an amusement park looks back to one side, sees no-one and turns 
toward the camera: the murderer (Bruno) materializes out of nowhere on her other side. The sudden 
appearance  of  Bruno  with  this  shock  cut,  defying  the  spectator’s  “natural”  temporal  and  spatial 
expectations, gives rise to an uncanny frisson. But at the same time it draws attention to the role of the 
apparatus in creating the response. In Vertigo, the uncanniness of the double (Madeleine Elster/Judy 
Barton)  is  conveyed  through  a  problematic,  unnatural  representation  of  space  and  narrative 
temporality: not  only in the theme of reincarnation but,  for example, in the strange temporal and 
spatial attenuations and prolongations of shots, such as that of Scottie Ferguson embracing the double 
(ironically the same woman) while the camera revolves around them. Of course, the viewer is also 
affected by the  protagonist’s  spatio-temporal  problem through the use of  what  is  now called the 
“vertigo shot” and its unsettling visceral  distress.   But throughout,  this visceral empathy with the 
protagonist  is  understood  as  such;  the  spectator  knows  that  the  protagonist  is  suffering  from  a 
psychological problem. By contrast, in these German films the problem is objectivised as part of the 
visual order.
13 Paul  Coates,  The Gorgon's  Gaze:  German Cinema,  Expressionism,  and  the  Image  of  Horror, 
Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 2.
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hallucinations, the narrative spacetime is seriously disturbed, and, following the fate 
of Freder’s sense of reality, the viewer’s ontological orientation toward the film, or 
his notion of what is “actually” happening, becomes uncertain. 
Uncanny moments in these films also coincide with a loss of motor activity 
for  the  viewing party  (generally  the  protagonist).  The  motor  activity  of  the  film 
viewer,  of course,  is relinquished in advance,  the requirement  of film exhibition. 
Thus, for example, when Balduin comes across his double or attempts to flee him, 
Caligari glares into the camera or at Jane, or Jack the Ripper pursues the protagonists 
of  Waxworks, the threatened characters appear to be deprived of corporal agency, 
like the spectator, and in many cases it is the threatening figure who approaches. In 
these moments,  the visual disposition of what  can be seen onscreen becomes all 
important; the viewer’s attention is drawn to the visible details, and narrative time 
seems to grind to a halt. 
These situations resonate with Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the time-image, 
which is in fact very illuminating for characterizing the temporality of the cinematic 
uncanny. While the time-image is a term of Deleuze’s analysis of Neo-Realism and 
its  thematic  of  a  “crystallization  of  time”,  it  nonetheless  pertains  to  the  exactly 
parallel way in which the uncanny functions in these films as a problem of visual – 
including spatial and temporal – uncertainty. With the time-image, writes Deleuze,
[T]he  distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  …  also  tends  to  lose  its 
importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the 
motor action. We run in fact into a principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility: 
we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the situation, 
not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no 
longer even a place from which to ask. It is as if the real and the imaginary were 
running after each other, as if each was being reflected in the other, around a point 
of indiscernibility.14
This is precisely the situation in the uncanny moments of these films, in particular in 
the  doppelgänger  encounter  –  the  ultimate  metaphor  of  the  breakdown  of  the 
subjective-objective divide and of a principle of indiscernibility (between real and 
imaginary,  self  and other)  that  is founded in vision.  The doppelgänger encounter 
14 Gilles  Deleuze,  Cinema  II:  The  Time-Image,  trans.  by  Hugh  Tomlinson  &  Robert  Galeta, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 7.
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similarly privileges visual description over motor action and coincides with the near-
collapse of the established temporality of the narrative. The preceding chapters have 
detailed at greater length how the optical situation or visual description are of great 
significance in such uncanny moments, not merely in the attention that is drawn to 
visible detail in tandem with the diminution of time (rather, its slowing down), but 
also where visual description becomes the basis of a problem of indiscernibility.15 
But it is worth noting that this indiscernibility paradoxically emerges together 
with an excess of visibility. The viewer’s attention is drawn to visibility and the 
visible, to the details of  mise-en-scène, such as the Baroque excess of ornaments: 
such as of hunting lodge in  The Student of Prague, the Ghetto in  The Golem, the 
bridges and rooftops over which Cesare walks, or Haroun-al-Rashid’s palace. At the 
same time, however, what is visible is profoundly suspect, ungrounded, and “unreal”.
The Double as Metacinematic Theme
The  films  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapters  reveal  a  host  of  self-conscious 
narrative and structural effects that justify reading the themes of the double as part of 
deliberately  constructed  allegories  of  cinema.  As  we  previously  noted,  in  the 
broadest  sense  this  arises  from how the  uncanny is  constructed  as  a  problem of 
vision,  and images  are  the language of  cinematic  representation.  In  other  words, 
uncertainty  regarding  the  true  and  the  false,  and  effects  of  mise  en  abyme and 
embedded frames and perspectives, and the posing of questions of diegetic “truth”, 
15 Cf. Miriam Hansen on Benjamin and cinema: “Congealing of the temporal dialectic of experience 
into spatial categories is itself a sign of the times. With the optical unconscious Benjamin readmits 
dimensions of temporality and historicity into his vision of the cinema, against his own endorsement 
of it as the medium of presence and tracelessness. The material fissure between a consciously and an 
unconsciously permeated space opens upon a temporal gap for the viewer, a disjunction that may 
trigger recollection, and with it promises of reciprocity and intersubjectivity… With the temporal gap 
that opens up with the optical unconscious comes the ‘surrender of spatial orientation to the gravity of 
the  gaze,  the  memory  image  that  seizes  the  beholder  rather  than  vice  versa.’”  (Miriam Hansen, 
“Benjamin, Cinema, and Experience: The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology”,  New German 
Critique, No. 40, Winter 1987, pp. 217–219). Lukács attributes a “spatialization of time” to capitalist 
reification in  History and Class Consciousness, published a year before the release of  Waxworks  in 
1923: “The contemplative stance adopted towards a process mechanically conforming to fixed laws 
and  enacted  independently  of  man's  consciousness  and  impervious  to  human  intervention,  i.e.  a 
perfectly closed system, must likewise transform the basic categories of man's immediate attitude to 




are based in vision, the faculty through which the spectators’ interaction with the 
film  takes  place.  The  uncanny effects  whereby  the  identity  crisis  of  the  double 
translates into a perceptual and subjective crisis for the spectator are founded on and 
refer to the fundamental tensions of the medium of cinema itself, the source of the 
unease. To return to Christian Metz’s well-known description of the double nature of 
film,  in  which  he  resorts  to  the  rhetoric  of  the  doppelgänger  encounter,  this  is 
because
[The] cinema, ‘more perceptual’ than certain arts according to the list of its sensory 
registers, is also ‘less perceptual’ than others once the status of these perceptions is 
envisaged rather than their number or diversity; for its perceptions are in a sense 
‘false’. Or rather, the activity of perception which it involves is real (the cinema is 
not a phantasy), but the perceived is not really the object, it is its shade, its phantom, 
its double, its replica in a new kind of mirror. It will be said that literature, after all, 
is only itself made of replicas (written words, presenting absent objects). But at least 
it does not present them to us with all the really perceived detail that the screen does 
(giving more and taking as much, i.e. taking more).  The unique position of the 
cinema lies in this dual character of its signifier: unaccustomed perceptual wealth, 
but at the same time stamped with unreality to an unusual degree, and from the very 
outset. More than the other arts, or in a more unique way, the cinema involves us in 
the imaginary: it drums up all perception, but to switch it over immediately into its 
own absence, which is nonetheless the only signifier present.16
Particularly appropriate to cinema then is the fact that “If …das Unheimliche has a 
privileged  relation  to  literary  ‘fiction,’  it  is  surely  not  to  the  mere  contents 
represented ‘in’ or ‘by’ texts, but to their ‘formal,’ textual structure itself”.17
A  variety  of  visual  effects,  as  discussed  above,  contribute  sustaining  an 
uncanny  optical  regime,  a  “principle  of  indiscernibility”.  In  this  context,  other 
reflexive effects, such as explicit representations of vision, the symbol of the eye, 
optical  instruments,  and  scenarios  of  spectatorship  and  film  projection,  become 
especially meaningful. These effects support a metacinematic allegory centered on 
the figure of the double, exposing cinema as an ambivalent medium composed of 
doubtful images.
Other than the double, characters with metacinematic significance are found 
in  all these  films,  which  consistently  showcase  dealers  in  “cinema”:  surrogate 
16 Christian  Metz,  “Identification,  Mirror”,  in  The  Imaginary  Signifier:  Psychoanalysis  and  the  
Cinema, trans.  Ben Brewster et al., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 44–45.




director figures, scientists, magicians, and inventors who put on cinematic spectacles. 
Such  characters as  Scapinelli, Caligari, the waxworks proprietor, Rabbi Loew, and 
Rotwang recall the scientist-inventors of the cinema: Marey, Muybridge, Demenÿ, 
and Méliès, and Oskar Messter. Their characterization and roles as often-diabolical 
media  technologists  are  highlighted  by  their  putting  on  shows  and  unleashing 
doubles. But as we have seen, they also refer to well-known, charlatanical Romantic 
literary predecessors and to their historical counterparts, who played a direct role in 
the development of the building blocks of cinema. The genre of the phantasmagoria 
and  its  showmen  are  one  source  of  the  connection  between  prototypes  of  such 
characters in Romantic literature and innovators of the “motion picture”. The return 
to Romantic motifs in the new medium of cinema is thus explicitly related to self-
conscious and reflexive themes.
Scenarios  of  spectatorship  are  repeatedly  performed:  voyeurism  and 
surveillance, exhibitions by showmen, audiences viewing films within films. These 
gestures  draw attention  to  the  constructed  character  of  the  cinematic  experience, 
serving a narrative function while also acting to distance the viewer from the film as 
narrative. More abstractly in this category – as the case of Caligari shows – are the 
mises en abyme of frames, stages, doorways, and other indicators of the uncertain 
status of what is seen, indications that the visible film is a perspectival composite of 
images.
In addition, all these films showcase uncanny moments involving the look 
into the camera by the diegetic figure of threat, experienced by the spectator as the 
threatening, exhibitionist return of his/her look. In this way too, danger is associated 
with the language and “nature” of cinema. The antagonist’s look into the camera, 
figured as a threat to the viewer (who becomes a voyeur “caught in the act”) relies on 
generic heterogeneity: the narrative subscribes to a cohesion, in the context of which 
gestures  that  “expose  the  instrument”  become  uncanny. Exploding  out  of  the 
spacetime of the narrative, this uncanny look perhaps more than any other effect is a 
gesture signifying “the arrival of the instrument”, and especially noteworthy as a 
point of contrast with American cinema, the primary competition for the German 
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market,  against  which products  of  German art  cinema sought  definition.  For  the 
former, 
The  solitary  and  ubiquitous  voyeurism  of  the  Institution  demanded  as  its 
indispensable complement the spectator’s invulnerability: the actors spied on must 
never return the spectator’s look, must never seem aware of the spectator’s presence 
in this auditorium, their looks must never pin the spectator down to that particular 
seat.18
In these diegetic crises of vision, on the contrary, their narrative status quo and the 
viewer’s  subjectivity  are  threatened  by  being  observed  while  looking:  by  an 
embodiment and corporalization of vision. In this context the viewed object becomes 
a viewing subject while his in-between status as film image, as both alive and dead, 
is  exposed  in  uncanny  indeterminacy;  from  another  perspective,  the  spectator 
becomes visible to the source of the diegetic threat of death/dismemberment.
Often this scene is set at the festival or carnival atmosphere of the funfair. 
The alternative visual regime of this milieu has a reflexive and exhibitionist effect, as 
Christian Metz has discussed: 
If there is an element of triumph in this kind of representation, it is because what it 
exhibits is not exactly the exhibited object but, via the object, the exhibition itself. 
The exhibited partner knows that he is being looked at, wants this to happen, and 
identifies  with  the  voyeur  whose  object  he  is  (but  who also  constitutes  him as 
subject). This is a different economic regime, and a different tuning of desire: not 
that of the fiction film, but the one which classical theatre sometimes comes close 
to, when actor and spectator are in each other’s presence, when the playing (of the 
actor and the audience) is also a distribution of roles (of ‘character parts’) in a game, 
an active complicity which works both ways, a ceremony which is always partly 
civic, involving more than the private individual: a festival.19
The suspension of order in the festival atmosphere (like Bakhtin’s carnival, with its 
orgiastic excesses and violence) puts its spectator ill at ease. The cinematic language 
used to construct these scenes – an obvious illustration being the Waxworks Jack the 
Ripper  sequence  –  contributes  to  a  visual  decentredness  and  a  Baroque 
“physiognomic excess”.  It is, in any case, inappropriate to read such milieus as a 
glorification of irrationalism, chaos, and anarchy: far from being Utopian, they are 
dangerously unpredictable, and visually and even corporally threatening.
18 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, trans. Ben Brewster, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1990, p. 216.
19 Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier, p. 94.
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Although a common observation, it is important to note how the themes and 
effects common to these films support a visual regime markedly contrasting with a 
(hypothetical)  narrative  mode  in  which  every  element  has  motivation  and  the 
spectator is accorded the omniscient position of a transcendental subject before the 
world viewed. Instead, they play up the arbitrary and contingent nature of the visible, 
engendering optical unease that ranges from visual indecision to direct “modernist” 
threats  to  the  eye.  This  cinema  of  the  double  is  marked  by  frontality, 
indecipherability, and visual assault; not least, with the direct look at the spectator 
from the source of the diegetic threat. The uncanniness of the double motif – and of 
cinema itself – is tied to this confusion and threat posed to the spectator’s vision. 
The  problems  of  vision  that  are  the  source  of  conflict  in  these  films  – 
nowhere  more  so than in  the  appearance  of  the  doppelgänger  –  reveal  what  the 
viewer  sees  to  be  composed  of  nested  images  within  images.  Here,  only 
representations and simulacra are available to the observer, whether to the diegetic 
observer, whose acts of observation are relentlessly highlighted, or to the spectator in 
the theatre,  whose process of watching is part  of the film. The cinematic images 
presented  are  shown  to  be  equivalent,  interchangeable,  and  epistemologically 
discreditable simulacra. It becomes unclear at what level the spectator could situate 
himself in any ontological hierarchy vis-à-vis this inaccessible and absent referent. 
The real  forest  within the painted mural in  A Student  of  Prague exemplifies this 
problem of  the mediation,  recession,  and inaccessibility  of  the  real;  likewise  the 
multiple framings and perspectives leading to the feeble resolution of Caligari. 
The double is the focal point of this visual problem. Within the diegesis it 
concerns the presentation of an “original” (which is itself always already an image) 
and its copy (a secondary image) as indistinguishable to sight and ultimately inimical 
to a mimetic ontological hierarchy. In thus evoking the uncanny, the double concerns 
the ontological status of what is seen (which remains indeterminate) and the power of 
vision to  establish knowledge and certitude,  putting in  question the reliability  of 
vision  as  a  means  of  access  to  the  “real”  and  iconoclastically  dismissing  its 
perceptions as a  mise en abyme  of equivalent images. Where interchangeability of 
the “original” and its “copy” evokes a “principle of indiscernibility”, this
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[C]onstitutes an objective illusion; it does not suppress the distinction between the 
two sides, but makes it unattributable, each side taking the other’s role in a relation 
which we must describe as reciprocal presupposition, or reversibility. In fact, there 
is  no  virtual  which  does  not  become actual  in  relation  to  the  actual,  the  latter 
becoming virtual through the same relation: it is a place and its obverse which are 
totally  reversible.  These  are  ‘mutual  images’  as  Bachelard  puts  it,  where  an 
exchange is carried out. The indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, or of the 
present and the past, of the actual and the virtual, is definitely not produced in the 
head or the mind, it is the objective characteristic of certain existing images which 
are by nature double.20 
The doppelgänger-couplet  has this characteristic indiscernibility,  being “by nature 
double” like the symbol of the mirror. Signifying the dilemma of indistinguishability 
between original and copy for human vision (in terms of a divided self), the image of 
the double is a potentially evocative “dialectical image” or “hypericon”, in the sense 
developed by W. J. T. Mitchell: as an image that offers a site for reflection on the 
nature of images and on the nature of man.21 In the case of these films, it is too a site 
for reflection on the ontological tensions of cinematic representation, to which it has 
a close affinity, self-consciously reflecting the dual character of cinema’s signifier as 
both  virtual  and  actual,  imaginary  and  real,  but  also  its  constitution  from 
heterogeneous and fragmentary elements. 
While film is assembled from myriad segments and body parts, pieces and 
perspectives of the real, into the illusion of a “whole” with an illusory homogeneity 
(cf.  “suture”  in  classical  narrative)  the  double  exposes  the  uncanniness  of  this 
alliance of parts. It is interesting to consider in this context how the uncanniness of 
Frankenstein’s  monster  is  similarly  related  to  the  visible  signs  on  his  body  of 
“suture”, such as stitches and bolts, remnants that expose the labour of the scientist-
magician in constructing a mimetic replica of a living man (from dead body parts). 
Both film and the double are disturbing as mementi mori: the double reveals cinema 
to be the depiction of moving ghosts of an absent “real” and the spectral and deathly 
20 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, p. 69.
21 See W. J. T. Mitchell,  Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology,  Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1986, p. 158. “Concrete instances of these dialectical images are a familiar feature of iconological 
discussion. They include the canonical examples (Plato’s cave, Aristotle’s wax tablet, Locke’s dark 
room) that come up whenever the nature of images becomes linked with an account of the nature of 
man.  And they have  their  analogues  in  the  realm of  graphic  images:  Wittgenstein’s  duck-rabbit, 
Foucault’s Las Meninas, Lessing’s Laocoön (the image, not the text), all serve, like the philosophers’ 




nature of the body on film – its kinship to a reflection severed from the “real” body 
and captured in the undying spaces of representation,  a process that  kills off  the 
original.
In all these films, the figure of the double both refers to and is built from the 
uncanny  nature  of  film itself.  What  it  undermines  with  its  threatening,  fantastic 
duplication is mimesis understood as the production of perfect replicas of the real – 
which the visual recording technologies of the nineteenth century purport to offer. 
Likewise the double responds to the stylistic counterpart of such simulacra, i.e., to 
the ontological claims of realism. As Webber writes with regard to realism in fiction, 
The  Doppelgänger  can be  said paradoxically  to  subvert  the  aesthetic  principle of 
figuration  precisely  by  a  virtuoso  act  of  imitation—duplicating  the  ‘real’  by  the 
unreal. The subjective spook at once threatens and underpins the objective claims of 
realism; it has something of the effect of a photographic negative. The realist project 
can be said to rely upon a repressible fantastic, a source of profound insecurity against 
which to gauge and assert its security; the two are dialectically interdependent.22 
What is the counterpart of this problematized realism in the case of cinematic texts, 
which are heterogeneously composed of disparate “cuts”, of images that are at once 
real and unreal and ontologically ambivalent? One way to consider this question is to 
imagine a spectrum of possible modes of representation, distinguished based on the 
degree  of  their  “transparency  of  form”,  i.e.,  the  extent  to  which  the  constructed 
“reality” is free of indicators of its constructedness or, in other words, the extent to 
which the spectator is made aware of his position with regard to the narrative. Once 
again the illuminating point of comparison (one end of the spectrum) is classical 
realism,  as  discussed  by  critics  such  as  Jean-Louis  Baudry  and Colin  MacCabe, 
which most closely resembles the realism of nineteenth-century bourgeois novels. 
This mode aims at the effacement of the apparatus, relying on suture, the illusion of a 
transcendental subject and the disembodied eye, a voyeuristic visual pleasure, and so 
forth. What is “repressed” in the classical narrative mode is the role of the apparatus 
– camera, screen, projection – and the discursivity of the narration. Its crucial feature 
is the primacy of vision in establishing the truth of events, where what the objective 
22 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 9.
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eye  of  the  camera  presents  is  the  established  “reality”.  As  Colin  MacCabe  has 
notably written, 
Classical fictional cinema… has the crucial opposition between spoken discourses 
which may be  mistaken  and a  visual  discourse  which  guarantees  truth – which 
reveals  all.  For  this  opposition  to  be  set  up,  the  spectator  must  be  placed  in  a 
position from which the image is regarded as primary… One such practice, which I 
have called classical realism… involves the homogenization of different discourses 
by  their  relation  to  one  dominant  discourse—assured  of  its  domination  by  the 
security and transparency of the image.23
It is precisely on the grounds of the (expected) ontological primacy of vision and the 
cinematic image that the doppelänger has its visceral effect of shock, which is at the 
same time a  subversive  effect  aimed at  realism and naturalist-illusionist  mimetic 
order.  While  acting within  certain  realist  narrative  norms  (the  cohesive  narrative 
structures of these films), it reveals the purportedly objective vision offered by the 
camera  to  be  subjective  and  perspectival,  disallowing  the  possibility  of  an 
establishing “true image”. In this guise it does act as a return of the repressed, not 
least, the repressed knowledge of the discursivity of the film. This deconcealment of 
the apparatus coincides with a sense of the uncanny, a challenge to bodily and textual 
integrity that is at once an evocation of mortality.
Here it is important to note the sense in which realism, and more generally, 
credible simulacra of the living world, are associated with a retreat from or defense 
against temporality and death (the Real in the Lacanian sense). This association is 
particularly  poignant  in  the  nineteenth-century  bourgeois  worldview,  with  what 
Adorno and Horkheimer called the organization of mimesis, and the Frankensteinian 
dream  of  modern  science  and  technologies  of  reproduction  overcoming  death. 
Villiers  de  l’Isle-Adam’s  archetypally  bourgeois  heroine  in  Tomorrow’s  Eve,  for 
example, “finds the phenomenon of death very shocking; it  is an excess that she 
doesn’t quite understand; ‘not the way we do things nowadays.’ That’s about the sum 
of her religious ideas”.24 The copy is motivated by this fear of death.25 
23 Colin MacCabe, “Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure”, in Narrative, Apparatus,  
Ideology,  ed.  Philip  Rosen,   New York,  Columbia  University  Press,  1986,  p.  182–83.  Originally 
published in Screen, Autumn 1976, Vol. 17, no. 3.
24 Ibid.
25 Cf. Jean  Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death.
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Cinema has a special position in this connection, because its iconic-indexical 
capacities as a medium (the addition of motion to photographic realism) offer an 
unparalleled possibility of mummifying the real, the very possibility that motivated 
innovators  such  as  Demenÿ and Edison.  The  development  of  film’s  Institutional 
Mode,  as  Noël  Burch  has  convincingly  argued,  was  the  culmination  of  the 
nineteenth-century drive to eliminate death, the bourgeois century’s Frankensteinian 
dream,  perhaps  most  egregiously  represented  by  the  ideology  behind  Edison’s 
technological  breakthroughs.  Much  like  how  film  was  conceived  as  a  way  of 
overcoming death, the double as identical copy is originally intended as a defense 
against  death  (e.g.,  Frankenstein)  that  paradoxically  becomes  its  harbinger  and 
evokes  a  threat  to  corporal  integrity.26 The  doppelgänger  is  thus  a  meaningful 
metaphor for revealing the connection between cinema as a medium for recording 
copies of “reality” and a primitive fear of temporality and death, symbolizing the 
problematic  ideological  motivations  behind  the  naturalist  use  of  the  medium of 
cinema and its  hidden potential  for  disturbing  effects.  In  this  sense  the double’s 
threat  to  corporal  integrity  (castration  in  the  psychoanalytic  interpretation)  can 
indeed be read as a return of the repressed – specifically as the return of what is 
repressed in the illusionist  cinematic simulacrum of the real.27 Not least,  it  draws 
attention  to  how  the  nineteenth  century’s  new  recording  technologies  similarly 
purported to offer a kind of immortality, but instead gave rise to a proliferation of 
spooky mementi mori and ghosts of the living.
In its symbolic affinity with the medium as copy, the doppelgänger reveals 
the hidden uncanny aspect of film technology: not only its intimations of mortality 
but also the occluded process of production behind its moving images.  The case of 
Waxworks (see Chapter VII) offers a vivid illustration of these effects, insofar as the 
threat that Jack the Ripper poses is inseparable from the power of cinema and its 
26 Otto Rank,  The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina 
Press, 1971.
27 To think about this from another perspective, what is repressed by a proliferation of simulacra is 
what not only poses a threat to the body but is also inaccessible to naturalist mimetic representation: 
e.g.,  blindness,  darkness,  and  death.  If  what  is  repressed by  realism/naturalism is  precisely what 
cannot be iconically replicated – what cannot be imaged, in other words – the return of this repressed 
is the appearance of something that  cannot quite be seen (or rationalized) – i.e., an optical problem 
signaling the limitations of naturalism.
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specific capabilities to unleash copies of an uncannily double nature. As part of an 
allegory of cinema, the killer’s approach and onscreen multiplication deconceal the 
nature of the cinematic image, both as a phantasmagoric visual commodity and as a 
simulacrum produced by an apparatus. Finally, considering how the double as an 
artistic device reveals the nature and function of the cinematic apparatus – a self-
referentiality that the directors of these films were keen to exploit – brings us back to 
the question of  the historical  significance of  the figure and its  related themes of 
vision and cinematic  narration.  For  invoking the uncanny aspect  of photographic 
realism and the naturalist norms of institutional cinema also addresses an ideological 
position that associates organized mimesis and the attainment of perfect images of 
reality with the rational mastery of the object of vision and the attempt to overcome 
death and nature. Here the doppelgänger becomes especially relevant to modernity 
and its forms of visual experience.
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CHAPTER V
SPECTACLES OF DOCTOR CALIGARI
Then I took a book by Schopenhauer, which contained a portrait 
of him. This inspired us with an idea: here was the mask for our 
authority!  And thus  in  our  directions  for  the  professor  may be 
found: “Doctor Caligari  is  a  heavyset  man who wears tortoise-
shell glasses, in the mask of Dr Schopenhauer.”1
Hans Janowitz
[The] liberal charlatan masks and unveils in dream his terrifying 
face: the bourgeois doctor “causes death by fright.” That buffoon 
comes from our phantasms. His identity is ours. What those filmic 
and textual figures return to us in inverted form is the threat of the 
too close: bourgeois, student, hysteric, all demoniacs, all victims, 
figures of a reversing projection that cinema and psychoanalysis 
put to work with the same power.2                
Catherine Clément
All seeing is essentially perspective, and so is all knowing.
Friedrich Nietzsche 
1 Hans Janowitz, "Caligari – the Story of a Famous Story (Excerpts)", in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari:  
Texts, Contexts, Histories, ed. Mike Budd, New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1990, p. 
234.
2 Catherine B. Clément, “Charlatans and Hysterics”, in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari: Texts, Contexts,  
Histories, ed. Mike Budd, p. 204.
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In  the weeks preceding the première of  The Cabinet  of  Dr Caligari,  Berlin  was 
bombarded with  Decla’s  advertising  campaign  for  the  film,  particularly  with  the 
bizarre slogan “Du mußt Caligari werden”. A contemporary review of the film in 
Der Kinematograph records the phenomenon: “Berlin has another new catch-phrase, 
‘You must become Caligari.’ For weeks this mysterious command shrieked out at 
one from every kiosk, jumped out from the pages of all daily papers”.3 Almost thirty 
years later, looking back with a kindly realist’s eye, Siegfried Kracauer finds this 
slogan “puzzling”.4 Naturally, one is led to ask what “becoming Caligari” entails as 
an invitation to watch the film.
Such a publicity campaign may be considered as one of The Cabinet of Dr Caligari’s 
various self-referential strategies, through which, rather than seeking to involve the 
viewer in the continuous spacetime of a fictional narrative (i.e., in a predominantly 
passive, voyeuristic experience), the film directly addresses its spectator, soliciting 
attention and astonishment. Considering the film’s sundry effects that foreground the 
3 Review of the film published in Der Kinematograph, March 3, 1920. Quoted by Kristin Thompson, 
“Dr Caligari at the Folies-Bergère”, in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari: Texts, Contexts, Histories, p. 138. 
For  a  considered  discussion  of  the  conception  and  execution  of  the  film  weighing  the  different 
accounts of the participants, as well as providing a comparison between the scenario and the film, see 
David Robinson, Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari, London, BFI, 1997.
4Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film, Princeton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press, 1947, p. 71.
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act of narration, its metaphors of optics and film exhibition, and various ontological 
indeterminacies, it has become a standard approach to read the film’s doppelgänger 
figure as part  of  a  modernist  allegory of cinema,  where the “film itself  explores 
cinema as a medium for hypnotism, sleepwalking, and phantom shadows”.5 In other 
words,
Es ist genau diese prinzipielle Ambiguität und Doppelbödigkeit, die den Film vor 
anderen  auszeichnet  und  ihn  zu  einem Exempel  der  selbstreflexiven  filmischen 
Moderne gemacht hat. Denn indem der Film offenläßt, was Halluzination und was 
Wirklichkeit  ist,  spiegelt  er  Eigenschaften  eines  Mediums,  das  beim  Anschein 
größtmöglicher  Naturnähe  essentiell  auf  Illusion  und  Sinnestäuschung  beruht. 
Caligaris  Zuschauer  sitzen  in  seinem Zelt  wie  die  Zuschauer  im Kinosaal.  Das 
Cabinet ist nichts anderes als das Kino selbst.6
In part, the film’s self-conscious effects arise from an admixture of disparate and 
irreconcilable stylistic and narrative characteristics. On the one hand, the narrative is 
a traditional detective story with romantic and sentimental interest for the viewer; on 
the  other,  the  anti-naturalist  Expressionist  graphic  design  and  “primitive”  effects 
contradict  the  possibility  of  a  classical  illusionist  engagement  with the  narrative. 
And,  in  conscious  rejection  of  what  had  by  then  become  established  norms  of 
editing, the cutting up of individual shots to construct a haptic space is studiously 
avoided in the film. According to Mike Budd, “Articulating both norm and deviation, 
realism and modernism within itself,  Caligari  stages a dialectical struggle of these 
modes  within  its  moments  of  production  and consumption…”7 Thus,  “Caligari’s 
unconventional aspects—mostly the Expressionist settings, the characters of Caligari 
and Cesare, and the plot reversal at the end—emerge from and are dependent on the 
largely conventional form of the film’s classic realist narrative”.8
While the film’s themes of the double and aforementioned reflexive effects 
have received considerable critical attention, as enacting allegories of cinema, male 
identity crisis in the Weimar Republic, and female sexuality,9 what has been missing 
5 Patrice Petro, “The Woman, the Monster, and  Caligari”, in  The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari: Texts,  
Contexts, Histories, p. 207.
6 Wolfgang Jacobsen,  Anton Kaes,  and  Hans H.  Prinzler,  Geschichte des Deutschen Films,  J.  B. 
Metzler  Verlag,  1993,  pp.  47–48.  See  also  Gerald  Bär,  Das  Motiv  des  Doppelgängers  als  
Spaltungsphantasie in der Literatur und im deutschen Stummfilm, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2005, p. 575.
7 Mike Budd, “The Moments of Caligari”, in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari: Texts, Contexts, Histories, 
p. 10.
8 Ibid., p. 17.
9 E.g., Kracauer’s original discussion of the film as a mirror of the German Zeitgeist; Elsaesser’s essay 
on “Social Mobility and the Fantastic”, and from the feminist perspective, Catherine Clément and 
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is  a  closer  look  at  the  significance  of  Caligari  as  doppelgänger  from a  broader 
historical perspective, i.e., in relation to Romantic literature, the history of cinema, 
and  19th century  science.  And,  while  the  major  works  on  the  film’s  use  of 
doppelgänger themes have addressed them from a psychological perspective, here 
the  focus  will  be  on  how their  historical  signification  relates  to  the  medium of 
cinema and the structuring of the film. At the center of the discussion will be the 
unforgettable daemonic Doctor Caligari  himself  and his relationship to the film’s 
reflexive metaphors of cinema and vision.
A suggestive starting point for this film-historical discussion of the film is to 
interrogate  the  relationship  between  the  doctor’s  divided  identity  and  the  film’s 
multiple, superimposed modes of representation. It is crucial to note, first of all, that 
in addition to its classical plot, the film deliberately evokes the “primitivism” of the 
milieus and mode of representation of early cinema. Noël Burch in fact has referred 
to  Caligari as the first instance of a “revival” of the “Primitive Mode” in so-called 
avant-garde filmmaking: 
Nor was it  by accident that  it  was a film issued directly from the Expressionist 
movement which should have been the first to effect a deliberate, sweeping “return” 
to some of the major gestures of the Primitive Mode. Expressionism, after all, in its 
critique of all the manifestations of Naturalism, had for nearly two decades been 
keenly attentive to “primitive” art of all kinds; the sculptures of Africa and the folk 
woodcuts of Germany, as well as the creations of mental patients and children.10
In any case, the forms of spectatorship that are both solicited by – and depicted in – 
The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari resemble not only that of a fairground sideshow, the 
milieu in which the framed action takes place, but likewise that of early cinema: what 
Tom Gunning, borrowing Eisenstein’s term, describes as a “cinema of attractions”. 
Caligari  recaptures  the  ways  in  which  “Early  films  explicitly  acknowledge  their 
spectator,  seeming  to  reach  outwards  and  confront.  Contemplative  absorption  is 
impossible here.  The viewer’s curiosity is  aroused and fulfilled through a marked 
encounter,  a  direct  stimulus,  a  succession of  shocks”.11 Especially  in  its  climactic 
Patrice Petro’s aforementioned articles.
10 Noël Burch, “Primitivism and the Avant-Gardes: A Dialectical Approach”, in Narrative, Apparatus,  
Ideology, ed.  Philip  Rosen,  New York,  Columbia  University  Press,  1986,  p.  495.  Burch perhaps 
overemphasizes  the  “primitive”  aspect  of  early  cinema,  never  describing  just  how it  technically 
resembles the actual primitive influences on avant-garde art.
11 Tom  Gunning,  “An  Aesthetic  of  Astonishment:  Early  Film  and  the  (In)credulous  Spectator”, 
reprinted in  Film Theory and Criticism,  ed. Marshall  Cohen and Leo Braudy, 5th ed.,  New York, 
    101
The Divided Screen
moments,  the  film  effects  an  aesthetic  of  astonishment  through  a  number  of 
confrontational techniques whereby the cinematic apparatus itself comes to notice. 
It  is  vital  that  in this context  Dr Caligari’s  role  as a fairground showman 
resembles  that  of  the  early  film exhibitor,  and  his  fairground milieu  the  chaotic 
proletarian sphere of early cinema. The correspondence points to a close relationship 
between the characterisation of Caligari and questions of film form and spectatorship 
at stake in the film (as have been extensively discussed), that is, the film’s metaphors 
of vision and cinema. At this point, a closer look at Caligari’s ancestry is called for, 
to  illuminate not  only the connection between his  characterisation and the film’s 
reflexive metaphors, but to ground what seems to be an iconic familiarity, evoking 
archetypal figures of German Romanticism, in an historical context.
Prototypes of Caligari: 
Romanticism and Nineteenth-Century Optical Entertainers
Caligari  recalls  a  line  of  scientifically  minded  charlatans  of  late-18th  and  19th 
century  literature,  characters  made  popular  in  German  Romanticism,  that  had  a 
resurgence in fin-de-siècle works of high culture and were subsequently appropriated 
by Expressionism and the early cinema:  “Dr Caligari represents the return of such 
Hoffmannesque bogymen as the demonic showman Coppola, projected here onto the 
enlightened therapist”.12 Similar diabolical figures, including Professor Spalanzani in 
The Sandman, the charlatan magic-lantern showman in Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer, Dr 
Frankenstein,  and  Dr  Jekyll,  characteristically  provoke  or  experience  crises  of 
subjective identity (the doppelgänger theme) through their dark arts, which combine 
positive science with magic. Often, these characters rely on state-of-the-art scientific 
instrumentation with uncanny powers – technology that may also serve as media of 
entertainment, even as forms of art. For example, the uncanny binoculars through 
which Nathanael watches the automaton Olympia are not only a magical-scientific 
instrument, but also give access to a fascinating peep-show (as in Alfred Hitchcock's 
Rear Window [1954]) from which the spellbound, doomed viewer can scarce tear his 
eyes. The prototypical devil in Adelbert von Chamisso’s Peter Schlemihl (1814) who 
Oxford University Press, p. 827.
12 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger: Double Visions in German Literature, Oxford and New York, 
Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 350.
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unleashes  the  protagonist’s  doppelgänger  by  stealing  his  shadow  foreshadows 
Caligari: 
Besides, do you not see who I am? A poor devil, a sort of scholar and physician who 
gets but small thanks from his friends for his excellent arts and who has no finer 
amusement on earth than to carry on a few experiments.13
Caligari is also reminiscent of Doctor X— in Hoffmann’s “Automata”, a story with a 
number  of  significant  similarities  to  the  film,  not  least  by  virtue  of  its  nested 
narratives. In the longest of these, two college friends, Ferdinand and Lewis, visit a 
famous automaton, the Talking Turk, who gives an alarming prophesy to Ferdinand 
concerning the woman he loves. The eerie automaton, as it turns out, was designed 
by the mysterious Doctor X—, a mountebank known for his mechanical and magical 
arts. The story stresses how the uncanny effects of such apparitions and automata 
rely on their contextualisation in the naturalistic world of everyday life. Much of the 
narrative concerns the sensory distress provoked by figures like the automaton, the 
sickening astonishment of looking upon something neither animate nor inanimate, 
human  nor  mechanical:  the  liminal  condition  that  Cesare’s  mechanical  motions 
approximate. A protagonist of Hoffmann’s story remarks,
All figures of this sort, which can scarcely be said to counterfeit humanity as much 
as to travesty it—mere images of living death or inanimate life—are most distasteful 
to me. When I was a little boy, I ran away crying from a waxwork exhibition I was 
taken to,  and  even to  this  day  I  never  can enter  a  place  of  that  sort  without  a 
horrible, eerie, shuddery feeling.14 
Doctor  X—,  like  other  sorcerer-scientists  who  motivate  the  appearance  of  the 
doppelgänger, reveals the grim dénouement of instrumental reason pushed too far, 
giving rise to the production of disquieting simulacra. Such prototypes of Caligari at 
once  belong  to  the  uncanny  world  of  the  fairground  and  to  the  sphere  of  the 
laboratory,  grotesquely  reconciling  magic  and  positive  science  in  works  that 
critically engage the legacy of the Radical Enlightenment. 
While studies of Caligari have highlighted the demonic Doctor’s relationship 
with fictional doubles of Romanticism and after, they have failed to note his equally 
13Adelbert von Chamisso, The Wonderful Adventures of Peter Schlemihl, trans. Theodore Bolton, New 
York, B. W. Heubsch, 1923, p. 70.
14 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Automata”, in The Best Tales of Hoffmann, ed. and intro. by E. F. Bleiler, New 
York, NY, Dover Publications, 1967, p. 81.
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important relationship to the real-life scientific innovators and showmen of magical 
wonders – forebears and influences on the literary and cinematic characters alike. 
These  figures  of  the  joint  history  of  technology  and  carnival  showmanship 
specifically help illuminate the connection between Caligari’s characterisation and 
the  cinematic  medium.  Carl  Mayer  and  Hans  Janowitz,  the  films  scriptwriters, 
conceived of Caligari as a murderous mixture of Cagliostro and Mesmer, at once 
itinerant showman, scientist and magician:
[He] has become Caligari, who in our story is a madman, whose character he has 
always  studied,  who  was  a  fictitious  character,  invented  by  us,  and  who  was 
supposed  to  have  lived  in  the  eighteenth  century,  in  Northern  Italy,  and  who 
travelled  through  the  country  as  a  showman,  with  a  somnambulist,  whom  he 
hypnotized and ordered to kill...15
Caligari  certainly  evokes  the  itinerant  showmen of  the  late-18th through  the  19th 
centuries. In particular, like other magicians and fairground exhibitors of Wilhelmine 
and Weimar cinema, he resembles the showmen-scientists who directly participated 
in the history of optical technologies and in the early milieus of film. As showmen 
with  multiple  personalities,  many  of  these  innovators  relied  on  mechanical  and 
electric technologies, including recording devices and projection, to enact credible 
copies of man for their audience. Much of the entertainment value of their spectacles, 
whether  by  magic  lantern  or  film,  derived  from  the  realistic,  astonishing 
representation of human traits and/or human motion. Conjurers of visible doubles, 
they are the real counterparts of the fictional doppelgänger-makers. 
Carl Mayer himself provides a marvellously Hoffmannesque example: At the 
age of 16, he worked during the day fixing barometers and advertising an optician on 
street corners of towns and villages.16 Thus Caligari recalls the spirits of Robertson 
the  Magician,  professor  of  physics  and  phantasmagoria  innovator;  Edison,  the 
Wizard of Menlo Park; and Georges Méliès, director of the Théâtre Robert Houdin 
and of the first  trick films.  As hypnotist  he is  just  as  much a  Méliès as he is  a 
Cagliostro, while, as scientist he is no less a Charcot or Gustav Fechner. For  The 
Cabinet of Dr Caligari, these associations are vitally important. Not least, Caligari’s 
fairground  realm,  the  central  setting  of  the  film,  and  Caligari’s  cabinet  itself, 
15Hans Janowitz, from “Caligari—The Story of a Famous Story (Excerpts)”, p. 225.
16 Ibid., p. 228.
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reproduce the world of early cinema and the related milieu of late 19th-century magic 
theatre.  In  this  forum “primitive”  elements  emerge  (or  are  recorded)  that  in  the 
narrative momentum of the film lend an opacity and indecision, casting doubt on the 
perspectives of narration and drawing attention to issues of spectatorship.
Janowitz and Mayer’s characterisation of Caligari as “wearing the mask of 
Schopenhauer” with tortoiseshell glasses is also suggestive, considering the film’s 
perspectival narration and foregrounding of spectatorship. Schopenhauer is a crucial 
figure  as  regards  the  fate  of  vision  in  the  19th century;  the  curious  uncertainty 
paradoxically intruding into the perception of phenomena at the same time as human 
vision came to be described and colonized by scientific study. His work, developing 
on the subjectivization of vision and the blurred distinction between external signs 
and internal sensations in Kantian thought, more explicitly embedded the perception 
of phenomena in physiology (i.e.,  in the empirical  body of an observer) and was 
among  the  first  conceptualisations  the  modern  observer.  As  Jonathan  Crary  has 
written, “Once the phenomenal self is reduced to simply one empirical object among 
others, the autonomy and authenticity of its representations are also put in question… 
The  subjective  vision  affirmed  by  Goethe  and  Schopenhauer  that  endowed  the 
observer with a new perceptual  autonomy also coincided with the making of the 
observer into a subject of new knowledge and new techniques of power”.17 
Psychoanalysis and cinema, inaugurated in the same year, are founded on this 
subjectivizing of vision.  Both as subject  of study (Cesare) and as consumer of a 
world of images (Caligari’s spectacle, film), the modern observer is the focal point of 
Caligari’s diegesis, as well as its viewer. Doctor Caligari’s power is associated with 
his mastery of both psychoanalysis and cinema. As doctor, his study is the modern 
17 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer, pp. 77–79.
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subject,  his  aim  the  rationalisation  of  human  consciousness,  or  mapping  the 
transcendent onto the empirical. But he himself is also a subject of study, ultimately 
the site of his own experiment. His project of disenchantment aims to make order out 
of the chaos of consciousness, to penetrate the mind, and, like classical narrative 
cinema,  to  restore  a  “fullness  and  homogeneity  of  ‘being’”18 to  the  fragmented 
subject. His efforts, however, result in his own doubling. As showman, he has the 
power  to  create  spectacles,  which  he  advertises  and  hapless  spectators  consume. 
These too turn out to be life-threatening. 
Caligari’s characterization as a representation of Schopenhauer is especially 
relevant to the film’s narrative structures and formal effects: “The film plays with 
effects of mise en abyme, portraying a show-cabinet within the show-cabinet of the 
cinema, and producing its spectacle through multiple screens, curtains, and title”,19 
resolutely  perspectivizing  its  stagy  scenes  and  the  viewer’s  perceptions.  To 
complicate matters further, Caligari is envisioned not as Schopenhauer himself but as 
his effigy: i.e., as a representation of the theorist of the image. Even Schopenhauer 
thus falls prey to the film’s reflexivity, its mise-en-abyme of reflections that puts the 
status of the film itself as mimetic reproduction in question.
The addition of tortoiseshell glasses to the mask of Schopenhauer must be 
numbered  among  the  film’s  multiple  frames,  a  diegetic  manifestation  of  the 
quotation marks, so to speak, in which it puts its every image. A fixated attention is 
drawn to his glasses through close-ups or medium close-ups in which he is toying 
with  them,  putting  them on,  or  in  which  they  are  simply  weirdly  askew.  These 
spectacles, an integral prop of the film and Caligari’s characterization, are among the 
myriad optical instruments that repeatedly appear and are consistently foregrounded 
in  doppelgänger  stories  and films.  Diegetically  a  technological  aid  to  his  vision, 
Caligari’s  spectacles  also  signify  his  desire  to  “see”,  the  scientist  or  scholar’s 
curiositas in unveiling the mysteries of nature and exposing the unknown to human 
vision. As lenses, however, they also reflexively refer to cinema, spectatorship, and 
Caligari’s role as a surrogate director.
18 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus”, in Film Theory 
and Criticism,  ed. Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, & Leo Braudy, 4th ed., Oxford and New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 305.
19 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 351.
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Caligari as Scientist and Showman
As hinted at by the discussion of his antecedents, Caligari’s characterisation as a 
scientist-showman doppelgänger is related to broader issues, not least the dialectic of 
positive science and myth, and the ontology of cinema as mimetic reproduction, but 
is  also  significant  for  the  film’s  heterogeneous  modes  of  representation  –  its 
combination  of  deliberate  “primitivism”  with  a  classical  narrative  structure  with 
spatial and temporal continuity. His roles in the two spheres of his authority, the fair 
and  the  institute,  require  further  consideration  in  relation  to  the  film’s  mode  of 
representation and reflexive effects. 
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The  fairground  setting  offers  a  context  for  metafilmic  references,  for 
cinematic metaphors that foreground visual pleasure and spectatorship. Caligari is 
the showman of this “primitive” cinema, and the object of disproportionately many 
close-ups in which he answers the spectator’s look. The spectator’s introduction to 
this setting, when the fair is in session, begins with an iris-in from a small off-centre 
circle, showing an organ grinder “whose arm constantly rotates” – a gesture that 
recalls the cranking of a film camera – and his monkey. This limited view expands to 
reveal the fair and the circular motion of the carousels, signifying the inversion of 
naturalist/bourgeois  norms  and  the  chaotic  character  of  the  fairground.  Kracauer 
characterises  the  fair  scenes  as  representing  “the  chaos  of  instincts”:  a  worthy 
counterpoint  of  the  institute.  The  Babelian  heterogenity  of  the  fairground,  “an 
enclave  of  anarchy  in  the  sphere  of  entertainment”,20 is  an  ideal  haunt  of  the 
doppelgänger and a perfect metaphor for the cinema with its halls of mirrors and 
carnivalesque suspension of the order of things.
  
Caligari first appears in this fairground milieu. Uncannily, he looks directly 
into the camera, returning the voyeuristic glance of the audience. That he is enclosed 
in  a  circular  frame  (iris-in)  that  closes  as  he  approaches  progressively  focuses 
attention on his disturbing glance. The use of a circular matte evokes early cinema’s 
genre of Peeping Tom narratives, indicating the point of view of a character looking 
at Caligari through the keyhole. This non-narrative and “cinematic” gesture, as others 
to  come,  acknowledges  the  spectator  in  his  voyeurism in  a  spectacular  way:  the 
framing confronts  and refers  to  this  act  of  viewership,  rather  than  according  the 
20This and the following quotations are from Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, pp. 73–74.
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viewer  any  pleasurable,  fictive  invisibility.  Caligari’s  uncanny,  disruptive  look 
constitutes an exhibitionist mode of representation, and an active rather than passive 
spectatorship on the part of the viewer. From this introduction, Caligari as fairground 
showman is associated not only with the violation of “classical” norms, such as the 
interdiction  on  the  look  into  the  camera,  but  more  broadly,  with  an  uncanny 
distantiation and the exposure of the language of cinema. 
The “spectacle” (Attraktion) for which Caligari obtains a permit is introduced 
with the reflexive intertitle: “The Cabinet of Dr Caligari”, a self-reference that is a 
fitting  prelude  to  a  film within  the  film.  The shots  of  Caligari’s  tent  play  on  a 
resemblance to the settings of early film exhibition, at the center of which “the key 
role of the exhibitor showman underscores the act of monstration that founds the 
cinema of attractions”.21 The scene that follows reveals Caligari to be a consummate 
showman and the master of ceremonies of this cinema of attractions. His exhibition 
of Cesare’s image, a poster, prefigures his display of the somnambulist himself, also 
an immobile image that he (and cinema) astonishingly bring to life.22 
As showman, the figure of Caligari is implicated in the film’s reliance on a 
so-called primitive aesthetic of the spectacle. An early-cinematic exhibitionist (on 
film) and exhibitor (on stage), and surrogate director in the diegesis, he solicits the 
21Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous Spectator”, p. 826.
22 In fact, Caligari’s show as a magical, cinematic bringing to life of the dead image (the poster of 
Cesare) has interesting echoes of Noël Burch’s discussion of the ideological motivations of technical 
innovators of the early cinema such as Edison, and the Frankensteinian desire to overcome death. See 
“Charles  Baudelaire  versus  Dr  Frankenstein”,  in  Life  to  Those  Shadows,  trans.  Ben  Brewster, 
Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1990.
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viewer’s look with his astonishing spectacle. The  mise en scène  draws attention to 
Caligari’s significance: his stage is framed within the outer frame of the screen, and 
his audience, the double of the “real” audience, are shown sitting and watching the 
spectacle. 
This doubled frame, like a host of other strategies of the film, reflexively 
draws attention to the status of the image shown as a representation and echoes the 
film’s narrative concern with perspectivism in its formal construction. Like accounts 
of early film exhibitors, Caligari begins his “screening” with the still image of the 
presentation  that  audience  is  about  to  see,  which  suddenly,  to  the  foregrounded 
astonishment of the spectators, takes on life—here, movement. Peucker, for instance, 
has noted how “Caligari represents the earliest stages of the moving picture’s release 
from the painted canvas”.23 The attraction of Caligari’s show is the unforgettable 
spectacle of his “waking” Cesare, as if by magic. The theme of somnambulism is 
vital: in this context the “Cabinet of Dr Caligari” is a place where the coming to life 
of the seeming dead is performed and what is an image attains mobility (precisely 
how film is distinguished from other graphic arts). It reflexively alludes to the fact of 
The Cabinet  of  Dr Caligari being  a  film,  a  concatenation  of  static  photographic 
23 Brigitte  Peucker,  Incorporating  Images:  Film  and  the  Rival  Arts,  Princeton,  N.J.,  Princeton 
University Press, 1995, p. 22.
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images – in particular, of a somnambulist – that magically attain movement through 
the wonder of modern technology. 
As a psychiatrist,  Caligari  is  also a surrogate  director  and motivator  of  the 
film’s  action.  The  crimes  for  which  he  instrumentalizes  his  creature  Cesare  are 
consequences of his pursuit of science as well as the diegetic motivation of the film 
(the detection plot). In fact, the very life and death of the characters are in his power. 
When Caligari returns to his scientist identity and to the institute, however, he is no 
longer on display and displaying, but has gone “behind the scenes”. When Francis 
and the asylum staff search his office, the base of his scientific operations, he is not 
there; only a skeleton stands in the corner as a reminder of the professor’s real job. 
Like the narrator in scientific writing, he is absent from his own discourse, except as 
reconstituted by his reader. He becomes invisible to the pursuing Francis and the 
film’s  audience,  only  appearing  at  yet  another  representational  remove:  in  the 
imaginary visualisation, from the point of view of readers of his diary, of what he has 
written.  As “director”, the doctor is absent from the narrative he unfurls and even 
nameless;  indeed,  we  never  learn  his  name.  In  fact,  Walter  Benjamin’s  famous 
comparison of surgeon and magician in his discussion of cinema resonates with this 
precarious distinction between the two personae of Caligari: 
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The surgeon represents the polar opposite of the magician. The magician heals a 
sick person by the laying on of hands; the surgeon cuts into the patient's body. The 
magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and himself; though he 
reduces it very slightly by the laying on of hands, he greatly increases it by virtue of 
his  authority.  The  surgeon  does  exactly  the  reverse;  he  greatly  diminishes  the 
distance between himself and the patient by penetrating into the patient's body, and 
increases it but little by the caution with which his hand moves among the organs. In 
short, in contrast to the magician – who is still hidden in the medical practitioner – 
the surgeon at the decisive moment abstains from facing the patient man to man; 
rather, it is through the operation that he penetrates into him.24 
More precisely, Caligari’s duality as showman and psychiatrist is founded on the 
opposition of two distinct visual regimes in which the motivation, on his part,  is 
being  seen  in  the  first  place  and  seeing  in  the  second.  And  if  the  showman’s 
exhibition recalls the modes of early cinema, the invisible psychiatrist’s alludes to 
classical structures of narrative. It is no coincidence that the explicit indications of 
acts of storytelling – the diary and the Francis’s prologue and epilogue – occur in the 
asylum sphere. Along these lines, in her discussion of the film, Catherine Clément 
has drawn an analogy between the psychoanalytic project and classical cinema: “The 
cure puts violence on display and destroys the spectacular effects: like the domestic 
cinema, tames the magic of the look. No more fear, hardly any fascination in the 
look”.25 For a comparison between Caligari’s scientist persona and the film’s uneasy 
espousal of linear narrative norms, the plot of the criminal investigation is important. 
The  investigator’s  project  resembles  the  positive  scientist’s,  the  search  for  an 
aperspectival  account  of  an  objective  truth  or  apodictic  certainty.  Francis  as 
investigator is a double of the scientist Caligari. 
A Cinematic Uncanny
Caligari’s central story, a far cry from the themes of “Expressionism”, is based on 
the linear narrative structure of the popular genre of detective films. The suspenseful 
dénouement  of  a  criminal  investigation,  in  other  words,  is  meant  to  engage  the 
viewer’s interest with a generic format that is related to the earliest narrative genre of 
the  chase  film.  Alongside  this  familiar  set-up  are  the  famous  fashionable 
24 Walter  Benjamin,  “The Work  of  Art  in  the  Age of  Mechanical  Reproduction”,  Illuminations:  
Essays and Reflections, New York, Schocken Books, p. 233.
25 Catherine B. Clément, “Charlatans and Hysterics”, in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari: Texts, Contexts,  
Histories, p. 198. 
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Expressionist mise en scène and stylistic effects, in conjunction, however, with what 
would  have  seemed  quite  old-fashioned  by  the  time:  a  return  to  elements 
characteristic of early cinema. These include frontal staging; the use of irises and 
vignettes;  the absence of spatial continuity editing, by this time established as an 
institution; and the use of tableau scenes.  With these effects,  writes Noël  Burch, 
“Caligari … reveals  a kind of  self-conscious return  to the major  features of the 
primitive cinema (and especially the autarchy and fixity of the primitive tableau in 
preference to the ‘realism’ of modern editing)…”26
Within the expectations engendered by the murder investigation narrative, the 
film’s  Expressionist  and  early-cinematic  elements  have  a  defamiliarising  effect, 
preventing the viewer from entering the space-time of the narrative or identifying 
with the camera’s perspective. They act as formal involutions, drawing attention to 
the  discursivity  of  the film and to  the  experience  of  spectatorship.  The repeated 
framing mattes  or  vignettes,  for  example,  deliberately  remind one  of  the  fact  of 
watching  something  seen  through  a  lens.  These  features  rely  for  effect  on  a 
dialectical relationship with the more classical narrative elements of the film. Even in 
individual images, Burch finds that
Caligari’s imagery plays constantly on a carefully sustained ambiguity... Thus, the 
same images seem to produce two historical types of spatial representation at once, 
two  types  which  are  as  it  were  superimposed  on  one  another…  This  same 
problematic  of  surface  and  depth  has  of  course  been  at  work  in  a  number  of 
important films made in the last few decades… But what is striking about Caligari is 
that  through its dialectical inscription of a historical  process—depth and flatness 
being  resolved  into  an  ‘average  relief’—it  provides  an  almost  unexampled 
commentary on the constitution of the [Institutional Mode of Representation] as a 
pictorial system.27
With  the  film’s  heterogeneous  mode  of  representation,  Caligari corroborates 
Webber’s description of the doppelgänger as displacing “the conventions of genre, 
by gravitating between forms and styles in cases of what might be called generic 
doubling or, after Bakhtin, dialogism”, playing “a constitutive role in the structuring 
of its texts, by doubling them back upon themselves”.28
The “primitive” elements, in the context of the film’s other effects, remarkably 
recapture an original astonishment at the marvellous invention of cinema, but with an 
26 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, p. 183. Italics in the original.
27 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, pp. 183–84.
28 Andrew Webber, The Doppelgänger, p. 4.
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added  effect:  they  return  as  the  uncanny.  The  heterogeneity  of  the  film’s  style 
coincides  with  its  evocation  of  the  uncanny,  through  which  the  film’s 
constructedness is made visible. The unforgettable scene in which Cesare comes to 
life at Caligari’s bidding is notable. As a moment of crisis it  reveals a dialectical 
connection between Caligari as the showman of a “primitive” mode of representation 
and the scientist embedded in the narrative.
In  the case of Cesare,  the uncanny is  related to  a  classical  Hoffmannesque 
perceptual  anxiety  that  is  provoked  by  his  indeterminate  position  between  the 
animation of life and the immobility of death. He is doubled by the poster image and 
the doll that takes his place in his coffin-like bed. But the unease he inspires also 
derives  from, and refers  to,  the uncanny character  of  recording technologies,  the 
inherently ghostly and liminal character of the image of man on film, which Maxim 
Gorky first  pointed out.29 Cesare’s  perceptual  indeterminacy fits  into the play on 
perspectives and framings of the film, which leave no position of certitude for the 
viewer/investigator. 
29 “This mute,  grey life finally begins to disturb and depress you. It  seems as though it  carries a 
warning,  fraught  with  a  vague  but  sinister  meaning  that  makes  your  heart  grow faint.  You  are 
forgetting where you are. Strange imaginings invade your mind and your consciousness begins to 
wane and grow dim”. Maxim Gorky, a review of the Lumière programme at the Nizhni-Novgorod 
Fair,  as  printed in  the  Nizhegorodski  listok newspaper,  July 4,  1896, and signed ‘I.  M. Pacatus’. 
Translated by Leda Swan. Reprinted in Jay Leyda, Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film, p. 
408.
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On  the  part  of  the  spectator,  a  visceral  sense  of  the  uncanny  is  notably 
provoked  by  the  shock  of  Cesare’s  return  of  the  look  and  the  unexpected 
intersubjectivity of the mutual act of looking.  At the film’s première, according to 
Janowitz,  a  woman  in  the  audience  screamed.30 Here  Cesare  –  an  unreal  image 
onscreen – is suddenly invested with an “aura”, in the sense developed by Walter 
Benjamin. Miriam Hansen’s well-known discussion helps illuminate its effect:
Significantly – and, perhaps, at first sight paradoxically – the perception of the aura in 
natural objects rests upon “a projection of a social experience among human beings 
onto nature.” That experience, as Benjamin elaborates in his later essay on Baudelaire, 
is the anticipated reciprocity of the gaze: “The person we look at, or who feels he is 
being looked at, looks at us in return. To experience the aura of a phenomenon means 
to invest it with the capability of returning the gaze...”31
A deliberate temporal gap is created with the opening of Cesare’s eyes and the return 
of the look, a “surrender of spatial orientation to the gravity of the gaze, the memory 
image that seizes the beholder rather than vice versa”.32 This is a pronounced parallel 
to the distancing effects  of  the tableaux and other painterly  gestures,  which “are 
significant  because  in  some sense  they  slow down the  very  automated  forms  of 
movement that were associated with the uncanny effect” and “express a hesitation 
concerning narrative development”.33
At the  same time Cesare  is  an  anthropomorphic  analogue of  the mimetic 
technology that displays him. He is Caligari’s film: “Cesare as ‘monster’ stands in, 
then, for the phantasmatic cinematic body, the body that critics and audiences of the 
period took to be soulless, one-dimensional, and lacking in presence, a frightening 
instance of nonorganic life”.34 The uncanny quality he embodies is related both to the 
pursuit  of  positive science (Caligari’s  work) and characteristic of technologies of 
reproduction. His awakening recaptures what must have been the fascination of the 
earliest films. While the viewer’s credulity or investment in the narrative is set aside, 
the  attraction  becomes  the  remarkable  power  of  the  film  image  as  image, 
specifically, of the image’s acquisition of motion:
30 For a description of the premiere, see Hans Janowitz, “The Story of a Famous Story”.
31 Miriam  Hansen,  “Benjamin,  Cinema,  and  Experience:  The  Blue  Flower  in  the  Land  of 
Technology”, New German Critique, No. 40, Winter 1987, pp. 187–88.
32 Ibid., p. 219.
33 Brigitte Peucker, Incorporating Images, p. 27.
34 Ibid. p. 26.
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Rather than mistaking the image for  reality,  the spectator  is  astonished by its 
transformation through the new illusion of projected motion. Far from credulity, 
it is the incredible nature of the illusion itself that renders the viewer speechless. 
What is displayed before the audience is … the force of the cinematic apparatus.35
The  uncanny  spectacle  of  Cesare’s  face  in  close-up  becoming animate,  his  eyes 
opening to look back, collapses the distinction between the diegetic and the “real” 
audiences. Both are transfixed by Caligari’s show: the exhibition of Cesare’s look. 
The  scene  confirms  Caligari’s  role  as  surrogate  director,  while  his  use  of  a 
“primitive” mode of representation coincides with a reflexive gesture in the context 
of  the  film’s  storytelling.  This  astonishing  exhibition,  which  is  based  on  the 
participation of its audience, poses a threat to the spectator’s vision and corporeal 
integrity: Participants can die, seemingly for no reason but the logic of the spectacle. 
The success of its uncanny effects has to do with its  contravention of a viewing 
experience  based  on  voyeuristic,  invisible  spectatorship  and  its  promise  of 
immortality.
Perspectivism and Film Technology
In The Cabinet of Dr Caligari, as Thomas Elsaesser has noted, “a visual form and a 
mode of narration have been found where several ‘versions’ or narrative perspectives 
(with shot set-up and editing echoing the sets’ perspectival mélange) converge or 
superimpose themselves on the same fictional space”.36 Similarly, Mike Budd has 
pointed out  how “In its  representation of  a  seemingly subjective world,  Caligari 
promotes  a  relativism over  the  objectivism  of  conventional  realist  films”.37 The 
film’s multiplicity of perspectives, the almost-cubistic perspectivism of its narration, 
is not ultimately resolved into any version that the viewer can accept as the “true” 
account (in comparison with what an omniscient narrator-camera would offer), and 
does not give the spectator an easy answer to any of the plot-related questions it 
raises. 
The major component of this uncertainty is the frame, which was substituted 
for the (insipid) prologue and epilogue Janowitz and Mayer originally had, in which 
35 Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous Spectator”, p. 822.
36Thomas Elsaesser,  “Social  Mobility  and  the  Fantastic”,  in  Fantasy  and  the  Cinema,  ed.  James 
Donald, London, BFI, 1989, p. 35.
37 Mike Budd, “The Moments of Caligari”, p. 104.
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Francis recounts his experiences of 20+ years before to guests at  his villa.38 This 
frame has, following Kracauer and Janowitz, often been read as destroying the intent 
of the film39 by revealing the story’s so-called critique of authority as the ravings of a 
madman, seeking to restore “realism” (the liberal-humanist cure) to the topsy-turvy 
carnival world, and settling the spectator’s uneasiness by giving the final meaning. 
This argument was, and remains, quite tenuous. One crucial fact to keep in 
mind is the persistence of the mise en scène; the asylum in the frame has precisely 
the same Expressionist style as the central narrative, the pictorial language used to 
represent an interior psychological state. Thus, while the frame purports to negate the 
entire plot of the film one has just watched as a mad delusion, it does not offer a 
viable alternative that one may take as the contrapuntal “reality” to Caligari’s “air of 
unreality”.40 Budd argues following these lines, that “Along with the continuation of 
the  expressionist  settings,  this  resemblance  suggests  less  the  confident 
reestablishment of sanity, order, and authority that Kracauer and Janowitz see, and 
hate,  than  the  uncanny  dream  logic  of  repetition  returning  within  the  smooth, 
repressive surface of classical narrative action”.41 Friedrich Kittler has insightfully 
described the problem in terms of the equivalence of the visible in the film and its 
reflexive thematisation of film technology:
It is precisely this indistinguishability between framed and framing story, between 
insanity and psychiatry, that does justice to film technology. Nothing prevents the 
asylum director in the narrative frame to act simultaneously as the mad Caligari… 
the identity between psychiatrist  and murderer  remains open-ended because it  is 
offered  to  the  eyes  only  and  is  not  institutionalized  by  any  word.  A  never-
commented-upon similarity between faces renders all readings indistinguishable.42
The film’s uncanny is founded on such indeterminacy, a perspectivism of images that 
discredit themselves. In other words, vision is deprived of the power to familiarize or 
38 However, Janowitz (and by extension Kracauer), in a revisionist description of the film’s production 
history attributed the addition of a frame to the production process (i.e., to Fritz Lang and Robert 
Wiene). The writers’ scenario, published from Werner Krauss’s copy, became publicly available only 
in 1995.
39 Notably, by Kracauer, and Mayer and Janowitz.
40 As Mike Budd has written,  “For Kracauer and Janowitz, the film would be more radical in its 
implications if it were more conventional in its discourse”. “The Moments of Caligari”, p. 29.
41 Ibid., p. 30.
42 Friedrich  Kittler,  Gramophone,  Film,  Typewriter,  trans.  Geoffrey  Winthrop-Young  & Michael 
Wutz, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 147.
    117
The Divided Screen
anchor  the spectator.  As such,  the frame has  no effect  of  putting things  back to 
“normal”, as the structural basis itself for a cinematic “homely” is discredited.
The doppelgänger theme is vital for this perspectival indecidability. A medley 
of doublings, the “similarity between faces” that Kittler identifies, revolves around 
the  asylum/film  director  Caligari,  whose  multiple  personalities  of  showman, 
scientist, and magician drive the dénouement. Caligari, however, is also doubled by 
his “creature” Cesare, who enacts his master’s murderous inclinations; by Francis, 
who is linked with Caligari by mutual desire for the girl; and by Dr Olson, the other 
doctor of the film, who is dressed like Caligari in a coat and top hat.43 While the 
film’s doublings in large part belong to the central story, the points of coincidence 
between  the  latter  and  the  purported  re-establishment  of  reality  in  the  frame 
contribute to make the latter equally disturbing, for example with the repetition of a 
straitjacket scene. 
The  characterization  of  Caligari  as  double,  as  mentioned  previously,  is 
structurally implicated in the relationship between the narrative’s ontological crisis 
and  the  medium  of  cinema.  His  subjective  divide,  an  uneasy  coupling  of  the 
magician-showman and the doctor as “realist” authority, dialectically relates to the 
film’s  crisis  of  form.  Simultaneously  involved  in  exhibitionism  and  voyeurism, 
strategies of “primitive” cinema and those of classical narrative, Caligari mediates 
between the aesthetics of astonishment and of suspense. 
43 See Thomas Elsaesser, “Social Mobility and the Fantastic”.
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In an especially disturbing moment at the end of the film, we learn, with a 
chilling sense of recognition, how the benevolent doctor indeed “becomes Caligari”: 
by putting on his spectacles, in both senses. All the other doctors, incidentally, wear 
them too. Janowitz’s comments on the genesis of Caligari are illuminating, showing 
that the source of the professor’s madness and crime was above all conceived as the 
compulsion to gratify a scientific curiosity taken to an extreme:
Nevertheless, it was the nucleus of the tragedy of a psychiatrist who had lost his 
mind, the gripping story of a man whose  idée fixe compelled him to “become 
Caligari” in order to learn whether murder through commanding a hypnotized 
medium was  possible… Our  professor  had  studied  this  story  of  that  Doctor 
Caligari  until  he,  himself,  had actually  gone  mad,  mad through studying this 
subject of murder by hypnosis; in his insanity he had the fixed idea that he must 
become Caligari  and play that showman Caligari,  whose case he had studied, 
over and over again.44
The  doctor  “becomes  Caligari”  as  a  result  of  intellectual  curiosity:  Augustine’s 
curiositas, a “lust of the eyes”. Here, as for Augustine, this voyeuristic perversion 
results in a craving for theatrical spectacles and the pursuits of magic and science.45 
44 Hans Janowitz, “The Story of a Famous Story”, p. 238. 
45 See Saint Augustine, Confessions, Book 10.
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This understanding of how the doctor “becomes Caligari” could apply to the 
spectator too, insofar as the experience of watching the film as a co-investigator is 
equally “studying this subject of murder by hypnosis”. “You must become Caligari” 
thus translates into a command to see the film, couched in which is a threat of its 
inducing a kind of madness. This madness, we find, is that of perceptual uncertainty 
and the lack of  any ultimate establishing perspective or perspectival  hierarchy, a 
sense of unease that is grounded in the metacinematic effects of the double. In the 
words of Jean-Louis Baudry, here it is indeed the case that “…Disturbing cinematic 
elements—similar, precisely, to those elements indicating the return of the repressed
—signify  without  fail  the  arrival  of  the  instrument  ‘in  flesh  and  blood’… Both 
specular tranquillity and the assurance of one’s own identity collapse simultaneously 
with the revealing of the mechanism, that is, of the inscription of the film work”.46
46Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus”, p. 312.
    120
CHAPTER VI
VISUAL APPREHENSIONS: DER GOLEM (1920)
I  can  imagine  a  kind  of  cinema  which  would  use  nothing  but  moving 
surfaces,  against  which  there  would  impinge  events  that  would  still 
participate in the natural world but transcend the lines and volumes of the 
natural… The real creator of film must be the camera. Getting the spectator 
to change his point of view, using special effects to double the actor on the 
divided  screen,  superimposing other  images  – all  this,  technique,  form, 
gives the content its real meaning…
With [the 1915  Golem]  I  went further  into the domain of pure cinema. 
Everything depends on the image, on a certain vagueness of outline where 
the fantastic world of the past  meets the world of today. I  realized that 
photographic technique was going to determine the destiny of the cinema. 
Light and darkness in the cinema play the same role as rhythm and cadence 
in music. 1
Paul Wegener, 1916
The  dramatically  exciting  moment  in  film  is  the  image;  everything, 
including the actor, must become images...2
Hans Richter, 1921
1 Paul Wegener, “Die künstlerischen Möglichkeiten des Films” (1916), in  Paul Wegener und Seine  
Rollen: Ein Buch von ihm und über ihn, ed. Kai Möller, Reinbek, Rowohlt Verlag, 1954, quoted in 
Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen, pp. 33; 40.
2In Das Kinojahrbuch, Vol. 3, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, Hans Hermann Richter Verlag, 1921, pp. 47–48. 
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Paul Wegener, who famously brought the doppelgänger to the German screen with 
The Student of Prague (1913), was also among the first to proclaim the artistic – i.e., 
specifically  cinematic  –  possibilities  of  film,  and  to  envision  abstract  film.  The 
appearance of the double in so many of his films testifies to his regarding the motif 
as an ideal vehicle for going “further into the domain of pure cinema”. An account of 
his second Golem film, Der Golem und die Tänzerin, a comedy shown in 1917 that 
is unfortunately lost, provides additional insight into Wegener’s understanding of the 
artistic use of the cinematic medium in relation to the double motif. 
Der Golem und die Tänzerin, to judge by the accounts, was a strange parody 
of the 1915  Golem using clips from the original,  at  a time when humorous self-
referential intertextuality must have been innovative: A man (played by Wegener) 
leaves the cinema after watching Wegener’s own 1915 Der Golem, starring Wegener 
and  Lyda  Salmonova.  He  then  puts  on  a  monster  suit  to  frighten  a  dancer 
(Salmonova) in her apartment.  The famous couple Wegener and Salmonova thus 
become the doubles of the principal characters they played in the first film (as the 
second film spells out) and also doubles of themselves as the stars of both films, as 
the au courant audience member would know. 
Here the transformation of Wegener into the Golem – his  doubling of an 
archetypal double – is instigated by Wegener watching himself as the Golem in his 
own film about the eponymous monster. Both the doppelgänger-maker (Wegener as 
director and showman) and the doubled protagonist (Wegener as actor, Golem, and 
film-goer) are Wegener himself. The double is thus bluntly an artifact of interaction 
with the cinematic medium: it is unleashed by the action of watching a film and by a 
process of identification with it, if not by starring in or making a film. 
However one interprets this complex narrative, part of the visual pleasure of 
watching it, and its humour, no doubt derive from the shared knowledge – on the part 
of both the film-maker and the viewer – of the discursivity of both the film-within-
the-film and  Der Golem und die Tänzerin itself. Its illusionist effect as a narrative 
thus gives place to the ironic effects of tongue-in-cheek self-reference, shared by the 
knowing spectator, and exposure of the formal characteristics of cinema itself. Not 
least,  the  sophistication  of  these  technically  proficient  manipulations  of  identity 
indicates  how aware  Wegener  was of  the  complex  possible  significations  of  the 
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double motif on film. With this involuted scenario of a Golem film within a Golem 
film, doubles of doubles,  and a plot parodying Wegener’s own Golem film,  Der 
Golem und die Tänzerin plays on the connection between the Golem as artificial life, 
the  doppelgänger  motif,  and  the  film  medium’s  mechanical  reproduction  of  the 
human form as a form of doubling.
Wegener’s several successful cinematic constructions of the Golem lead one 
to  wonder  why  he  found  the  clay  automaton  to  be  an  especially  suitable  and 
meaningful subject for his filmmaking, in light of his understanding of the cinematic 
medium, or for film in general. What does the cinematic representation of the Golem 
signify? Regarding  Der Golem: Wie er in die Welt kam  (1920), there are several 
points to consider: what is specifically  cinematic about the treatment of the Golem 
legend;  how  sources  of  the  legend  were  modified  for  the  film;  and  what  these 
changes signify with regard to the change of medium. It is also especially interesting 
to consider how the Golem legend reflects or relates to the context in which the film 
was produced and exhibited.
Meyrink’s Golem: Visual Mediation and the Doppelgänger Encounter
The legend of the Golem of Prague, an artificial man brought to life by Rabbi Loew 
in  the  16th Century  to  protect  the  Jews  of  the  Ghetto  against  persecution  by 
Christians, was repopularised for mass German audiences in the early 20th Century 
by Gustav Meyrink’s novel, The Golem, published in serial form in 1913–14 and as a 
best-selling book in 1915. The theme of the Golem had earlier been influential for 
German Romanticism, originally appearing in 1808 (Jacob Grimm), later to be taken 
up  in  a  number  of  works,  including  Achim von Arnim’s  Isabella  von  Aegypten 
(1812), E.T.A. Hoffmann’s  Secrets  (1821), and Mary Shelley’s  Frankenstein. The 
Golem thus belongs in the ranks of the myriad Romantic figures that resurfaced 100 
years later in the Wilhelmine/Weimar era and in German silent film. In addition, the 
novel’s  miscellany  of  fantastic  motifs  with  uncanny  effects  –  antique  texts  that 
conceal  secrets,  wax  dolls  and  puppets,  menacing  and  demonic  architecture,  the 
motif  of  the  eye  and  the  demonic  oculist  –  recall  the  obsessions  of  German 
Romanticism and prefigure those of German film.
123
The Divided Screen
While  Meyrink’s  novel  only  tangentially  evokes  the  legends  surrounding 
Rabbi Loew that provide the subject matter of this third Golem film, the reflexive 
and cinematic effects of its doppelgänger narrative deserve mention with regard to 
the 1920 film. The novel involves a  mise en abyme of doublings, especially with 
reflections  of  the  central  figure  of  the  narrator  by  other  characters.  The  Golem, 
whose hazy origins do follow the Rabbi Loew legend, is  a  free-floating Double: 
anyone who has the uncanny experience of crossing its path senses that the latter is 
somehow a part of himself that has assumed an independent form. Thus the Golem is 
a  visible  projection and  embodiment  of  the  viewer’s  problematic  selfhood  – 
problematic precisely in its heterogeneity – a manifestation of self-alienation as a 
moment  of  visual  crisis.  An uncanny and astonishing spectacle,  it  represents  the 
breakdown of the viewer’s identity between his empirical self or bodily presence and 
a  separate,  abstract,  alien element  of  his  being or  “soul”.  A woman who sees  it 
becomes “firmly convinced that it could only have been her own soul which had left 
her body for a moment and confronted her for a brief second with the features of an 
alien creature. In spite of the terrible dread with which she was seized, she said she 
was never in the slightest doubt that the other could only be a part of her inmost 
self”.3 
The Golem’s  appearance  as  projection/spectacle  in  which the  viewer  sees 
both himself and other resonates with the spectatorial dynamics of cinema.4 But more 
explicitly  cinematic  themes  and  effects  play  a  pronounced  role  in  the  novel’s 
depictions of the narrator’s interiority. Indeed, the possibility that cinema may have 
provided the inspiration for such “visual” effects in the novel is evidenced by the fact 
that the original manuscript was subtitled “Ein Guckkasten”. These effects include 
scene transitions with fade-ins and fade-outs and other random discursive “camera 
work”, such as close-ups. This becomes apparent with the narrator’s highly cinematic 
perception: “As if they had simply materialised before my eyes, two strange figures 
appeared out of the clouds of tobacco smoke” (p. 70). “A picture flashed through my 
mind’s eye and immediately faded…” (p. 80). “[The] image of the stone that looked 
like  a  lump of  fat  grew in my mind to  enormous dimensions…” (p.  23).  These 
3 Gustav Meyrink, The Golem, trans. Mike Mitchell, Sawtry, Cambs., Dedalus, 1995, p. 61.
4 Cf.  seminal  concerns  of  film  theory,  such  as  the  mirror  analogy  and  identification,  the  self-
constitution of the viewing subject, Metz’s imaginary signifier, etc.
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cinematic descriptions contribute to the novel’s narrative discontinuity and uncanny 
effects. In particular, as they comprise the (mad) narrator’s account of his experience, 
they  interfere  with  or  cast  doubt  on  his  perceptions  of  phenomena,  creating  a 
structural instability that affects both the narrator’s subjectivity and the narrative’s 
credibility itself, giving rise to uncanny effects.
The narrator’s fragmentary identity is represented through visual effects that 
are  explicitly  both  cinematic  and  uncannily  undecidable.  The  following  scene 
highlights  this  suggestive  connection  between  metaphors  of  cinema  and  the 
instability of the narrator’s perception:
Zwakh’s last sentences were drifting away over the surface of my consciousness; I 
saw him moving his hands to demonstrate the piston of a large pump going in and 
out, then the scenes that were unfolding all around us suddenly started to flick past 
my vision as quickly as if they were part of a clockwork peepshow, and yet with 
spectral clarity, so that for a while I completely lost awareness of myself and felt 
like a cogwheel in a living mechanism.5 
Here, the narrator’s drifting into a dream state is described as the metamorphosis of 
the world of the everyday into cinema. He is simultaneously part of the audience 
viewing the spectacle,  the projection instrument’s “clockwork”,  and the projected 
image itself. Becoming an element of this moving-picture scene as a “cogwheel in a 
living mechanism”, an uncanny dyad of human and machine, the narrator is both self 
– the writing self – and other; and, as a machine part without self-consciousness – 
like the camera – both blind and all-seeing.  Discussing such effects in Meyrink’s 
Golem, Andrew Webber has similarly noted their association with cinema, arguing 
that
Even before  the  film  version  of  the  story,  the  novel  anticipates  the  voyeuristic 
appeal  of  the  cinematic  effects  of  reflection  and  projection…  The  eponymous 
Golem is another sort of universal doppelgänger, not so much a mirror-man as a 
mirage…,  a  projection  of  a  photographic  or  filmic  negative…  The  protagonist 
becomes part of an uncannily live cinematic machinery.6
It is especially significant that  visual uncertainty, exemplified in its most extreme, 
spectacular form by the shocking appearance of the Double/Golem, is represented 
5 Gustav Meyrink, The Golem, p. 76–77.
6 Andrew  Webber,  The  Doppelgänger:  Double  Visions  in  German  Literature,  Oxford,  Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 352–53.
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through  oneiric  effects  associated  with  the  machinery  of  cinema,  hinting  at  the 
medium’s potential for ontological distress. 
For  the  narrator,  the  Golem-double  is  encountered  on  the  path  to  self-
knowledge,  signalling  a  recognition  of  his  heterogeneous,  equivocal  identity  by 
visibly  representing  this  fragmentation  in  the  moment  of  crisis  of  the  self.  The 
novel’s mystical/Judaic solution for restoring the beleaguered self to its ideal unity is 
a “gift” available to the chosen few who alone can understand the magical side of the 
Kabbala,  an understanding that  is  impossible to  attain through reason.  Meyrink’s 
novel  thus  champions  a  form  of  elitist  irrationalism  with  vague  echoes  of  the 
contemporary work of Stefan George and his circle, but it differs from the latter in 
being explicitly anti-aestheticist. 
A principal aspect of the novel’s irrationalist tendencies is a keenly distrustful 
treatment of vision. With its ambivalent thematisation of the rational eye, Meyrink’s 
novel denigrates the primacy of vision and the rationalist  perception of everyday 
reality in favour of a non-naturalistic, “visionary” sight. The latter is represented in 
the uncanny Golem encounter, which is ultimately redemptive for the narrator. This 
representation  of  vision  parallels  that  of  Expressionism,  as  Lotte  Eisner  finds  it 
represented by German cinema: “The Expressionist does not see, he has ‘visions’. 
According to Edschmid, ‘the chain of facts…’ does not exist; only the interior vision 
they provoke exists”.7
Interestingly,  the  novel’s  most  reprehensible  character  is  the  greedy  Dr 
Wassory:  a  demonic  oculist  who  is  paradoxically  both  positivist  and  aesthete;  a 
devotee of “the cult of the beautiful” who performs unnecessary eye operations on 
people who fear blindness from glaucoma, giving them blurry vision for life.  With 
his spiritual awakening, the narrator finds that the artist’s true insight into reality 
(and art)  comes through a form of elite  blindness to the phenomenal world.  The 
chosen few are those able to turn a blind eye to the world’s shadow-play of images 
and “see” things-in-themselves:
For years I had parrotted the mistaken dictum of the painters that to create a work of 
art one had to study nature. It was only since that night when Hillel had woken me 
that  my inner eye had opened, that sight behind closed lids which vanishes the 
7 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max 
Reinhardt, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 10–11.
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moment you open your eyes, a gift that everyone believes they possess, but that is 
given to less than one among millions.8
This denial of the ontological authority of the sense of sight is echoed by Meyrink’s 
use  of  cinematic  tropes,  which  destabilize  perception  both as  depicted  (what  the 
narrator sees) and as solicited (on the reader’s part).  The uncanny arises with the 
inability  to  trust  the  eyes,  appearing  as  an  ontological  problem  that  infects  the 
narrative and the structure of the text alike. 
What the chosen few “see”, instead, is their own subjective heterogeneity: 
“The soul is not ‘one and indivisible’; it will ultimately become so, and thereby attain 
what man calls immortality; your soul consists of infinite component parts—egos 
innumerable, like an ant-heap is composed of multitudinous ants”.9 While looking 
into the  mirror  may promise  a  reassuring narcissistic  duplication of  the  self,  the 
insightful  look  shows  the  uncanny  monster,  and  the  recognition  of  fragmentary 
selfhood.  The  novel’s  conception  of  subjectivity,  it  is  worth  noting,  has  an 
expressionist flavour, in that it problematically proclaims both an extreme form of 
subjectivism,  i.e.,  world-creation  through  individual  vision,  and  a  thoroughgoing 
abstraction  of  the  individual:  his  multiplication,  reflection  of  others,  and 
heterogeneity.10
A  kind  of  uncanny  obscurantism,  in  short, pervades  The  Golem,  where 
everything, including the self, to borrow Wegener’s words, “depends on the image, 
on a certain vagueness of outline where the fantastic world of the past meets the 
world of today”. The novel’s use of visual metaphors is an illuminating comparison 
in analyzing the visual  rendering of similar  effects  in  the film. As we shall  see, 
Wegener and Karl Boese’s 1920 Golem offers a similar obsessive depiction of vision 
that echoes features of Meyrink’s novel, but with quite a different result. 
8 Gustav Meyrink, The Golem, p. 138.
9 Ibid., p. 254.




The  immediate  source  for  the  plot  of  the  1920  film  is  Chayim  Bloch’s  highly 
successful collection of stories,  Der Prager Golem (1919). Bloch’s book, based on 
the original source material, made the Jewish legends surrounding Rabbi Loew and 
the  Golem’s  creation  available  to  a  broad  German-speaking  audience.  Here,  the 
learned Rabbi Loew, with the help of two devout colleagues, fashions a large man 
out of clay to help protect the Jewish community from the blood libel, the accusation 
that Jews were murdering Christians to use their blood in making matzo for their 
ceremonies. At the time, in the reign of the Hapsburg emperor Rudolf II, a Christian 
who planted a murdered body in the house of a Jew could accuse the Jew of murder. 
As a result, the latter would be executed and his property divided between the state 
and  his  accuser.  The  novel  focuses  primarily  on  the  Golem  as  the  Rabbi’s 
instrument: He is a tool built by a noble and wise humanist to right an injustice.
While in Meyrink’s novel the Golem is a type of universal double, in Bloch’s 
he  is  explicitly  treated  as  that  of  his  creator,  “a  spectre  of  Rabbi  Loew”.11 
Specifically, he is an instrument that the Rabbi has constructed to extend his own 
senses and power; the Golem works as an investigator around the Ghetto on Loew’s 
behalf. In one episode, for example, the Rabbi provides the Golem with an amulet 
that renders him invisible, so he may go about the Ghetto as a spy (as the Rabbi’s 
eyes  and  ears),  reporting  anything  suspicious  or  threatening  so  danger  may  be 
averted. In addition, he follows instructions to the letter, continuing to do as he is 
told until ordered to stop. Unlike in the 1920 film, the Rabbi does not lose control 
over him; rather, he is retired when his services are no longer required.
Wegener’s  film  draws  its  plot  from  several  distinct  episodes  related  in 
Chayim Bloch’s novel to form a cohesive tale. However, it  also imposes a more 
straightforward Frankensteinian narrative on the legend: the artificial man who is 
shown to  be  all  too  human  is  rejected  by  society,  eventually  rebels  against  his 
unorthodox scientist  creator,  and goes on a rampage of destruction.  At the same 
time,  the  film  blurs  the  Golem  story’s  political  significations,  presenting  an 
ultimately ambivalent depiction of the Golem legend – a telling departure from its 
sources, which are highly sympathetic to the plight of the Jews and adulatory of 
11 Chayim Bloch, The Golem: Legends of the Ghetto of Prague, trans. Harry Schneiderman, Vienna, 
John N. Vernay, 1925, p. 76.
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Jewish religion. Bloch’s novel, for example, stresses the fact that Rabbi Loew, an 
eminent thinker and a close friend of Tycho Brahe and Copernicus, convinces the 
Emperor through the use of reason that the blood libel is unfounded. His role in the 
cases that are brought before him in the Prague Ghetto is that of a rational and just 
investigator; he determines the facts of the cases and identifies the true culprits in 
cases of  false accusation,  such as  the blood libel,  and of  mistaken paternity  and 
adultery. He detects the truth through reason (and spiritual  revelation) and judges 
accordingly. In this respect  The Golem film, as Kracauer argues, does indeed fit in 
with the anti-rationalist trends in German thought that assumed political significance 
in the 1920s and after.
Wegener diverges from sources in changing the reason behind the Emperor’s 
expulsion order from the blood libel to the accusation that the Jews use black magic 
and thirst after the lives and property of their fellow men. The irony is that in the 
course of the film the accusation’s truth is amply shown, even emphasized. That 
many of the Jews wear wizards’ hats (albeit by Hapsburg decree) is mirrored by the 
silhouetted roofs of the Ghetto: the implication being that it is a site of dark sorcery. 
For  the court,  Rabbi  Loew enacts  a  scene by magic and compels the Emperor’s 
retraction  of  his  expulsion  decree  by  instigating  fear  and  chaos;  in  other  words, 
precisely by endangering the lives and property of Gentiles. The Emperor is thus 
convinced by force and not by reason. In addition, the love affair between the Jew 
Miriam and the Christian Count Florian is punished severely; the brutish Golem is 
the agent of this punishment. Finally, a curly-haired blond Christian child outside the 
walls of the Ghetto saves the Jews from the monster they have unleashed by taking 
away the amulet. Taken together, these deviations from the Golem legend tend to 
discredit Rabbi Loew’s legendary status as a saviour of the Prague Ghetto and offer 
an ambivalent depiction of the Jews and their religion. 
While the film originally consisted of five chapters, the narrative can usefully 
be divided into three sections, based on the climactic sequences: (1) the creation of 
the Golem in response to threatened misfortune; (2) the episode at the Emperor’s 
court, whereby the Jews are allowed to stay; and (3) the loss of control over the 
Golem. The three climactic moments are the Golem coming to life, the scene of 
destruction at  the Emperor’s court,  and the Golem’s rampage through the Prague 
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Ghetto. These sections of the film are also unified by the continuity of the Miriam–
Florian subplot, presented as parallel action, which is consistently cross-cut with the 
Golem scenes until the final sequence unites the two plots. Internal echoes between 
scenes also serve a cohesive function: The scene in which the Golem is brought to 
life by magic is echoed by the scene in which Rabbi Loew brings Jewish history to 
life  for  the Emperor’s  court.  The chaos  that  ensues at  court  is  paralleled by the 
Golem’s rampage in the final section of the film.
In terms of editing,  The Golem has a classical structure, with temporal and 
spatial continuity, including cutting back and forth between simultaneous events; the 
use  of  shot–reverse  shot;  and  a  straightforward  narrative.  The  action  takes  place 
continuously  in  the  course  of  a  day.  The  Miriam-Florian  subplot  provides  both 
suspense  and  the  voyeuristic  pleasure  of  watching  a  secret  and  forbidden  erotic 
interaction.  In  contrast  to  these  naturalist  aspects  are  the  film’s  highly  stylized 
aspects,  such  as  the  visual  effects  of  Hans  Poelzig’s  Expressionist  sets  and 
chiaroscuro lighting. Titles are used minimally and only as necessary. At the same 
time, characters are not psychologized, and the viewer’s identification with any is not 
overtly solicited, with the possible exception of the Golem himself, who draws some 
measure of sympathy. 
Like Meyrink’s novel, vision is a central theme of the 1920  Golem, which 
consistently draws attention to visual phenomena and the visibility of its images. 
Lotte Eisner has pointed out the extensive use of Max  Reinhardt–inspired lighting 
effects and chiaroscuro lighting,12 which seem to illustrate Wegener’s assertion that 
“Light  and darkness in the cinema play the same role as rhythm and cadence in 
music”. But, importantly,  the film’s images not only draw attention to lighting and 
the visibility of what is lit,  but they diegetically account for the sources of light: 
candles and lanterns appear throughout to explain how the objects of the scenes are 
illuminated,  and  the  film  redundantly  draws  attention  to  them.  They  are  even 
specifically described in the script: e.g., “Fade to candles burning”.13 
Similarly, a number of shots in the film display optical instruments. In the 
beginning of the film, Rabbi Loew uses a telescope to study the heavens. In an over-
12 Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen, p. 56.
13 Golem script; see Masterworks of the German Cinema: The Golem, Nosferatu, M, The Threepenny  
Opera, intro. by Roger Manvell, London, Lorrimer Publishing, 1973.
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determined sequence, the intertitle announcement of what is about to be shown is 
followed by a classic shot-countershot sequence: a shot of him looking through the 
telescope is followed by a shot of the stars (what he sees), enclosed in a circular 
frame to triply stress the fact, followed by another shot of the Rabbi at the telescope. 
This is an initial indication of Rabbi Loew’s function as a surrogate director figure: 
he alone in the film looks through a lens and sees a framed image. His response to 
what he sees through the lens determines the course of the film. 
The film, however, also foregrounds the visual by portraying the obscuring of 
vision and poor visibility (e.g., through the darkness of many Ghetto scenes). In a 
couple of sequences, for example, visual instruments come to notice through their 
malfunction or discomfort. In two different shots, Rabbi Jehuda has problems with 
his eyes, and the viewer’s attention is drawn to his spectacles. Toward the beginning 
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of the film he is reading by the light of two candles when, hearing a noise, according 
to the script, he removes his spectacles and shields his eyes from the glare. Shortly 
thereafter, a man enters to inform him of Count Florian’s arrival, and he again takes 
off  his  glasses and wearily puts  his hand over his tired eyes. These gestures are 
explicitly called for in the script.14
What are the effects of these depictions of vision, for example the obfuscation 
of what is seen by both the characters and film viewers? In part, the striking use of 
chiaroscuro lighting and other obscuring techniques contribute to the Ghetto’s dark, 
mysterious,  and opaque medieval  atmosphere.  They indicate the space physically 
occupied by the Jews not to be easily penetrable to vision, and by extension, to the 
rational, to habituation and the everyday. More generally, though, the unveiling of 
diegetic lighting conditions draws attention to the act of looking itself, to the fact 
that, as Wegener’s speech proclaims, light and darkness are film’s language.
What  we  as  viewers  see  is  strongly  linked  to  the  diegetic  conditions  of 
visibility: we can only see what the characters onscreen can see. Thus, conditions of 
diminished visibility affect both us and the characters; this is even indicated in the 
script,  e.g.,  “The courtiers  panic,  fight,  choke in  the  dust...  Smoke blots  out  the 
praying Jews.  The  Rabbi  is  also lost  in  the smoke”.15 The viewer  sees  with  the 
characters,  but  not  from  any  individualized,  particularized  perspective,  and  is 
subjected  to  precisely  the  diegetic  obscurities  they  perceive.  Differently  put,  the 
camera does not offer an easy answer – transparency – to the spectator’s look, or an 
ironic, privileged viewpoint that may be identified with an omniscient narrator. That 
the viewer can see no more than the diegetic visible produces a structural parallel or 
identification between the spectator and the diegetic world, in terms of knowledge, 
by  a  mutual  subjection  to  the  same  conditions  of  visibility. The  Golem’s  visual 
obscurities in this sense foster precisely the effects Todorov ascribes to the fantastic: 
“The fantastic therefore implies an integration of the reader into the world of the 
characters; that world is defined by the reader’s own ambiguous perception of the 
events  narrated…  The  reader’s  hesitation is  therefore  the  first  condition  of  the 
fantastic”.16
14  Masterworks of the German Cinema: The Golem, Nosferatu, M, The Threepenny Opera, pp. 20; 22.
15 Ibid., pp. 41, 49.
16 Tzvetan  Todorov,  The  Fantastic: A  Structural  Approach  to  a  Literary  Genre,  trans.  Richard 
Howard, Cleveland, Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973, p. 31.
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In addition, where “classical” cinema constructs “fictional characters in terms 
of what they saw and how they reacted to sights”,17 here they are not psychologised 
through an individualised vision.18 Here, vision is privileged as a mode of interaction 
both with and in the diegetic world, but it is at the same time deprived of primacy or 
stabilizing value with regard to what is seen. This basic identification between the 
viewer and the diegesis allows the uncanny, shocking effects of moments of the film 
when the “narrative” is disrupted and threatens the will of Rabbi Loew, the surrogate 
director:  the  crisis  moments  in  which  the  Golem comes to  life,  the  court  of  the 
Emperor is destroyed, and control over the Golem is lost. How vision is constructed 
in these moments is of great consequence for the uncanny effects of the film.
For two of the film’s characters – the Golem and Moses – the act of looking 
is foregrounded: In the film’s most uncanny moments, the Golem and Moses look 
around themselves, take stock of their surroundings, look toward the camera, and 
even approach it. The implication is that they assume an independent agency in these 
moments that escapes the will of the narrative and its director. Just after the Golem is 
brought  to life,  we see a  prolonged close-up of his  face that shows him looking 
around for the first time, and looking directly at the camera; the countershot shows 
Famulus’s fearful response. Immediately thereafter, the Rabbi orders him to walk: 
again we see a head-on shot of the Golem standing alone looking at us.
17 P.  Adams  Sitney,  Modernist  Montage:  The  Obscurity  of  Vision  in  Modernist  Cinema  and  
Literature, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 19.
18 The exception to this normalization of vision are  the Golem itself and the Wandering Jew, to be 
discussed.
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The Golem then walks toward the camera: Rabbi Loew stops him as if he has 
gone too far, orders him to walk in the opposite direction; he knocks down Famulus 
in his path.19 This sequence hints at the precariousness of control over the creature. 
Both before and after this brief trial run, when the Golem comes to life and when he 
is temporarily put to sleep, his eyes glow eerily in the darkly lit embrasure where he 
stands.
Here,  as  later,  a  sense  of  the  uncanny  is  fostered  with  the  Golem’s 
unambiguous looking, which threatens to escape the narrative space, an unwarranted 
intersubjectivity: above all, with the look into the camera at the viewer watching the 
film, and the approach toward the camera/audience. In the classically constructed 
narrative space of the film, this look creates a sense of fear or shock – an unnerving 
effect best described by recourse to the classic distinction between the point-of-view 
shot and the look. As Colin Maccabe has written,
The point of view preserves the primacy of vision, for what is left out of one point-
of-view shot can always be supplied by another. The look, however, is radically 
defective. Where the point of view is related to an object, the look is related to other 
looks. The look’s field is not defined by a science of optics in which the eye features 
as a geometrical  point but by the fact that the object we are looking at offers a 
position from which we can be looked at—and this look is not punctual but shifts 
over the surface.20
19 Similarly, at the Rose Festival, we see two terrified ladies. The countershot reveals what frightened 
them: a close-up of the Golem, looking at us. A sequence of shots of frightened courtiers follows.
20 Colin MacCabe, “Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure”,  Screen, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
Autumn 1976. Reprinted in Film Theory and Criticism, ed. G. Mast, M. Cohen, & L. Braudy, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 86.
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The uncanny becomes possible precisely with the loss of primacy of vision, which 
involves ontological uncertainty and a threat to physical and psychic integrity. In this 
sense,  The  Golem’s  unnerving  cinematic  effects,  signifying  the  compromised 
position of vision as establisher of ontological mastery, could be compared to the 
critical  engagement  with  Cartesian  perspectivalism  that  is  a  common  feature  in 
Modernist works of art (e.g., Cubism). Here, the narrative itself is put on trial by the 
uncanny  look,  at  once  threat  and  metafilmic  commentary,  which  constitutes  a 
violation of  naturalistic  cinematic  norms of  continuity  and the  haptic  space.  The 
Golem’s look disrupts the viewer’s voyeuristic or objectifying interaction with the 
image, expanding unexpectedly beyond the bounds, both spatial and temporal, of its 
function within the narrative, and beyond the will of its director (diegetically, Rabbi 
Loew). 
The  scene  at  the  Emperor’s  court,  a  key  moment  in  the  film’s 
problematization of vision, has a similar structure. Based on this scene, Kracauer 
lauded the film as  one of  only two works of  German silent  cinema that  suggest 
rational thinking as a solution to the German soul’s dilemma, a double longing for 
tyranny and chaos: “But interest in mobilizing reason was apparently so limited that 
it reached the screen only in two isolated instances, one of which was nothing more 
than an episode of Wegener’s second Golem (1920)”.21 Kracauer’s rigidly thematic 
reading of The Golem, however, is characteristic of his tendency in From Caligari to  
Hitler to neglect the specifically cinematic qualities of the film, which were likely 
Wegener’s predominant concern. In this climactic scene, the Golem, as the tool of 
the Rabbi, helps save the oppressed Jews from the threatened pogrom:
To soothe the emperor’s  mind, Rabbi Loew, by means of  magic,  conjures  up a 
procession of Biblical figures—among them Ahasuerus,22 who proceeds to trespass 
on the domain of reality, starting to destroy the imperial palace. The emperor, panic-
stricken, agrees to withdraw his order of expulsion if the rabbi will avert the danger; 
thereupon the latter directs the Golem, his servant, to prevent walls and ceilings 
from falling down. The Golem obeys with the automatic promptness of a robot. 
Here  reason  avails  itself  of  brute  force  as  a  tool  to  liberate  the  oppressed.  But 
21 This  and  the  following  quotation  are  from  Siegfried  Kracauer,  From  Caligari  to  Hitler:  A 
Psychological History of the German Film, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1947, pp. 112–
113. The other film illustrating the power of reason, argues Kracauer, was Schatten (1922).
22 Moses  is  sometimes  identified  as  Ahasuerus,  the  Wandering  Jew,  in  discussions  of  the  film. 
However, the script specifies that the figure is Moses. The Wandering Jew is also an unlikely figure 
because of the character's explicit anti-Semitic significance.
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instead  of  following  up  this  motif,  the  film  concentrates  upon  the  Golem’s 
emancipation from his master, and becomes increasingly entangled in half-truths.23
Focusing on the role of the Golem, Kracauer interprets the scene as the mobilization 
of instrumental reason: a powerful new technology, created by a brilliant man, serves 
the pacifist  will  of  its  wise master for a liberal  end,  protecting the courtiers and 
liberating  the  Jews.  The  anti-rationalist  Frankensteinian  denouement  therefore 
appears  to  contradict  this  positive representation of  the man-made man.  But  this 
reading characteristically ignores several crucial aspects of the scene that determine 
its significance and relationship to the rest of the film. Chief among these, as we shall 
see, is its depiction of an extraordinary visual crisis in the context of an allegory of 
cinema, a film projection scenario within the film. The sophisticated intertextuality 
of Wegener’s previous Golem film, Der Golem und die Tänzerin (1917), should alert 
us to this scene’s importance. Kracauer also ignores the important ways in which the 
Rabbi’s  display  of  this  “historical  film”  parallels  his  other  magical-mimetic 
enactment, the Golem.
In this scene the film’s sources are modified in significant ways.  First,  in 
contrast to Bloch’s story, the Rabbi brings his creature with him; the Golem thus 
becomes the saviour of the courtiers and, as a consequence, of the Jews. Second, the 
spectacle enacted by Loew is studiously depicted as the projection of a film within 
the film, i.e.,  as a biblical epic.  In the version published by Bloch, however, the 
episode is related quite briefly: The Rabbi magically enacts a show of Jewish history 
for  the  emperor’s  court;  the  Emperor  is  impressed,  yet  laughs  at  the  figure  of 
Naphtali. The wall starts to crumble, but Rabbi Loew saves the Emperor with the 
name of God (Shem). Meyrink’s novel also contains a laconic retelling of the story 
of Rabbi Loew and the Golem, including a version of this scene. Significantly, the 
Rabbi’s legendary display – in which the dead are brought to life – is hypothesized to 
have  been  a  magic  lantern  show,  and  Loew  is  compared  to  a  showman  of  the 
phantasmagoria:
‘That same Rabbi is supposed to have been summoned to the Emperor in the castle 
on the Hradschin, where he called up the spirits of the dead in visible form’, added 
Prokop. ‘Modern scientists claim he must have used a magic lantern.’
23 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 113.
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‘A magic lantern! People will believe anything nowadays’, Zwakh rejoindered. ‘As 
if Emperor Rudolf, who had devoted his whole life to such matters, would not have 
seen through a crude trick like that right away.’24
The magic lantern hypothesis is in keeping with the cinematic themes of Meyrink’s 
Golem. But The Golem film script even more explicitly foregrounds the resemblance 
of the Rabbi’s spectacle to cinema: “Fade back to the emperor’s court, where all are 
seated with their backs to us while Rabbi Loew stands on a platform… The Rabbi 
raises his hands. There is an explosion of white flame… There is a flare of light and 
as the guests wonder, we see two lines of people toiling across the desert”.25 The 
images appear on a wall above the courtiers, who are shown both in groups and from 
behind, highlighting their  position as spectators. The moving image appears on a 
white background resembling a film screen framed by a jagged edge. Although the 
screen is not rectangular,  the jagged edge stresses the distinctness of the moving 
image as a conjured representation. Rabbi Loew occupies the position of the early 
film exhibitor or showman on the platform, enacting the spectacle and hearkening to 
a long tradition of similar characters and their representations of cinematic ghosts.
As a prelude to his biblical film, Rabbi Loew warns the courtly audience not 
to speak or laugh: in other words, not to react to the moving image as a form of 
24 Meyrink, The Golem, p. 56.
25 Golem script, see Masterworks of the German Cinema: The Golem, Nosferatu, M, The Threepenny 
Opera.
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entertainment.  When  the  courtiers,  regarding  the  spectacle  precisely  as  moving-
picture show, burst into laughter, Moses, shown walking across the desert – after 
having  seemed to acknowledge the presence of an audience by looking around in 
their direction – starts wrathfully walking toward the court, i.e., toward the camera. 
As when the Golem comes to life,  Moses’s look in  the direction of  the diegetic 
audience and head-on movement toward the camera, signals the uncanny disruption 
of  the projected “classical”  narrative and its  intrusion into reality  in  terms of an 
explicit  physical  threat.  The  uncanny here  is  related to  the  indeterminacy of  the 
image’s status, of something long since accounted dead coming to life. With this 
exhibitionist motion, the erstwhile shadow comes to life and towers over the court in 
a flash of light and smoke, and destruction ensues. 
When  Rabbi  Loew  projects  his  film,  the  breakdown  of  the  diegetic 
“instrument”, the cinematic illusion, results in chaos and violence, and prefigures the 
Golem’s breakdown to follow in the film that we as spectators are watching. For the 
courtiers  watching Rabbi  Loew’s picture-show, seeing becomes uncanny and life 
threatening when what is being seen and objectified looks back and approaches the 
camera. In this moment of astonishment, Jewish history uncannily trespasses on the 
reality constructed by the film, not only interrupting the order of the represented 
audience’s  reality,  but  constituting  a  shocking  moment  within  the  established 
narrative followed by the real audience, the doubles of the represented spectators. 
The  diegetic  viewers  and  the  real  audience  alike  are  lulled  into  a  voyeuristic 
interaction with the image that is  suddenly disrupted by the exhibitionism of the 
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image itself – its intrusion, in Kracauer’s words, into the “real”. In his anger, Moses 
crosses the boundary of the screen into the (comparatively three-dimensional) court, 
as if no longer conceding to being merely the image of himself.  With a burst of 
smoke he flickers for a split-second outside the demarcated inner screen, appearing 
to  have  emerged  from  the  screen  into  the  court.  This  is  a  reflexive  (because 
cinematic) formulation of the Frankenstein story, in which the creature escapes the 
will  and  intention  of  its  creator:  here  the  film  escapes  the  will  of  its  diegetic 
exhibitor/director and its instrumental function as a narrative representation. 
Although the scene at the Emperor’s court clearly presents a projection and 
spectatorship scenario, a film within the film, Kracauer neglects its significance as 
such.  Rabbi  Loew  is  again  shown  as  a  surrogate  director,  both  magician  and 
technician – not just as exhibitor of the moving image but also as creator of the 
Golem. The analogous “nature” of these two spectacles is hinted at by the Emperor. 
Seeing  the  fascinating  Golem,  he  invites  the  Rabbi  to  show  the  court  further 
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wonders: “What manner of marvel is this that you display for us today, you strange 
illusionist?  Let  us see  more of  your  art”.  The  Rabbi  is  explicitly  compared to  a 
Cagliostro-like illusionist who displays marvels, like a showman of early cinema, 
and the projection of the moving image is solicited as a continuation of the self-same 
mimetic art that made a Golem. 
The episode at the Emperor’s court is a key unifying moment of the film, not 
least  in  evoking  a  structural  analogy  between  the  film-within-the-film  and  the 
automaton:  Both  are  Frankensteinian  spectacles  magically  and  pyrotechnically 
enacted by Loew and meant to serve his interests. Both compel the astonishment of 
their  audiences  within the diegesis  and beyond it,  as  spectacular  techno-mystical 
innovations, sharing an uncanny nature as effigies of man – one is a clay statue and 
the other a representation of Biblical ghosts – that come to life through the agency of 
the director. Loew in both cases loses control over his creations, and the uniform 
result is life-threatening chaos. 
Finally, both evoke a sense of the uncanny, construed as a threat to vision and 
an  ontological  crisis,  at  the  moment  when  they  exceed  their  instrumental  (and 
narrative)  bounds,  blurring  the  line  between  animate  and  inanimate,  natural  and 
artificial. Paralleling the scene at court, the last part of the film shows Rabbi Loew’s 
loss of control over the Golem, again signalled by the creature’s uncanny look back 
at  the  audience:  his  fiendish  glare  toward  the  camera  in  close-up.  The  Golem’s 
transgressive  look  is  thus  both  a  precursor  (just  after  he  comes  to  life)  and  a 
repetition of  that  of  Moses.  But  while  Moses's  look into the camera has  a  clear 
diegetic  audience  within  the  film,  that  of  the  Golem more  directly  threatens  the 
film’s spectator. In these moments of crisis, the uncanny is constructed as a spatial 
and temporal disruption of narrative continuity by the ghostly spectacle coming to 
life – signified by the look at or approach toward the camera. The representation 
itself, an effigy of man, poses a threat to narrative order. The uncanny arises, in other 
words, when the mimetic reproduction, mise en abyme and watched in a voyeuristic 
mode by multiple nested audiences, escapes its instrumental function to watch back.26
26
One could argue that  this happens with the  Golem film as a  whole,  which sets up a voyeuristic 
viewing scenario – cf. scenes with Miriam and Florian – and ultimately escapes this function.
140
The Divided Screen
These  uncanny  gestures  not  only  rely  on,  but  refer  to  basic  structural 
possibilities of film editing and the position of the spectator  vis-à-vis the narrative 
space.  They are therefore key elements of the metacinematic  themes of the film. 
Echoes  between  the  film projection  sequence  and the  fate  of  the  Golem,  which 
illuminate  the structural  parallels  between the automaton and cinema,  support  an 
allegorical, reflexive reading of the film. Like cinema, the Golem is a mechanical 
reproduction of life with an uncanny double nature as both human being and his 
instrumental parody. Automatic and cinematic effigies of man present the same kind 
of threat to their diegetic and actual viewer: the threat of a mimetic reproduction that 
visually approaches indistinguishability from the “real” but is its Ersatz, a being of a 
mixed nature. Both have the capacity to engender a particular kind of visual and 
ontological uncertainty in the viewer. With The Golem’s reflexive effects, however, 
the mise en abyme of mechanically reproduced selves threatens the “reality” external 
to the text with the uncanny.
As we have seen, visual and ontological uncertainties are a central concern in 
The Golem. The film’s deliberate frustration of the viewer’s look sets the obfuscated 
stage  on  which  the  lucid,  disruptive,  and  exhibitionist  look  of  the  double 
(Golem/Moses)  enacts  a  crisis  of  vision  and  of  identity.  This  materialization  of 
vision, in conjunction with the uncanny, is a recurrent feature of the doppelgänger 
story.  In opaque renderings of vision,  perception is mediated or indirect,  and the 
mediating process or material is made visible and foregrounded. As Tzvetan Todorov 
originally observed, vision has to be made opaque in order for “themes of the self”, 
such as the doppelgänger, to have a proper milieu:
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Indirect vision is the only road to the marvellous… Eyeglasses and mirrors become 
the image of a vision that is no longer a simple means of connecting the eye to a 
point in space, which is no longer purely functional, transparent, transitive. These 
objects are, in a sense, vision materialized or rendered opaque, a quintessence of 
sight.27
How  such  a  thematization  of  vision  actually  functions  within  the  narrative  is 
illuminated by recourse to the concept of the uncanny. When vision is made opaque, 
it is also made contingent and perspectival, a function of instruments and viewing 
positions. The uncanny, as a crisis of phenomenality, is founded precisely on this 
denigration  of  vision,  and  begins  where  perception  no  longer  has  primacy  in 
establishing a phenomenal or subjective stability.
In cinematic representation, however, the visual features of the doppelgänger 
literature assume a different aspect, not least because “indirect vision” is itself the 
medium’s axiomatic characteristic. Indeed, the experience is thoroughly mediated by 
visual  instrumentation  from  production  to  projection.  If  for  Hoffmann,  “every 
appearance of a supernatural element is accompanied by the parallel introduction of 
an element belonging to the realm of sight”,28 in film such introductions do not mean 
altogether the same thing: Everything is already in the realm of sight.29 Effects that in 
a literary context merely describe the “visual” uncertainty required by the uncanny 
onscreen refer explicitly to cinema itself, exposing the contingency of its images. 
Precisely  because  vision  itself  is  materialized  or  made visible  in  a  visual 
medium, The  Golem’s  foregrounding  of  visual  phenomena  in  the  diegesis  has  a 
reflexive tenor, revealing the mimetic reproduction’s position as shadow-play and 
double. The counterpart of the eyeglasses and mirrors is here also the film instrument 
itself,  from  camera  lens  to  screen,  the  source  of  an  indirect  vision  (and  the 
appearance of optical instruments, such as Rabbi Loew’s telescope, alludes to this) 
through which vision itself is materialized or rendered opaque, navigating between 
the  always-already-iconic  effects  of  its  realistic  images  and  the  ever-present 
possibility of the eruption of the uncanny.
27 From a reading of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “Princess Brambilla”. Tzvetan Todorov,  The Fantastic, p. 
123.
28 Ibid., p. 121.
29 Here, incidentally, Moses  is introduced by the projection scenario of the film-within-the-film, and 
the Golem is introduced by the film itself (the real projection scenario).
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The Golem’s  scenario relies  on a  double mode of representation:  both on 
naturalistic  classical  narrative  techniques  and  on  their  problematic  obfuscation. 
Where  a  narrative  scenario  along  classical  lines  (with  temporal  and  spatial 
continuity)  blurs  the  role  of  the  cinematic  apparatus  and  supports  a  voyeuristic 
spectatorial interaction, in its context the reflexive effects by which the uncanny is 
evoked appear as interruptions or divergences from the film’s characteristic play of 
the look. At the focal point of this treatment of vision, film is revealed as a medium 
with a double nature like that of the doppelgänger. These reflexive effects constitute 
an allegory of film as uncanny instrument. For Wegener and Boese, “going further 
into the domain of pure cinema” makes for a film concerning film and its conflicting 
possibilities,  of  spectatorship  based  on  voyeurism  and  the  shock  of  cinema’s 
unexpected forms of intersubjective experience. The Golem parallels cinema’s threat, 
as  a  man-made  man,  both  natural  and  artificial,  photogenically  offering  the 
considerable visual pleasure of the new technology and the threatening return of the 
look, and as something deeply uncanny emerging in the world of the everyday. 
Returning to Wegener’s 1916 speech, we can trace a connection between the 
visual  thematics  of  the  doppelgänger  encounter,  in  which  “By  the  hesitation  it 
engenders, the fantastic questions precisely the existence of an irreducible opposition 
between  real  and  unreal”,30 and  Wegener’s  notion  of  a  pure  cinema,  “a  kind  of 
cinema which would use nothing but moving surfaces, against which there would 
impinge events that would still participate in the natural world but transcend the lines 
and volumes of the natural”. What is at stake, then, is a visual representation of the 
interdependence of the real and the unreal. This dialectic requires divesting vision of 
epistemological  primacy,  which  is  related  to  its  mediation  by  instruments,  its 
physiological exploration, and even the idea of seeing as essentially perspectival. The 
themes  of  vision  involved,  recalling  those  of  German Romanticism,  make visual 
apprehension the source of fright. Their representation in the optical-technological 
medium of cinema is at once ambivalent and ironic. 
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CHAPTER VII
THE TYRANNY OF IMAGES:
 DOUBLE EXPOSURE IN WAXWORKS (1924)
If the designer merely imitated photography to construct his sets, the film 
would remain faceless and impersonal. There has to be the possibility of 
bringing out an object’s essential attributes so as to give the image style 
and colour... 
This is particularly necessary for films set wholly in a world of 
unreality. For my film Das Wachsfigurenkabinett, I have tried to create sets 
so stylised that they evince no idea of reality. My fairground is sketched in 
with  an  utter  renunciation  of  detail.  All  it  seeks  to  engender  is  an 
indescribable fluidity of light, moving shapes, shadows, lines and curves. It 
is not extreme reality that the camera perceives, but the reality of the inner 
event, which is more profound, effective and moving than what we see 
through everyday eyes, and I equally believe that the cinema can reproduce 
this truth, heightened effectively…
I cannot stress too strongly how important it is for a designer to 
shun the world seen everyday and to attain its true sinews... It will be seen 
that a designer must not construct 'fine' sets. He must penetrate the surface 
of  things and reach their  heart.  He must  create  mood (Stimmung)  even 
though he has to safeguard his independence with regard to the object seen 
merely  through  everyday  eyes.  It  is  this  which  makes  him  an  artist. 
Otherwise I can see no reason why he should not be replaced by an adroit 
apprentice carpenter…
Paul Leni1
1Paul Leni, Kinematograph, No. 911, 1924. Quoted by Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen, Berkeley, 
CA, University of California Press, 1969, p. 127.
Jack the Ripper
The Divided Screen
The framing narrative of Paul  Leni’s  Waxworks returns to the fairground milieu, 
purportedly dispatched with by  Caligari’s conclusion (which, as some readings of 
the film would have it,  relegated its fairground scenes to the narrator’s psychotic 
delusions). Here, a writer enters a booth that is identified as a waxworks show, or 
Panopticum. Toward the end of the film, in the remarkable pursuit in the writer’s 
nightmare by Jack the Ripper,2 we once again see the word, superposed over the 
image of the killer. In the grotesque space-time of this dreamworld, Jack the Ripper 
is  getting  closer  and  closer,  both  to  his  victim  and  to  the  spectator.  The  word 
Panopticum (panopticon), a room for the exhibition of novelties such as waxworks, 
thus frames the film itself  and assumes an undeniable significance,  both with its 
repetition and as one of the few verbal signposts in the diegetic world. Not least, it 
serves  as  a  reflexive  reference to  Waxworks the film, which promises its  viewer 
something akin to the spectacle that this show offers:  the astonishment of seeing 
liminal beings, lifeless technological creations that have the vitality of life itself… in 
other words, the uncanniness of cinema. The arrayed wax figures, illuminated one by 
one by the show’s proprietor with a lantern,  come to be illuminated in sequence 
through the writer’s stories and by the film itself.3
The first two episodes of Waxworks present a “classical” spatial and temporal 
continuity and a familiar narrative structure that leaves little room for bewilderment. 
In fact, the plot would have been especially familiar from Fritz Lang’s  Der Müde 
Tod (Destiny;  1921),  which  similarly  has  a  framing  story  and  three  “historical” 
episodes, in which a girl tries to save her lover from Death. However, in conjunction 
with a clear narrative structure,  Waxworks relies on expressionist stylistic elements 
and  other  distancing  visual  strategies  that  prevent  the  viewer  from  illusionist 
immersion in the fiction. Among these are the  mise en scène and its anti-naturalist 
ornamentation, and the film’s constant foregrounding of its narration and narrator. 
The  explicit  identification  of  what  the  viewer  sees  with  the  imagination  of  the 
2 For  the  English  version  of  the  film,  Jack  the  Ripper  was  changed  to  Spring  Heeled  Jack,  a 
mysterious character who terrorized the British in the late 1830s. The latter’s attacks mainly consisted 
of clawing young ladies about the chest with his sharp fingers and spitting balls of gas/fire to blind his 
victims before making his getaway with superhuman jumps over walls and onto rooftops. He was also 
described as a cloaked figure with fiendish, protuberant orange eyes and sharp ears.
3 It is perhaps no coincidence that the première of the Cinématographe Lumière in Berlin was in the 
“Panoptikum” at  Friedrichsstrasse  65a,  1st floor.  See  Martin  Loiperdinger,  “1986–The  Arrival  in 
Germany of  the Cinématographe Lumière”,  in  Before Caligari:  German Cinema,  1895–1920,  ed. 
Paolo Cherchi Usai and Lorenzo Codelli, Edizioni Biblioteca dell’Immagine, 1990, p. 34. 
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narrator,  as  opposed  to  the  presentation  of  a  purportedly  objective  account  of 
historical  events  (i.e.,  with  an  invisible  narrator-camera),  likewise  forestalls 
immersion and suspense. 
In  his  1924  article  for  the  Berlin  Kinematograph,  quoted  above,  Leni 
discussed the function of  mise en scène,  particularly in fantastic cinema and with 
reference  to  his  approach  in  Waxworks:  With  an  anti-naturalist  aesthetic,  i.e.,  a 
departure from the principles of photography, the film artist attempts to bring out “an 
object’s essential attributes” and “the reality of the inner event”. Leni’s argument 
participates in the broader German debate on film as a medium,4 in this case with the 
underlying claim that film has the status of an independent art form, and is therefore 
suitable for bourgeois consumption, in its distinctness from other arts. His comments, 
like those of others, attribute to cinema the possibility of “redemption of physical 
reality” (Kracauer), but through the medium’s capacity to record and reveal what is 
invisible to “everyday eyes”. Leni’s argument invokes metaphysical categories for 
differentiating art from craft, and film from other media. It is unclear just what is 
meant  by  “an  object’s  essential  attributes”,  or  the  formal  structures  or  viewing 
experience that would deconceal “the reality of the inner event”. It is also unclear 
how  the  capabilities  of  representation  specific  to  the  apparatus  –  “indescribable 
fluidity of light, moving shapes, shadows, lines and curves” – are meant to penetrate 
the film under which reality lies obscured, to reveal the “reality of the inner event” in 
contradistinction to “what we see through everyday eyes”. 
Taking Waxworks as an attempt toward these abstract ends, a distinguishing 
feature of its mise en scène  seems to be a reliance on ornamentation and baroque 
imagery. The film also redundantly foregrounds the discursive, fictional character of 
what its viewer sees, e.g., with the straightforward framings. Indeed, readings of the 
film have tended to  criticize these elements of  distraction and a  perceived over-
reliance on ornamentation, on the “classical” grounds that such effects detract from 
the film’s narrative force and effect:  in  other  words,  for  their  making “safe” the 
film’s elements of horror.  Lotte  Eisner,  for example,  criticized the film’s refined 
4 See, e.g., Anton Kaes, Kino-Debatte: Texte zum Verhaltnis von Literatur und Film, 1909–1929, 
Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978; Sabine Hake, The Cinema's Third Machine: Writing 
on Film in Germany, 1907–1933, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1993.
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Baroque  imagery  precisely  for  its  seeming  gratuitousness  vis-à-vis narrative 
motivations. Discussing the Jack the Ripper sequence, she found that
…Despite its manifest virtuosity this film marks a regression, as this last episode 
clearly shows. Although Jack the Ripper moves forward threateningly and the sets 
open up like sliding-doors, the depth-effect is botched; there is more depth here than 
in Caligari. In addition, sort of resolute perfection, an over-refined composition, an 
excessive  mannerism,  can  make  the  spectator  feel  uncomfortable.  Purely 
‘decorative’ Expressionism here ends in the same impasse as Genuine had done. 
In the United States Paul Leni was to realize the necessity of intensifying 
the ‘mood’ and of going beyond mere enjoyment in the Baroque and in the use of a 
super-abundance of forms. The set stops being a game or a subterfuge and becomes 
part of the action.5
But considering Leni’s comments on the possibilities of film as a kind of redemption 
of  physical  reality,  one  is  led  to  wonder  how  the  striking  stylistic  elements  of 
Waxworks  relate  to  Leni’s  understanding  of  cinema.  What  are  the  “essential 
attributes” of its cornucopia of objects, or the “reality of the inner event” and “true 
sinews” of the world? A closer look at  Waxworks’  visual style is needed, in the 
context of its narrative constructions, chief among which is the doppelgänger motif, 
of  its relationship to cinema as “panopticon”,  and of its  participation in a debate 
about film form in the context of Weimar Germany.
The Ornamental Image as Commodity
The most striking feature of Waxworks’ imagery is its profuse, erotic ornamentation. 
This obsessive redundancy includes the serial repetition of similar shapes, presented 
by  different  objects  and  recurring  motifs.  One  such  repetition,  especially  in  the 
Haroun and Ivan episodes, is of globular forms. Numerous objects – including the 
Caliph himself, his hat, and the Baghdad architecture; and Ivan’s hourglasses, bed, 
and the palace’s onion domes – share a rotund, bulbous shape. As with the hourglass, 
these forms are often doubled.  Not least  in their  indexical  association with eyes, 
breasts, or testicles, they also have an organic feel and an erotic resonance. 
5Lotte Eisner, The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max  




An effect similar to this diachronic multiplication or reproduction of forms 
occurs within individual images. The  mise en scène of Ivan’s place, for example, 
where the bride’s father waits for the Czar, is overrun by onion-shaped domes, icons, 
and men: all  these metonymically reproduce each others’  shapes within the shot. 
Individual  characters  are  also  multiplied  within  the  image,  for  example  through 
mirroring scenarios – a manifestation of the doppelgänger theme.
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These forms both refer to and reinforce each other by purely formal/visual 
association, both iconically and indexically (in Peirce’s terms). In other words, they 
echo the analogous forms and images of the film in a metonymic chain, referring to 
each other on purely visual grounds, rather than requiring symbolic interpretation or 
justification within the narrative itself  – hence Lotte Eisner’s charge that “Purely 
‘decorative’ Expressionism here ends in [an] impasse”.6 With their erotic undertones, 
these repetitive shapes are comparable to the chain of similarly “shaped” metaphors 
in Georges Bataille’s  The Story of the Eye: eyes, eggs, testicles, etc. According to 
Roland  Barthes,  whose  reading  of  Bataille  is  suggestive  for  a  discussion  of 
Waxworks,  The Story of the Eye enacts a “technical transgression of the forms of 
language, for metonymy is precisely a forced syntagm, the violation of a signifying 
limit of space; it permits, on the very level of discourse, a counterdivision of objects, 
usages, meanings, spaces, and properties, which is eroticism itself…”.7
Waxworks’ repetition of spherical forms is a visual counterpart of Bataille’s 
discursive effect,  enacting an erotic  metonymy with no (paradigmatic)  hierarchy. 
Here, a purely specular effect is the most pronounced, overriding any engagement of 
the viewer in a symbolic reading of individual motifs of the chain. But what are the 
effects  of  such metonymic eroticism – and its  “violation of a signifying limit  of 
space” – in the realm of images? For one, I would argue, the film’s objects develop a 
kind  of  fetish  character  as  “imaginary”  commodities  (imaginary  in  the  Lacanian 
sense) for the viewer’s  Schaulust  or scopophilia. Like the consumer’s relationship 
with the commodity, as Karl Marx argued in Capital,8 here the mode of engagement 
is visual and the object of this engagement has a phantasmagorical, metaphysical, 
and erotic character. This, of course, could be argued for any cinematic image, which 
according  to  these  criteria  is  the  commodity  par  excellence:  Not  least,  in  the 
“classical” cinematic product, the process of production is masked by the outward 
appearance  of  the  product,  which  presents  itself  as  self-producing.  Finally,  the 
relationship of the viewer with the image, like that of the consumer with the product, 
is disconnected and phantasmal by nature.
6 Ibid., p. 125.
7 Roland  Barthes,  “The  Metaphor  of  the  Eye”,  in  Critical  Essays,  Evanston,  Il.,  Northwestern 
University Press, 1972, p. 246.
8 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, New York, Modern Library, 1906.
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For Leni’s film, however, it is especially the case that through their repetition 
and  erotic  undertones,  the  film’s  idolatrous  forms  are  openly  foregrounded  as 
fetishistic  objects.  The  director’s  avowed intention of  bringing  out  the  “essential 
attributes”  of  objects  makes  for  a  film  that  is  as  much  a  representation  of 
relationships among objects  as among characters.  Whereas the characters  are  not 
psychologized,  things  –  which,  following  Expressionist  principles,  are  meant  to 
represent interior states – are. The lack of explicit narrative motivation to justify their 
foregrounding  –  often  in  close-ups  that  dissociate  them  from  their  spatial  and 
narrative contexts – compounds this effect. In sum, the visual pleasure involved in its 
spectatorship,  based  on  an  indexical  eroticism  with  quasi-mystical  undertones, 
exploits the images’ fetish character and commodifies them.9 
In  conjunction  with  this  metonymy of  objects,  it  is  noteworthy  that  both 
episodes  repeatedly  present  imagery  of  egregious  surface  glamour  (i.e.,  Glanz), 
gleaming wealth and luxury. The Caliph’s exaggerated jewelry and Ivan’s icon-like 
golden  habit,  and  both  rulers’  magnificent  palaces,  fill  the  screen  with  their 
resplendence  and  voluptuous  opulence.  This  opulence,  in  the  case  of  the  first 
episode, contrasts with the humble poverty of the baker’s residence and lifestyle, and 
in the second, with the horrors of the dungeon that it conceals within. 
It is important that the type of visual fascination evoked by the film’s images 
exploits a structural similarity to the visual appeal of the commodity, representing 
something  ornamental  whose  “real”  nature  (i.e.,  the  means  of  its  production)  is 
9 For Marx, the commodity fetish had erotic undertones as well. See W. J. T. Mitchell,  Iconology:  
Image, Text, Ideology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 193–95. Freud’s theory of 
fetishism was published two years after the release of Waxworks.
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masked by its external attributes and that operates in the visual register to hoodwink 
its  consumer.  Like the  commodity in  industrial  capitalism,  the film’s  objects  are 
multiplied by mechanical reproduction, are disconnected from a historical/narrative 
context, e.g., as abstracted historical figures, and hint at a meaning/core/center that is 
inaccessible, or nonexistent.  This commodified foregrounding of objects (including 
characters)  dissociated  from their  surroundings,  which  are  “made  visible”  in  an 
exhibitionist  solicitation  of  Schaulust,  has  a  snapshot  effect  and  enacts  a 
spatialization of (narrative) time.
With the serial repetition of quasi-magical forms and the opulent and organic 
erotic glitter of the film’s empty symbols,  Waxworks transfixes its spectator with a 
visual pleasure based on ornamentation. The Baroque fascinations of its imagery are 
what compensates for any loss of scopic interest that might have resulted from the 
film’s dispensing with narrative credibility and bracketing of any claim to naturalism 
or historical  accuracy.  Despite their  being embedded in a semi-classical  narrative 
structure, the spectatorial interaction these images solicit, the desire to look, is akin 
to the exhibitionist quality Tom Gunning attributes to early films as a “cinema of 
attractions”: 
 
Rather  than  … an  involvement  with  narrative  action or  empathy  with  character 
psychology, the cinema of attractions solicits a highly conscious awareness of the 
film image engaging the viewer’s curiosity. The spectator does not get  lost in a 
fictional  world  and  its  drama,  but  remains  aware  of  the  fact  of  looking,  the 
excitement of curiosity and its fulfillment.10
The  vital  distinction  to  be  made,  however,  is  that  in  Waxworks the  dialectic  of 
fulfillment  and  deferment  of  curiosity  and/or  desire  replicates  that  of  specular 
interaction with the commodity. It is in this sense that the film’s imagery relates to 
the  context  of  its  production;  how,  from  the  year  of  its  release,  the  end  of 
hyperinflation,  the  urban  centers  of  Weimar  Germany  represented  “a  culture 
dedicated  to  surface”,11 with  the  sudden  rise  of  department  stores,  new  lighting 
effects, picture palaces, and white-collar consumers. As Kracauer notably described, 
Weimar urban white-collar culture was marked by the desire for façades and images, 
10 Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator”, in Art  
and Text 34, Spring 1989; reprinted in Film Theory and Criticism, ed. Braudy and Cohen, p. 825.
11 Thomas Elsaesser, “The Irresponsible Signifier, or ‘The Gamble with History’:  Film Theory or 
Cinema Theory”, New German Critique, No. 40, Winter 1987, p. 75. 
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“surface glamour” and “distraction” were sought for their own sake.12 Indeed, the 
images of Waxworks strike a chord with Kracauer’s discussion of the Haus Vaterland 
picture palace, where
The views and vistas reproduced merely have the function of signifiers, referring to 
other  signs,  the  total  effect  deriving  from  the  montage,  the  contiguity  and 
coexistence  of  the  heterogeneous:  this  gives  both  an  experience  of  power  and 
control, but also mimics the objective reality of a commodity-producing society.13
The mise en scène of Waxworks reflects this milieu, albeit in its incipience, and the 
cult  of  “surface  glamour”.  The  fact  that  Waxworks  was  primarily  filmed  in  the 
heyday  of  hyperinflation  is  a  further  indication  that  the  kind  of  visual  pleasure 
provoked by the film not only has a complex significance but is itself at issue in the 
dénouement of the film.
The Ornamental Uncanny: The Doppelgänger as Counterfeit and Commodity
As  we  have  seen,  the  visual  fascination  of  Waxworks’  effects  and  imagery,  in 
particular  in  the  first  two  episodes,  tends  to  engage  the  viewer  in  moments  of 
detemporalized  (i.e.,  spatialized)  aesthetic-erotic  spectatorship.  As  the  film 
progresses,  however,  the  Baroque  and  luxurious  mise-en-scène that  compels  the 
viewer’s  desire  to  look  becomes  progressively  more  ambivalent  and  uncanny, 
growing more explicitly associated with violence and tyranny. In the process, the 
very forms that draw the viewer’s fixated look as simulacra, and that look itself, 
become questionable. Within the narrative too, fear arises with the act of looking. On 
several occasions, characters simply cannot bear to look, and shield their eyes from 
fearful sights to preserve themselves. They then peep through their hands and arms, 
both compelled by Schaulust and curiosity and repelled by fear of what they might 
see.
12 See Siegfried Kracauer,  The Salaried Masses:  Duty and Distraction in  Weimar Germany (Die 
Angestellten), London and New York, Verso, 1998.




At the same time, the plentiful, erotic bulbous objects come to be juxtaposed 
with indicators  of  violence  and threat.  For  example,  the  movement  of  the  vizier 
sharpening his sword, as Eisner points out, is continued by the baker kneading his 
bulging  dough,  a  sequence  reminiscent  of  dialectical  montage  in  Soviet  cinema. 
Similarly,  the  photogenic  hourglass  indicates  the  moment  of  death  of  tortured 
prisoners in Ivan’s dungeons and finally causes the Tsar’s madness.  In Haroun’s 
bedroom, a point-of-view shot shows us the Caliph’s round hat together with the 
sharp sword with which Assad will slay his effigy, fetishized in their dissociation 
from the context and their spotlighting.
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The recurring motif of tyrants’  hands likewise functions as an emblem of 
regal  power that,  when cut  off  from its  corporal  or  embodied context  –  literally 
severed  in  the  case  of  Haroun  –  becomes  uncanny.  In  fact,  the  first  episode’s 
narrative is motivated by the attempt to explain how Haroun’s wax figure has lost his 
arm. In the writer’s story, the Caliph’s wrapped counterfeit arm is used to certify his 
death. Significantly, both tyrants wear rings, which as jewelry are ornamental and 
desirable  commodities,  and  are  foregrounded  and  fetishized.  Metonymically 
associated with the power and the hand of the ruler, these rings represent another 
motif through which the visual pleasure of the image/commodity becomes associated 
with the uncanny and violence. The Haroun plot revolves around his magic ring, a 
commodity that compels desire and promises power and wealth, and its attempted 
theft. In the Ivan episode, the ring as metonymic symbol of power returns invested 
with a greater evocation of horror: The Czar’s ring-bedecked hand, dissociated from 
his  invisible  body,  gestures  through  the  bars  of  the  torture  chamber  to  indicate 
whether the prisoner’s torture continues or ends.
Broadly, it is important to note how the film’s signifiers of luxury and wealth, 
the very sources of visual pleasure, come to be implicated in the plot’s conflicts and 
visual anxieties.14 First, signifiers of wealth and power are inseparable in the film 
from (misplaced) erotic exchange. In the first episode, the poor baker’s vain wife is 
amenable to the Caliph’s love-play because she is seduced by his wealth, explicitly 
contrasted  with  Assad’s  poverty.  The  success  of  his  suit  is  indicated  when  he 
encircles her in a row of his pearls: the luxury item signifies her compliance. In the 
14 See also Thomas Elsaesser, “Social Mobility and the Fantastic: German Silent Cinema”, in Fantasy 
and the Cinema, ed. James Donald, London, BFI, 1989.
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second  episode,  Ivan,  whose  resplendence  and  power  shine  in  his  royal  garb, 
attempts to coerce the bride into a sexual encounter by blackmail: if she complies, he 
will cease to torture her bridegroom. Here, the luxurious, ornamental, rotund, and 
luminous bed – the spectacular bed – on which this violation is meant to take place 
resembles not just a woman’s invitingly open gown but an iron maiden, the medieval 
German instrument of torture. With regard to the virgin bride’s unforeseen wedding 
night, the bed thus becomes an amusing visual pun. Here too, aestheticism, erotic and 
luxurious  display  –  the  surface  of  things  –  masks  a  symbolic  association  with 
violence, horror, and torture. 
Waxworks’  ornamental  uncanny,  uniting  visual  pleasure  and  anxiety  in 
ambivalent  display,  progressively  instills  a  kind  of  distrust  of  the  pleasures  and 
revelations of  vision,  tending toward a full-blown denigration of perception.  The 
narrative’s nested repetitions of doppelgänger  figures is  a key constituent  of  this 
progression. Lotte Eisner first noted how in Waxworks, even the figures on the screen 
are “reduced to ornaments, their gestures frozen to the point of a carefully elaborated 
abstraction”.15 This is especially the case with the film’s proliferate doppelgängers, 
which become yet another kind of serial  repetition in the diegesis,  but as  human 
ornaments and counterfeits, both fantasy selves and visual commodities.
The status of  both the film’s characters  and their  doubles as simulacra is 
explicit. The waxworks characters in the framing story,16 already merely effigies (an 
15 Lotte  Eisner,  discussing  Waxworks’ influence  on  Eisenstein’s  Ivan  the  Terrible, The  Haunted 
Screen, p. 119.
16 Excepting Rinaldo Rinaldini – unless it is he who appears in the Ripper sequence.
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automaton in Ivan’s case) of real historical figures, are redoubled – brought back to 
life – by the stories and the dream (and the film), as are the writer and the girl, 
perpetually fleeing from the waxworks’ so-called tyranny. But within the sequences 
themselves, the “tyrants” create their own doubling scenarios. Haroun, known from 
A Thousand and One Nights for disguising himself as a commoner and going among 
his subjects in the pursuit of truth, here goes about in disguise just for a good time, 
leaving a wax double in his bed. This double is mutilated by Assad in the Caliph’s 
place.17 In  the  parallel  second  episode,  Ivan  trades  his  luxurious  robes  with  the 
bride’s father and drives his troika, as a consequence of which the girl’s father is 
assassinated in the Tsar’s place. In each case, the body-double of the tyrannical ruler 
has harm inflicted on it that is meant for the ruler himself, whereby the ruler escapes 
death, and the dissimulation of identity is a tool of tyranny.
Characters  are  also  multiplied  within  individual  shots,  where  the 
doppelgänger theme participates in the film’s ornamental repetitions. In a couple of 
cases, reflections in mirrors become the diegetic mechanism of this human repetition. 
A remarkable instance is how, about to attack the Caliph’s effigy, Assad is reflected 
in  Haroun’s  phony  ring,  multiplied  seven-fold  in  the  counterfeit version  of  the 
personal ornament. This shot, unnecessary for narrative momentum, instead pauses it 
for a time-image of seemingly gratuitous ornamentalism. But it likewise compounds 
the levels of reflection at work: Assad, the narration’s double of the writer, himself a 
double of the actor who plays him, is reflected kaleidescopically by a phony copy of 
the  Sultan’s  ring.  This  reflection,  however,  is  fragmentary,  with  an  amalgam of 
points of view that do not add up to a whole: the ring does not reflect him as it 
promises. 
Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of the symbol of the mirror in  Cinema II: The 
Time-Image is especially illuminating – and strikingly appropriate – for what such a 
complex mirror  image signifies.  Mirrors,  Deleuze argues,  are  inseparable  from a 
circuit, where 
This circuit itself is an exchange: the mirror-image is virtual in relation to the actual 
character that the mirror catches, but it is actual in the mirror which now leaves the 
character with only a virtuality and pushes him back out-of-field. The exchange is 
all the more active when the circuit refers to a polygon with a growing number of 
sides: as in a face reflected on the facets of a ring, an actor seen in an infinity of 
17 Thus, the story the writer composes is written to explain how the effigy of Haroun lost his arm.
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twins. When virtual images proliferate like this, all together they absorb the entire 
actuality of the character, at the same time as the character is no more than one 
virtuality among others.18 
This mutual and nested virtuality, or dyad of actuality and virtuality, I would argue, 
is  a  central  thematic  concern  of  Waxworks.  Precisely  at  its  most  ornamental 
moments, as in a multiplicity of reflections of an actor in a ring, the quality of the 
image as an ontological equivalent of a hall of mirrors is made apparent. The double 
theme  is  crucial  for  this  kind  of  uncertainty,  appearing  as  a  multiplication  of 
simulacra with no hierarchy of actuality from episode to episode, within individual 
tales, and even within individual shots.
As with Assad’s multiplication by the Caliph’s ring, an astonishing scene of 
doubling within an image is the shot of Zarah looking flirtatiously into her broken 
mirror and directly engaging the look of the spectator through the shard’s mediation. 
On the one hand, the viewer’s visual pleasure derives from identification with the 
camera, and from unobservedly (by the husband) becoming the correspondent with 
whom the wife is flirting secretly under her husband’s nose, shielded by the alibi of 
the mirror/film screen. Looking into the screen-mirror, he is also identified with the 
18 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time-Image, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 
70.
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reflection of the actress. In both guises, he has a position of pleasure and power in 
the imaginary space, or the space of the image. 
The erotic  construction,  however,  has darker  undertones,  and the mirror’s 
jagged edge strikes a note of discord in the imaginary whole. The status of Zarah’s 
reflection as commodity and fetish is highlighted by her fragmentary reflection in the 
mirror, as well as by the self-referential nature of the process in which she engages 
and the viewer participates: i.e., the application of make-up, an effort that seeks to 
increase her visual appeal and become more of a consumable image, not only within 
the diegesis,  but  outside it  as  a  “star”.  This scene hints  at  a structural  similarity 
between  film  and  the  mirror;  it  relies  on  the  medium’s  spectator  effects  of 
identification and visual pleasure, but at the same time reflexively foregrounds the 
staging of these effects. 
The second episode contains a more explicit and quite remarkable counterpart 
to  this  doubling  scenario.  Tsar  Ivan,  magnificent  in  his  princely  regalia,  comes 
through a double door decorated by double icons, looking directly into the camera. 
Kracauer ascribes the scene’s fascination to the “magic spell” of power:
One shot in the Ivan episode reveals the magic spell power radiates: Ivan appears in 
a folding-door, the portrait of a saint in life-size in each leaf, and as he stands there, 
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vested with all the insignia of his dignity, he seems a living icon between the two 
painted ones.19
Emerging  from this  double-depicting  door  as  a  living  icon,  Ivan  approaches  the 
camera, growing progressively larger, engaging the spectator directly by looking into 
the camera and at the audience, and going from medium long shot to close-up. With 
his halo-like hat and luminous clothing,  which closely resemble the icons’ attire, 
Ivan becomes the third and middle term in a triptych, which ironically ascribes to 
him, the sadistic tyrant whose torture of an old man we have but lately witnessed, the 
position  of  a  saint.  This  double  valuation,  pitting  surface  against  essence,  is 
characteristic of the film’s images. But with the double (here, triple) theme it also 
enacts a  mise en abyme of the perceived object that ultimately leaves no primary 
version or original against which counterfeits can be judged on visual grounds alone. 
19 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 86.
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Like  preceding  depictions  of  multiplied  inanimate  objects,  what  this  shot 
solicits with its techniques of a cinema of attractions, as opposed to its insignificant 
narrative role, is the spectator’s desire to look. But hidden in the enchantment of 
looking, precisely because of the photogenic character and surface glamour of the 
consumable image,  is  its  “true” nature:  the sadistic  tyrant.  By the image’s fetish 
character its “essence” is occulted: it even makes sense that something as Terrible 
should be as beautiful. Neither does the association between the Tsar and the icons, 
as  icons,  arise  by  chance:  Ivan  too  is  an  ornament  and  counterfeit,  a  double  of 
paintings,  a  copy of a waxwork,  and of course,  “Conrad Veidt”.  The constricted 
movements  that  the  architecture  necessitates,  which  ornamentalize  the  Tsar,  are 
perfectly appropriate. The “magic spell” of power resides in its metaphysical pull as 
imagery. 
The doppelgänger theme is perhaps an ideal vehicle for the representation of 
this dialectic of the surface and “true nature”, and virtual and actual, as represented 
through a problematisation of vision and its loss of ontological primacy. Here,  a 
sense of the uncanny has to do with the occultation of the “true nature” of what is 
seen by its purely specular attributes, and emerges as a function of aestheticism, the 
prioritization of the form of things over their “substance”. But the viewer’s visceral 
sense of unease is crystallized in the moment of Ivan’s direct and shocking approach. 
Ivan’s look confronts the viewer (and the viewer’s voyeuristic look) and constitutes 
an  interruption  to  the  flow  of  narrative  time:  The  peculiar,  almost  accusatory 
expression on his face seems to acknowledge the viewer’s complicity. 
Within the film’s episodic structure,  there is a  progression in the level  of 
horror.  From the  humour  and  charm of  the  Haroun-al-Raschid  sequence,  to  the 
grotesque, twisted tyrant Ivan the Terrible, and finally to the phantasmagoric Jack the 
Ripper sequence, so too do the film’s images gain in uncanny effect. And, while the 
film  initially  presents  us  with  a  diegetic  audience  of  the  writer’s  narration,  the 
waxworks showman and his daughter, to whom the writer is describing the narrative 
we share,  toward the end this  audience has disappeared,  and the spectator is  left 
alone in the writer’s imagination.
161
The Divided Screen
Phantasmagoria: The Jack the Ripper Sequence
In contrast  to the clear narrative structure of the first  two episodes,  the Jack the 
Ripper sequence has no plot and is dominated by the obvious use of film techniques 
or tricks rather than set design, in particular by numerous superposed shots. Suitably 
for the depiction of a dream, there is little spatial and temporal logic – other than that 
offered by the familiar narrative structure of the chase – and little distinction between 
interior and exterior spaces.  Although the chase was the “original  truly narrative 
genre  of  the  cinema”,20 here  the  multiplicity  of  superposed  images  and 
spatiotemporal  chaos  make  it  much  more  an  abstract  chase  than  its  classic 
counterparts. Superpositions are taken to an extreme, sometimes with more than five 
images at a time overlying the first-level spaces that the protagonists traverse. Their 
effect is spectral: pursuit by a ghostly foe who is visible yet invisible, and against 
whom all resistance is futile as he is effectively impossible to kill (his immortality is 
assured by the medium itself). This haunting, firmly entrenched in the capabilities 
and  tricks  of  the  medium  of  cinema,  refers  back  to  the  apparatus  itself,  the 
foregrounded  and  unveiled  source  of  horror.  Kracauer  captures  the  spirit  of  the 
sequence pithily, noting the significance of the fairground:
But what in the framing story was nothing more than a crowded pleasure spot is 
now  a  deserted  hunting  ground  for  specters.  Expressionist  canvases,  ingenious 
lighting effects and many other devices at hand in 1924 have been used to create 
this  eerie  phantasmagoria,  which substantiates  more  forcibly than the  analogous 
décor in Caligari the notion of chaos… Much as the episode recalls Caligari, it goes 
beyond its model in stressing the role of the fair: the fair that in  Caligari merely 
served as a background is here the very scene of action. In the course of their flight, 
the poet and the girl hurry past the constantly circling merry-go-round, while Jack-
the-Ripper himself, Caligari and Cesare in one, pursues them on miraculous dream 
paths, hovering through a gigantic Ferris wheel that also turns without pause.21
The description of the scene as phantasmagoria captures the quality of these floating 
images, which recall and refer to the experience of the popular medium of projected 
horrors at the beginning of the nineteenth century. An ancestor of the horror film, the 
phantasmagoria enjoyed great popularity in Europe in the late-18th century into the 
19th  century,  terrifying  its  audiences  with  ghoulish  illusions  created  with  magic 
lanterns and other forms of projection from behind the screen. Its greatest showman, 
20 Tom Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator, and the Avant-Garde”, in 
Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. T. Elsaesser, London, BFI, 1990, p. 60.
21 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 87.
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Robertson  the  Magician  (1763–1837),  invented  a  magic  lantern  on  wheels 
(fantoscope) that made effigies of the dead appear to approach the audience, as Jack 
the Ripper does in Waxworks.
But  the  phantasmagoria  is  an  appropriate  description  not  only  in  its 
significance as the precursor of the horror film, but also because of later connotations 
that the concept acquired in the nineteenth century. Terry Castle has considered the 
shift in the word’s usage from its original signification of a genre of images of horror 
projected  by  uncanny,  spectrelike  showmen to  its  describing  the  capacity  of  the 
imagination  to  unleash  its  own  daemonic  projections  (in  other  words,  how  the 
“ghosts” engendered by an actual external medium were internalized). Importantly, 
though, the term was also appropriated by Marx (and subsequent Marxist thinkers) to 
describe the objective, unreal experience of the commodity-world under industrial 
capitalism.22 In  addition, as  Tom Gunning  has  noted, the  optical  illusion  of  the 
phantasmagoria can be understood as an instance of how visual technologies “opened 
up an area in which ontological uncertainty held sway”.23 
But  the  Jack  the  Ripper  sequence,  as  we  will  see,  also  represents  a 
phantasmagoria  in  the  Marxist  sense,  of  bourgeois  capitalism  as  a  world  of 
equivalent, interchangeable simulacra, of fetishized commodities whose “real” nature 
and  process  of  production  are  occulted  by  their  surface  attributes.  The 
phantasmagoric effects of the Jack the Ripper episode resonate with the film’s theme 
of  an  ontological  uncertainty  grounded  in  vision,  connecting the  proliferation  of 
images  enacted by  the  medium of  cinema with the  experiential  consequences  of 
bourgeois modernity. 
Significantly, unlike the previous spectacular and photogenic tyrants of the 
film, with their surface glamour, Jack the Ripper is presented as the very type of 
modest bourgeois respectability, utterly normal and scarcely noticeable in his coat 
and scarf as a  Bürgerteufel. Likewise suggestive is the fact that the identity of this 
notorious sex murderer of then-recent history (1888) has remained a mystery. He is 
22 The phantasmagoria genre is discussed in relation to these films in greater detail in the conclusion.
23 Much like the early cinema, notably discussed by Tom Gunning, a significant component of the 
visual  pleasure  of  the  phantasmagoria  was  curiosity  and  amazement  at  the  power  and  magic  of 
mimetic technologies, in particular their capacity to unleash doubles of man and their replication of 
motion (cf. Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer). See Terry Castle, "Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and 
the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie”, Critical Inquiry, 15.1, 1988, pp. 26–61.
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thus archetypal for the recurring demoniac bourgeois characters of German cinema.24 
Although  his  benevolent  exterior  hides  his  “true  nature”,  contrasting  with  the 
extreme terror he generates in the protagonists and with the phantasmagorical décor 
on which he is superposed, he is the worst tyrant of all in the film, not least because 
he  is  the  most  abstract.  In  fact,  the  introductory  frame  refers  to  the  bourgeois 
gentleman on the outside, and devil inside, as “the most amazing character of all 
time”.  Interestingly,  there  is  little  indication  of  any  sexual  motive  in  the  chase 
sequence that follows, and instead of attacking the girl, the expected behaviour of an 
infamous sex-murderer,  he stabs  the  young man.25 Finally,  whereas  the first  two 
tyrants wear rings of power, he carries a gleaming knife.
While the first two episodes take place in the distant past and far-off lands, 
the technological phantasmagoria of the nightmare sequence is integrated into the 
frame, occupying the self-same fairground realm and taking place in the diegetic 
present.  The  beginning  of  the  episode  is  merged  with  the  framing  story.  After 
penning the horrible fate of Ivan the Terrible, the writer walks over to peer at the 
now-sleeping girl through a curtain. After this Peeping Tom behavior, which marks 
him as a voyeur, who is identified here and throughout the film with the spectator, he 
walks – under the gaze of Jack the Ripper – over to his desk. Casting several curious 
glances at Jack, whose effigy in turn watches the writer, he grows bleary eyed. He 
looks  at  the  murderer  and  sees  a  blurry  image,  composed  of  numerous 
superpositions. This shot signals the beginning of ontological doubts that mark the 
uncanny: a loss of faith in the primacy of vision and a concomitant infection by 
indecidability of the phenomenal world, and by extension, of the viewing subject. 
Worried by this unnatural vision, the writer rubs his eyes and looks at the waxwork 
again, this time for reassurance. Checking that everything is back to normal, he dozes 
off. But the perceptual distress refers back to the means of its depiction, implicating 
the agency of cinema and cinematic narration in the contagion of uncertainty.
24 Cf. Beckert the serial child murderer in Fritz Lang’s M. The latter is, nevertheless, an individual – a 
psychologised character – and not a cipher/symbol, as is Jack the Ripper.
25 Perhaps too shocking for the screen?
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The  writer’s  desk  and  lantern  are  integrated  into  the  beginning  of  the 
fairground sequence. While the writer is approaching from the background, in the 
foreground we continue to see the stand where Jack the Ripper’s wax figure was 
perched,  now empty  but  with  his  name remaining  visible.  The  murderer  is  thus 
present through his absence, as if he has stepped off his perch and is lurking unseen. 
The  scene  is  set  with  numerous  superpositions,  some  at  a  slant,  in  a  Cubist, 
aperspectival mélange. 
A  shot  follows  with  Jack  the  Ripper  in  the  foreground,  with  the  viewer 
sharing his point of view, as the couple slowly back away from us into the center of 
the screen, looking back at the Ripper and audience. Also in the foreground, as a 
further nod to  the integrated framing story,  the wax figure of Haroun-al-Raschid 
remains and becomes animate, turning his head in the couple’s direction to watch 
them go. The young man shields the girl from the sight of the Ripper, as if danger 
lies in sight. 
Following  this  beginning,  Jack  the  Ripper,  over  the  word  “Panopticum”, 
approaches the screen looking directly  at  the audience,  returning the gaze of  the 
viewer, who is now identified with the pursued couple. This uncanny movement, 
recalling that of Ivan, is immediately reiterated against a different background. In the 
deliberately irrational architecture of the sequence’s spaces, the viewer is sandwiched 
between the Ripper and the lovers and becomes the victim of the Ripper’s pursuit, 
endangered by the facts of looking and being seen.26
 
26 One of the working titles of Fritz Lang’s M recalls precisely this kind of terror: “Dein Mörder sieht  
dich an”.
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The remarkable doubling of Jack the Ripper occurs shortly thereafter, when a 
strange series of shots brings us to a paradigmatic Weimar scene: the department 
store. Mistakenly thinking that the danger is past and embracing in celebration, the 
pair find themselves in a grotesque rendition of a department store display, next to a 
large sign that says “MODES”. Their manifest delight hints that the wares are there 
for the taking. 
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The happy couple.
The approaching murderer, the cringing lovers, and the viewer in between (not shown).
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While  the  writer  inexplicably  disappears,  a  most  incongruous  sequence 
unfolds: The girl puts on a luxurious fur-trimmed lamé coat. At that moment, Jack 
the Ripper appears, almost as an avenging angel punishing commodity fetishism, and 
with the semi-visibility of a spectre. About to pounce on his victim, the shadowy 
larger-than-life murderer is progressively doubled, tripled, and quadrupled, the girl’s 
terror increasing with the serial killer’s mechanical reproduction. 
  
Jack  the  Ripper,  multiplied,  resembles  a  mass-produced  commodity  in  a 
department-store  display,  a  salient  feature  of  Weimar  visual  culture.  The 
effectiveness  of  displays,  through  techniques  such  as  the  serial  repetition  of 
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commodities, was a subject of empirical investigation at the time. As Janet Ward has 
described,
Psychotechnical experiments were conducted on how best to achieve a “capture of 
the  gaze”  [Blickfang].  Paramount  were  light-effects  and  the  machinic,  serial 
reproduction of the commodity, as in the  Stapelfenster… The aim was to move, 
incite, be electric, or simply impress by the rationalized repetition of mass-produced 
goods.27
With  Jack  the  Ripper,  however,  there  is  a  bizarre  inversion:  instead  of  mass-
produced goods, the shopper finds mechanically reproduced evils. And, while this 
sequence in some wise repeats the motifs of the first two episodes, where the tyrants 
are  doubled  through  their  own  artifice,  here  the  mechanism  of  the  doubling  is 
technological:  based  on  lighting  effects  and  montage.  As  its  terrors  are  not 
diegetically  explicable  without  recourse  to  the  role  of  technology  and 
phantasmagoric effects, the apparatus of transmission and multiplication of the image 
is implicated in their propagation.28 The representation of vision and its uncertainties 
thus refers back both to the specular interaction of consumer and commodity, and to 
that of film viewer and film. 
Following  these  ambivalent  constructions  of  visual  pleasure,  Waxworks 
returns to the framing story, the purported “real”. Unlike Caligari, however, this only 
means the  topsy-turvy world of  the  fairground,  where  the  narrative  of  history  is 
characteristically  suspended,  the  real  and  counterfeit  are  indistinguishable,  and  a 
particular visual regime operates. The writer and the spectator, both observed by Jack 
the  Ripper,  confirm that  the  fair  is,  in  Derrida’s  words,  “…the place  where  the 
spectator, presenting himself as spectacle, will no longer be either seer (voyant) or 
27 Janet Ward (Lungstrum), “The Display Window: Designs and Desires of Weimar Consumerism”, 
New German Critique, No. 76, Winter 1999, p. 138. See also Janet Ward, Weimar Surfaces:  Urban 
Visual Culture in 1920s Germany, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001.
28 In this sense, the description as phantasmagoria is even more apposite. For Marxist thought, the 
world becomes phantasmagorical under capitalism, in part with the powerful visual grip, a magical or 
metaphysical  delusion,  exerted  by  the  commodity.  Benjamin  and  Adorno  rely  on  the  term  in 
discussing reification and the illusory nature of the commodity. Adorno, discussing Wagnerian opera, 
refers  to  the specular  quality  of  the product  that  masks its  true  attributes,  i.e.,  the process  of  its 
production: “…the occultation of production by means of the outward appearance of the product” 
whereby the “product presents itself as self-producing”. Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone, London, NLB, 1981, p. 85. 
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voyeur, will efface within himself the difference between the actor and the spectator, 
the represented and the representer, the object seen and the seeing object…”.29
While Waxworks initially offered its spectator a “classical” viewing prospect, 
as observers in a cinematic panopticon, by its conclusion this spectatorship comes to 
be  radically  altered.  The  word  “Panopticum”  superposed  over  Jack  the  Ripper 
coincides with a terrifying phantasmagoria that, instead of delivering a voyeuristic 
visual  pleasure,  puts  the spectator  in  the position of  the object  of  the look,  thus 
signifying  the  viewer’s  identification  as  a  potential  target  for  a  serial  killer. 
Waxworks as panopticon is an uncanny, self-referential display of novelties whose 
observer is as much viewed as viewing.
As the sequence concludes, the continuation of certain motifs from the dream 
into the frame casts doubt on whether there is a reassuring disjunction between the 
two episodes, between dream and diegetic “reality”. When the writer is stabbed by 
Jack the Ripper,  he immediately wakes in  the framing story,  where he has  been 
stabbed by his pencil.  A jarring and sinister note is struck resoundingly in the last 
shot/still  of  the  film,  where,  while  the  protagonists  who  have  survived  such 
imaginary dangers fulfill their responsibility as onscreen lovers, sealing the film with 
a kiss, in the background and center screen, we see the gleaming knife spotlighted in 
the hand of Jack the Ripper’s disturbing wax effigy, who continues to watch us. 
29 Jacques  Derrida,  Of  Grammatology,  trans.  Gayatri  Spivak,  Baltimore,  MD,  Johns  Hopkins 
University Press, 1976, p. 306. 
169
The gleaming knife in the film’s closing shot.
The Divided Screen
While the Waxworks conclusion brings us back to its diegetic present tense, 
its “reality”, this is not the canny sphere of the everyday.  And, as is ultimately the 
case  with  Caligari (and,  e.g.,  Schatten),  here  the  doublings  within  the  plot  are 
purportedly  ascribed  to  the  “unreal”  or  “imaginary”,  an  oneiric  aside  within  the 
narrative order. However, the visuality of the medium itself – which has been at issue 
– democratizes the status of the different segments of the film and equalizes them for 
the viewer in terms of their ontological validity. What this and other doppelgänger 
films, in particular those with a frame structure, rely on, is the visual equivalence 
with which the medium stamps its images. Thus, the film’s “imaginary” realm and its 
“real”  have  equal(ized)  ontological  weight,  inasmuch  as  the  language  of  their 
representation, itself put into question, is the same. As Lukács insightfully wrote in 
1913,
“Everything is possible”: this is the credo of the cinema, and because its technique 
expresses  at  every  moment  the  absolute  (even  if  only  empirical)  reality  of  this 
moment, “vituality” no longer functions as a category as opposed to “reality”: both 
categories become equivalent, identical. Everything is true and real, everything is 
equally true and real; this is what a sequence of images in the cinema teaches us.30
Waxworks relies on precisely this effective (and affective) equivalence in cinema –
because it arises in the visual register – of the real and the counterfeit. In addition to 
the obvious importance of the waxwork effigies, the “phony” objects – Haroun’s 
fake ring,  Ivan’s  hourglass with his  name on it,  and the knife-pen – have major 
consequences in the film. Not only with the integration of the dream sequence into 
the framing story, but also because of their structural similarity, the similarity of the 
dream  and  film,  which  here  literally  shows  a  dream  world,  the  conclusion’s 
stabilizing effect is diminished and a vague sense of foreboding prevails. Kracauer 
consequently  remarks  how  “the  dream  character  of  the  Jack-the-Ripper  episode 
arouses the suspicion that Jack and his confreres are not merely figures of the past, 
but tyrants still among us”.31 
While relying on standard narrative archetypes such as the chase and the kiss 
at  the  end,  Waxworks  accords  them  an  uncanny,  self-referential  aspect,  relating 
30 See “Gendanken zu einer Ästhetik des Kinos”, (1913),  Kino-Debatte, ed. Anton Kaes, Tübingen, 
Niemeyer,  1978,  p.  114.  Quoted  and  translated  in  T.  Elsaesser,  “Cinema  –  The  Irresponsible 
Signifier”.
31 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, p. 86.
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visual uncertainty to the effects of the cinematic apparatus. Jack the Ripper’s chase is 
reflexive in its unabashed cinematic motivation; the medium itself has unleashed the 
ghost, and the horror is directly tied to the apparatus and its capacity for spectral 
effects that challenge human vision. The technical nature of the threat dispels the 
possibility of any real resistance, and only allows a futile flight, as in The Student of  
Prague. At the conclusion, there is no real resolution: we are still in the domain of 
images that compel attention but are an unacknowledged source of terror. 
To return to Lotte Eisner’s comments on the Jack the Ripper sequence: In 
Waxworks it is precisely the “over-refined composition” and “excessive mannerism” 
that  make  the  spectator’s  discomfort  meaningful.  For  mise  en  scène,  including 
ornamentation and the virtuosities of montage, as the third episode makes clear, are 
implicated in and, in some respects, the source of the uncanny. In other words, in 
decrying how these Baroque elements effect a discomfort in the spectator, Eisner 
fails to consider what such discomfort has to do with the film’s subject matter: i.e., 
the relationship between the ornament, the commodity, and tyranny – as between the 
real and the counterfeit – that is grounded in vision. It is fitting to expect that an 
antithetical aim, using mise en scène merely to accentuate the “mood” and “action”, 
might be realized in the United States.
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CHAPTER VIII
VISIONS OF EXCESS: METROPOLIS (1926)
I saw a street lit as if in full daylight… At night [New York] did not give 
the impression of being alive; it lived as illusions lived. I knew then that I 
had to make a film about all of these sensations.
Fritz Lang1
For, from out the marvel of light, spun into ribbons, the knowledge had 
come upon him that  it  was day, that  the invulnerable transformation of 
darkness  into  light  was  becoming  consummate,  in  its  greatness,  in  its 
kindliness, over the world. 
Thea von Harbou’s Metropolis
1 “Was ich in Amerika sah”, Film-Kurier, 11 December 1924.
Rotwang’s hand extinguishing Maria’s candle.
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Legend has it,  that  a few weeks before the completion of their  scenario for  The 
Cabinet of Doctor Caligari, Carl Mayer and Hans Janowitz were at a loss. They had 
amassed several ideas, but these somehow did not seem to fit together in the right 
way. Then late one night, Mayer took Janowitz to an amusement ground that they 
frequented  “where  sideshow  magic  could  be  found”,  ironically  located  in  the 
Kantstrasse in Berlin. There they chanced upon a show marked in huge letters “Man 
or  Machine?”  – starring a  man in  a  stupor  who performed feats  of  strength and 
clairvoyance. According to Janowitz, this incident was decisive in bringing together 
all their ideas, and provided the ultimate inspiration for the film: “On that night the 
original story of Doctor Caligari  was conceived.  We returned to my room in the 
Passauer Strasse, where we sat and talked through the night into the dawn.”2
It is doubtless telling that Caligari, widely regarded as the film that ushered 
in  German  cinema’s  “Golden  Age”  and  an  icon  of  Weimar  visual  culture,  was 
inspired by a sideshow whose spectacular and specular value lay in the indeterminate 
constitution of man on show. Although the tacit understanding of its spectator might 
have been that the man was real, the visual fascination of such a display would come 
of  its  making  uncanny  and  ambiguous  the  distinction  between  animate  and 
inanimate, the real man and his mimetic technological replica. Not incidentally, such 
a  performance would require  a showman who is  both magician and scientist  – a 
media-technology innovator like Caligari himself – who displays the man-machine, 
his  “creature”,  to  the  astonished  spectator.  His  work,  founded  on  a  mechanistic 
conception of the human body, reveals the hidden magic within technology, releasing 
representations of man whose ontological status is unclear, uncanny doubles. Above 
all,  however, this scenario taps into a broader cultural  anxiety having to do with 
perception and intimately related to the visual regimes of classical modernity.
A primary product of these visual regimes is cinema, whose images of life 
have a  similarly  indeterminate  and liminal  position  as  mirrors  of  nature  and the 
height of artifice. In the in-between sphere of uncertainty, where the mechanisms 
involved (of reproduction or projection) are not immediately apparent, simulacra of 
this double nature, whether cyborg or cinema, can give rise to their own fears: a 
2 Hans Janowitz, “Caligari—The Story of a Famous Story (Excerpts)”, in The Cabinet of Dr Caligari: 




certain indecidability infecting vision that is a sense of the uncanny, the onset of 
indeterminacy between the organic and technological, living beings and machines. 
The issue – the distressing indecidability of the real and the illusory in the age of 
technology, including film technology – is a central preoccupation of Fritz Lang’s 
Metropolis.  A  recent  reading  of  Metropolis  rightly  highlights  the  film’s  diegetic 
concerns with the uncanny character of mimetic technologies, how
Mimetic  technologies,  including  photography,  cinema  and  even  artificial 
intelligence ... transfix the modern imagination in a manner similar to the viewer’s 
fixation on the Maria robot. Cinematic images mesmerize not because they simulate 
the living, but because we know they are dead, as if we have seen a ghost, as if the 
corpse stands up and walks away, a corpse. Life is quantifiable, we know it because 
we embody it. Death on the other hand, is incomprehensible. The fascination for 
anthropomorphic  automata  is  macabre.  It  is  based  not  on  a  preoccupation  with 
immortality, but with death. Technologies of human imitation, then, are laden both 
with the celebration of human potential and its darker side…3
Lang’s  city  of  the  future  relates  such  technological  misgivings  and  ontological 
distress both to Weimar debates on the question of technology (industrialization and 
modernity)  and  to  film  itself  as  a  medium,  in  particular  through  the  allegorical 
figures  of  Rotwang  and  the  robot.  The dystopic  Metropolis  is  the  outcome  of 
unchecked  rationalism  and  rationalization  in  a  capitalist  society,  a  city  whose 
“Master” is a captain of industry and where civil bureaucracy and business concern 
are one. Likewise, the film’s portrayal of ultra-specialised, rationalized factory work 
is the ultimate extension of Taylorism and Fordism. Thea von Harbou’s novel makes 
both the Taylorist aspect of Fredersen’s factory and Freder’s understanding of the 
subordination of the workers to their machines quite clear. Confronting his father 
with the wretchedness of the workers’ lives, Freder says:
[N]ear  the  god-machines,  the  slaves  of  the  god-machines:  the  men who ...  have 
nothing else to do but eternally one and the same thing, each in his place, each at his 
machine. Divided into periods of brief seconds, always the same clutch at the same 
second, at the same second.4
3 Julia  Dover,  “The  Imitation  Game:  Paralysis  and  Response  in  Fritz  Lang’s  Metropolis  and 
Contemporary  Critiques  of  Technology”,  in  Fritz  Lang’s  Metropolis:  Cinematic  Visions  of  
Technology and Fear, eds. Michael Minden and Holger Bachmann, Rochester, NY, Camden House, 
2000, p. 278.
4 Thea von Harbou, Metropolis, New York, Ace Books, 1963, pp. 28–29.
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This  depiction  of  American  capitalism  taken  to  an  extreme  responds  to  crucial 
debates  of  the  day  concerning  the  industrial  dénouement  of  rationalism  and  the 
mechanistic conception of the human body. Historians attribute Germany’s “crisis of 
classical  modernity”  partly  to  the  fact  that  Germany  underwent  speedy 
industrialization on an unprecedented scale from the 1890s on, culminating in the 
“modern”  outlook  of  the  Republic.  The  turmoil  of  modernisation  infiltrated  all 
aspects  of  German  life  under  the  government’s  programmatic  pursuit  of 
technological  advance  in  the  framework  of  a  rational  liberal  system.  In  the 
workplace, the American ideal of rationalization held sway as far as the recurrent 
financial  crises  would  allow,  involving  the  mechanisation  of  assembly  lines,  the 
specialization  of  labour,  and  the  reification  of  the  work  of  salaried  employees, 
famously  discussed  by  Kracauer  in  Die  Angestellten.  The  proliferation  of  mass 
media, including newspapers and periodicals, and later radio and film, were part of 
these dramatic changes. In short, Metropolis appeared in a context where
The  world  of  the  new could  no  longer  be  ignored,  and  it  was  not  an  entirely 
attractive sight. The Janus-faced nature of the process of modernization became a 
fact of everyday life; it dominated cultural discourse. 
The ‘golden twenties’ were seen, at the time, as the culmination of a process of 
rationalization and efficiency, not only in technology and the economy, but in the 
social  structure  and  in  people’s  daily  lives.  A  substitute  religion of  social  and 
technological  utilitarianism  and  a  euphoric  faith  in  progress  inspired  a  cult  of 
‘Americanism’, but optimism was dispelled by the brute realities of the economic 
crisis.5
The film’s representation of alienation under high capitalism echoes the daily lives of 
its spectators, undergoing the drastic changes brought about by modernization. But it 
also relates to the unprecedented technological destruction of the “war machine” in 
World War I and the urban landscape in its aftermath, strewn with amputees wearing 
prosthetic  limbs  tailored  to  factory  applications.  The  film  depicts  the  possible 
gruesome  conclusion  of  contemporaneous  industrial  practices,  with  its  rows  of 
interchangeable workers who are slaves to the machines they work for and to the 
network  of  artificial  eyes  that  observe  them.  It  engages  contemporary  currents 
questioning the consequences of high technology and the mechanistic conception of 
the human body, conjuring the worker’s alienation in the face of rationalization in 
5 Detlev J.  K.  Peukert,  The Weimar Republic:  The  Crisis  of  Classical  Modernity,  trans.  Richard 
Deveson, New York, Hill and Wang, 1993, p. 277; emphasis mine.
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the  metropolitan  workplace  and  the  terror  inspired  by  his  (potential)  robotic 
replacements. As Jeffrey Herf has argued, the debate on technology – the Weimar 
responses to which include the technophilia of the Neue Sachlichkeit and the post-
war  technophobia  of  Expressionism –  found  a  resolution  in  the  “Reactionary 
Modernist” compromise of the Nazis: the paradoxical wedding of technology and the 
German Geist.6
Ambivalence toward modernity and technology – depicted as a competing 
religion  –  is  perhaps  the  defining  characteristic  of  Metropolis,  a  city  where 
“Americanism” has led to oppression and panoptic surveillance, indistinguishability 
between  men  and  machines,  a  “society  of  the  spectacle”  for  the  wealthy  and 
mechanical slavery for the workers or “hands”. The men, the machinery, and even 
the  city  itself  have  a  double  nature,  indiscriminately  combining  organic  and 
mechanical traits. The workers, deprived of names and numbered instead, are already 
ambivalent  machine-men  serving  the  ruling  class,  slaves  to  rational  time  and  to 
industrial machinery that is both futuristic and archaic.7 The driving force of the city, 
itself a complex of machinery and organic parts, is Frederson, the city’s brain. His 
office, the “brain-pan” of the New Tower of Babel, as the novel puts it, is “peopled 
with numbers”.8 
Metropolis relies  on  the  resonance  of  the  double  theme in  this  industrial 
context, especially in making apparent the rational, numerical, economic equivalence 
of its characters by its use of a mise-en-abyme of doubled and multiplied figures: not 
only including Maria and the robot, but Maria and the mother Hel (in the original 
film), Frederson and Rotwang, and ultimately, the interchangeability and equivalence 
of all men. There is a kind of facelessness in operation, an identity of workers and 
even  their  oppressors.  The  novel  describes  what  the  film  seeks  to  depict  quite 
explicitly: “And they all had the same faces. And they all appeared to be of the same 
age.”9 This  kind  of  equivalence  recalls  Adorno  and  Horkheimer's  dictum  on 
Enlightenment: "The identity of everything with everything else is paid for in that 
6 Jeffrey Herf,  Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third  
Reich, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
7 E.g., the man Freder replaces at the clock- machine, Georgy, introduces himself as the palindrome 
11811.
8 Thea von Harbou, Metropolis, p. 22.
9 Ibid., p. 18. This is a recurring theme of contemporaneous avant-garde art’s critiques of modernity, 
e.g., in paintings of groups of identically dressed men without faces in the Berlin Dada movement.
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nothing  may  at  the  same  time  be  identical  with  itself."10 On  film,  this  visual 
equivalence of men becomes apparent not only because of the medium's capacity to 
present a bird’s-eye view of a group of men, but also insofar as figures onscreen have 
a  kind  of  de  facto equivalence  as  moving  ghosts.  “Facelessness”  is  therefore  a 
cinematic, structural condition as well as a thematic/diegetic one.
This  brief  look  at  the  significance  of  Metropolis’s  central  themes in  the 
context of the Weimar Republic’s accelerated modernization provides a background 
for looking at the relationship between the film’s characterizations and the history of 
technology, including the visual medium of cinema and its role in mass culture. The 
conjunction of these themes in the figure of the double is vital for considering the 
film’s constellation of meanings; it is significant, as Raymond Bellour has written,
The focus of Lang’s  mise en scène  is so often vision itself, articulated in various 
ways, among which the most obvious is the presence of the investigator, the reporter 
or  the  photographer,  the  man  who  sees  and  seizes  appearances  within  the 
rectangular frame of his camera… Every film-maker, in a sense, defines the essence 
of cinema, but is there another for whom it is so nakedly, and so unequivocally, as 
with Lang, the ultimate metaphor?11
One important avenue to explore is how the film’s formal constructions of vision and 
doubles, especially as part of its metacinematic theme, are related to its narrative 
concern with technology, alienation, and factory life. As Andreas Huyssen has noted, 
“doubling, mirroring and projecting not only constitute the technological make-up of 
this  film,  but  they  lie  at  the  very  core  of  the  psychic  and  visual  processes  that 
underlie its narrative”.12 Looking at how the film constructs a relationship between 
vision and technology, both within the narrative and for the spectator, will illuminate 
the reflexive relationship between the themes of technology and the medium of its 
narration, and how the narrative conflicts of the film relate to the “nature” of cinema. 
Metropolis is, perhaps above all, a story of visual crisis – at once relating an allegory 
of  cinema  and  referring  to  the  crises  of  classical  modernity;  it  is  necessary  to 
10 Theodor  W.  Adorno  and  Max  Horkheimer,  "The  Concept  of  Enlightenment",  in  Dialectic  of  
Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming, London: Verso, 1997, p. 12.
11 Raymond Bellour, “On Fritz Lang”, in Fritz Lang: The Image and the Look, ed. Stephen Jenkins, 
London, BFI, p. 28.
12 Andreas  Huyssen,  “The Vamp and the Machine:  Fritz  Lang’s  Metropolis”,  in  After  the Great  
Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University 
Press, 1986, p. 68.
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reconsider its complex images with reference  both to an archeology of the cinema 
and to the Weimar context of modernity in crisis. 
Metropolis foregrounds acts of vision and its discontents through a wide array 
of techniques of montage and mise en scène. Among these are numerous depictions 
of spectatorship and exhibition, and of crowds watching a performer or a speaker, 
sometimes voyeuristically observed by a hidden meta-viewer. The film also displays 
a  stylistic  and  generic  heterogeneity,  a  pastiche  of  different  styles  from  the 
graphic/decorative arts,  including Art Deco, Expressionist,  and  Neue Sachlichkeit. 
With this inexhaustible bricolage, it is unwise to categorize the film in terms of genre 
or to make broad stylistic attributions: for what defines  Metropolis  stylistically is, 
precisely, visual excess. In addition to profuse quotations from visual culture, gothic 
to  avant  garde,  a  cinematic dialogism is  also  at  work:  montage  effects  recalling 
Soviet  and  other  avant-garde  cinema,  classical  narrative  norms,  and  even  early-
cinema effects of frontality and exhibition. The admixture of these techniques and 
styles,  which  has  often  resulted  in  the  charge  of  excessive  and  gratuitous 
ornamentation  on  the  part  of  critics,  is  in  fact  the  basis  of  a  self-referential 
Gesamtkunstwerk concerning vision and spectatorship.
The creation of the android double is vital for a cohesive reading of the film 
as an allegory of cinema exactly because it links the theme of technology in its two 
dimensions: that of the factory-city of the future, which the film portrays, and that of 
the film itself as a technological medium. The robot is not only a major technological 
industrial innovation, but also a total work of art, a perfect mimetic technology that 
reproduces the (diegetic) real as a compelling spectacle. With the robot, the question 
concerning  technology,  including  film  technology,  becomes  more  precisely  a 
question of vision and its technological manipulations, and of the ontological and 
epistemological  consequence  or  capacity  of  the  eye  when  indistinguishability 
between the real and its image has arisen. The robot Maria in this guise compels a 
kind of ontological anxiety that goes hand in hand with modernity, and is revealed in 
its critiques, one having to do with a loss of faith in vision emerging both with the 
science of optics and the proliferation of visual stimuli and simulacra.
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A Cinema of Excess
Metropolis’s pastiche of styles and techniques involves a set of dichotomies whose 
common ground is an issue of vision: viewer and viewed, original and image, visible 
and invisible,  darkness  and  light,  blindness  and  sight,  ignorance and knowledge, 
disempowerment and power. The fundamental divisions of Metropolis are expressed 
architecturally as the distinction between the world above the ground, brilliantly lit 
by infinite lights and presided over by a man in a tower with a panoptic view out of 
his windows over what transpires. Frederson’s power is above all the power to see; 
his knowledge comes from vision. His henchman, the Thin Man, too serves as an 
extension of his senses as a detective uncovering what he wants to know – like a 
roving  extra  eye  or  camera.  A  closed-circuit  TV  system monitors  his  industrial 
empire,  the  machinery,  on which he speaks  to  Grot.  Frederson’s senses are  thus 
technologically extended; he is himself already a machine-man. His New Tower of 
Babel is intended to serve the same purpose as the architecturally akin panopticon 
designed by Jeremy Bentham, which was,  according to Foucault,  “a machine for 
dissociating  the  see/being  seen  dyad:  in  the  peripheric  ring,  one  is  totally  seen, 
without ever seeing; in the central  tower, one sees everything without ever being 
seen.” 
Freder  is  under  his  father’s  ceaseless  observation,  especially  through 
Frederson’s instrument, the Thin Man. The workers are also under the Master’s eye, 
but have not entirely internalized this surveillance, which exactly aims to “induce … 
a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning 
of power”.13 They have secret hieroglyphic maps of the catacombs in their pockets, 
which Frederson cannot decipher. Significantly, what escapes Frederson’s god’s-eye 
view is that which is  underground and in darkness, unlit by the gleaming electric 
lights. Not only do the dark catacombs predate Metropolis’s “age of reason”, but the 
Master has been unaware of their very existence. Both spatially and temporally, they 
lie outside Frederson’s dominion. And the electricity that lights the city does not 
reach these depths: candles are used to illuminate their irrational caverns in medieval 
chiaroscuro. The contrast between high technology and the gothic underbelly, linked 
to a contrast in artistic styles, could not be clearer, and is founded on the opposition 
13 This and the above quotation are from “Panopticism”, in Michel Foucault,  Discipline & Punish:  
The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York, Vintage Books, 1995, p. 228.
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of darkness, the unknown, that which is beyond the domain of reason, to signifiers of 
“Enlightenment”  and  modernity,  including  the  technological  impetus  of  capital, 
knowledge  and  power,  and  mimetic  technologies  that  mechanically  reproduce 
reality.14 Rotwang  mediates  between  these  two  spheres  –  his  house  remains 
connected to the catacombs and, like the cathedral, tied to a gothic, irrational past 
that is impervious to “modernization”.
The dichotomies in question become problematic, however, with the double 
motif and related self-referential themes of vision and spectatorship, which disrupt 
the clear-cut divisions between Master and slaves, knowledge and ignorance, reason 
and unreason, and so on. Here it is significant that “the hallmark of [Lang’s] style is 
precisely the interpolation of disorienting or disrupting visuals into the classic match-
cut sequence, making what is represented seem ambiguously motivated and always 
happening at  one remove”.15 These disorientations have thematic meaning: When 
Freder confronts his father about the deplorable work conditions of the workers, the 
14 An  interesting  point  of  comparison  for  the  symbolic  function  of  the  Metropolis  catacombs  is 
Georges Bataille’s concept of the labyrinth. As Martin Jay has written, for Bataille, “The labyrinth… 
served as the antidote to the pyramid, that architectural symbol of solidity and substance, which was 
homologous  to  the  optical  cone.  Its  valorization  also  signaled  Bataille’s  repudiation  of  the 
Enlightenment,  which,  as  d’Alembert’s  Preliminary  Discourse  to  the  Encyclopedia made  clear, 
sought to place the philosopher high above the labyrinth of knowledge.” Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes:  
The Denigration  of  Vision  in  Twentieth-Century  French  Thought.  Berkeley,  CA:  University  of 
California Press, 1993, pp. 229–30.
15 Thomas Elsaesser, Metropolis, London, BFI, p. 40.
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viewer’s  familiarity  with  classical  shot-reverse  shot  structures,  and  according 
expectations, are used to take him/her off guard, and create visual ambiguity. A shot 
of Freder speaking, looking to his right, is followed by a shot of his father looking to 
his left. The rules of spatial continuity make one suppose they are looking away from 
each other. The third shot then comes as a surprise: It shows that the father is looking 
at Freder, while Freder is looking away from his father. The diegetic inability of the 
father and son to communicate is thus represented as a visual miscommunication: not 
only between the characters, who are unable to look at each other at the same time 
throughout this sequence, but between the film and its spectator. The disjunction 
between the father and son, which has a social and ideological basis and coincides 
with disparate views on technology, is presented as a visual disjunction to the viewer: 
as a problem of vision or an unexpected sight. When “Lang lets ambiguity hover 
over  the  relationship  which  unites  character  and  creator  through viewpoint”,16 in 
Metropolis  it is clear that this ambiguity has ideological significance. But it is also 
cinematically significant in its reliance on and subversion of “classical” narrative 
techniques. The representation of a narrative ideological conflict coincides with a 
conflict  in  the  language  of  cinema.  Where  a  conflict  concerning  technology  is 
expressed in terms of visual disparity or contention over visual fields, cinema itself 
comes to be implicated in the film’s dénouement.
16 Raymond Bellour, “On Fritz Lang”, p. 31.
181
The Divided Screen
In  the  established  visual  order  of  Metropolis,  rebellion  against 
“Enlightenment” is expressed as blurring and obfuscation, the terrifying possibility 
of blindness and dismemberment: in other words, it brings with it the ontological 
uncertainty of the uncanny. “Irrational” rebellion in the film leads to visual threat, 
terror,  and  catastrophe.  But  the  film  also  associates  fears  of  blindness  with  its 
depictions of spectatorship and with the vamp-Maria (and the Father),  which has 
served psychoanalytic readings of the robot as inducing castration anxiety. But the 
larger question of the relationship that the film sets up between technology and the 
danger of blindness, in conjunction with its ambivalent allegorisation of vision and 
cinema, remains. Andreas Huyssen has sought to rectify the limitations of an Oedipal 
reading of the vamp-machine motif by considering “how or why male fantasies about 
women  and  sexuality  are  interlaced  with  visions  of  technology  in  the  film”, 
contending that “only by focusing on the mechanical vamp can we fully comprehend 
the  cohesion  of  meanings  which  the  film transports”.17 Huyssen  argues  that  two 
competing  views  of  technology,  as  represented  by  Expressionism and  the  Neue 
Sachlichkeit, are at issue in the film, and “the machine vamp plays the crucial role in 
resolving a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction”:18 
[The] film manages an ingeniously original ‘resolution’ ... by constructing a fable in 
which the (culturally recent) fear of ‘technology out of control’ is mapped onto the 
(more archaic) fear of ‘female sexuality out of control’. The move at the ideological 
level  has  its  stylistic  correspondence:  the  characters’  language  of  Expressionist 
pathos  is  eventually  contained  by  the  Neue  Sachlichkeit cool  of  the  machine 
aesthetics.19
Huyssen’s account focuses on a homology between woman and technology, and not 
on the relationship between these technological themes of the film and its cinematic 
themes,  focusing  on  film  itself  as  technology:  cinema’s  implication  in  how 
technology is made problematic and the spectator’s incorporation as the site of the 
conflict. With regard to these questions, there is, on the contrary, no “resolution” as 
such: The film’s visual and graphic stylizations persist at the end, confronting the 
spectator with a dialectic of visual pleasure and (ideological) repulsion. Interestingly, 
Andrew Webber has read the visual structuring of Metropolis as playing a “now you 
17 Andreas Huyssen, “The Vamp and the Machine: Fritz Lang’s Metropolis”, p. 68.
18 Ibid., p. 68.
19 Thomas Elsaesser, Metropolis, p. 55.
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see it, now you don’t” game with its spectators (including its diegetic spectators), 
recalling  Freud’s  fort-da  game  of  pleasure  and  unpleasure,  and  representing  the 
dichotomy of the two scopic drives of Schaulust and Zeigelust.20 
These  metacinematic  tropes  relate  narrative  issues  of  technology  and 
ideology  to  the  modern  medium  of  cinema  in  its  technological  and  ideological 
significance. The depiction of technology in the film and its constitution of vision 
and spectatorship as reflexive effects (e.g.,  showing the terms of male gaze, female 
object)  raise  the  question  of  what  technological  crises,  depicted  as  visual  crises, 
mean for and in cinema. Of Lang’s use of technological advances in filmmaking, 
such  as  Schüfftan’s  Spiegeltechnik,  Huyssen  has  written,  “For  his  indictment  of 
modern  technology as  oppressive  and destructive,  which  prevails  in  most  of  the 
narrative, Lang ironically relies on one of the most novel cinematic techniques”.21 
This irony, I would argue, is at the center of the constellation of the film’s conflicts: 
an ambivalence toward cinema that incorporates the history of its development and 
its implications in and for modernity. 
With  Metropolis’s  representation  of  modernity  as  Faustian  science  and 
(incomplete) Weberian disenchantment, film itself – a product of this process – is an 
ambivalent agent of modern visual experience. For example, when Maria relates the 
story of the Tower of Babel to the workers, it appears as a metaphoric film-projection 
scenario in which the viewer is presented with the image of the tower, fetishized by 
being cut off from its surroundings and presented as a wondrous, astonishing object. 
Then, the camera pans out to show that this tower is in fact only an architectural 
model, a small object surrounded by the men who envision it. A “cinematic” framing 
of the tower is used to dupe the spectator; then, the process whereby this was made 
to  happen  is  ironically  divulged  –  as  if  to  train  the  spectator  to  distrust  the 
mechanically decontextualised perspectives that cinema presents.
There  are  abundant  scenes  of  exhibition,  spectatorship,  voyeurism,  and 
surveillance  in  Metropolis whose  metacinematic  effects  are  readily  apparent. 
Notably, in crowd scenes – the workers listening to Maria, to the robot, or to Grot; 
watching the witch burn; the final handshake; the men at the Yoshiwara watching the 
20 Andrew Webber,  “Canning  the  Uncanny”,  Canning  the  Uncanny:  The  Construction  of  Visual 
Desire in Metropolis", in  Fritz Lang's Metropolis: Cinematic Visions of Technology and Fear, eds. 
Michael Minden and Holger Bachmann, Rochester, NY, Camden House, 2001.
21 Andreas Huyssen, “The Vamp and the Machine: Fritz Lang’s Metropolis”, p. 68.
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robot’s lascivious displays – the processes of spectatorship depicted mirror the actual 
spectator’s engagement in the same activity. In a sense, what  unites the classes in 
Metropolis is this desire to look. The in-between characters,  however,  Maria, the 
robot, and Rotwang, evince a desire to show (Zeigelust). Maria’s first word in the 
film is “Look!”22 
Scenarios  of  spectatorship  and  their  spectators  are  themselves  subject  to 
another level of surveillance by someone unnoticed, e.g., at the back of the crowd 
(Freder) or voyeuristically observing the proceedings through an eye-shaped aperture 
(Rotwang and Frederson). This ironic mise-en-abyme of watchers of watchers again 
draws  attention  to  the  spectator’s  position  as  observer,  incorporating  him/her  in 
ambivalent valuations of spectatorship and as victim of the (sometimes uncanny) 
nature of the exhibit. Numerous images of eyes in the film have similar signification, 
reflexively expose the viewer’s culpability in voyeuristic spectatorship and exposing 
him  to  the  diegetic  threat.  These  images,  for  example  the  montage  tapestry  of 
numerous eyeballs and various other eyelike forms, participate in the construction of 
the uncanny. But in their way they also reflect the viewer's act of spectatorship. In 
the  characteristically  ironic  vein  of  the  doppelgänger  theme,  here  the  uncanny 
22 At least, in the best available version, which is missing a fourth of the film as originally shown.
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involves the return of the look: scrutiny is not only undertaken by the viewer but by 
the thousand eyes with which Metropolis is looking back.23
As symbols, the disembodied, uncannily technological eyes also recall  the 
privileged, disembodied Cartesian eye of modern science and the “ocularcentrism” 
on which modern industrial capitalism and its naturalist narratives are based.24 Martin 
Jay’s discussion of the status of vision in intellectual history is illuminating:
Cartesian dualism was, moreover, particularly influential because of its valorization 
of the disembodied eye … shared by modern science and Albertian art. In either of 
its guises, speculative or observational, it  justified a fully spectatorial rather than 
23 Echoes of this construction of the look as uncanny source of distress may be found in the more 
murderous “Thousand Eyes of Dr Mabuse” and in a working title for  M: “Dein Mörder sieht dich 
an!”.
24 Cf. Man Ray’s La Marquise Casati (1922), which has multiple superimpositions of eyes, and Dali 
and Buñuel’s famous slicing of the eye while a cloud passes across the moon, in Un chien andalou 
(1929).
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incarnate eye, the unblinking eye of the fixed gaze rather than the fleeting glance…
The Descartes who had called his own philosophical quest a journey in which he 
tried “to be a spectator rather than an actor” in the affairs of the world, in Gibson’s 
sense, to a visual field and consigned the body to objecthood in it.25
Signifying the fetishistic, decorporalised look of the sons of the Metropolis elite, like 
that of the Master from his tower, these eyes are associated in the narrative with the 
mastery  of  denarrativized,  instrumentalized  objects  in  the  visual  field.  But 
structurally, they appear as a form of cinematic excess, distorting narrative time and 
drawing attention to the act  of narration itself.26 They are made problematic,  and 
contribute  to  an  ambiguous  hesitancy  of  vision,  ironically  exemplifying  how, as 
Bellour has written, Lang “distorts time in favor of pure scrutiny”.27 As reflexive 
motifs, also mass-produced by a mimetic technology, they are counterparts of the 
effects of the double.
 
The In-Between: Rotwang and the Robot as Reflexive Figures
Mythologising the origins of Metropolis, Fritz Lang attributed his inspiration to a trip 
to New York City, the paradigmatic modern urban experience: “I saw a street lit as if 
in full daylight… At night the city did not give the impression of being alive; it lived 
as  illusions  lived.  I  knew  then  that  I  had  to  make  a  film  about  all  of  these 
sensations.”28 The sensations in question emerge because of the illusory character of 
modern optical experience, the nightscape lit by artificial lights, the assault of visual 
stimuli,  the  supposed  triumph  of  technology  over  darkness  (i.e.,  that  which  is 
impervious to knowledge and representation). The medium of electricity, unalloyed 
symbol of progress, is also related to a certain indeterminacy of the visible. At once 
alive and dead, real and illusory, the ultramodern metropolis is also a necropolis, 
inducing an ontological anxiety in its bewildered spectator founded on loss of faith in 
25 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes, p. 81.
26 Rosalind Krauss's analysis of Surrealist photography succinctly describes the temporal effects of 
doubling in the frame: “Without exception the surrealist photographers infiltrated the body of this 
print, this single page, with spacing… more important than anything else is the strategy of doubling. 
For it is doubling that produces the formal rhythm of spacing—the two-step that banishes the unitary 
condition of the moment, that creates within the moment an experience of fission. For it is doubling 
that elicits the notion that to an original has been added its copy.” See “The Photographic Conditions 
of  Surrealism”, in  The Originality of  the Avant-Garde and Other Myths,  Cambridge, Mass.,  MIT 
Press, 1985, p. 109.
27 Raymond Bellour, “On Fritz Lang”, p. 35.
28 Fritz Lang, “Was ich in Amerika sah”, Film-Kurier, 11 December 1924.
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the  visible  and  in  the  capacities  of  the  eye.  Lang’s  quite  cinematic  experience 
foreshadows the themes of  Metropolis,  the indecidability  between true and false, 
reality and illusion, and the ontological uncertainties that assail the modern observer 
faced with the electrically visible. In this context, Rotwang (Edison’s proxy) and the 
robot  are  especially  important  as  mediators  between  truth  and  illusion,  in  their 
special  affinity with electrical  power,  and in explicitly causing the intrusion of a 
distrust of vision and an inability to distinguish the real from its image. They are the 
key figures of the film’s allegory of cinema. 
Rotwang as Surrogate Director
Rotwang  is  revealed  to  have  the  ultimate  power,  over  life  and  death,  which  is 
expressed as power over light and shadow and the creation of simulacra of man. 
Paradoxically  a  metaphysical  physiologist,  Rotwang  descends  not  only  from 
Caligari, whom he physically resembles, but also from Edison, the Wizard of Menlo 
Park.  His  creation,  the  false  Maria,  is  represented  as  an  astonishing  new media 
technology, a fact consistently highlighted in the film’s depictions of spectatorship 
and their montages of eyeballs. 
As an amoral scientist-magician who unleashes doubles and presents them to 
the  astonished  spectator,  Rotwang  participates  in  a  long  tradition  of  similar 
characters  in  the  history  of  media  technologies,  including  cinema,  who  are 
represented in exaggerated form (or perhaps not so exaggerated,  in retrospect) in 
doppelgänger fiction. Their real counterparts too were often consummate showmen, 
contributing to the development of technologies with applications in the realms both 
of entertainment, especially the development of cinema, and of science, in particular 
optics. Their work as scientists and magicians is based on mechanistic conception of 
man usually credited to the work of  Descartes and most egregiously affirmed in 
Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s  L’Homme machine (1748), which established medical 
materialism. 
Exploring  these  connections  is  illuminating  for  a  reading  of  the  film. 
Unsurprisingly,  many  major  figures  in  media-technological  developments  that 
directly or indirectly led to inventions of the cinema were scientists and doctors by 
profession.  Robertson  the  Magician  (1763–1837),  the  greatest  showman  of  the 
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phantasmagoria, was a professor of physics in Liège. Among his inventions was the 
fantoscope,  a  magic  lantern  on  wheels  that  made  effigies  of  the  dead  appear  to 
approach terrified audiences. Likewise Vaucanson, the automaton designer, was a 
physician. His astonishing works, which asserted the mechanical nature of the inner 
working of living things, were robotic precursors of modern industrial machinery. As 
previously  discussed,  these  historical  characters  and  their  inventions  appear  in 
transfigured form in the doppelgänger tales of Romanticism and after, where they 
and the doubles they unleash give rise to chilling uncertainties about the ontological 
status of what is seen.29 Their proliferation indicates a broader cultural anxiety arising 
with  scientific  progress.  Specifically  as  media  technologists,  they  point  to  the 
historical  significance of the double theme and highlight its relationship with the 
development of cinema. 
With his real and fictional avatars, Rotwang shares the aim of reproducing 
life, inventing uncanny, undead replicas of the “real”, which grotesquely reconcile 
positivism and metaphysics and represent the canonical, Frankensteinian affinity of 
technology and myth:
Rotwang,  whom Lang describes as  the source of  evil  in  the film, combines the 
images  of  the  modern  and  the  gothic  in  the  Spenglerian  figure  of  the  Faustian 
scientist. He is a master of technology, whose own hand is mechanical, the inventor 
of  a  race  of  robots  ordered  by  Joh  Frederson.  But  the  visual  portrayal  of  his 
surroundings  marks  Rotwang  as  a  medieval  wizard,  a  trafficker  in  spirits  and 
demons.30
The  director  of  the  film’s  horrors  and  its  evil  doppelgänger,  Rotwang’s 
characterization as inventor  (and one might  argue,  as a  Jew) has an irrationalist, 
Counter-Enlightenment flavour. And he appears in a context where the pursuit of 
mechanistic science, its relation to industrialization, and the question of technology 
were hotly debated.  Participating in the debate,  Metropolis  explores the dialectical 
association of magic/primitivism/myth with technology and the rational order. Both 
the  novel  and  the  film  paradoxically  wed  an  ultra-futuristic  visual  register  with 
archaic emblems of myth and superstition. Rotwang thus fittingly lives in an old 
29 E.g.,  the  Armenian charlatan in Schiller’s  The Ghost-Seer,  Edison in  Villiers  de l’Isle-Adam’s 
Tomorrow’s Eve, and even Miracle Doctor Dapertutto in Adalbert von Chamisso’s  The Wonderful  
Adventures of Peter Schlemihl.




gothic  house  that,  like  the  cathedral,  predates  the  construction  of  Metropolis. 
Accordingly, Elsaesser has found that
Read from the point of view of Rotwang, Metropolis appears most truthful where it 
insists  on  the  persistence  of  the  archaic-anarchic  aspects,  but  also  the  mythic 
dimension of the technological-rationalist fantasy that social progressives like H.G. 
Wells found so anachronistic and deplorable.31
In  post–World War II  hindsight,  critics  have generally  considered the film’s  and 
novel’s  repeated  conflation  of  technology/rationalisation  with  mythical/religious 
motifs  to  indicate  a  “Reactionary  Modernist”  ideology.  In  fact,  however,  it  is 
undeniable  that  in the film this  paradoxical  union is  presented negatively,  as  the 
miserable way things are. It offers a depiction of an (unresolved) controversy over 
technology, rather than any solution: “Joh Frederson’s head stood out against [the 
clock]. It was a crushing yet accepted halo above the brain of Metropolis.”32 
In light of Rotwang’s relationship to the history of mimetic technologies, it is 
especially important that the film foregrounds several scenes exhibiting his role as a 
showman, in which he puts on extraordinary spectacles. The demonic scientist stages 
Frederson’s  introduction  to  the  robot  Futura/Parody,  pulling  aside  a  curtain  to 
introduce the Master of Metropolis to his astonishing creation. In the false Maria’s 
show at the Yoshiwara, the male spectators are agog at the spectacle Rotwang has 
directed and produced, while he himself remains invisible behind the scenes. In the 
extraordinary metaphorical  rape  scene  in  which  Rotwang  captures  Maria  with 
electricity itself as his weapon, he masterfully controls the medium and determines 
what the spectator can see. In fact, this scene offers a very telling inversion of the 
norm  in  the  horror  genre,  where  characteristically  darkness  is  the  source  and 
repository  of  terror: Maria  is  terrified  by  electricity  and  Rotwang’s  light,  which 
reveals her to his gaze, disrupting and inverting the association of fear and darkness. 
Maria is caught by electricity itself, and by the voyeurist, panoptic gaze of Rotwang: 
his superior ability to see. Finally, Rotwang’s mechanical hand (technology) puts out 
her obsolete candlelight. This sequence, like many others, equates power both with 
vision (knowledge) and with exhibition (e.g., when Maria preaches to the workers). 
31 Thomas Elsaesser, Metropolis, p. 50.
32 Thea von Harbou,  Metropolis,  p. 23. The novel is not equivocal in its resolution, however, and 
could be read as an illustration of a “Reactionary Modernist” ideology, much like its author.
189
The Divided Screen
The camera following Maria’s moves and shakes in its pursuit. Its shuddering 
course captures the terror of Maria’s flight into the shadows and identifies Rotwang 
with the camera, bespeaking his power (not least in making things visible) in the 
denouement. The chase sequence also reveals the stark outline of Maria’s shadow in 
the  spotlight.  Presenting  her  in  the  beam  of  light  as  a  double  image  and  as 
representation, it prefigures her soon-to-come mechanical reproduction, evoking the 
classic  metaphor  of  doubling  as  the  loss  of  the  shadow.  Maria’s  status  as 
doppelgänger is hinted at again at the end of the film, where we see her disembodied 
shadow mounting the steps of a ladder while she herself is invisible on a staircase.
The remarkable reverse shot of Rotwang’s uncanny gaze into the camera, flanked by 
death’s  heads  and  above  the  flashlight’s  electric  eye,  identifies  his  lamp  with 
panoptic spectatorship, power, and the camera eye. Yet, as a scientist who seeks to 
create  life  through its mimetic reproduction,  Rotwang is  in the selfsame moment 
associated with death, evoking precisely the double bind of mimetic technologies of 
the  19th century  that,  while  aiming  to  overcome  death,  instead  unleash  morbid 
replicas of the real that are neither alive nor dead. As the camera and the spectator 
are identified with Rotwang’s point of view, for which Maria is the object of visual 
pursuit,  the viewer participates in this terror-inducing voyeurism from Rotwang’s 
angle and colludes in the girl’s capture/rape. When the diabolical inventor seizes his 
prey, the scene fades to black.
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Crucially too, Rotwang uses his mechanical hand, the high-tech replacement 
of the hand he lost in creating the robot, to extinguish Maria’s paltry, old-fashioned 
flame,  a  remnant  of  the  candle-lit  gothic  scene  in  which  she  has  spoken  to  the 
workers. While Maria earlier asserted a kind of power that escaped the will of the 
Master of Metropolis – the power to tell a story to the workers, metaphorically that 
of showing a film – the extinguishing of her flame by Rotwang’s technological hand 
foretells that technology is about to assert itself over the resistant elements of the old 
world. Electricity, the binary opposite of candlelight in this context, is associated 
both  with  the  power  of  technology  and  with  the  creation  of  illusion,  i.e.,  the 
cinematic text itself, in Metropolis. As Brigitte Peucker has argued,
The artificial hand [Rotwang] wears, covered with a black glove, is  an ominous 
reminder that in the literature of Romanticism man’s hubristic attempt to create life 
is punished by violence to the mind or body; Rotwang is aligned with the many of 
Hoffmann’s “false artists” who have this aim, while representing additionally the 
filmmaker  who  animates  the  image  by  technological  means.  With  his  gloved 
artificial hand, Rotwang is an emblem of the fragmented and heterogeneous nature 
of the cinematic text.33
33 Brigitte Peucker,  Incorporating Images: Film and the Rival Arts, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1995, p. 32.
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Himself a cyborg,  Rotwang mediates between the world of machines and that of 
human beings, between film and the reality it aims to duplicate. That Rotwang has 
lost his hand to his uncanny creature, both machine and work of art, corroborates his 
role as surrogate filmmaker. Interestingly, Tom Gunning has recently discussed the 
significance of  the  hand as  a  metaphor  in  Fritz  Lang’s  films,  the imprint  of  the 
authorial presence.34 Like Hitchcock, Lang himself often appeared in his films, but 
specifically in a shot showing a close-up of his hand. In this case, however, Lang’s 
hand – identifiable from his watch – appears in a close-up of the hand of another 
“director”, Frederson.
The Robot as Cinema
Like Rotwang, the robot (allegorically named Parody in the novel) is a focal point of 
Metropolis’s mise-en-abyme of mimetic effects and reflexive themes whose status as 
representation, spectacle, and metaphor for cinema is amply underlined throughout 
the film. The robot  compels an extraordinary visual fascination,  a  thoroughgoing 
astonishment on the viewer’s part that reproduces (and exceeds) that of looking at a 
new mimetic technology and that collapses into that of viewing Metropolis itself. A 
simulacrum  of  the  human  form,  the  robot  is  also  a  metaphor  for  cinema:  In 
Rotwang’s laboratory, the process of its transformation into Maria’s effigy involves a 
“scanning” of Maria’s body with an electrical light and the inscription of the data or 
life-force thus gathered on the robot’s body. This mimetic production “steals” some 
of the original’s  soul  and vitality,  indicating that  the duplication of the real  as a 
defense against death in a sense paradoxically kills the thing it seeks to duplicate. 
It is by now commonplace to acknowledge that this scene reenacts cinematic 
processes of recording reality, much as the false Maria’s dance to follow allegorizes 
a  certain  mode  of  cinematic  representation,  male  spectatorship,  and  the 
objectification of the female form. Specifically, the creation of the false Maria serves 
as a metaphor for how the camera records the “real” by inscribing its image on film 
emulsion: 
The process aims at producing a simulacrum, a copy. Raymond Bellour, in fact, 
describes the sequence as a whole as a reflection of the cinematic medium, ‘the 
34 See Tom Gunning, Films of Fritz Lang: Allegories of Vision and Modernity.
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actual process of substituting a simulacrum for a living being directly replicates the 
camera’s power to reproduce automatically the reality it confronts.’35
The creation  of  this  android  double is  vital  for  a  cohesive  reading of  the  film’s 
allegory of cinema precisely because it  links the theme of technology in  its  two 
dimensions: the dystopic plot involving the city of the future and film itself as a 
technological medium. Anton Kaes has summed up the role of the robot as metaphor 
for cinema:
The  robot  as  machine  and  simulacrum  comments  on  the  materiality  of  image 
production and the properties  of  the  cinematic  apparatus.  Technology is  able to 
conjure up machine-made images that cannot be distinguished from reality. Thus, 
the robot’s lascivious dance in front of a male audience attracts and at the same time 
deceives the spectators’ desirous gaze. Indeed, the female robot becomes an emblem 
for  cinema  as  such:  a  product  of  technical  ingenuity,  an  incarnation  of  visual 
pleasure,  and  a  temptress  out  to  delude  anyone  who  falls  for  the  illusion  of  a 
replica.36
Thus,  in  accord  both  with  the  history  of  media  technologies  and  its  fictional 
renditions,  the  film  foregrounds  a  structural connection  between  the  double-
automaton and film, both of which have the dual potential of being an astonishing 
mechanical  spectacle  –  if  the  instrumentation  is  exposed  –  or  an  uncanny 
simulacrum, neither real nor illusory, if it is not. 
35 Ibid., p.  67.  Raymond  Bellour  is  quoted  from “Ideal  Hadaly  (On  Villiers’  The  Future  Eve),” 
Camera Obscura, No. 15, Fall 1986, p. 131.
36 Anton Kaes,  "Cinema and Modernity: On Fritz Lang's  Metropolis", in  High and Low Cultures:  
German Attempts at Mediation, eds. Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermand, Madison, WI, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1994, p. 25.
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In  the  process  by  which  Maria’s  physiological  data  are  inscribed  on  the 
robot’s  body,  complex  special  effects  reveal  a  network  of  vein-like  electrical 
currents,  exposed  beneath  what  will  become  the  skin.  Becoming  human 
paradoxically requires the sorcery of high technology. Günther Rittau described the 
incredibly  intricate  production  process  of  this  scene  –  a  making  visible  of  the 
invisible – as follows:
Electric current tends to be invisible. On the other hand, the phantastic-mysterious 
transformation  now  taking  place  naturally  had  to  be  rendered  in  images.  We 
illuminated  liquids  in  strange  test-tubes  and  made  them  bubble,  the  electric 
apparatus surrounding Maria was made to emit sparks and we gradually enveloped 
it  in huge arcs of lightning, at the same time as rings of fire formed around the 
robot, moving up and down her body. As she became human, her blood circulation 
lit  up. We spent months in the lab preparing these effects, with photo-chemistry 
playing a major role, as well as the most unlikely aids… Some strips of celluloid 
had to be exposed up to thirty times.37
The scene illustrates the workings of the human-machine, the mechanical component 
of  human  bodily  functions  (i.e.,  l’homme-machine),  in  a  manner  recalling  19th 
century physiological illustrations. It also negates the outside-inside boundary of the 
body present  to  human vision.  The  process  of  the  robot’s  “becoming human” is 
indicated by a progressive resemblance to “liminal” scientific imagery that purports 
to make visible what is naturally invisible to the naked eye. What it reveals, in fact, is 
an occluded connection between modern physiology and the consumption of optical 
simulacra, what Barbara Stafford has called 
[T]he tendency to collapse all sensory experience into the visual  and the human 
body, specifically, into an assemblage of its projected optical effects. What had been 
one of the chief forces of enlightenment—making visually accessible inaccessible 
domains—has turned into the creation of, and demand for, ghostly simulations.38
37 Günther Rittau,  “Die Trickaufnahmen im Metropolis Film,”  Die Filmtechnik,  28 January 1927. 
Quoted and translated by Thomas Elsaesser, Metropolis, London, BFI Publishing, 2000, p. 25.
38 “The history of this far-ranging aesthetic trend toward automated spectralization and the automatic 
consumption of  illusions has yet  to be recognized or  analyzed in a  systematic way.”  Barbara M. 
Stafford, Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and Medicine, Cambridge, Mass., 
MIT Press, 1991, p. 28.
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Significantly, when the false Maria opens her eyes, one of them has been 
made  to  appear  bigger  than  the  other,  hinting  at  the  onset  of  a  visual 
incommensurability – either in her perception or in ours, but certainly in “cinematic” 
perception. This lack of symmetry betokens the uncanny nature of the new Maria’s 
look. While a number of characters look into the camera in the course of the film, in 
the case of the false Maria and Rotwang this look is made uncanny, in part because it 
lacks diegetic motivation and is thus construed as a threatening, direct reply to the 
film’s spectator gaze. In contrast, when Freder and the real Maria look at the camera, 
the “classical” sequence of shots makes it understood that they are looking at each 
other, while the spectator merely has the good fortune to be sandwiched in between. 
In the case of the false Maria, the opening of her eyes and subsequent look into the 
camera  violates  narrative  demands and expectations,  becoming,  like  Cesare’s,  an 
astonishing waking of the “dead” of representation, a creature of a mixed nature and 
a reflexive source of optical unease.
The  Metropolis double  confirms  Friedrich  Kittler’s  assertion  that  “Film 
doppelgängers film filming itself.”39 Appearances of the robot-Maria are framed in 
39 Friedrich Kittler,  Grammophone, Film, Typewriter,  trans.  Geoffrey Winthrop-Young & Michael 
Wutz, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 149.
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ways that draw attention to its or her status as a technological representation with an 
uncertain  ontological  position.  Initially  hidden  behind  a  curtain  and  exposed  by 
Rotwang, the robot is later onstage flanked by curtains. Toward the end, she is shown 
receding into the background and going “behind the curtains”. Andrew Webber has 
thus remarked that the film provides
A compelling case for viewing the uncanny body that is brought to life … as having 
a mise-en-abyme function. That is, what is engineered or otherwise experimentally 
projected into life is always also figuring the celluloid body of the film medium, 
specifically film in its fantasy forms.40
But to go yet  further,  the robot  more broadly functions as a kind of  “dialectical 
image” or “hypericon”, in the sense developed by W. J. T. Mitchell, as an image that 
serves as a site for reflection on the nature of images, which is itself bound up with 
reflection on subjectivity:
Concrete examples of these images are a familiar feature of iconological discussion. 
They include the canonical examples (Plate’s cave, Aristotle’s wax tablet, Locke’s 
dark room) that  come up whenever the nature of  images becomes a subject  for 
philosophical  reflection,  whenever the nature of  images becomes linked with an 
account of the nature of man. And they have their analogues in the realm of graphic 
images…  all  serve,  like  the  philosophers’  images,  as  what  I  have  called 
“hypericons”, figures of figuration, pictures that reflect the nature of images.41
Here,  the robot  doppelgänger  is  the site  of  reflection on the modern problem of 
technical reproducibility, the problem not simply of original and image, but of the 
image  and  its  infinite  reproduction,  not  least  by  cinema.  The  corporeal  and 
psychological integrity of the subject, whether depicted or viewing, is put in jeopardy 
by  this  technological  mimetic  process.  Cinema  is  thematized  as  an  ambivalent 
medium that gives rise to uncanny effects.
Remarkably, in  Metropolis the enigma of “machine life” is associated with 
avant-garde  graphic  and  cinematic  effects.  From  the  technophilic  montage  of 
rhythmic mechanical motion at the beginning of the film to the transformation of the 
robot  into  Maria,  formalist  avant-garde  montage  effects  are  used  to  depict 
mechanical nature and its inhuman impenetrability. In fact, a stylistic dichotomy can 
be discerned in the film between the hi-tech montage and special effects associated 
40 Andrew Webber, “Canning the Uncanny”, p. 252–53.




with machine life (and the uncanny) and the almost  classical  narrative style that 
naturalizes the “canny” for the viewer,  above all  in the interaction of Maria  and 
Freder. Thus, the division of Maria and her double into virgin and vamp, the old 
world and high technology, is articulated by the cinematic language used to represent 
them:  the  canny Maria  is  naturalized  through association with classical  narrative 
norms, while the uncanny robot is associated with avant-garde montage effects that 
are threatening to the beholder’s eye. This stylistic disjunction translates the diegetic 
conflict into the reflexive terms of two different visual regimes, and is characteristic 
of the ambivalent ways in which the spectator is engaged with the film’s images. 
Rather  than  Huyssen’s  suggestion that  the  film’s  stylistic  heterogeneity  could be 
understood as a conflict between Expressionism and the Neue Sachlichkeit, it would 
be more accurate to consider it in relation to conflicting views of technology, where, 
e.g.,  stylistic effects from technophilic artistic movements are used to signify the 
domain of the mechanical, almost as its leitmotifs.
The Conflict of Vision and the Assault on the Spectator’s Eye 
With its themes of problematic vision, Metropolis’s narrative conflicts are implicated 
in  an  ambivalent  allegory  of  cinema.  As  one  commentator  writes,  “Fritz  Lang’s 
Metropolis… is a powerful laboratory of relationship between the biological subject 
and technological object on two levels: in the subject and style of its presentation, 
and in  the  cinematic  medium itself,  or  the  viewer’s  interaction  with  the  moving 
images onscreen”.42 These narrative conflicts register as tensions within the film’s 
dichotomous organization of vision and power, and are inseparable from the visual 
indecidability that infects its images and implicates cinema in its questioning of the 
machine  world.  This  uncanny  optic  is  expressed  cinematically  as  visual  excess, 
obfuscation, blurriness, and in the film’s climactic moments, as a full-on assault on 
vision.  Here  too,  the  in-between  characters  of  Rotwang  and  the  Robot  are  key 
figures. 
The potential of the “creature” – whether the machines or the workers – to 
escape  the  Master’s  control  is  presented  as  a  threat  of  obfuscation that  likewise 
42 Julia  Dover,  "The  Imitation  Game:  Paralysis  and  Response  in  Fritz  Lang's  Metropolis and 
Contemporary Critiques of Technology", p. 275.
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affects the viewer. When Freder sees the Moloch machine at the site of the accident 
on his first trip to the machine rooms, visual anxiety and indecision are emblematic 
aspects of the moment of crisis. In a shot whose structure is repeated in the film, 
Freder covers his  eyes because of  the indecidability  of what  he sees,  then looks 
again.  The  machine  rooms,  associated  with  steam  and  smoke  and  the  loss  of 
visibility, contrast both with Frederson’s panoptic office with its view of the whole 
city and with the primitive darkness of the catacombs. Not only when there is a so-
called accident or during the workers’ rebellion, but indeed on a regular basis, the 
machines spew forth bursts of steam and smoke, and have a “natural” or organic 
quality  of  pent-up  energies,  unpredictable  outbursts,  untamable  beastliness.  It  is 
therefore not surprising that a technophile such as H. G. Wells found them to be 
distressingly archaic.
 
Moments of crisis in the film, such as Freder’s hallucination and the flooding 
of  the  workers’  city,  are  explicitly  depicted  as  crises  of  vision.  The  danger  that 
threatens, which equally affects the spectator with visual anxiety, is blindness itself, 
the potential for darkness. As Webber has noted, this is signified by the black eye-
sockets of the death’s head:
This absent gaze [of Death] represents the blacking out of the viewer’s vision which 
duly ensues. The circles of light and the spinning dark sockets which feature in this 
hallucinatory  vision  on  Freder’s  mind-screen  correspond  to  a  leitmotif  which 
structures the film’s visual regime. The circle of light as emblem of the gaze is 
prone to conversion into its negative, the black and blind socket.43
43 Andrew Webber, “Canning the Uncanny”, p. 267–68.
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Beyond this binarism of visual pleasure and unpleasure,  seeing and the threat of 
blindness, however, what is at issue for the viewer is visual uncertainty itself: neither 
vision nor its absence, but the gray area in which the film makes visible a problem of 
perception  through  shots  that  have  a  reflexive  indecidability;  the  narrative 
embodiment of this indecidability is the double. The stills shown below of Freder’s 
hallucinations  exemplify  this,  with  formalist  film  tricks  that  disrupt  the  easy 
decipherability  of  the  images.  From  this  representation of  contingent,  ambivalent 
vision emerges a sense of the uncanny, involving, as Samuel Weber has argued, a 
reflexive moment that implicates its means of transmission.44
 
 
44 “…But the uncanny is not merely identical with this indecidability: it involves and implies a second 
moment or  movement,  namely the defense against  this  crisis  of  perception and phenomenality,  a 
defense  which  is  ambivalent  and  expresses  itself  in  the  compulsive  curiosity  …  the  craving  to 
penetrate, discover and ultimately to conserve the integrity of perception: perceiver and perceived, the 
wholeness of the body, the power of vision—all this implies a denial of that almost-nothing which can 
hardly be seen, a denial that in turn involves a certain structure of narration, in which this denial 
repeats and articulates itself.” See Samuel Weber, “The Sideshow: or Remarks on a Canny Moment”, 




Freder’s  hallucinations,  arising with his  unwillingness  to  believe  what  his 
eyes show him, exemplifies how the film’s theme of visual anxiety is founded on 
metacinematic effects that call into question the ontological status of the medium 
itself.  Freder’s crisis is depicted by blurred point-of-view shots, superpositions, and 
even the scratching of the film emulsion itself. Finally, “Beautifully, Lang images 
Death’s attack as an attack on the film image itself: a huge arcing scratch appears 
over the image of Freder, marking in a supernatural way the curving stroke of the 
scythe  in  this  visionary  reverse  angle”.45 In  terms  of  editing,  Lang relies  on  the 
viewer’s familiarity with shot–reverse shot conventions to cast doubt on what Freder 
sees through the subversion of classical optical cues. Because his look is cross-cut 
with the scene of the robot’s dance, Freder, sitting in bed, becomes a hallucinatory 
participant  in  the  Yoshiwara  audience.  Lang  here  uses  the  language  of  spatial 
continuity to connect two independent spaces, making it ambiguous whether Freder 
is witnessing the scene or not.
The climax of the film is the catastrophe of the destruction of the machines 
and the ensuing flooding of the workers’ city, which puts innocent children at risk. 
This sequence is intercut with repeated shots of the gong that Maria uses to warn the 
children, filmed head-on, facing the camera. What it strikes with its strident warning 
is  the  eye  of  the  spectator:  a  gesture  that  recalls  distanciation  effects  in  Soviet 
montage and Brechtian theatre.





Reviews  of  Metropolis, before  its  recent  “postmodern  appropriation”  by 
contemporary  critics  such  as  Andreas  Huyssen,  have  characteristically  been  torn 
between applauding the film’s extraordinary visual effects and decrying its mawkish 
plot and apparent ideological message, which seem puerile or reactionary compared 
to its formal scope. In an especially vicious critique, historian Peter Gay has written 
that
As early as 1927, the greatly overrated director Fritz Lang brought out the tasteless 
extravaganza, Metropolis, which would be of no importance had it not been taken so 
seriously and acclaimed so widely. Metropolis is a fantasy without imagination, a 
picturesque,  ill-conceived, and essentially  reactionary tale  which has  only a  few 
good shots of mass movement and rising waters to recommend it; the film sees the 
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The workers celebrate the destruction of the machines.
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class struggle as science fiction and draws the kind of conclusion that can only be 
called a studied lie...46
Interestingly, the film’s ideological significations have been condemned as proto-
Fascist or conciliatory to capital by leftists (e.g., Kracauer) and decried as Bolshevik 
by  reactionaries  (e.g.,  Nazi  reviews).  Metropolis  has  even  been  criticized  for  its 
“unrealistic” depiction of technology (H. G. Wells).47 A very suggestive critique is 
that  of  Kracauer,  who found  the  film’s  apparent  fetishisation  of  the  purely 
ornamental quite reprehensible, and accused Lang of dehumanising the workers by 
abstracting and aestheticizing their suffering: 
The office of the big boss, the vision of the Tower of Babel, the machinery and the 
arrangement  of  the  masses:  all  illustrate  Lang’s  penchant  for  pompous 
ornamentation. ...In Metropolis, the decorative not only appears as an end in itself, 
but even belies certain points made through the plot. It makes sense that, on their 
way  to  and  from the  machines,  the  workers  form ornamental  groups;  but  it  is 
nonsensical to force them into such groups when they are listening to a comforting 
speech from the girl Maria during their leisure time. In his exclusive concern with 
ornamentation, Lang goes so far as to compose decorative patterns from the masses 
who are desperately trying to escape the inundation of the lower city. Cinematically 
an  incomparable  achievement,  this  inundation  sequence  is  humanly  a  shocking 
failure.48
Similarly,  both  Andreas  Huyssen  and  Anton  Kaes  have  read  the  conclusion  as 
exemplifying a “Reactionary Modernist” ideology: the handshake of spiritualism and 
technology (with the Jew Rotwang eliminated), foreshadowing the paradoxical union 
of  the  two  that  the  Nazis  were  soon  to  offer.  Huyssen,  following  Adorno  and 
Horkheimer’s  thesis  in  Dialectic  of  Enlightenment  (the  relation  between  the 
domination of outer nature and inner nature), has concluded that the film shows that 
“Vision as pleasure and desire has to be subdued and manipulated so that vision as 
46 Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider, New York, Harper & Row, 1968, p. 141.
47 For a comprehensive history of reception of Metropolis, see Thomas Elsaesser, Metropolis, London, 
BFI, 2000; and Holger Bachmann, “The Production and Contemporary Reception of Metropolis” and 
Michael Minden, “The Critical Reception of Metropolis”, both in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis: Cinematic  
Visions of Technology and Fear, eds. Holger Bachmann & Michael Minden, Rochester, NY, Camden 
House, 2000.
48 Siegfried Kracauer, From Caligari to Hitler, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947, pp. 149–
150. Kracauer’s analysis is especially appropriate for the novel and its blatant authoritarian allegory of 
the abstract “face of the masses”, the proletariat as a single entity without human agency and in need 
of an authority to guide it, as in the following passage: “When I came out of the cathedral door in the 
morning the masses were standing as one man, looking towards me. Then the face of the masses was 
turned towards me. Then I saw, it was not old, was not young, was sorrowless and joyless. ‘What do 
you want?’ I asked. And one answered: ‘We are waiting, Mr Fredersen…’ ‘For what?’ I asked him. 
‘We are waiting,’ continued the spokesman, ‘for someone to come, who will tell us what way we 
should go…’” (Thea von Harbou, Metropolis, pp. 220–21.)
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technical and social control can emerge triumphant”.49 Anton Kaes has argued that 
the film displays an ambivalent appraisal of technology:
If placed in the artistic and social history of modernity,  Metropolis  … is Janus-
faced,  looking  back  to  the  revolutionary  Expressionist  avant-garde  and  looking 
ahead to quiet submission under a fascist leader. Metropolis, I contend, displays the 
modernist dimension in fascism and the fascist dimension in modernism; it creates a 
site where modernism clashes with modernity.50
The film’s interesting ambivalence about its own message stems from the images 
that fetishize technology even as they display its cataclysmic power… Seen in its 
historical  context,  the  film  thus  dramatized  the  reaction  of  German  modernism 
against  an overpowering modernity.  It  was a  modernist  reaction of  a  modernity 
which had negated its own emancipatory potential.51
However, with an understanding of how vision is foregrounded and problematized in 
Metropolis, and of the role played by the film’s visual excesses and obscurities in a 
narrative  that  explicitly  questions  the  impetus  and  outcome  of  technology  and 
modernity, these readings of the film become problematic. Considering themes of 
vision and their reflexive effects, and at their locus the uncanny robot and Rotwang, 
it becomes difficult to ascribe an ideological stance to the film’s conclusion. The 
visual  regimes  of  the  film,  which  persist  through  its  conclusion  (which,  in  fact, 
continues the mise en scène of spectatorship and questionable visuality that the rest 
of the film has taught us to distrust) cast doubt on the value of the resolution. The 
viewer is left with an uncertainty that is at odds with the plot setting everything to 
rights and killing off the Jew outsider. When cinema itself is put in question – e.g., 
with how the climactic moments of the film, in the diegesis and for the viewer, are 
figured as an assault on vision, of threats to the eye – a diegetic resolution can no 
longer be read as a clear-cut ideological message. Instead, the historical significance 
of  the  film’s  visual  themes  is  better  understood  along  the  lines  of  Huyssen’s 
speculations on how
...By thematizing male gaze and vision in the described way the film lays open a 
fundamental filmic convention usually covered up by narrative cinema. But there is 
more to it than that. Lang’s film may lead us to speculate whether the dominance of 
vision per se in our culture may not be a fundamental problem rather than a positive 
49 Andreas Huyssen, “The Vamp and the Machine: Fritz Lang’s Metropolis”, p. 76.
50 Anton Kaes, “Cinema and Modernity: On Fritz Lang’s Metropolis”, p. 20.
51 Ibid., p. 33.
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contribution to the advancement of civilization as Norbert Elias would have it in his 
study of the civilizing process.52
Considering  the  visual  effects  and  metaphors  of  Metropolis from this  historical 
perspective, i.e., of the historical determination of optical experience, is necessary for 
understanding  their  potential  ideological  import.  For  instance,  the  egregiously 
ornamental  masses  (and  other  constructions)  of  Metropolis  can be  regarded as  a 
highly significant effect in terms of the film’s visual themes. Partly, and only partly, 
this ornamentalism creates the impression that the people depicted in the film are 
overwhelmed and altered in nature by the dominion of the world of objects  and 
technology. The structures the workers form underline their identity as “mass”, their 
interchangeability and equivalence, facelessness and lack of individual identity, and 
their liminal nature as machine-men. These effects rely on and echo those of the 
doppelgänger motif in both the film and novel. That the viewer’s look cannot easily 
assimilate  or  digest  the  profusion  of  visual  stimuli  presented  mimics  the  visual 
regime of modernity and the urban landscape’s “society of the spectacle”. 





But these visual elements also have an important counternarrative effect that 
may in some degree account for the outrage its reviewers have shown. The viewer is 
presented with a profusion of visual cues, in whose choice and repetition there seems 
to  be  little  narrative  motivation.  The  concept  of  cinematic  excess  is  helpful  in 
clarifying the kind of spectatorship involved here, describing cinematic devices that 
seem to have “no function beyond offering itself for perceptual play”.53 The excess of 
stimuli, the ornamental character of catastrophe, give these images a kind of “obtuse 
meaning” that exceeds the requirements of narrative momentum, and brings to the 
foreground the  cinematic basis  of  the depiction.  As a result,  technological  crisis, 
expressed  as  a  visual  surfeit,  participates  in  the  cinematic  allegory.  The  film’s 
baroque heterogeneity in style and technique is part of its construction of an alarming 
optical regime – an uncanny  Gesamtkunstwerk. These over-inscribed shots engage 
the spectator in an active relationship with the image, not just teaching but obliging 
the act of decipherment and scrutiny – one that is inconclusive and even threatening 
– of their visual complexities. This engagement calls forth not passivity vis-à-vis the 
53 Kristin Thompson, “The Concept of Cinematic Excess”,  in  Narrative,  Apparatus,  Ideology,  ed. 




narrative, but a sense of astonishment comparable to that evoked by the experience 
of a new technology. [Indeed, most reviewers, even if inadvertently, confirm this 
response to the film’s imagery.]
Lang himself admitted that what interested him in Metropolis  was not Thea 
von  Harbou’s  sentimental-reactionary  plot  as  much  as  the  machines.54 But  what 
Metropolis depicts with regard to technology remains controversial: it is neither pure 
anti-technological irrationalism (the Luddite rebellion of the workers who blame the 
machinery for their enslavement) nor technophilic idolatry of the machine-gods as 
superior and necessary extensions of the senses of man. Rather, both aspects are co-
present  dialectically  in  the  film,  which  not  only  makes  the  ranges  of  choices 
problematic but also associates this ambivalence with the medium of cinema itself, 
where “Metropolis is not so much a film about machines as it is itself a machine, 
made up of parts fitted together, whose intricate clockwork elements are as much the 
human passions,  anxieties and aggressions as they are the pistons,  flywheels and 
dials”.55 In his insightful chapter on Metropolis, Tom Gunning finds, 
Through the proliferation of looks at the camera, its multiplication of saviour and 
anti-Christ  figures,  Metropolis overloads  the  allegorical  mission  of  its  film  and 
threatens  to  reduce  it  all  to  a  hall  of  mirrors  reflecting  competing  authorities, 
counterfeit identities and spurious images.56
Instead, we have a text whose allegorical energies seem unable to coalesce into a 
single grand narrative, but rather ceaselessly generates reference to nearly all the 
narratives – political, religious, occult, aesthetic, sexual – that circulated through 
Weimar culture. The energy in Metropolis becomes increasingly centrifugal, images 
escaping from the grand narratives to which they belong.57
Precisely this problematic heterogeneity, the mise-en-abyme of images, is where the 
film’s  formal  effects  relate  to  the  theme of  the  double,  and  both  in  turn  to  the 
medium of cinema itself. These effects evoke a broad ambivalence toward vision and 
mimetic  technologies,  an  anxiety  having  to  do  with  the  ontological  status  of 
simulacra in modernity.
54 See Anton Kaes, , “Cinema and Modernity: On Fritz Lang’s Metropolis”.
55 Thomas Elsaesser, Metropolis, p. 64.
56 Tom Gunning, The Films of Fritz Lang: Allegories of Vision and Modernity, p. 68.




From Edison, the “Wizard” of Menlo Park, to Méliès, who built automata before a 
film career in which he appeared as magician and scientist and multiplied onscreen, 
to Carl Mayer, who sold barometers before the fateful visit to the Kantstrasse – the 
history  of  cinema  is  a  Hoffmannesque  tale  of  sorcerer-scientists  and  their 
apprentices, uncanny mimetic technologies they use to capture and transport doubles 
of the living, and the images of a mixed nature that they generate. As the preceding 
discussions have shown, the double and its accompanying constellation of themes of 
vision and the self not only rely on but also refer to this prehistory and history of 
cinema  and,  by  extension,  to  the  uncanny  tensions  of  the  visual  regimes  of 
The real Maria (Metropolis).
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modernity.  In these films,  the formal  requirements and spectatorial  effects  of the 
double theme are structurally bound up with self-referential gestures concerning the 
medium of cinema and the experience of spectatorship. The double’s appearance as a 
result of a scientist-magician’s interference alludes to the agency of the writer or 
filmmaker,  in  a  network  of  metaphors  of  vision,  spectacle,  and  representation 
invoking basic issues of cinematic discourse.
As  the  preceding  chapters  have  shown,  these  films  (and  their  directors) 
deliberately explore and foreground the specific  characteristics of the medium of 
cinema  and  the  kinds  of  effects  that  it  makes  possible  for  the  first  time.  The 
unfolding of their narratives is dialectically linked with the structural capacities of 
cinema. Nowhere is this made more apparent than by the doppelgänger, where an 
original capability of film (e.g., to show the moving image of a man fencing with 
himself, as Wegener noted in his 1916 lecture) becomes the motivation of the story. 
Such  self-conscious  filmmaking  is  concomitant  with  the  effective  cinematic 
construction of the uncanny and the remarkable and unusual spectatorial effects of 
these films. At the same time, the ontological stability of vision is put in question 
through a variety of strategies, such as bizarre forms of direct address (which diverge 
from early cinema’s exhibitionist streak precisely because of their self-consciously 
uncanny  effect)  and  strange  and  sometimes  Baroque  configurations  of  visible 
objects.
As the Introduction to this study suggested, and the intervening chapters have 
hopefully shown, the doppelgänger is an especially fruitful subject, because as an 
uncanny  motif  concerning  vision  and  subjectivity  it  appears  as  a 
structural/metacinematic problem within the text. Considering the doppelgänger as a 
diegetic  crisis  of  phenomenality  and corporal  unity  which reflects  back upon the 
cinematic text itself – thus as part of a self-conscious allegory of cinema – offers 
special  insight  into  questions  of  historical  motivation  and  the  double’s  powerful 
resurgence in Wilhelmine and Weimar cinema, insofar as studying what the double 
“means” spans the gap between questions of film form and spectatorial effects. But 
the double also offers a way of incorporating questions of socio-historical context in 
the discussion because of its complex significations for modernity and the changing 
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nature of visual experience: not only with reflexive, distanciating effects, but also in 
the  sense  in  which  doubles  are  “In  our  era  …  archetypes  of  the  unreasonable 
facsimile:  images  of  ourselves  that  arouse  consternation;  omens  of  the  peril  of 
relentless copying”.1 
The readings of the films in the previous chapters problematize a number of 
recurring assumptions  in  studies of  German silent  film and the  double.  For  one, 
looking at the sophisticated use of the double, a recurring theme of both Wilhelmine 
and  Weimar  film,  invalidates  the  usual  division  starkly  made  between  the  two 
periods  or  the  characterization,  notably  Kracauer’s,  of  Wilhelmine  films  as 
“primitive”.  These readings  also indicate  that  approaching the doppelgänger  as a 
national,  specifically  German  phenomenon,  which  is  the  case  with  many 
commentators (e.g.,  Elsaesser in “Social  Mobility and the Fantastic”) can tend to 
obscure its greater resonance with the experience of modern life by relating it to a 
specifically  German  experience.  It  also  confuses  the  issue  to  interrogate  the 
doppelgänger as a figure that proliferates at every fin de siècle, e.g., as illustrating a 
parallel between the 1790s and the 1890s. While the argument could be made that the 
double  took  especially  stark  forms  in  German  high  culture,  nineteenth-century 
Europe  abounds  in  doppelgänger  fictions,  as  the  twentieth  does  in  films.  The 
uncanny  double  of  German  Romanticism  and  after  has,  since  circa  1800,  been 
continuously  present  in  European  high  art  and  mass  culture,  while  also  being  a 
central metaphor in philosophical reflections on modernity and subjectivity, e.g., of 
man’s alienated condition or the heterogeneity of the self.  The double in fact is a 
paradigmatic  figure  not  only  for  modernism,  in  its  ironic,  anti-oculocentric 
tendencies,  but also for  modernity  and its  critiques,  which inevitably rely on the 
rhetoric of the doppelgänger plot. In the words of one commentator, “We do now 
appear to accept a culturally and historically peculiar sort of self-commenting, self-
combative,  doubled  but  estranged  consciousness.  Doubleness  has  become  an 
inescapable element of modernity; yea, for some, its very definition”.2
1 Hillel Schwartz, The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles, New York, 
Zone Books, 1996, p. 49.
2 Ibid., p. 87.
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While the preceding chapters have primarily offered close readings of several 
representative  films,  the  discussion  has  nonetheless  consistently  returned  to  the 
question of how their  recurring metaphors and ontological problematics could be 
contextualized within the broader context of modernity and its cognitive and socio-
cultural effects. These readings suggest that the use of such tropes evokes in complex 
ways tensions arising with modernity’s visual regimes while also closely concerning 
the status of the cinema as a modern mass medium. The composite picture that has 
emerged offers a new perspective on the double as a reflexive theme that integrates 
the characteristic divisions in its study between thematic analysis and questions of 
film form.
The figurations of vision and representation in these films, which question the 
claims of  “realism”,  at  the same time put  into question the ontological  status of 
technologically mediated representations of the human body and the experience of 
the modern spectator. The concept of the uncanny has been especially helpful in 
elucidating the ambivalent character of vision and the visible in the films. In these 
films,  the  uncanny  is  so  effectively  tied  to  the  mechanisms  of  the  image’s 
transmission  that  the  resolution  provided  by  the  plot  –  in  the  same  discredited 
cinematic language – lacks a stabilizing effect.  What makes the visible uncertain 
arises from outside the individual, in the external order.  Because it  is only made 
visible  cinematically  it  is  insurmountable,  being  a  structural  characteristic  of  the 
apparatus that has brought about (i.e., made visible) ambivalence and distrust in the 
first place. Ultimately, when narrative conflict implicates the “nature” (the structure) 
of the cinematic spectacle itself, through multiple forms of self-reference, its unease 
cannot be put to rest through any diegetic resolution. 
Thematically  too,  the  films  both  reveal  optical  instruments  to  have  the 
capacity to deceive the eye and show the eye itself to be untrustworthy. What the eye 
sees (whether the spectator’s or protagonist’s)  is disclosed to be contingent upon 
both the empirical  specificity  of  the  observer  (who could be mad)  and upon the 
limitations  of  vision  itself,  which  is  circumscribed  by  nature  and  discredited  by 
superior instruments. Thus, one aspect in which the perceptual problems of Weimar 
cinema and the double theme relate to the broader question of the status of vision in 
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modernity  is  the  conception  of  vision  as  subjective,  dissociated  from  external 
referents in the “real”, and mediated by a host of instruments and mechanisms. 
In the context of these films, a wellspring of visual anxiety – for diegetic 
victims and for the spectator – is technologically mediated representation, including 
film  itself  (as  the  various  films-within-films  illustrate).  Thus  in  The  Golem,  for 
example, catastrophe befalls the courtiers with the showing of a film and as a result 
of its thoughtless, pleasurable viewing. The use of the double as an uncanny and 
reflexive device is bound up with the problematic nature of mediated vision, even if 
this may ultimately be the only kind of visual experience possible in modernity. Yet 
it  also  references  the  actual  history  of  the  objectification  and empirical  study of 
vision.  Thus  it  is  significant,  for  example,  how  the  spirit  of  nineteenth-century 
inventors and opticians, and modern science as a vocation, is ambivalently appraised 
in these films.  Allegories of cinema in the case of the double are also allegories of 
modernity: appraisals of “modern” subjectivity, technology and industrialization, and 
mass culture. These films draw attention to  the ways in  which the technological 
stepping  stones  (linear  developments  or  not)  in  the  invention  of  cinema  were 
implicated  in  and  relied  on  the  understanding  of  the  human  body  that  Ford’s 
assembly lines and modern war required; how, “With its dialectic of continuity and 
discontinuity, with the rapid succession and tactile thrust of its sounds and images, 
film rehearses in the realm of reception what the conveyor belt imposes upon human 
beings in the realm of production”.3 Not only a figuration of the fragmentary nature 
of  the  cinematic  text,  the  double  is  also  a  “synecdoche  of  mass  production”,4 
metaphorically recalling the multiple copies of a technically produced (and infinitely 
reproducible) commodity whose nature (as Marx described) is phantasmagoric and 
whose process of production is occulted in the final product. 
As we have  also  seen,  the  reliance  of  these  films on literary  themes and 
motifs  should be understood in relation to a set  of post-Kantian issues originally 
taken up in  German Romanticism.  Partly,  it  concerns  problematic  aspects  of  the 
Kantian  account  of  subjectivity  (in  particular,  as  Andrew  Webber  discusses,  its 
3 Miriam Hansen, “Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology”,  
New German Critique, No. 40, Winter 1987, p. 184.
4 Hillel Schwarz, The Culture of the Copy, p. 39.
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Transcendental Subject)5 and an arguably countervailing conception of the self as 
divided and heterogeneous. With regard to the experience of this subject, it concerns 
the problem of perception as a means of access to the real and to knowledge. Themes 
of optical advances and the proliferation of simulacra, the ambivalent figure of the 
scientist,  and  the  magic/primitive  moment  at  the  heart  of  technological  advance 
(including cinema) are shared by these films and the stories to which they allude. But 
focusing  on  the  double  shows that  this  return  to  Romantic  (sometimes  Counter-
Enlightenment) themes specifically engages the status of cinema itself as a mode of 
experience and the optical  history of modernity.  Its effect  is one of ambivalence 
toward modernity’s experiential consequences, its instruments and images.
This said, the connection between the rise of the fictional doppelgänger and 
the composition of modern visual experience, including the conceptualization of the 
observer, is a forbiddingly broad area of study whose more detailed discussion has in 
many ways been outside the scope of this  work,  appearing as a  subtext of close 
readings  of  the  films. The present  work  nevertheless  points  toward a  number  of 
exciting  avenues  for  further  exploration  of  how  the  themes  of  the  double  are 
intertwined  with  the  rise  of  modern  visual  experience.  Speaking  very  generally, 
understanding  the  historical  relevance  of  the  double  (specifically,  in  terms  of  a 
problem of perception and its anxieties) from its birth circa 1800 requires taking into 
account how, as Jonathan Crary has discussed, the conceptualization and status of 
vision underwent a shift in the same period. 
One illuminating approach is the metaphorological study, as exemplified by 
Terry  Castle’s  exploration  of  the  phantasmagoria  as  metaphor  of  the  poetic 
imagination and Jonathan Crary’s discussion of the magic lantern and photograph as 
paradigms of visual experience.6 Crary’s work, for example, revealingly combines a 
history-of-science perspective with an analysis of the use of metaphors in intellectual 
history, where he analyzes how metaphors of optical instruments and media were 
5 See Andrew Webber,  The  Doppelgänger: Double Visions in German Literature,  Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996.
6 See Terry Castle, “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie”, 
Critical Inquiry, 1988, 15, 1, pp. 26–61; The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and  
the Invention of the Uncanny, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995; Jonathan Crary, Techniques  




used in accounts of subjectivity and cognition and how their uses may have changed 
over time. Along similar lines, it would be interesting to take a closer look at how 
themes of the doppelgänger (and more generally, the conventions of the uncanny) 
have been used to articulate a variety of theoretical and philosophical positions in 
influential critiques of modernity concerning the heterogeneity of the modern subject 
and the sensory experience of modernity, i.e.,  the subjective effects of modernity 
and/or  its  objective  conditions.  Suggestive  examples  include  Marx’s  account  of 
alienation,  Freud’s  discussion  of  subjectivity  and  the  unconscious,  or  Foucault’s 
description of Modern man and his doubles. From a somewhat different perspective, 
further studies of whether and how the figure of the double has played a role in 
discussions  of  the  nature of  perception  (e.g.,  in  empirical  studies)  and recording 
technologies promise to be of interest.
As far  as  doppelgänger  fiction  is  concerned,  there  has  been  little  explicit 
consideration accorded to the significance in these stories of metaphors of optical 
instrumentation and forms of entertainment. The preceding chapters have contended 
with  this  question  in  part  by  considering  the  proto-cinematic  themes and effects 
present in several works of fiction. In addition, the discussion of the doppelgänger 
stories that influenced many of these films would also benefit from greater insight 
into a subject that has received little attention so far, namely, the impact of cinema 
and even earlier  technologies of recording the human body and motion (e.g.,  the 
camera obscura) on literary stylistics. As Anton Kaes has pointed out, “The new, 
more nervous rhythm of life, which found its most visible expression in the hasty and 
discontinuous series of images in silent film, also made its way into prose. The extent 
to  which  film,  with  its  techniques  of  montage,  close-ups,  etc.,  functioned  as  a 
structural model for the prose of the early 20th century remains for the most part 
unexplored”.7
7Anton  Kaes,  “The  Debate  about  Cinema:  Charting  a  Controversy  (1909–1929)”,  New  German 
Critique, No. 40, Winter 1987, p. 29.
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The Return of the Phantasmagoria 
Metaphorological  approaches  combining  literary,  scientific/technological, 
philosophical, and historical perspectives in the study of metaphors of vision and the 
double, along the lines hinted at above, offer important insights into the significance 
of the double in film. One important instance of such a connection is the metaphor of 
the  phantasmagoria.  Originally  referring  to  a  genre  of  moving  images,  the 
phantasmagoria as a form of optical illusion not only evolved into an important trope 
in critiques of modernity and the nature of modern perceptual experience, but also 
offers  a  suggestive  way  of  historicizing  the  cinematic  experience  of  the 
doppelgänger. It presents a point at which themes of the double in Romanticism may 
be connected with those of German cinema, and both may be related to critical and 
philosophical works on perception and modernity.
The  phantasmagoria,  a  chilling  optical  spectacle  that  became  enormously 
popular around the end of the eighteenth century, consisted of illusions created using 
the magic  lantern and other  visual  and aural  effects  at  the  hands of  an uncanny 
showman.  In  Romantic  (and  post-Romantic)  literature  of  the  doppelgänger, 
phantasmagoric  scenarios  recurringly  appear  to  signify  the  uncanny  visual 
experience:  not  just  explicitly  (as  in  Schiller’s  The  Ghost-Seer),8 but  also  more 
implicitly in scenarios of horror and subjective crisis involving optical indecision – 
where the eye scarcely knows what to believe – often incorporating the magic lantern 
and  other  optical  technologies.  In  addition,  the  concept  is  especially  useful  for 
characterizing the cinematic experience offered by these films of the double. In part, 
this is simply a consequence of the fact that the phantasmagoria is a kind of ancestor 
of  the  horror  or  fantastic  film  experience;  in  these  films  the  original  “ghost 
connection” of the phantasmagoric spectacle has been preserved:
In the end the phantasmagoria gave way to new kinds of mechanical representation. 
Yet  amid  all  the  technological  breakthroughs  and  the  refinements  in  cinematic 
technique, the ghost-connection, interestingly enough, never entirely disappeared. 
Well into the twentieth century motion-picture shows continued to be advertised in 
8 Like the charlatan in Schiller’s novel,  Robertson, the greatest  showman of  the phantasmagoria, 
“emerged, specterlike, from the gloom, and addressing the audience, offered to conjure up the spirits 
of their dead loved ones.” (Terry Castle, “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics 
of Modern Reverie”, p. 35).
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the manner of the old ghost-shows, and many early films, such as Georges Méliès’, 
featured explicitly phantasmagorical illusions. In various ways the new medium of 
motion pictures continued to acknowledge and reflect on its “spectral” nature and 
origins.9
But the doppelgänger films of Wilhelmine and Weimar cinema go further yet, in fact 
acknowledging their close generic association with the phantasmagoria, as well as 
with early cinema and its showmen. In many cases, for example, characters explicitly 
appear in the guise of showmen of the phantasmagoria and create problematic optical 
illusions, not the least of which is the double.
What is interesting about the phantasmagoria as a form of entertainment is 
exactly the quality that these films exploit to uncanny effect, namely a “principle of 
indiscernibility”. Their effect relies on a hesitation on the part of the viewer who may 
know the  vision is  false  but  is  presented with the thing’s  presence,  in  actuality, 
outside himself.  The epistemological quandary this double nature signifies, which 
explores the tenuousness of the real-unreal binary and the foundations of rationalism, 
gives rise to a kind of uncanny ambivalence that was a recurring theme of German 
Romanticism. It also became a focal point of the Surrealist movement and its concept 
of  the  marvelous.  Identifying  themselves  as  the  tail  end  of  Romanticism,  the 
Surrealists looked to German fantastic cinema as a model for their project, which 
aimed at  the oneiric  reappropriation of  the world of  the everyday,  a  redemptive, 
Utopian experience of being. As such, the movement was an important influence for 
Walter Benjamin and his work on the Paris Arcades.10 
Considering the phantasmagoria – in particular how the word, signifying a 
sequence of optical illusions, was employed in intellectual history and how its use 
changed  over  the  nineteenth  century  –  is  promising  for  a  more  historicized 
understanding of the doppelgänger theme (and metaphor). In her seminal essay on 
the usage of the word, Terry Castle has described how 
From  an  initial  connection  with  something  external  and  public  (an  artificially 
produced “spectral” illusion), the word “phantasmagoria” has now come to refer to 
something wholly internal or subjective: the phantasmatic imagery of the mind. This 
9 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
10 See, e.g., Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1989.
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metaphoric  shift  bespeaks,  I  think,  a  very  significant  transformation  in  human 
consciousness over the past two centuries—what I shall call here the spectralization 
or “ghostifying” of mental space. … The rationalist attitude, it  might be argued, 
inevitably depends on this primal internalization of the spectral.11 
As such the  shift  in  the  use  of  the  word  exemplifies  the  more  general  trend  of 
phenomena once considered real, such as ghosts, being reclassified as products of the 
mind, and paradoxically introducing an uncanny character into thought, “as if there 
were,  at  the  very  heart  of  subjectivity  itself,  something  foreign  and  fantastic,  a 
daemonic presence from elsewhere, a specter-show of unaccountable origin”.12
While Castle describes how the phantasmagoria became an emblem of the 
poetic  imagination  in  the  nineteenth  century,  her  essay  neglects  to  consider  the 
highly  significant  appropriation  of  the  term  by  Marx  in  Das  Kapital.  The 
phantasmagoria becomes paradigmatic for Marx in describing how under capitalism 
the object as commodity acquires the quality of an optical illusion, casting an arcane, 
fetishistic spell on the consumer, who is lured by its empty specular promise. At the 
same time, the real attributes of the object (such as use value or the labour involved 
in  its  production)  are  occulted by its  magical,  phantasmagoric  phenomenality.  In 
subsequent Marxist thought, the phantasmagoria has served as a pregnant metaphor 
for describing the modern commodity world under capitalism, the illusory visuality 
of alienated things and people, and the form of spectatorial interaction required from 
the spectator-consumer. 
Interestingly,  the  Marxist  metaphor  of  the  phantasmagoria  is  a  powerful 
reversal of the shift Castle describes in the word’s signification, i.e., its going from 
medium of objective projected optical illusion to describing subjective projections of 
the mind/imagination. It is very important that for Marx the phantasmagoria instead 
refers to the objective, external character of the world of things and people – as a 
quality  that  has  become inscribed  into  the  nature  of  experience  under  bourgeois 
capitalism. Along  these  lines,  Walter  Benjamin  returns  to  the  metaphor  in  his 
analysis  of  the  effects  of  capitalism  and  the  concomitant  evolution  in  human 
experience. For Benjamin, with the phantasmagoria of capitalist modernity,
11 Terry Castle, “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie”, p. 
29.
12 Ibid., p. 59.
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To live in a world which appears as an enormous collection of (real or potential) 
commodities means to endow objects with significations that have nothing to do 
with their useful properties. Such a world confers meanings that, while no longer 
transcendent but inner-worldly and in fact fabricated (through display, fashion, and 
advertisement),  again  become  reified.  Commodities  actually  repress  their  own 
making, their origin in human labor and construction. This endows the things of 
everyday with an illusory glitter, an  aureole:  a weak remnant of the sacred. The 
world of commodity is not so much that of an impoverished rationality, but rather a 
world of re-enchantment which overlays everything with a spell promising profane 
enjoyment, but what it offers for enjoyment is the alienation of the individual from 
his/her own product and from other individuals, a contemplative empathy with the 
aesthetic luster of exchange value. This lure of novelty is primarily responsible for 
the continuous maintenance of this phantasmagoric attraction.13 
In such a state of affairs, “One could say that the dynamics of capitalist industrialism 
had caused a curious reversal in which ‘reality’ and ‘art’ switched places. Reality had 
become artifice,  a  phantasmagoria  of  commodities  and  architectural  construction 
made  possible  by  new  industrial  processes…”.14 But  such  a  description  of  the 
commodity’s phantasmagoric attraction is above all exemplified by film, perhaps the 
bourgeois  commodity  (and  actual  phantasmagoria)  par  excellence:  a  form  of 
experience in which the specular aspect and contemplative empathy are crucial, and 
what is offered for consumption actually consists of mere images of things which 
offer  acutely  oneiric  and  fetishistic  visual  pleasures.  (Indeed,  the  effect  of  the 
apparatus is to greatly magnify these pleasures, compared to viewing the original 
objects themselves.)15 And in the institutional cinema, the process of production is 
occulted in the final product, which seems magically visible and alluring with its 
“illusory glitter”. 
The  concept  of  the  phantasmagoria  offers  an  illuminating  way  of 
interrogating the themes of the double as they concern the relationship between film, 
understood as bourgeois commodity and optical illusion, and the visual regimes of 
modernity and the modern observer.  While all films are phantasmagoric (both as 
projected  ghostly  images  and  as  reflections  of  the  phantasmagoric  commodity-
13 Gyorgy Markus,  “The Commodity as Phantasmagoria”,  New German Critique,  No. 83, Special 
Issue on Walter Benjamin, Spring–Summer 2001, pp. 16–17.
14 Susan Buck-Morss, “Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk: Redeeming Mass Culture for the Revolution”, p. 
213.
15 Needless  to  say,  this  is  above  all  true  for  Hollywood cinema,  as  opposed to  avant-garde and 
modernist practices that attempt to make these characteristics precisely problematic.
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world), these doppelgänger films are radically distinct because of the ways in which 
they actually depict phantasmagorias, in the original sense of a genre of illusory and 
alarming optical entertainment and of characteristic “phantasmagoric” themes. To go 
yet  further,  it  is  very  significant  that  the  films  are  optical  illusions  that  self-
consciously  concern  the  nature  of  optical  illusions  (cinema). But  how  these 
allegorical effects of doppelgänger themes (having to do, for example, with the forms 
of spectatorial  interaction required by cinema) engage the problem of the greater 
phantasmagoria, namely, the commodity-world and its visual dispositions and their 
alienating effects, requires closer consideration.
Effects of Shock and the World of the Everyday 
Paul Leni’s description of the task of the cinematographer offers special insight into 
the kinds of spectatorial experience he, and, I would argue, the directors of the other 
films, were attempting to create in depicting the world of objects and the spaces of 
the  doppelgänger  on  the  film  screen.  Leni’s  conception  of  the  ideal  practice  of 
filmmaking  foregrounds  how  his  intention  is  above  all  to  shun  a  naturalist  or 
illusionist film practice (involving photographic realism), and instead seeks to bring 
out the “hidden” reality of objects: 
If the designer merely imitated photography to construct his sets, the film would 
remain faceless and impersonal. There has to be the possibility of bringing out an 
object’s essential attributes so as to give the image style and colour... 
This is particularly necessary for films set wholly in a world of unreality. For my 
film  Das Wachsfigurenkabinett,  I  have  tried  to  create  sets  so  stylised  that  they 
evince no idea of reality. My fairground is sketched in with an utter renunciation of 
detail. All it seeks to engender is an indescribable fluidity of light, moving shapes, 
shadows, lines and curves. It is not extreme reality that the camera perceives, but the 
reality of the inner event, which is more profound, effective and moving than what 
we see through everyday eyes, and I equally believe that the cinema can reproduce 
this truth, heightened effectively…
I cannot stress too strongly how important it is for a designer to shun the world seen 
everyday and to attain its true sinews...  It  will be seen that a designer must not 
construct 'fine' sets. He must penetrate the surface of things and reach their heart. He 
must create mood (Stimmung) even though he has to safeguard his independence 
with regard to the object seen merely through everyday eyes. It is this which makes 
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him an artist. Otherwise I can see no reason why he should not be replaced by an 
adroit apprentice carpenter…16
According to Leni,  in other words,  what the movie camera specifically offers,  in 
spite  of  its  Edisonian/naturalist  appropriations,  resides  –  paradoxically  –  in  its 
capacity  to  penetrate  the  surface  or  externally  visible  attributes  of  things  and to 
capture “essential attributes”, achieved by shunning the reproduction of the world 
seen through “everyday eyes”, i.e., the canny, natural bourgeois world. While Leni’s 
metaphysical  rhetoric,  the  division  of  things  into  appearances  (rational/empirical 
aspect) and essences (hidden authentic being), and the aim of revealing the “true” 
features of things through film artistry may sound like irrationalist mumbo-jumbo, or 
at least prefigures the position of the Surrealists vis-à-vis the everyday world and its 
objects, the film itself illustrates better what this may mean in practice. In the case of 
Waxworks,  as  we  have  seen,  these  principles  result  in  a  stylistic  bric-à-brac,  as 
Jürgen Kasten has put it,17 and a scenario actually involving a phantasmagoria at the 
“Panopticon”  that  are  very much directed as a  threat  to  everyday eyes  and their 
everyday  objects.  Importantly,  as  our  discussion  of  Waxworks  showed,  the  film 
harnesses precisely the oneiric and fetishistic effects of the commodity in order to 
construct its sense of the uncanny.
To better understand the historical significance of such effects of film style 
and mise en scène, it is revealing to read Leni’s article side by side with another body 
of  work altogether,  namely, Walter  Benjamin’s analysis  of the experience of the 
world  of  the  everyday  under  capitalism and  his  consideration  of  the  utopian  or 
redemptive possibilities of mass culture. For Benjamin, following the Surrealists, the 
outmoded commodities of the recent past, the detritus of bourgeois culture (as found 
in the Paris arcades), offered the possibility of divining the origins and nature of 
modernity and of overcoming the thrall of industrial capitalism’s phantasmagoria.18 
In other words,
16 Kinematograph,  No.  911,  1924.  Quoted  by  Lotte  Eisner,  The Haunted  Screen,  Berkeley,  CA, 
University of California Press, 1969, p. 127.
17 Jürgen Kasten, “The Bric-à-Brac Principle in Paul Leni’s Waxworks”, in Expressionist Film: New 
Perspectives, ed. D. Scheunemann, Rochester, NY & Woodbridge, Suffolk, Camden House, 2003.




Benjamin’s “physiognomic materialism” reveals not only the “origin” of modernity; 
it simultaneously intends also to defamiliarize this way of apprehending reality as a 
“phantasmagoria”  by  invoking  its  early-transitory  manifestations  that  are  now 
present  only  in  ruins,  whose  strangeness  strikes  us.  At  the  same  time  it  aims, 
precisely through such distancing, to bring our own way of perceiving the world to 
reflexive,  but  sensuous,  presence,  to make the veil,  which our collective dream-
images impose upon it, directly open to the waking gaze. This veil not only conceals 
reality,  but  its  very  distortions  also  vaguely  outline  the  possibilities  of  another, 
desired future as well.19
For  Benjamin,  while  the  world  of  the  everyday,  the  commodity  world,  was  a 
phantasmagoria in which the “real” natures of things remained hidden behind their 
specular enchantments (or were actively obscured),  the ultramodern technological 
medium of film possessed the revolutionary possibility of revealing this condition of 
bourgeois experience for what it was. But what would constitute a film practice that 
attempted to  do just  this?  How exactly could the structural  characteristics  of the 
moving image make a redemptive spectatorial experience possible? Miriam Hansen, 
in a classic exegesis of Benjamin’s writing on cinema, has described how such a film 
practice would necessarily involve an ambivalent and uncanny experience:
[A]lthough film as a  medium enhances  the historical  demolition of  the aura,  its 
particular form of indexical mediation enables it to lend a physiognomic expression 
to objects, to make second nature return the look, similar to auratic experience in 
phenomena of the first. Such film practice, however, would not only have to reject 
the misguided ambition to adapt and prolong the bourgeois cult of art; it would also 
have to abandon classical standards of continuity and verisimilitude and, instead, 
focus its mimetic devices on a non-sensuous similarity, on hidden correspondences 
in which even the dreamworld of commodities may “encounter us in the structures 
of frail intersubjectivity.” Such a return of the gaze, in the emphatic sense, would 
always  involve  a  transgressive,  unsettling  moment;  it  is  certainly  not,  as  in 
commercial conventions of direct address, “a question of the photographed animals, 
people or babies ‘looking at you’ which implicates the customer in such an unsavory 
manner.”20
This conception of film practice  strikingly echoes Leni’s description of the task of 
the cinematographer, and of the characteristics, more generally, of the films of the 
double that we have discussed. For one, the latter, as we saw, explicitly rely on a 
form of intersubjective spectatorial experience, most obviously so when the viewer is 
subjected to the unexpected return of his/her look by the source of diegetic threat. 
19 Gyorgy Markus, “The Commodity as Phantasmagoria”, p. 16.
20 Miriam Hansen, “Benjamin, Cinema and Experience”, pp. 209–210.
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They  likewise  foreground  cinema’s  capacity  for  a  “physiognomic  materialism”, 
lending a “physiognomic expression to objects”, much like what Leni calls “bringing 
out an object’s essential attributes” – which  the case of  Waxworks  exemplifies in 
images like that of the caliph’s hat. Indeed, the very aim of this anti-naturalist cinema 
of the double is a renunciation of what is seen through everyday eyes, which is the 
bourgeois  sphere  of  the  everyday  or  “second  nature”.  It  comprises  a  curious 
mutuality of the gaze, taking the form of objects, including film images, which are in 
the first place part of the spectacle and the dreamworld of commodities, looking back 
and encountering us “in the structures of frail intersubjectivity”. 
Of special consequence here are the moments of shock, notably that of seeing 
the double, that this experience entails, both for the protagonist and for the spectator. 
They belong to the middle ground between anxiety and fear which characterizes the 
uncanny. But the vital point is that this frisson of the encounter with the double is 
directly  related  to  the  power  of  the  technological  apparatus  of  cinema,  as  the 
previous chapters described. As a technique of aesthetic defamiliarization, the double 
allegorizes and makes visible this power of the medium; the wonder and fear of its 
appearance is related to that of the cinema as unleasher of doubles. 
In this sense, the figure of the double is able to recapture an original feeling 
of wonder at the uncanniness of cinema, a spectral awe much like what the viewers 
of  the  phantasmagoria  and  of  early  cinema  must  have  felt,  which,  a  couple  of 
decades into the history of the medium, must have been ossified with habituation and 
domesticated in narrative.21 Tom Gunning has recently discussed the uncanny in the 
context of the reception of technology, arguing that aesthetic defamiliarization is a 
route whereby the original amazement at new technologies that have since become 
part of bourgeois “second nature” can be recaptured. Referring to Freud’s association 
of the uncanny with the primitive and the belief in animism, Gunning argues that
[New] technologies  evoke not only a  short-lived wonder  based on unfamiliarity 
which  greater  and  constant  exposure  will  overcome,  but  also  a  possibly  less 
dramatic  but  more  enduring  sense  of  the  uncanny,  a  feeling  that  they  involve 
magical operations which greater familiarity or habituation might cover over, but 




not totally destroy. It crouches there beneath a rational cover, ready to spring out 
again… 
The  reception  of  technology  allows  re-enchantment  through  aesthetic  de-
familiarization, the traumatic surfacing of allayed fears and anxieties, as well as the 
uncanny re-emergence of  earlier stages of magical thinking. While this may not 
exhaust the variety of responses that we find to technology (parody and nostalgia 
are  two  other  notable  responses  I  won't  treat  here),  it  does,  I  think,  provide  a 
relevant model for a cultural history of the reception of technology in the modern 
era. But we should realize that not all technologies are received in the same ways 
and that the experiences of wonder and especially of the uncanny are more likely in 
some technologies than others.22
Precisely  this  kind  of  dialectical  relationship  between  high  technology  (in  the 
“nature”  of  which  something  magical  is  hidden)  and  the  “primitive”/magical  is 
evoked through the uncanny elements of these films. This primitive aspect in part has 
to do with magical character of the double as production of a copy.23 But it is also 
related to the use of atavistic or outmoded techniques, for example, allusions to the 
norms  of  early  cinema  (as  we  found  in  Caligari).  Significantly,  with  the 
doppelgänger  theme,  a  dialectical  tension  between  the  “primitive”  and  high 
technology is not only expressed in terms of stylistic features but is a central feature 
of  the  plot,  as,  for  example,  in  The  Golem and  Metropolis.  It  is  especially 
illuminating  to  read  the  shock  effects  of  such  uncanny  moments,  and  their 
magical/technological undertones, with reference to Walter Benjamin’s discussion of 
the  redemptive  possibilities  of  cinema vis-à-vis  the  phantasmagoria  of  bourgeois 
“second nature”. Like the potential Benjamin found in Surrealism, in these cases the 
figure of the double can be considered to offer a “radical crossing of the artificial 
flowering  of  images  of  second  nature  with  a  mode  of  experience  traditionally 
reserved for  those of  an ostensibly more primary nature”.24 For  Benjamin,  shock 
could “assume a  strategic  significance  –  as  an  artificial  means of  propelling  the 
human body into moments of recognition”.25 
22 See Tom Gunning, “Re-Newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second Nature, and the Uncanny 
in Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century”, in Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics 
of Transition, eds. David Thorburn and Henry Jenkins, MIT Press, 2003, pp. 39–60.
23 Cf. the notion of the copy and its role in sympathetic magic. See Michael Taussig,  Mimesis and 
Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses, New York, London, Routledge, 1993.
24 Miriam Hansen, “Benjamin, Cinema, and Experience”, p. 193.
25 Ibid., p. 211.
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Also applicable to our discussion of the theme of the double is how film, 
according to Benjamin, with its discontinuous structures (shots and montage) and 
alienating  shock  effects,  had  the  potential  to  depict  the  similarly  fragmentary 
phantasmagoric everyday world so that, in its reflected image, the illusory nature of 
the “original”  would be revealed for  the sham that  it  was.  This  effect  would be 
contrary to that produced by the institutional mass media, as “the reality conveyed by 
the cinematic apparatus is no more and no less phantasmagoric than the ‘natural’ 
phenomena of the commodity world it endlessly replicates… Benjamin knew all too 
well  that  the  primary  objective  of  capitalist  film  practice  was  to  perpetuate  the 
mythical chain of mirrors”.26 As Susan Buck-Morss has observed: 
Mass media (Benjamin would have called it mechanical reproduction) could now 
replicate this commodity world endlessly as the mere image of an illusion (examples 
were Hollywood films, the growing advertising industry, Riefenstahl’s “Triumph of 
the  Will”).  But  the  critical,  cognitive  function  in  which  a  politicized  art  might 
participate  was  precisely  the  opposite:  not  to  duplicate  illusion  as  real,  but  to  
interpret reality as itself illusion. This, I would claim, was in fact the goal of the 
Passagen-Werk. If the artwork essay argues theoretically for the transformation of 
art from illusory representation into an analysis of illusions, the Passagen-Werk was 
intended to put theory into literary practice. It was to have appropriated the new 
techniques of film so that it could meet the distracted public halfway, in order to 
expose to  them how and why reality  became composed of  illusions in  the first 
place.27 [italics mine]
Leaving aside the question of political  consequence,  the uncanny effects  of these 
films, I would argue, should be understood as an illustration of such an effect. In 
contradistinction to attempts to copy reality naturalistically or to compose a credible 
(bourgeois) dénouement, they foster a visceral unease that is directed outward, i.e., 
toward  the  status  of  external reality  as  a  point  of  reference,  questioning  its 
ontological priority vis-à-vis the cinematic/diegetic reality. This is a product of how 
the sense of the uncanny is engendered, and of its structural, ontological misgivings 
(i.e., the visceral response of the spectator and its in-between quality). In other words 
how, while the spectator knows that such apparitions are optical illusions, they are 
nonetheless actually present, and relate intersubjectively with their observer.28 Hence 
the “epistemological  abyss”,  as  Terry Castle  puts  it,  of  the phantasmagoria.  In  a 
26 Ibid., p. 204.




related  vein,  Brigitte  Peucker  has  argued  that  this  constructed  blurring  of  the 
distinction between the real and the image evokes the possibility of film coming to 
life or of the spectator entering the diegetic world:
But it also wants to entertain the possibility, if only for a few moments, that the 
space of the real will be invaded by the image become thing, or that it might be 
possible to enter the diegetic space of the screen. It is this confusion between the 
real and the image that is recorded in the mirror shots of Expressionist cinema and 
thematized when a  character  shoots  his  mirror  image only  to  fall  down “dead” 
himself.29
These films constitute  a  reversal  of  the  usual  mimetic  intention of  (institutional) 
cinema to naturalistically copy reality or create a credible visible world. The fantastic 
world,  with  no  claims  to  naturalistic  veracity  and  with  an  explicitly  constructed 
quality, comes to affect the status of its original reference point – like the action of 
the double in relation to the status of the “original”.  The indiscernibility between 
reality and the unreal that is operative in these uncanny situations as a structural 
problem  acknowledges  the  “nature”  of  the  illusion  as  a  phantasmagoria  but 
nonetheless contains an outward motion,  reflexively speaking to the status of the 
external  visible,  the  world  of  the  everyday.30 This  kind  of  hesitation  has  an 
interesting echo of Marx’s (inverted) usage of the metaphor of the “phantasmagoria”: 
here too, the optical illusion that was diegetically purported to be the product of a 
sick mind (e.g.,  of the protagonist who sees his double, or the nineteenth-century 
patient prone to “phantasms”) is instead revealed as the structural condition of the 
experience, and at a remove, as the objective character of experience “outside”. 
It is important to note the necessity that such a cinematic use of the double 
theme coincide with  a  self-conscious,  defamiliarizing film practice,  in  which  the 
exposure  of  the  film  image  as  both  phantasmagoria  and  fetishized  commodity 
likewise exposes the process of its production, the “apparatus” (see, e.g., the dance 
28 This is the axiomatic dual character of the film signifier, as discussed by Christian Metz in  The 
Imaginary Signifier, but with the uncanny this dual character itself is the subject of the image and 
dénouement. Illusionism is not a possibility, as the experience of film spectatorship is simultaneously 
defamiliarized.
29 Brigitte  Peucker,  Incorporating  Images:  Film  and  the  Rival  Arts,  Princeton,  N.J.,  Princeton 
University Press, 1995, p. 118.
30 A more recent film with similar uncanny effects is The Matrix. One leaves a first viewing somewhat 
uncertain about the natural special and temporal motions of objects and the status of external reality.
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show of the robot Maria in Metropolis). The uncanny accompanies the unveiling of 
the  “truth”  of  the  moving  image  in  terms  of  its  process  of  production  and 
transmission; precisely what, in institutional/Hollywood film practice, is occulted by 
the  oneiric  and  fetishistic  surface  attributes  of  the  image  and  its  solicitation  of 
Schaulust. But such effects arise only in the midst of cohesive narrative structures; 
similar techniques found in self-referential avant-garde and modernist films have no 
uncanny effects, for example in Dziga Vertov’s The Man with the Movie Camera. In 
this guise, reflexive and uncanny gestures not only engage issues of film form but at 
the same time, the economic and ideological “repressed” of representation (a telling 
point of contrast again being the institutional cinema, which aims at the production 
of a film commodity, a slick phantasmagoria from whose final version the traces of 
the labour and production process have been eradicated). (Although they sometimes 
reappear in advertisements, which tout the costliness of the production, the number 
of extras, and so on, as indices of quality.)  And finally, the return of the gaze and its 
uncanny  intersubjectivity,  for  example  by  Jack  the  Ripper  as  doppelgänger  and 
daemoniac bourgeois, has a transgressive effect, as a revelation of the uncertainty of 
the visible.
The images produced by such self-conscious film practice, in Waxworks as in 
those  of  the  other  German  doppelgänger  films,  and  even  the  anti-naturalist 
tendencies of Meyrink’s  Golem, thus have a paradoxically iconophobic quality, as 
images that disparage the status of the image. This quality strikes a chord with the 
iconoclastic tendencies of Marxist thought with regard to the inauthenticity of what 
can be  seen  with  “everyday eyes”  (second nature),  exemplified,  for  instance,  by 
Kracauer’s assertion that “The flight of images is a flight from revolution and from 
death”,31 or Guy Debord’s claim that with the society of the spectacle, “The real 
consumer becomes a consumer of illusions.  The commodity is  this  factually real 
illusion, and the spectacle is its general manifestation”.32 
The  function  of  the  double  as  allegory  of  cinema  is  a  paradoxical 
combination of technophilia and iconoclasm: it glorifies the magical-technological 
31 Kracauer, The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany, London and New York, 
Verso, 1998, p. 94.
32 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, 1967, section 47.
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wonders  of  cinema while  at  the  same time urging a  distrust  of  its  images.  At  a 
remove,  though,  these themes,  with their  ironies and multiple framings,  enact  an 
annihilation  of  the  “real”,  which  is  inaccessible  to  the  faulty  human  sensorium, 
mediated  by  optical  instruments  that  distort  and  distance  it,  and  replaced  by  a 
proliferation  of  “images”.  The  basis  of  their  engagement  with  their  particular 
historical context becomes apparent in considering how in the use of uncanny themes 
and motifs, uncertain constructions of vision coincide with an ambivalent account of 
modernity,  technology,  and  instrumental  reason.  Onscreen,  the  return  to  the  old 
tropes  of  Romanticism  also  has  an  ambivalent  character:  despite  their  original 
irrationalism,  the  new  versions  can  neither  be  categorized  as  unadulterated 
irrationalist  inwardness  (hence  proto-Fascist),  nor  simply  as  bourgeois  image-
commodities.
As  self-conscious  works  grappling  with  questions  of  film’s  specificity  – 
understood  as  something  other  than  bourgeois  naturalism  in  art  or  photographic 
realism,  or  than  avant-garde  formalism  – these  films  respond  to  the  optical 
consequences  of  modernity  and  its  effects  of  perceptual  distress.  It  is  especially 
worth noting how the onscreen appearance of doppelgänger in these narratives is 
distinct from doubling effects in most self-avowed modernist or avant-garde works, 
because  its  narratives  remain  “systematically  unstable  rather  than  subversive”.33 
Unlike the case of much modern art, I would argue that the systemic instability of 
such uncanny effects prevents their easy co-optation by the bourgeois mass culture 
they critically engage, e.g., as advertising. “In the end”, according to Paul Virilio, 
“‘modern art’ was able to glean what communications and telecommunications now 
accomplish on a daily basis: the mise en abyme of the body, of the figure”.34 Instead 
of  mirroring  the  alienated  and  fragmentary  status  of  the  spectator’s  body  in 
modernity, as much of modern art, these films enact the process of its imprisonment 
in a hall of mirrors of simulacra. And, their critical appraisal of the consequences of 
33 “Subversive” is here used to indicate deliberate, politically engaged critiques of bourgeois art – 
which ultimately serve as technical preludes to advertising strategies. Mike Budd, “The Moments of 
Caligari”, in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari: Texts, Contexts, Histories, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers 
University Press, 1990, p. 25.
34 Paul Virilio,  Art and Fear (La Procédure silence), trans. Julie Rose, New York & London, 
Continuum, 2003, p. 35.
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modern  technology  for  human  experience  is  at  odds  with  their  simultaneous 
exploration of the specific possibilities of the most modern, technological medium of 
doublings – a productive tension that is  never resolved.  Because this  exploration 
coincides with the critique of vision (mediated and modern), the capacity of the eye 
to apprehend the real,  and mechanical  extensions of human vision,  doppelgänger 
films  betray  a  kind  of  ambivalence  to  cinema itself,  as  emblem and  product  of 
modernity.  It  is  in this  sense too that the screen on which the double appears is 
divided:  by  an  underlying  uncertainty  about  the  power  and  possibilities  of  the 
medium whose unprecedented capacities have brought the double to life.
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